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AN INTRODUCTION
TO PHILOSOPHY

By RUDOLF EUCKEN

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
T. FISHER UNWIN LTD.

LONDON

AN INTRODUCTION
TO PHILOSOPHY . *By*
WILHELM WINDELBAND
Translated by JOSEPH McCABE

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD
LONDON : ADELPHI TERRACE

B
W 72 M



First published in English 1921
Second Impression . . . 1923

Made and Printed in Great Britain

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THE Introduction to Philosophy which I here offer to the public gives a general view of philosophical problems and explains the tendencies of the various attempts to solve them. It seeks to provoke the reader to think over the great problems of life. It is in no sense an introduction to a special philosophical system, but it makes a very wide survey of all the possibilities in the way of solutions. Naturally, it is based upon the author's personal view, as the student of philosophy will easily perceive; but this will not be pressed, or suffered to influence the author's judgment in appraising other systems of thought.

In view of the aim of the work I have not found it necessary to burden it with literary references to the historic systems to which reference is made in its pages.

WILHELM WINDEL BAND.

HEIDELBERG,

February 1914.

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WE to-day find the words "Introduction to Philosophy" as the title of a book more frequently than we used to do. This assuredly means that there is a growing demand for philosophy, and we see this reflected more and more distinctly in our whole literature, in the experience of booksellers, and in our academic life. The demand plainly implies a craving for a philosophy of life. This feeling, which Schopenhauer has, with his customary felicity, called "the metaphysical craving," lives inextinguishably in human nature, though it assumes different forms in different ages, according to their spiritual character. There are ages in which it almost entirely fades from view: ages which seem to be almost absorbed in the definite tasks set them by their own pressing problems, either of the politico-social, the artistic, the religious, or the scientific life. These are times which vigorously pursue such special aims, work unswervingly for their accomplishment, and find a complete satisfaction in their task. They may be entitled "positive ages." Such a period, certainly, was the second half of the nineteenth century, which has been characterised with equal justice as the scientific or the technical or the political age.

It is evident that a change has taken place. Our life to-day is assailed by a multitude of tasks that go right down to its roots. Our people betray something of a desire to get beyond themselves, to strain out toward

the undefined and unknown. We live in a ferment of forces that is, like all periods of deep human emotion, permeated with religious elements. We see the fact in literature and art, where there is, though unhealthy excesses mingle with sound impulses, a seeking and groping of vigorous originality and compelling pressure. We feel that we live in an age of transition, and the poet has devised a formula for it in his "transvaluation of all values." It is not so much as it was in the time of Romanticism, for we have more hope. It is more like the period of the Renaissance. We find the same craving as there then was for a philosophy of life in which a new creative power may strike root. In Germany there is for the younger generation the additional incentive, which gradually forces itself into recognition, that it is time to reconsider the spiritual foundations of our national life, the appreciation of which threatens to disappear in the intoxication of material success or under the hard pressure of secular labours.

Hence it is that people turn to philosophy for a new creed of life. It is true that each brings with him such a creed already made. No one approaches such a task with an entirely open mind ; for every man needs, and has in some form, an expansion of his knowledge which amounts to a view of the world as a whole, and generally of the place which man occupies, or ought to occupy, in it. Thus there is a metaphysic of the nursery and the fairy-tale, a metaphysic of practical life, a philosophy of religious doctrine, a conception of life which we enjoy in the work of the poet or artist and seek to assimilate. All these varieties of a creed of life have grown up and hardened more or less involuntarily. Each of them has its natural, personal, historical assumptions, and its usefulness is accordingly limited. It is the task of philosophy to determine whether there is in them anything of absolute value, which may be held intellectually, and need not merely be an object of desire, affection, or faith. In accordance with the demand which has always been made of philosophy, and is made to-day with greater emphasis than ever, it must always be a metaphysic or

at least a criticism of metaphysics. Will the philosophy of our time meet this imperious demand? It, at all events, endeavours to meet it. The resignation which covered itself with the name of Kant, the narrow conception of its task which we inherited from preceding generations, have given place to a new resolution. The courage of truth, which Hegel preached when he mounted his chair at Heidelberg, is once more awake.

Many wish to know something about this work, and they ask for a special introduction to it: an introduction more lengthy than is customary in the other sciences and of a different character. Philosophy has long had the reputation of being a particularly difficult study, an abstract and abstruse science for which one needs a special equipment. This is certainly true in regard to the great creative achievements of philosophers; and it is more true than in the case of other sciences. For here there is question, not merely of severe mental operations, but of artistic originality in the conception of the whole. Yet such equipment is not needed by the man who asks only to understand and assimilate these achievements. As Kant said of Newton, there is in the highest productions of the scientific spirit nothing that any man cannot understand and make his own.

The truth is that it is not so much the difficulty of philosophy as the poor literary standard of philosophical writers which perplexes the student. They cannot liberate themselves from academic formulæ and attain a free and living contact with the thought of their time. Their obscurity is, it is true, not without excuse, in a certain sense. They have made use—often an excessive use—of a right which is in itself quite justified. It is certainly necessary in some circumstances to adopt a special terminology to express scientific ideas and keep them distinct from the vague phrases of daily life and popular speech, and so protect them from confusion and abuse; and, as experience teaches and psychology can easily explain, words taken from the dead languages, which stand out as something independent and fixed from the current of modern speech, are the best for this purpose.

We allow the chemist, the anatomist, or the biologist to coin such terms habitually, yet would forbid the philosopher to do the same, and we express annoyance when he makes any extensive use of the right. That is inconvenient for philosophy, but it is, if you regard it properly, not unflattering. It seems to mean that the things with which the philosopher has to deal concern everybody, and ought therefore to be accessible to everybody and expressed in terms that can at once be understood by all. This is, however, not entirely true. Indeed, it is particularly incumbent on the philosopher, precisely because he deals with things of universal interest, to rid his ideas of the common crudity and looseness and give them scientific form and expression; and it is accordingly both his duty and his right to stamp his name upon the results of his work. This lays upon any Introduction to philosophy the task of initiating the student to this difficult and inevitable terminology.

Yet the finer quality of the artistic expression can only be mastered by entering intimately into the problems from the study of which the leading ideas have arisen. We have, therefore, to deal here especially with the sympathetic approach to the problems and the scientific treatment of them. The student does not, however, need any special equipment for this. He needs only a strict discipline, earnest and conscientious thought, and, above all, the avoidance of prejudices. The man who asks, or even expects, of philosophy that it shall tell him something of which he was already convinced had better not waste his time over it. The man who has a creed of life already formed, and is determined to retain it in any circumstances, has no need whatever of philosophy. For him it would mean merely the luxury of finding proof that his beliefs were true. This applies not only to religious ideas, which are usually regarded in this connection, but even more particularly to the attitude of those who trust to find in philosophy a confirmation of the views they form in the course of daily life. It is quite easy, but not very honourable, to win the kind of popularity which people express when they say: "The

man is right ; that is what I always said." That is, as the poet says, a ware that always finds a large public. The man who wishes to make a serious study of philosophy must be prepared to find that in its light the world and life will present a different aspect from that which he saw previously ; to sacrifice, if it prove necessary, the preconceived ideas with which he approached it.

It is quite possible, perhaps inevitable, that the results of philosophy will diverge considerably from the conclusions that one had in advance, but the things which philosophy discusses are not remote and obscure objects that need some skill to discover them. On the contrary, they are precisely the things which life itself and the work of the various sciences force upon a man's attention. It is the very essence of philosophy to examine thoroughly what lies at hand and all round us. In the whole of our intellectual life there are uncriticised assumptions and ideas lightly borrowed from life and science. The practical life of man is pervaded and dominated by pre-scientific ideas, naïvely developed, which usage has incorporated in our speech. These ideas, it is true, are modified and clarified in the special sciences as far as it is necessary for their particular purpose of arranging and controlling their material ; but they still demand consideration in connection with the problems and inquiries of philosophy. Just as life affords material to the scientific worker in its pre-scientific ideas, so life and the sciences together provide, in their pre-scientific and *pre-philosophic* ideas, material for the operations of the philosopher. Hence it is that the frontier between the special sciences and philosophy is not a definite line, but depends in each age on the state of knowledge. In common life we conceive a body as a thing that occupies space and is endowed with all sorts of properties. Out of this pre-scientific notion physics and chemistry form their ideas of atoms, molecules, and elements. They were first formed in the general impulse to acquire knowledge which the Greeks called "philosophy." To-day these scientific ideas are pre-philosophic concepts, and they suggest to us so many problems of philosophy.

These assumptions which have not been thoroughly examined have a legitimate use in the field for which they are intended. Practical life manages very well with its pre-scientific ideas of bodies ; and the pre-philosophical ideas of atoms, etc., are just as satisfactory for the special needs of physics and chemistry. While, however, they are thus suited to the demands of empirical theory, it may be that they will present serious problems in the more general aspects in which philosophy has to consider them. The idea of natural law is an indispensable requirement both for practical life and for scientific research, which has to discover the several laws of nature. But what a natural law is, and what is the nature of the dependence of our various concrete experiences upon this general idea, are difficult problems which must be approached, not by empirical investigation, but by philosophical reflection.

In the special sciences and in common life, therefore, these fundamental assumptions are justified by success ; but the moment they are considered more deeply, the moment a man asks himself whether these things which are naïvely taken for granted are really sound, philosophy is born. It is, as Aristotle says, the *θανάσιμον*, the hour in which the mind is puzzled and turns upon itself. It is the *ἐξετάσιμον*, the demand of proof, with which Socrates disturbed the illusory self-complacency of himself and his fellow-citizens. It is complete honesty of the intellect with itself. We can never reflect on things without assumptions which must be taken for granted ; but we must not leave them indefinitely without investigation, and we must be prepared to abandon them if they are found to be wrong. This testing of one's assumptions is philosophy.

Every great philosopher has passed through this phase of examining what had been taken for granted, and it is the same impulse which directs a man to the study of philosophy. In the life of every thoughtful man there comes a time when everything that had been assumed, and on which we had confidently built, collapses like a house of cards, and, as during an earthquake, even the

most solid-looking structure totters. Descartes has very vividly described this, with the most exquisite simplicity and fineness, in his first *Meditation*. He experiences, as Socrates did, the real mission of scepticism; which is, both in history and in the very nature of human thought, to lead us onward to a final security through the dissolution of our unreflecting assumptions. Herbart has the same idea when, in his *Introduction to Philosophy*, he, in his usual dry way, discusses the nature of scepticism.

Our Introduction to philosophy has, therefore, to formulate the fundamental problems which emerge from this disturbance of the naïve assumptions of daily life and of the sciences. It begins with current and apparently quite intelligible phrases. In these things we, taught by the lessons of history, find the starting-point of our problems; and we have to show how necessarily they arise out of the vigorous and dispassionate examination of the assumptions of our mental life. When that is understood, we see clearly from moment to moment the nature of the connection between the leading ideas whose relation to each other constitutes our problem, and we understand the divergences of the attempts which have been made to solve each problem. We may thus hope that, as we realise the inevitability of the problems, we shall understand and appreciate the lines along which efforts have been made, and can and must be made, to solve them.

Once we have conceived the task of philosophy from this point of view, we find the best answer to a number of criticisms which are commonly urged against it. These prejudices arise not unnaturally from the impression which a history of philosophy makes upon an outsider. But—and this should arouse one's suspicions—they tend to take two quite contradictory forms. The history of philosophy does, in fact, present a totally different aspect from the history of any of the other sciences. The latter have a more or less clearly defined subject, and the history of each of them represents a gradual mastery of it. Take, for instance, the history of physics or of Greek philology.

In each such case we see a gradual expansion of the knowledge acquired and a clearer understanding of the subject; extensively and intensively there is an unmistakable, if not a continuous, progress. A history of this kind is able to describe achievements which are recognised as permanent, and it can regard even errors as partial truths. It is otherwise in philosophy. The moment you attempt to define its subject-matter, you find the philosophers themselves failing you. There is no such thing as a generally received definition of philosophy, and it would be useless to reproduce here the innumerable attempts that have been made to provide one. The outsider, therefore, gets the impression that in philosophy there is question *de omnibus rebus et de quibusdam aliis*. Each philosopher seems to work as if no others had existed before him, and this is particularly noticeable in the case of the most distinguished. Hence it is that the history of philosophy gives one an impression of something disconnected, something that is constantly changing, something wanton and moody. Nothing in it seems to be beyond dispute. There seems to be nothing that one can point to as definitely established. There is no science of philosophy in the sense that there is a science of mathematics or law, and so on. It looks therefore as if people are right when they see in this fruitless series of mental efforts only a history of human weakness or human folly.

On the other hand, however, one gets the impression, especially when one compares the great figures of the history of philosophy critically with each other, that, in spite of all the changes of view, it is always the same thing. The same questions, the same "tormenting riddles of existence," recur in each age. They merely change the garment of their verbal expression, the outer aspect of their features, from one age to another. The substantial content is always the same unanswered question. And even the attempts to answer it have something stereotyped about them. Certain antithetic views about the world and life recur over and over again, and they attack and destroy each other with their mutual dialectic. Here

again, therefore, though for quite other reasons, one gets the impression that something is attempted with inadequate resources, an impression of sterility and senseless repetition.

This is not the place to show how this not unnatural impression may be disarmed, and how, in spite of all, an extremely valuable meaning may be read in the history of philosophy. But we may draw attention to one point in connection with these criticisms. This undeniable vacillation from one side to another clearly shows that the problems of philosophy, in their entirety and their connections, are not so plainly indicated as problems are in the other sciences ; that the totality and the system of the problems themselves have first to be discovered, and that this may perhaps be the last and highest problem of philosophy. However, the discontinuity in the emergence of the questions is best understood when we reflect that the various elements of those assumptions about life and science, to the disturbance of which we trace the birth of philosophy, are only called into question and awake reflection successively in the course of time, from various historical circumstances that are due partly to the features of personal, and partly to the characteristics of general, intellectual life. Hence the problems of philosophy are brought forward from different points of view at different times, and the energy with which now one question and now another forces itself upon our attention is not so much determined by the systematic connections as by the historical constellations of the fundamental ideas.

And if, in the end, it is always the same problems and the same general lines of solution that we find, we may see in this precisely the best title of philosophy to recognition. The fact proves that its problems are inevitable ; that they are real and unescapable problems which no thoughtful intellect, once it is awakened, can succeed in ignoring. The perpetual recurrence of the same solutions of problems, which seemed at first sight to be a reproach, really shows that there are certain inevitable relations of thought to the subject-matter, and that,

in spite of the constant change of the historical stimulation, they are bound to return. To explain these essential elements in the questions and answers is the chief task of an Introduction to philosophy. It has to show that philosophy is no idle play of the imagination, no hopeless tangle of arbitrarily conceived difficulties; but that it concerns itself with very real things and very serious questions, and explains this intrinsic pressure of its irrepressible subject.

Thus both the problems and the solutions of them become intelligible as a necessary correlation of the mind and the objects it desires to know. This relation itself is, it is true, one of those assumptions we have described; a pre-philosophic way of looking at things which certainly must not pass without scrutiny, but from which the introductory consideration is bound to start. And in regard to this relation between the intellect and its object we must at once put a point of view which cannot be justified, but merely stated, here, because the entire contents of this book, as a whole and in detail, go to prove it. It is the point of view which we call Antinomianism.

All our knowledge is an interpretation of facts by reflection; and for reflection we need an intellect of a certain character. It is of the innermost essence of this intellect to have certain assumptions which we usually call, in the scientific sense of the word, "prejudices," or pre-judgments; that is to say, judgments which form the foundation and starting-point of all reflection. In so far as these serve us as norms we call them *axioms*; but in so far as they are supposed to hold also for objects, and we expect that these will conform to them, we name them *postulates*. In virtue of this relation we may, to use a modern way of looking at things, regard the intellectual process as an adaptation of our assumptions to the facts and of the facts to the assumptions. In the choice and schematisation of the facts, which we accomplish by means of our axioms and postulates, we always get this double process of adaptation. But it is clear that, besides the substantial conformity of the two elements, there is also a certain unconformity. The

conformity is, as Kant and Lotze have pointed out, the fortunate fact which makes it possible for us to receive the material which we experience into the forms of our reflection, its comparative and relating activities. The partial unconformity, on the other hand, which we find between the two elements affords a starting-point for that revision of our assumptions which is the essence of philosophy.

The result of this revision may either lead to a reconciliation and removal of the differences, or at least indicate ways in which the work may be pursued with some prospect of success, or it may end in a recognition that the problems are insoluble. Which of these lines the inquiry will take cannot, of course, be determined in advance; we must, in fact, stress from the first the fact that we cannot expect the inquiry to have the same success in regard to all problems. It is, on the contrary, not only quite possible, but even probable, that many of the problems will be found to have been already solved, or at least proved to be clearly soluble, while in the case of others, perhaps, we may see that all efforts to solve them are hopeless. For if there are in fact definite limits to the possibilities of scientific knowledge, we must suppose that, while many of the questions with which the metaphysical craving assails philosophy lie beyond those limits, yet at least a certain number which are capable of a satisfactory answer will be found within them. In any case, our task is to take this element of adaptation and understand the necessity with which the various attempts at solution, together with the problem itself and the antithesis of mental attitudes, arise therefrom. In doing so we must not overlook the fact that the actual form in which these solutions appear in history is due to the personal work of distinguished individuals. This element must be fully appreciated; and it is especially in the complication of various problems, which makes their solution more difficult, that the historical and personal element comes chiefly into consideration. The difficulties, however, are chiefly due to the relations themselves, and we shall direct our attention mainly to these,

in order to understand and appreciate both the problems and the attempts to solve them. In sum, our task is to expound, establish, and comment on the chief problems of philosophy, and the lines on which the solution is to be sought, with a full account of their historical appearance. In this way an Introduction to philosophy becomes a critical inquiry into the possible forms of a philosophic view of life.

In meeting such a task we may adopt either a predominantly historical or a predominantly systematic method. The former would, in view of what we have already said, be open to the objection that the philosophers themselves, at least in their purely historical succession, seem to be a confusing and conflicting group, in the study of which one is apt to lose the real thread or to miss the most important points. The danger is least if one begins with Greek philosophy, especially in its earliest developments. It is of a highly instructive character, because of the splendid simplicity and resolute onesidedness with which these gifted founders of science, not yet distracted by an abundance of material, conceived their intellectual work and naively accomplished it. Great as is this didactic value, however, the grandiose and primitive schemes of these pioneers do not meet the more complicated problems of modern times. Their simple, strong lines cannot provide an expression of the finer structure of modern thought, which goes deep into the multiplicity of the individual.

The systematic method of solution has appealed chiefly to philosophers because it could be used as an introduction to *their* philosophies. Fichte conceived his two *Introductions to the Theory of Knowledge* rather in this sense. For him the theory of knowledge is what is generally called philosophy, and of his two Introductions, one is intended to teach those who know nothing about philosophy, and the other to educate those who have a philosophy, from Fichte's point of view. Herbart also, the only one of the more eminent philosophers to write an *Introduction to Philosophy* under precisely that title,

was chiefly concerned to introduce his readers to his own philosophy, to the obscurities of his ontology.

Treatment of this kind is more to the taste of the author than of the reader, for the reader, as a rule, desires an introduction to philosophy in general, not to a particular system. It is true that any man who makes the attempt will find it difficult to exclude his own views in constructing his work and in dealing with the various sections of it. We do not anticipate any objection to the following sketch on that ground. One cannot speak about these things, which stir the thoughtful mind to its depths, without betraying one's own point of view. But that must not be our goal, and it shall not be our chief concern.

An Introduction to philosophy must be neither a mere historical survey nor an apology for some special system. It must rather introduce the reader to the science of philosophising, to the living work of reflection, to the direct understanding of its themes, its intellectual stresses, and the various attempts to relieve them. It is only in this sense that it must take up a position in regard to the systematic development of that inner necessity which is at the root of the problems, in the historical forms of philosophy; which often, indeed, contain a clue to their solution, if not the solution itself. The Introduction, therefore, proceeds from the standpoint of *immanent criticism* in face of the systematic and historical material, and in this way it must, in the forms of modern thought, accomplish what Hegel once attempted in his *Phenomenology of the Mind*. It must point out the necessity by which human thought is driven, from the standpoint of philosophy, from its naïve ideas of the world and life on account of the contradictions which they involve.

We should not, it is true, imitate to-day the way in which Hegel pursued his task. Neither his confusion of the logical, psychological, historical, and philosophical movements, nor the mysterious explanations by which he covers the change of his point of view, would be tolerated to-day; the less so as the broad historical knowledge which such a method implies, both in author and

reader, is no longer possible. Moreover, we can no longer share the confidence with which Hegel, at least in principle, believed, in his historical optimism, in the identity of the historical and the logical necessity of progress. We must rather admit, as has been said previously, that the order in which history unfolds the problems of philosophy is immaterial to their systematic connectedness; and that therefore this systematic connection of the problems cannot be deduced from history, but is, on the contrary, the last and highest problem of philosophy. Yet it is the imperishable merit of Hegel that he recognised the organon of philosophy in the history of concepts. To him we owe the perception that the shaping of the problems and concepts, as the evolution of the human mind in history has brought it about, is for us the only satisfactory form in which we can arrange the tasks of philosophy for systematic treatment. This historical equipment alone will save us from discovering afresh truths which were known long ago or from attempting the impossible. It alone is fitted to orientate us securely and fully as to the problem-content of philosophic thought. For man cannot deduce out of his own self, but must learn from the interpretation of his nature by history, the proper attitude to take up in regard to the necessary contents of rational consciousness in general, which is the ultimate object of philosophy.

The literature which might be quoted for the purpose of an Introduction to philosophy in this sense is very extensive when one considers that, in substance, the whole literature of philosophy is relevant to it; but it is extraordinarily scanty if we confine ourselves to special treatments of this theme. Hardly one of the older encyclopædic works which call themselves Introductions to philosophy need be rescued from its oblivion. Of the works actually in circulation which bear the title, the least fortunate is that of Wilhelm Wundt. The distinguished psychologist obviously intended in this work to expound his not very profound views on the history of philosophy, and he has added to these only a few schematic observations, which are surprisingly inadequate, on general

philosophical tendencies. The most attractive of such works is that of Friedrich Paulsen. He confines himself, on the whole, to the theoretical problems, and completes his work by a study of ethics; and both his volumes are written in an easy and graceful style which makes them suitable for any man of average education. By far the most scientific and instructive work is that of Oswald Külpe; but this also is rather valuable for its distribution of the various philosophical disciplines than as an organic development from the standpoint of a formative fundamental principle. Less important attempts, such as that of Cornelius, which is mainly concerned with the theory of knowledge, and the purely psychological work of Jerusalem, need only be mentioned.

On the whole, one finds this scantiness of material for our purpose quite intelligible.* The more profound the subject is, the less are pioneers in teaching and writing disposed to venture to deal with it; for the task demands not only a most extensive knowledge of the historical forms of philosophy, but also a great deal of work of one's own in elaborating the whole material and formulating afresh the problems and their solutions in a living philosophy. In this sense we may recommend, rather than any of the books already mentioned, several works which are really Introductions to philosophy without bearing that title. To this class I especially assign Otto Liebmann's *Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit* (4th ed., Strassburg, 1911) and its continuation, *Gedanken und Tatsachen* (2 vols., Strassburg, 1904), and the *Esquisse d'une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques* (Paris, 1885) of Charles Renouvier.

As the science of a creed of life philosophy has to meet two needs. Men expect of it a comprehensive, securely based, and, as far as possible, complete structure of all knowledge, and at the same time a definite conviction which will prove a support in life. This indicates the theoretical and the practical importance of philosophy. It must be both wisdom about the world and wisdom about life, and any form of philosophy which confines

itself to only one of these tasks would now seem to us one-sided and undesirable. The union of the two elements is so characteristic of philosophy that the division of its historical details into really distinct periods can best be derived from the changes of the relations between the two. We see what we call philosophy arise in Greece from a purely theoretical interest and gradually come under the power of a practical need ; and we follow the triumph of the latter through the long centuries during which philosophy is essentially a doctrine about the salvation of man. With the Renaissance a predominantly theoretical interest again gets the upper hand, and its results are used by the *Aufklärung* in the service of its practical aims ; until at last the intimate connection between the two aspects of philosophy is clearly impressed upon the mind by the works of Kant.

This relation is, as we now clearly see, based really upon the nature of man. He is not only a perceptive, but a willing and acting, being ; he is an organism moved by judgments, not merely a machine moved by impulses. The judgment itself, in which all knowledge is found, is an act in which presentation and will are both active. All our views pass spontaneously into conceptions of value and motives ; and, on the other hand, our will requires views or impressions as its basis of action. Knowing and willing are not two powers casually bound up together in us, but they are inseparably connected aspects of one and the same indivisible being and life, which can only be distinguished in psychological reflection. Hence all knowledge tends to become a power in the life of the will, to affect our appreciation of things, to alter, create, satisfy, or repel our cravings. Hence, on the other hand, the tendency of the will to determine the goal or direction of our knowledge. It is true that in some men we find extreme developments of one or the other, according as thought or will predominates. The solitary thinker, who is content with the bliss of *θεωρία*, is estranged from the mass of men, who lead practical lives. The separation is right, as it is only an application of the principle of division of labour, in accordance with

which really fruitful knowledge comes only to the entirely disinterested inquirer. But in the general life of man the two elements, the theoretical and the practical, are interwoven. The results of knowledge are at once converted into appreciations of value, and the need to appraise things furnishes the objects of inquiry.

And not only the objects. The general lines of the solution of problems and the answers to questions are for the most part determined by ideas of value. We may deplore and criticise this, or we may approve and confirm it—to that we return later—but it is a fact which we must note here, and a fact which will be explained and critically considered throughout this work. If the views of the individual, the direction of his attention, the sphere of his intellectual interests, the choice and connection of subjects and the appreciation of them, are determined by the special needs of his profession or his position—in a word, by the personal will—can it be otherwise with the whole human race in its historical development? Are these motives of the will likely to be entirely eliminated in the mutual adjustment of the individual's ideas, or is it not more likely that the more closely related of such motives will strengthen each other and thus increase their control of the judgment? We cannot keep the will clear of our thoughts. Indeed, from the psychological point of view the whole energy of thought depends upon such values. It is a source of error; it is also the power of truth.

This relation between thinking and willing, between intellect and character, is plainly seen even in the case of the greatest philosophers. It is, in a sense, peculiarly characteristic of philosophy; for, as we shall see in a later section, in philosophy knowledge without value and knowledge with value have a quite special relation to each other. Philosophy is science; it is, like other sciences, a process of thought, the arrangement of the data of experience in concepts. But it is also distinguished by an impulse to turn back from the abstract and conceptual to life, to views and actions. It needs to work up its material into a comprehensive view of reality, which is

equivalent to an inspiring conviction. Philosophy can never be mere knowledge; it must also be artistic and ethical life. Philosophical systems have been called conceptual poems. They are; though not in the capacious sense that the conceptual construction is characterised by unreality, but in the higher sense that genuine poetry always is moulded and moulding life. The æsthetic-ethical element in philosophy is at the same time the personal. It determines the importance and the active influence of the great personalities in its history.

This intimate unity of the theoretical and the practical had especially to be stressed here because the distinction between the two will be the basis of the following work on problems and theories. The division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, which Aristotle initiated, has proved up to the present time the most permanent, and we will therefore find it best to divide the subjects with which we have to deal into problems of knowledge and problems of life, questions of being and questions of value, theoretical and practical—or, as is now said, axiological—problems.

But it is only the problems, the subjects, the questions which may be thus divided. In our attempts to find a solution we shall always discover that, in the actual, historical work of thinking, the results of which will be critically reviewed in this book, the division has not been sustained. That is apparent on both sides. The practical or axiological problems, under which head we include all ethical, æsthetic, and religious questions—or questions about value generally—cannot be scientifically solved without regard to theoretical views. The solution cannot, of course, and ought not to, be determined by any purely rational knowledge of reality; in the end there is always a *stat pro ratione voluntas*. Yet the solution cannot, on the other hand, be reached without a scientific knowledge of the data. No knowledge of duty can be put into action without a knowledge of being. Hence our theoretical judgments become motives, if not the exclusive motives, in the practical problems of philosophy. But, on the other hand, our practical interest constantly

invades our purely theoretical reflection for the purpose of decision. We need only recall the many historical deviations which the purely intellectual process of thought has suffered, as Lotze points out in the Introduction to his *Microcosm*, from the pressure of the heart. There is in philosophy a special and frequent case of this : the case in which the practical postulate gives the decision when there is theoretical uncertainty, in which theoretically equal possibilities in opinion leave the decision dependent upon the purpose, so that once more *stat pro ratione voluntas*. We have a conspicuous illustration of this in the case of Kant. It constitutes the most intimate connecting-link, even the decisive and characteristic point of his teaching ; and he has given us an explicit treatment of it, in which his teaching is justified by an interest of the reason.

We must therefore be prepared to find these amalgamations of theoretical and practical elements in the solution of problems of both sorts. They are, in fact, a special incentive to inquiry. And precisely on that account this unfailing relation points to a final connection of the two groups. It positively requires a binding link between questions of being and questions of value. This must be expressed in the sense that the highest of all philosophical problems concern the relation of being to values, and of value to being. Hence, as we shall see more fully at a later stage, we get religious problems as the last of the axiological group.

PART I

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

(QUESTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE)

WE may make a preliminary survey of the range of questions of being by reflecting upon the ideas we use in daily life. In our experience we believe that we perceive things between which something happens, and thus, to use the brief form of a catechism, we may reduce the theoretical problems to the three questions: What is that? How does that happen? How do we know that? We have therefore to deal with being, happening, and the possibility of a knowledge of the world; and the questions take the form of three sorts of problems, which we may, without doing violence to their interconnections, distinguish as ontic, genetic, and noetic problems.

But before we approach them in detail, we must make an inquiry which is common to them all. These elementary questions, as we have stated them, already imply a disturbance of those common ideas which we derive from simple perception and the views which spontaneously develop therefrom. Without such an unsettlement our common experience would never become a problem to us. We have these ideas of things and of the processes which take place between them, and this is supposed to be our knowledge of them. The questions, therefore, mean that it has occurred to us to doubt if things and events are really such as we naively represented them; behind the questions is a suspicion that we may be wrong, and that our supposed knowledge may have to be replaced by something better. This feeling of misgiving opens out

the possibility that behind what we first thought we had perceived as reality there may be another reality which we have yet to discover. This problem we describe as the conceptual relation of being and appearance.

§ I

Reality and Appearance.—True and apparent reality—Metaphysical and empirical, absolute and relative reality—Objective and subjective appearance—Positivism—Metaphysics and religion—Metaphysics as a hypostasis of ideals—Philosophic methods—The unconditioned—The transcendental appearance.

The distinction which is indicated in these categories is the fundamental assumption of all scientific and therefore of all philosophic thought: the most general form in which it finds expression. It means that a man is not satisfied with his *prima facie* view of the world and life; that he may be able to get behind it and learn what it really stands for. There is in it a vague idea, a sceptical surmise, that reality may be something quite different from what man imagines in his naïve perceptions and opinions. Possibly reality is not what it appears to be. The superficial ideas formed from our daily experience have "merely" the value of appearance. Things *seem* so.

This fundamental consideration pervades all philosophic thinking. All our research may be characterised in the words which Mephistopheles applies to Faust:

Far removed from all that seems,
Into being's depths he peers.

It is customary to call this the search for "the thing-in-itself"; but this phrase, which has been used since the time of Wolff and Kant, indicates something that has been known for ages. The thing-in-itself has had at least sixteen ancestors. With the ancient Ionians, the Eleatics, and Plato it meant the innermost essence of the world. When the Milesians seek the essence of the world, the ἀρχή, and find it in matter, in the ἀπειρον; when the seeming reality of the senses is replaced by

the "elements" of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the numbers of the Pythagoreans, the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus, the ideas of Plato, or the entelechies of Aristotle—what is all this but a search for the reality behind appearances? The mind is ever seeking to conceive the genuinely real, as Democritus said (the *ἐτεῖν ὄν*), or the truly real, as Plato called it (the *ὄντως ὄν*).

This antithesis of *true* and *apparent* reality implies a differentiation of value in the concept of reality itself. The apparent multiplicity of things must not be regarded as non-existent, as a mere seeming. Appearance must be considered a secondary reality, a reality of the second class, or even a "merely apparent" reality. Modern men of science, for instance, tell us that the real nature of things, the primary reality, is in the atoms, and that what seems to our simple perception the real thing is only a phenomenon or appearance it presents to us.

For the truly real in this sense Plato has given us the term *οὐσία*, which corresponds to the concept of "essence." In the Latin terminology of the Middle Ages it is called the *essentia*, and is opposed to *existentia*. Wolff and Kant change these terms into "thing-in-itself" and appearance, while Hegel draws the distinction between *being* and *existence*. We shall learn the various shades of meaning of these expressions more fully at a later stage. The common element of them is the division of reality into a true, self-existent reality and an inferior, apparent reality—one original and genuine, the other derived and only a half-real reality. The latter expression is occasionally to be taken quite literally in philosophers, when they, as Plato does to some extent, regard appearance as a mixture of being and non-being. As opposed to this the genuine reality is called "pure" being.

From the first, thinkers were aware that this distinction is due to a psychological difference; that the appearance is in perception and the opinions formed therefrom by the spontaneous play of the imagination, whilst the essence reveals itself only to deliberate conceptual reflection. Thus the antithesis of essence and appearance corresponds to the antithesis of *thinking* and *perceiving*. The essences

are the *νοούμενα* conceived by reason; the appearances are the *φαινόμενα* given in perception. In accordance with this, the general aim of philosophy is, by means of thought, to get behind the appearances which are presented in perception to real being. In this we find the genuine meaning of the word "metaphysics." It arose, as is known, accidentally and from an extrinsic reason, through Aristotle calling his work "the books after the Physics"—*τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ βιβλία*. The inquiry into the ultimate principles of being and thought, which is undertaken under various aspects in these books, does in reality go behind the sensible presentation, or *μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ*. We therefore give the name "metaphysics" to the philosophic science of genuine reality; and we call the effort to reach a conceptual view of life "the metaphysical craving."

In this sense we also, when there is a question of essence and appearance, speak of *metaphysical reality*, which belongs to the essence, as compared with the inferior, derivative reality which suffices for the appearances; and in the same connection the latter is described as *empirical reality*—that is to say, the reality or half-reality of existence which is given in experience and perception. In this terminology, which opposes the metaphysical and empirical to each other in the same sense as essence and appearance, there is, it is true, a certain noetic tinge of a fundamental assumption which we will examine more fully later. For the present we have to deal with another form of the same categories, which describes them as *absolute* and *relative* reality. The primary, genuine, self-existing reality, true being, the essence, or metaphysical reality, is called the absolutely real, or even the Absolute; the secondary, dependent reality, existence, or empirical reality, is only relative—that is to say, a reality which merely owes its form of being to a relation of the genuinely real. This relation may be conceived in two different ways. The appearances, beyond which we must penetrate to the truly real, are either themselves real experiences and events of the originally real, though of a derivative and secondary class, or they are simply

the ideas with which the mind conceives the true reality in accordance with its own nature. We cannot very well express this distinction except by the use of the words "objective" and "subjective," though the abuses which have crept into the use of these terms would make it advisable to avoid them. In the present case they can, however, scarcely give rise to a misunderstanding. The antithesis which they convey is easily explained by a reference to metaphysical theories which are widely known. In Spinoza's system the real being is the Deity or Nature as the one substance; relative being, or *modi*, are objective appearances thereof. In Schopenhauer's system the real being is the Will; relative being is the empirical world as a subjective appearance in consciousness shaped according to space, time, and causality. This double relativity, in which the appearance is conceived either objectively, as an outcome, a real self-expression—*exprimere*, Spinoza says—of the primary and essential real, or subjectively, as a mental presentation of the genuinely real, prepares us for the division of ontic problems—questions concerning real being—into genetic and noetic; that is to say, questions as to the possibility of events and questions as to the possibility of knowledge.

The very multiplicity of the terms in which the antithesis of being and appearance is expressed, in spite of the various shades of meaning of each, apprises us that it is one of the permanent aims of philosophy to seek a true reality behind apparent reality. What is the foundation of this persistent effort? What sort of unsettlement of our ideas leads to it?

It certainly does not pass unchallenged. There is a strain of thought which regards it as the highest principle of wisdom to be content with what we perceive. To-day we call this the *positive* point of view. We use the word in the same sense as when we call it "positive" to regard a thing as settled without criticism. Positive religion, for instance, is a given religion which, without challenge, is recognised, or claims to be recognised, as dominant. We speak of positive law as existing law in contradistinction to an ideally and critically desirable law. Again, by

positive theology and jurisprudence we mean disciplines which are simply expository and remain within the sphere of the actually existing; and in them we recognise as positive tendencies those which in principle put forward the actual as legitimate. In a general way, in fact, we call positive sciences those which have no other aim or desire than to establish facts. In fine, we give the name of positive philosophy, or Positivism, to a system which is based upon a combination of the positive sciences, and holds that all thought and knowledge can and ought to have as their object only the facts we perceive; and that it is therefore illusory and morbid to try to get beyond these to a "truly real."

Positivism bases its claim upon the conviction that there is no such being behind appearances. It is a fiction, a phantom. In this we have, as will be more fully explained later, when we come to deal with noetical questions, the radical difference between the critical or agnostic school and the positivistic. The former equally denies that we can know the thing-in-itself, the Absolute, but only to affirm more emphatically its real existence beyond appearances; the latter declares that the Unknowable is an illusion. As its chief representative says: "*Tout est relatif, voilà le seul principe absolu.*" There is nothing behind appearances; not only nothing for us, but nothing there at all. This view, of which we seem to find traces in antiquity, and certainly find in modern times before Auguste Comte, is in our days also upheld by what is called the immanent philosophy. It has had this name since Avenarius, and it purports, as Berkeley did in his way, to bring us back to the simplest and most natural theory of reality. To it, therefore, all forms of metaphysics are vain struggles, condemned in advance, of artificial and transcendental thinking to discover another and more genuine nature behind the facts. The positive or immanent school thus challenges our right to describe the facts as appearances in the sense of our category; for this at once implies a relation to a being that appears in them, a thing-in-itself.¹

¹ Jacobi, for instance, contended against Kant, though not in the

Immanent Positivism of this kind is, in the light of all that we have said, nothing less than a denial of the possibility of philosophy, for it rejects our essential stimulus to research. As history shows, our irrepressible impulse is to seek the metaphysical reality, and in this sense philosophy is necessarily a process of transcendental thinking. If it were true that this is only a continual aberration, a self-deception of the scientific mind, philosophy is impossible, and we might as well give up the name with the reality. If there is no absolutely real, there is no such thing as philosophy, which is supposed to deal with it. In that case we should have only the various empirical sciences; and philosophy ought to be too proud to give its name to a synthesis in which we might gather together the most important facts of these sciences.

When Positivism, which on that account calls itself "scientific" philosophy, disowns the search after a real essence of things, it appeals with some success to the fact that the motives which have induced the mind to strive to pass beyond the facts are not of a theoretical character. On the lines of the doctrine which Turgot and Comte developed as the law of the three stages, it stresses the fact that the human mind, as it gradually advances, passes from the theological and the metaphysical to the positive stage, and that it was detained in the earlier stages by the persistent force of transcendental impulses. That is certainly true. We cannot more correctly describe the fundamental religious sentiment than by tracing it, just as we trace the metaphysical craving, to the dissatisfaction of the mind with facts, with the things of the world. We recognize in it, as in metaphysics, the fundamental impulse toward the higher and deeper, the supramundane. Religion is a mood of discontent with the world, a search for something purer, better, more lasting, for things above space and time. This affinity between religion and metaphysics is clear and unmistakable. As an instance we need only quote

Positivist sense, that it is a *petitio principii* to call the contents of experience "appearance," and to conclude from this that there must be a corresponding "thing-in-itself."

the deepest elements of Plato's philosophy, and we at once find that the vigour with which he proves the reality of the suprasensible world is certainly due to a religious feeling. The mood of discontent with the given facts inspires the assumption that there is another and a higher world, which lies mysteriously behind the world of sense. Plato calls this religious-metaphysical impulse the *ἔρως*, the yearning of the soul for a better home. And many other metaphysical systems are just as deeply rooted in religious feeling and familiarity with religious ideas as is that of Plato. We need only recall how Descartes, in his *Meditations*, even when he is building up his purely theoretical doctrine, without any intrinsic religious interest, reconciles himself with the current implications of the idea of God. But we may go further. What powerful elements of metaphysical thought there are in the æsthetic impulse to conceive the world as a harmonious whole, a living organism, a single work of art! The philosophy of the Renaissance and that of German idealism afford instances in every phase. How clearly we see imagination helping to round out the facts as fragments of the whole, to think things out from beginning to end, to soar above the confines of the empirical and the unsatisfactory into the broad realm of infinite and true reality!

But why need we heap up instances? This religious, ethical, æsthetic woof in the tissue of philosophical systems is the most conspicuous of facts. Philosophy is never detached from ideas of value; it is always strongly and consciously influenced by them. It has never restricted itself to what is supposed to be established in what we call the exact sciences. It has always taken its elements from the entire province of culture, from life and the appeals of the religious, moral, political, and artistic consciousness and aspiration. It has always claimed the right to conceive the world in such fashion that beyond all the unsatisfactoriness of its phenomena, in its deepest depths, the appreciations of value are the living reality of the mind. Metaphysics is the hypostatisation of ideals.

Possibly the philosopher himself is often unaware of this. It may be that the course of his critical search will show to what extent his convictions, his judgments of value, have influenced him in the enlargement and completion of his knowledge. This correlation of elements was very clearly brought out by Kant. He found that theoretical reason threatened to call into question, not only the knowableness, but even the thinkableness—that is to say, the metaphysical reality—of the suprasensible, or at least to make it entirely problematical; then his practical reason “realises” the suprasensible, and inspires a conviction of the higher world of ethical-religious metaphysics lurking behind the appearances.

Thus practical elements are seen to be at work even in the general statement of our problems, and these determine the search for “genuine” reality. The right to seek this may be affirmed with Kant or denied with the Positivists. We have not to decide that here, as it is clearly a noetic problem of the first importance. We will be content here to grant the fact that this transcendence beyond the facts has really often been inspired and influenced by practical impulses of this kind. But we deny that Positivism has the right to say that these elements, which it regards as scientifically unjustified, are the only ones at the basis of metaphysical thought. We cannot concede that this fact vitiates the impulse in its root. We must rather ask whether there are not purely theoretical reasons—indisputable and unassailable reasons—for this search for a truly real.

This question must be answered emphatically in the affirmative. There is, in the first place, a strong historical presumption in favour of it. It is the ancient Ionians, the founders of philosophy, who point the way for us; and they are certainly above all suspicion of emotional prejudice. Victorious assailants of religious fancy on the intellectual side, coldly indifferent to men’s ideas of values, they are the true types of pure theoreticism. Undisturbed by religious, ethical, or æsthetic interests, they follow only the impulse to acquire knowledge. That is their boast and their strength—the strength of their

narrowness. They oppose all dogmatic tendencies ; they have no ethic ; they ask nothing about beauty. Yet these ancient Ionians are pronounced metaphysicians—seekers of the real being behind appearances. What else was it when Thales said that all the variety of nature meant changes of the one Proteus—water ? Or when his friend Anaximander said that water could not be the real essence, the original thing, since it is finite and would be exhausted in the combinations, and we must therefore imagine an eternal, infinite matter (τὸ ἀπειρον), which produces temporary things out of itself by ever new creations ? There you have, literally, an advance of thought *μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, beyond things physical ; yet it was due to purely theoretical reasons. What was the reason ? Because the facts given in appearances do not satisfy the scientific demands of conceptual reflection, and therefore something has to be “thought out,” conceptually constructed, which may be regarded as the genuine and true reality. It was the hypostatisation of a logical ideal, and it is entirely wrong to call these hypotheses “fictions.” Philosophers consider that in these things they have a knowledge of true reality. Hence metaphysical thought shows in its very origin that it is logically compelled to assume something that will satisfy the claim of the interpretative reflection, and it is not afraid, when the actual world of perception furnishes nothing of this kind, to set forth the conceptual postulate as the true reality behind it. Much the same was done by the Eleatics with their concept of being. They insist—and here again the impulse is purely logical : there *is* no ethical or æsthetic or other axiological impulse—that there must be in existence some being (*ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι*) that is enduring, and not merely relative ; while what seems to be in the world of facts does not exist in this sense. There was a time when it was not, and a time will come when it will be no more ; it is therefore only apparent, only a deception of the senses. Thought requires something more—the one true absolute being—though it cannot go further and discover *what* it is.

In this first dialectic, though so hampered by poorness

of language, the concept (of being) is so strong that it is affirmed, while the entire perceptual world opposed to it is denied. Thought is braced to such a degree of self-consciousness as to regard itself as real knowledge in opposition to perception. In these experiences of the thinker we see the origin of the belief that knowledge of the imperceptible true being must be a quite distinct activity of thought, and so we need a special method in philosophy, which shall be quite different from the method of the empirical sciences. Plato himself regards his dialectic as the method of philosophic knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) as distinct from opinion based upon experience (*δόξα*); and from that time to Herbart's elaboration of concepts by the method of relations and Hegel's dialectical method we get all sorts of attempts to accomplish this, with a more or less enduring success.

In this we may distinguish two main tendencies, which correspond to the double relation of being and experience. On the one side, being is assumed to be something other than the appearances; and any man who places decisive emphasis on this, and therefore brings out most strongly the dualism of true and apparent reality, will always be disposed to seek in pure thought the means of knowing being, and will use some sort of constructive method for that purpose. On the other side, however, it is held that the essence is precisely that which appears in appearances; and any man who bears in mind this positive aspect of the relation, who says with Herbart, "So much appearance, so much indication of being," will have to strive to get beyond the appearance, in the ways which are used in the special sciences or ways analogous to those, to real being; much as Democritus formulated the principle of conceiving true being in such a way that the appearances remain (*διασώζειν τὰ φαινόμενα*). The one school is in some danger, in reaching the essence, with which it alone is concerned, of losing sight of the explanation of the appearances, on account of which it is really necessary to conceive the essence. The other school, devoting its attention mainly to the appearances, is exposed to the opposite danger of not getting beyond

the appearances themselves and the ideas of the special sciences.

In any case we must insist that metaphysics is a hypostatization of ideals, and, in the purer cases, of logical ideals. Pure and true being is, either in virtue of appreciations of value or the postulates of conceptual thought, what *ought to be*, yet is no part of empirical reality, and therefore is, and must be, conceived as the metaphysical reality behind it. Amongst these elements of the theoretical postulates we must lay special emphasis on one, because, recurring as it does in various forms, it is well calculated to show at once the irrepressibility and the insolubility of the problems. This fundamental metaphysical element is the infinity which we find in all aspects of the given facts. Every experience we have is limited, and it points to something beyond with which it is connected, and with which it forms some sort of unity. This is due to the fundamental synthetic character of the mind itself, as it always gives some sort of unity to any multiplicity which it embraces; and in this sense all knowledge is directed only to think such conceptual interconnections as are based upon the actual coherences of the contents of presentation. But each of these forms points most pressingly in its applications toward infinity. We see this clearly in the conception of space. Every shape which we perceptually experience is limited, and, with whatever limits it, forms an overlapping unity in the space which is common to them and their surroundings. We come to no limit. Beyond every limit which we try to assign there are always wider and more comprehensive unities. In the same way every thing that we try to conceive as a separate reality is related to others, and these again to others, and so on to infinity. Every event, in the same way, points back to another, of which it is the continuation and modification, and onward to another in which it will be continued and modified; and these lines in turn lead in both directions to infinite time. This infinity of the finite, of what cannot be defined and conditioned except as finite, does not allow the intellect, which would completely embrace this definiteness and

conditionedness, to come to any rest within the world of appearances, as far as it can measure this even with the aid of imagination. It does not rest until it has reached the idea of an infinite, which is something different from the individual conditioned thing or even the sum total of all individual conditioned appearances. Thus the one infinite space is something quite different from the totality of all that we experience, or even of all the infinite spaces imagined in connection with experience. It is not an object of perception. It is unknown to the naïve consciousness ; it is an outcome of metaphysical thought. It is the same with the concepts of the absolute thing, absolute causality, and so on. In every case the logical postulate passes beyond the facts to the construction of absolute reality.

Thus precisely in this intractability of the illimitable facts we get the Antinomianism which entails that the demands of the intellect, since they cannot be realised in experience, shall lead to the construction of a supra-empirical, metaphysical reality. Kant showed this in his criticism of metaphysics ; which was at the same time a proof of the necessity of metaphysics. In the Introduction to his transcendental dialectic he pointed out this relation and called it "transcendental appearance." The phenomenal world of sense points to endless chains of the conditioned, and the understanding, with its craving for definiteness, demands for the totality of the conditions a limit of these series which we can never find in the sensory perception of appearances. It has, therefore, to think out such a limit ; but it can never know it, just because neither a single one of the experiences nor the sum total of them provides such a knowledge. Hence the unconditioned is never given in experience, though it is "conceded" of real necessity. The problems of metaphysics are unavoidable, but ever insoluble, tasks of reason. So we have in Kant's *Criticism of Pure Reason* the new concept of "the idea" and "the transcendental appearance," which at once explains the actuality of metaphysics and is fatal to its claims, due to a confusion by which the necessity which compels the formation of the

idea and the definition of the task is retained for the accomplishment of the task and for acquiring knowledge of an object—the true reality. Kant's conception of transcendental appearance is, in fact, the key to an understanding of the history of metaphysics. It implies the undeniable fact that our thought is on all sides pressed irresistibly beyond our actual experience of empirical reality; yet as regards the possibility of solving the problems . . . At all events, we need no further proof that in the work of philosophy we have no cobwebs of the brain, but very real and solidly grounded tasks.

CHAPTER I

ONTIC PROBLEMS

THE path to being leads philosophic thought from pre-scientific and pre-philosophical ideas, beyond appearances, to metaphysics: from the plain man's ideas of the world, through the special sciences which have the first task of modifying and correcting them, to the problems which they leave untouched.

What we conceive as being are things that are variously conditioned in time and space, and are distinguished from each other by different properties. Every *thing* is something—somewhere—somewhen. In our conception of it this multiplicity of properties and relations is brought into some sort of unity, and this unity we call a thing. But in practice this idea of a thing is subject to much change. We find that the things which are empirically perceived or supposed are superficial ideas, with which “the matter does not end,” and so the question of seeking the real things arises. We speak of this as the concept of substance.

§ 2

substance.—The category of inherence—The thing and its properties
—The identity of the thing—Essential and unessential properties
—Identity of mass, form, and development—Elements—Absolute qualities: ideas—Atoms, entelechies, and monads—Universalism and Individualism—Attributes and *modi*—The ego—Coherence of the properties.

The form of thought which lies at the root of the formation of concepts of things, and therefore of the search for substances as the real things, is in logic called the category of inherence. It is the first of all the

categories in the sense that it is the fundamental constituent form of our whole view of reality. It is this which first and above all others objectifies, projects, or externalises—that is to say, gives the form of an existing reality to—the content of presentation. For a long time, under the influence of Schopenhauer's teaching, to which the physiologists subscribed under the lead of Helmholtz, this primary function of objectivisation was attributed to the other fundamental constituent category, causality. That is, however, a mistake, due to the fact that the idea easily occurs to the inquiring mind when a doubt has been started. It is only when we reflect what right we have to regard our states of consciousness as a knowledge, or at all events the elements of a knowledge, of a world that exists independently of us that we perceive that the cause of these states is not in ourselves, but must be sought in the objects. Such a reflection is very far removed from the unthinking mind. Without the aid of such a thought it converts the impression, which is at first (as Lotze says) nothing but a sort of feeling, into the idea of a thing in the simplest of all ways, as speech enables us to see. I have a sensation of green, and I say: "I perceive something green"—that is to say, a green thing, or something of which green is a property. Lotze has pointed out in the beginning of his *Logic* that this is the first logical work of the intellect. The words themselves show this, as the adjective is converted into a substantive. The substantive is the verbal expression for the conceptual form of the thing, the substance. But once we have thus elaborated our experience into the object, we ask further what sort of properties green has: where it is, how large, what shape, whether smooth or rough, hard or soft, and so on. We only attain a complete idea of the thing by a synthesis of many properties, which in the long run we receive through different senses; but this union of the various conditions into the unity of the idea of the thing already includes the logical assumption that all these different elements belong to one and the same thing, and that they together represent a coherent unity.

All reality given in experience consists of such things. Each of them signifies a number of conditions linked together in a unity, and these conditions belong to it and are called its *properties*. We can only think of or define a thing by its properties; we can only distinguish things from each other by their different properties. From this it seems at once to follow that we can only speak of a thing as the same at different times as long as it has the same properties; and, on the other hand, that we have to do with different things when we find different properties and combinations of properties.

But this assumption is not consonant with empirical reality. On the one hand, we do not find it surprising that one and the same thing changes; that is to say, has different properties at different times. On the other hand, it does not trouble us to imagine two different things with precisely the same properties. We find such things, perhaps, not so much in nature as in the products of human industry (for instance, two steel pens or needles of the same pattern from the same works), and we find it in its most pronounced form in the conceptions of scientific theory, as in the case of atoms. This shows that the metaphysical "identity" of the thing with itself is not the same as the permanent identity of its properties. We must neither infer at once an identity of things from a similarity of two impressions nor make a mistake as to identity because of different impressions. Two different billiard balls may seem perfectly alike to us, and the same ball seems to us different when it is dusty from when it is clean. What we really perceive is only the similarity or dissimilarity of impressions. An inference from this to metaphysical identity is justified only by arguments which are based upon general assumptions and habits and often very intricate and far-reaching considerations. If I find my writing-desk in the morning just as I left it the night before, I assume that it is the same, provided I have only one and there was no possibility of an entirely similar desk being substituted for it during the night. In thus assuming identity on the ground of similarity

of impressions we are, notoriously, very liable to make mistakes. We need only recall the part played in Goethe's *Elective Affinities*, in the case of Edward, by the superstitious delight in the treasured glass with interlaced names on it. Toward the close of the tragedy it appears that the old glass had been broken long before and secretly replaced by a new one. It shows how difficult it is to affirm the identity of things which are not continuously within our perception, such as lost or stolen things. All that we can swear to with complete confidence is the similarity of the impression. Identity is a deceptive assumption, though in certain circumstances it may be fully sustained. If I lose my watch, and some one puts before me another that is not only just like it, but has the numbers engraved in precisely the same place as they had been in my watch, it is extremely probable that I have here, not merely a watch from the same factory, but my own watch. But what justifies me in assuming this is not the sameness of the impression; it is a series of considerations which are based upon a knowledge of the entire circumstances.

This belief in the existence of things which are identical with themselves we may contrast with the change of either like or unlike impressions. It is an assumption by means of which we interpret the facts of experience; a conceptual postulate which we think into the facts. Let us try how far we can do that, and whether there really are identical things of this kind amongst the apparent things of our perceptual experience. I have here a stone, a piece of chalk, a thing having a number of properties which distinguish it from all other things. I break it up, and now I have two or more things, each differing from the others in its properties, at least in shape and size. The same reality presented itself first to me as one thing, then as a number of things. Where, then, is the thing identical with itself which I look for and assume in this same reality? On the other hand, I take several lead pencils, clearly different things. I throw them into the fire, and they become one thing of a definite shape and size. Further, the wood which seemed to

me from a distance a unity plainly marked off from the rest of the landscape becomes, on closer inspection, a collective mass consisting of a number of trees. Each tree, in turn, seems to me a single thing until a woodman cuts it down, and then trunk, branches, twigs, and leaves lie before me as so many different things. Was the tree, like the forest, a collectivity? Now I take one of these things, say a piece of wood, and throw it into the fire. It turns into ashes: to my eye a number of minute things which have not the least resemblance to the piece of wood. If I, in fine, see a chemist analysing something into two substances which are far removed from each other and from the object analysed, I find it quite impossible to say where the reality identical with itself is in all these changes.

It follows, at all events, that our empirical notions of things are for the most part superficial, and do not hold good, either in the empirical reality or in my thought, with the postulate of identity. The question arises, therefore, whether there are at all fixed and unchanging concepts of things, and whether by means of these we know things which really are and remain identical with themselves. It seems quite possible that we might have here only a constitutional necessity of our mental processes. The category of inherence is, as we saw, the highest form of the intellect which works up our impressions. With its co-operation the sensory elements of our perception are arranged in thing-unities; and we should therefore be compelled to think of the world in things even if it did not consist of them. It is also undeniable that we often use the concept of thing quite wrongly. We should certainly not go so far as to say that, whenever we use a substantive, we wish to indicate a thing, yet it is incontestable that this form of speech disposes us to ascribe a certain sort of thing-like reality to such expressions, such as "freedom" and "evil." And does not the Platonic theory of ideas seek to give a higher reality to all generic concepts? Or do not both language and psychology tend to assign a thing-like reality as parts of the same to such

concepts as will, understanding, and so on? If critical consideration compels us to regard these expressions as superficial, with no serious claim to be things in the proper sense of the word, does this apply also to other ideas of things which the ordinary mind takes for granted? Is it possible that all our ideas of things are merely superficial forms, a scaffolding put together at one moment and after a longer or shorter period taken down again, by means of which we try to reach the structure of reality from without? In any case, we cannot be content with this arbitrary use of the category of inherence. We must look for criteria which will enable us to attain stable and permanent concepts of things. And if this cannot be done in the world of experience, there is nothing for it but to seek the reality of such things behind experience. If it cannot be done physically, it must be done metaphysically. In both cases we call these real things, as distinct from the apparent, *substances*.

All the paths which lead thought to this goal start with the familiar fact that, even in the case of apparent things, the properties are not all of the same value. They differ from each other, really and logically, in value, as far as the identity of the thing is concerned. Even when we do not use the words, we are all accustomed to distinguish *essential* and *unessential* properties in our things: that is to say, those which may change or disappear without destroying the identity of the thing and those which cannot be removed without destroying or casting doubt upon the identity. Essential properties are those which belong to the true, absolute being; unessential, those which belong to the appearance, the relative reality, the existence of a thing. In concepts of things we also call these *essential* and *accidental* features. Clearly, when we thus distinguish between the essential and unessential in a thing, we, even if not always consciously, make a selection amongst the variety of elements which, under the category of inherence, are bound together in the unity of the concept of thing. On such a selection not only the notions of things in common experience, but even all concepts

of substance in science and philosophy, are based. From this we see that scientific and even philosophic thought moves more and more critically along the line marked out by pre-scientific thought. The concepts of substance arise from a progressive selection of the essential conditions, and at every step which knowledge makes we have to consider the reasons and the justification of this selection.

In order to test this, let us first see how we make this selection in daily life: that is to say, what we consider accidental and what indispensable in things, in connection with their empirical identity. The first thing we may take is the place in which the thing is—the “where.” A rolling billiard ball is the same wherever it is and no matter how it moves. This indication of space in our impression is, it is true, bound up with the whole of our perception; but in most cases the position is immaterial as regards the object itself. It is the same wherever it is. It is, however, not always immaterial. In an æsthetic sense, for instance, it may be very material what position a thing has in a landscape or a picture. In the same way there are things, such as organisms, for which it is a most important matter where they may be: the plant, for instance, in relation to the soil, and the animal in relation to its whole environment. These things, however, concern only the relations, the activities, or the means of development. As regards that which the thing essentially is, place seems to be a matter of indifference.

This, as we saw, makes clear a great difficulty of Atomism. Each atom is supposed to differ from others as a primordial and self-identical reality. But atoms of the same element and, according to hypothesis, of the fundamental matter are entirely alike in everything that can be used in defining them. They differ from each other only in difference of position. Yet this position is immaterial to each; each remains the same atom no matter how much it moves. An atom of oxygen remains the same whether it rushes along in a brook or is in a stagnant pond; whether it rises in vapour and

is carried through the air, or is taken in with the breath and enters the blood. In each of these positions, which are quite immaterial to its nature, it could be replaced by an entirely similar atom. Yet we regard the two as two different realities. As a matter of fact, if we apply to Atomism what Leibnitz called the *principium identitatis indiscernibilium*, we find that we can distinguish the atoms only by their position, and that this is not at all part of their essence. Atomism distinguishes between its substances only on the ground of their most accidental features.

But let us leave atoms and come back to apparent things. The least essential thing is position. The ball is just the same in each stage of its movement. The shape, colour, elasticity, etc., constitute the thing. Let us suppose, then, that a white ball is painted red. Is it still the same thing? At first we answer this question unreflectingly in the affirmative. In that case, therefore, the colour is not material to the identity of the thing, however much we may like or dislike it, or however important it may be in a game of billiards. The essential qualities of the thing, which remain, must be mass and shape. It would no longer be a billiard ball if it were cut into a die, and it would not be the same if it were replaced by another, even one made out of the same piece of ivory. In this case form and mass are equally essential.

Well, let us take a ball made of wax, or of compressed breadcrumbs. We can mould this into an oval or cubical shape, or any other form. It remains the same piece of wax and therefore, in this respect, the same thing. It is clear that the form is now immaterial to the identity of the thing, and all that remains is the *mass*.

We might, however, take it in the reverse way. Who does not at once think of the illustration of a river, which Heraclitus used so effectively? The river is, in our impression, a permanent figure of an identical being, a permanent thing; yet we know that the form alone is permanent, while the volume of water changes unceasingly. By means of this comparison of the

mutually contradictory processes, this ἐναντιοτροπία, the sage of Ephesus explained the illusion by which we see a permanent thing in what is constantly changing. Permanence of form in certain circumstances suffices for us to constitute the identity of the thing. A man has, perhaps, had a new handle put on an old walking-stick, renewed the ferrule many times, and possibly at some time broken the wood and had it replaced. It remains the same dear old stick, though not an atom of the original material remains. The ancients used to illustrate this by the "vessel of Theseus," which was for centuries sent by the Athenians to the annual festival at Delos. Although its masts, decks, oars, etc., had been successively replaced, it was still the same ancient and sacred ship. It seems, perhaps, trivial to quote such an instance in this connection, but have we not an illustration of a much more subtle and gradual transformation in the case of our own body? Does not physiology teach that the organism is perpetually renewed, giving off as much of its structure as it receives in the form of nourishment? Even the solid frame of the bones, growing constantly from within, is renewed in its material, and after a number of years—it does not matter to us in this connection what the number is—not a single atom is left in our members of the stuff which once composed them, apart from atrophied deposits which are not vital. Hence this thing, the organised body, has its identity, not in its mass as such, but in the permanent form in which this is moulded.

But even constancy of form is not essential to identity. The organic being, at least as far as immediate and external observation goes, undergoes in certain circumstances a number of material changes of size and shape. The plant is one and the same, the same thing, from the acorn to the oak. It may be possible to speak of an identity of form throughout the whole development in a microscopic, scientific sense, but certainly not in the sense of ordinary observation. Further, the organism certainly remains identical when it has lost several members. The amputation of a finger, an arm, or a leg does

not destroy it. We say at once that the identity is at an end when the head is cut off, but is it not as if the organism were the same as before when an experimental biologist cuts off the head of a frog? Where is the limit in this case? What change of form is immaterial to the identity of the organism? What type of form is indispensable? If we cared to put this in the abstract, we should say: When what remains as a connected whole after the loss of various parts can go on living as such, it is the same individual as before. If this is so, it is neither form nor mass, but continuity of life, continuous sameness of function, in which we must find the identity of the living thing. When this remains, the matter and form may change without leading us into any error as regards the identity of the thing. We see the same in other connections, where verbal expression would, perhaps, not use the word "thing" as readily as in the preceding illustrations. Even in the case of man's psychic life we speak of the identity of the personality as a thing complete in itself, and we are not intimidated by the fact that such a being, in the course of life, changes its ideas, feelings, views, and convictions to a very great extent. These changes may be quite radical transformations—religious claims such as that of "new birth" show how possible this is—and even quite apart from pathological cases, the gradual replacement of the psychic contents in the course of life may be so great that here again we have only the continuity of life on which we may base an affirmation of identity.

We have another conspicuous instance when we speak of the people or State as one being. Here again we have a constant coming and going of the individuals which compose the people or masses, so that at the end of a century hardly a single one of the earlier component parts survives. Besides this succession of generations, the identity of the people is not affected by the historical events by which some sections are detached from it and new sections are added to it. We take the continuity of language in this case as a criterion. It is the same in historical culture as regards the meaning

of the State. A State, as an historical unity, undergoes considerable changes. It has its growth; it may contract, and then expand again; and it survives the change of its inner life-form, its constitution. Yet in spite of all these profound alterations we still in such cases speak of the same people or State; and this is not merely a retention of the name because the changes only occur gradually in our experience, but we are really thinking, though not strictly in the category of inherence, of an identical reality throughout all the changes.

When we regard all these different attempts of our ordinary thinking to determine the essential, which constitutes the identity, it seems that this essential is always selected from the non-essential and accidental from a definite point of view. And what may be essential from one point of view need not be essential from another. The elements which in each case lead to the determination of the identity, which is never perceived as such, differ according to our way of looking at them. The principle of the selection which enables us to distinguish between the essential and the accidental changes with the point of view of each science. This has been shown by the illustrations we have taken from ordinary life, as well as from the scientific procedure of physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists, and historians, and we have found that three things are chiefly used in determining the essential: mass, form, and development. They explain that which directed us in forming the concept of substance—namely, the unchanging being which persists throughout the changes of experience. This temporal element, the relation of the unchanging to the changing, was the first criterion of even pre-scientific thought for fixing its concepts of things. In the various sciences, however, this reflection on the permanent takes the deeper form of conceptual relations, and in this we find, in the main, two routes adopted. One of them runs on the line of the reflective category of the general in relation to the particular; the other proceeds on the constitutive relation of causality. Upon these logical forms rests the general validity which

the scientific concepts of substance seem to possess, and which as a matter of fact gives them their pre-philosophical significance.

According to the first form the constant general element in the contents of experience is the truly real, of which the various appearances are merely fleeting secondary realities. This procedure of thought follows the actual connections which are constantly repeated in our experience and seem to be the permanent element amidst the changes. The earliest Greek thinkers occupied themselves in many ways with the problem of qualitative change (*ἀλλοίωσις*), which seems to present to us the real from moment to moment, and sought to show that in this we should see only a fleeting appearance and disappearance of unchangeable elements of the true reality. More than one of these ancient thinkers pointed out to his fellows that they were wrong in speaking of origin and end in the case of apparent things. It was, they said, only a combination and division, a mingling or separation, of the truly real, and that the latter is an unchangeable reality, without beginning or end. If one sought in this sense the immutable elements, out of which we see that empirical things were composed when they dissolve, one discovered the important difference between unequal and equal constituents. When one seemed, in the case of the latter, to have reached the limit of qualitative divisibility, one must suppose that one had come to something of the permanent nature of reality, some aspect of real being. In this way the chemical idea of "elements" was discovered, especially by Anaxagoras, and also the ideas of *homoomeria*, which we seem to owe to Aristotle. The genuinely real things are those which, when one is able to divide them at all, divide always into like parts. The qualitative general concepts which constitute substances of the nature of the chemical elements according to this view, clearly depend upon the means of division which are at the disposal of the student of science, and we cannot therefore be surprised that to Anaxagoras the number of elements seemed to be infinite. When modern

chemistry tells us that there are more than seventy such elements, it makes it clear that this enumeration is temporary and determined by the limits of our means of subdividing them, and it keeps in mind all the time the idea of an ultimate and entirely simple primitive matter.

But what physical division cannot do may be attempted with more prospect of success in the way of logical analysis. The Greeks very soon saw the analogy between chemical structure in the material world and the grammatical structure of language. Just as the multiplicity of apparent things may be reduced to a limited number of elements, so the whole immense variety of our language may be reduced to the comparatively small number of its constituents, the letters of the alphabet. As early as Plato we find the same word (*στοιχείον*) used for the elements of the material world and the letters of the alphabet, and it seems that even in the Latin language *elementum* meant at first the letters with which the alphabet was learned in school. Plato, in fact, elaborated this analogy, and extended the comparison to the unchanging elements of thought. The moment we reflect on this we notice that every word we utter has a general signification. When I say "this green thing," it is not merely the something "green" which might be said of many other things, but the demonstrative pronoun itself, which is supposed to refer directly to an individual thing, may also be applied to countless other things. It is so with all qualities of things without exception. Each of them has a generic significance, and may be verified in the case of many individuals. These "absolute qualities," as Herbart called them, seem to represent the generally and immutably real, of which the individuals of appearance are compacted in much the same way as, from the chemical point of view, material individuals arise from the cohesion of general elements and disappear when they are separated. Herbart rightly pointed out that this analogy is one of the foundations of the Platonic theory of ideals. According to Plato, a thing is beautiful because the idea of beauty is incorporated

in it. A body becomes warm when the idea of warmth is added to it, and it becomes cold when this idea departs and gives place to its contrary. In exactly the same way that Plato (in the *Phædo*) speaks of the coming and going of ideas as the true meaning of changes of properties, Anaxagoras also contended that each individual thing owes its properties to the elements which are in it; that it acquires a new property when the corresponding element is added to it, and loses a property when this is removed. We find the same idea, in a subtler form, in the modern theory of the constitution of molecules. If from a certain molecule I extract an atom of bromine and replace it with an atom of iodine, I get a different substance with correspondingly different qualities.

In all these theories of elements, in spite of their differences from each other, there is the common idea that the truly real, the substantial, consists in the general and homogeneously permanent, and that the apparent reality which we perceive in individuals owes its properties to its participation in the general. From this arises the system of Universalism, according to which the individual exists only in so far as the general momentarily unites with it.

These general substances, however, whether matter or ideas, are really only denaturalised concepts of things: gold or radium or oxygen is not strictly what we call a thing according to the original structure of the category. The danger of this use of the word is particularly clear in the case of the generic ideas with which we describe the fundamental forms or states of the psychic life. When we speak of the intelligence or the will, the substantive expression easily disposes us to conceive them as things, whereas critical consideration does not find this justified. This view of the psychic generalised ideas as real "faculties" must be extruded from scientific psychology as quite mythological, though it remains useful in popular thought and speech.

In addition to this, the process of abstraction on which these generic concepts depend inevitably urges us to

form higher and higher analogies and contrasts, and comes to rest only in the ultimate and simplest general reality. Thus we find chemistry, when what were thought to be elements prove, on closer examination, to be compound, leaning to the hypothesis of one fundamental element; and for a time it was believed that this was found in hydrogen. It is true that this turned out to be erroneous, yet such facts as the series of atomic weights compel us to continue to search for some absolutely simple element as the truly existent. The simpler these generic ideas become, however, the more they diverge from the original meaning of the category of things, which, as inherence, always implies the arrangement of the manifold in a unity. Thus the Cartesian ideas of extended and conscious substance, and to some extent Herbart's "reals," which are supposed to have only one simple quality, are in the end denaturalised concepts of things. And the same applies to such generalised ideas as matter or spirit or even "nature." It is sheer Universalism when we find Goethe in his well-known hymn to nature speaking of it bringing forth individuals prodigally yet being quite indifferent to their fate. It makes nothing for itself out of individuals; it reabsorbs them in itself and creates others. It gives them only a secondary reality. This Universalistic way of thinking is quite familiar even in scientific work when it regards matter, with its general forces, elements, and laws, as the true and enduring reality, and the individual as a temporary phenomenon.

There is a certain religious attitude that coincides with this metaphysical way of looking at things, namely, the attitude of those who regard the individual as sinful and unworthy of existence, and think the absorption of the individual in the whole the proper goal of all aspiration. The mystic idea of deification, or the merging of the individual in the divine whole, is the religious form of Universalism; and this played a great part in medieval Realism. But, on the other hand, it is ideas of value which oppose this conception: ideas of value by which the personality, conscious of its freedom and

responsibility, asserts its own feeling of reality and originality, its proud sense of "aseity" or self-containedness. Even apart from these feelings, however, there are grave theoretical objections to Universalism. It cannot solve the problem of individuality; it cannot intelligibly explain how individual things proceed from the general reality, or why the elements unite to form the individual thing precisely at this spot, at this time, or in this particular way. If things are supposed to be products of change in the substances, why the change? It has no foundation in the nature of substances. In seeking an explanation we rather find ourselves driven to other and earlier individual things, and thus get a *regressus in infinitum*. The only thing for us to do seems to be to assume that the true substances are originally existing individual things. Individualism of this kind may take various forms, according to the different ways in which it conceives the individual things. There is, in the first place, the Atomism of Democritus, which was much more Individualistic than the modern atomic theory. The latter recognises only chemically differentiated elements, and, owing to the disintegration of the atoms by cathode rays and their dissolution into electrons, is well on the way to complete Universalism. Democritus, on the contrary, conceived the atoms as all qualitatively alike, but individually quite different from each other in size and shape. He spoke of the occupation of space or impenetrability, as we now say, as the one general quality of all reality, and then described individual realities as differing in "shape." He, for instance, spoke of hook-shaped and sickle-shaped atoms, and he required such shapes in order to be able to explain the interlocking of the atoms. Each atom had not only its particular shape, but also its own original movement, of a definite direction and velocity. In the corpuscular theory of the Renaissance this view was for a time revived, but it is not retained in modern physics and chemistry. Our modern sciences have quite abandoned Individualism.

The form of Individualism introduced by Aristotle, the biological form, has held its ground much more

effectively. In his idea of Entelechy Aristotle has conceived the individual life-unity of the organism as the true *οὐσία*; as the entity which realises its form in association with matter. The material elements used for this purpose are no more than general possibilities; they only attain to living reality in the individual existence. That is a conception of thing which keeps very close to the original category of thingness, and has therefore proved historically one of the best ideas for the interpretation of phenomena. Hence our common use of the words individual and "individuality" to-day has lost the original sense, in which it meant the *ἄτομον*, the indivisible particle of matter, and usually implies the organic individual, if not the spiritual individual or personality. It is no longer the mass, but the form and function, which is indivisible, as the members cannot continue to live apart from the whole.

We thus understand a third form of metaphysical Individualism, which occurs in the case of Leibnitz's Monadology. According to this the universe consists of spiritual individual elements, *monads*, all of which have the same life-content, but each develops it in a different way. Individuality here consists in the degree of intensity of the clearness and explicitness with which the monad becomes a mirror of the world. The chief objection to this is seen when we ask the question, what it is that is to be differently mirrored in all these monads. If each of them reflects only itself and all the others, we have no absolute content in the whole system of mutual mirroring. That is, in a certain sense, a concentration of all the dialectical difficulties which arise between Universalism and Individualism precisely when the conflict takes its highest form in the case of spiritual reality.

These difficulties recall to us that it is, as a fact, impossible to form a quite definite idea of individuality. All the properties which we use for this purpose are in their turn generic ideas: that is to say, definitions which will apply to other individuals as well. The unique and special thing about the individual is its combination

of the manifold. But what this constitutes cannot properly be expressed in words which, on account of their general significance, will always apply to something else. *Individuum est ineffabile*. Individuality cannot be described; it is felt. This is true of great historical personalities like Napoleon and Shakespeare, Goethe and Bismarck. It is true also of the inner nature of great characters in literature such as Hamlet or Faust. The more a personality can be described or defined, the less is its individuality and originality. Each quality and achievement even of the greatest man can be expressed in words; but the prepondering element has to be experienced. Hence the intimate nature of a personality is missed by those who try to express it in analogies and comparisons; as that prince of dilettanti, Houston S. Chamberlain, tries to do with Kant. Individuals and individual qualities can never be intellectually conceived; the reader must be made to experience them æsthetically, the description of their lives in each phase being so shaped that it will present to the mind a unity such as we have in the living reality.

These are matters of importance which it is for the methodology of the higher sciences to explain. But even as regards the metaphysical formulation of problems we have here very serious questions, and they imply very marked limits of possible intellectual knowledge in an individualistic metaphysics. We can conceive, genetically understand, and axiologically interpret the various elements of individual natures by means of the historical definiteness of all their phenomena. All that pertains to this historical appearance of theirs is rational. But in the end their substantial individuality consists in that inexpressible unity which can never be an object of thought and knowledge, but only a postulate of comprehension, only irrationally felt by intuition. Hence Individualism frequently assumes a mystical form, and from this arise questions which we will discuss later when we come to deal with problems of value. We notice them here only in order to characterise the extremes of Universalism and Individualism in this aspect

also. The contrast between them is just as important to a philosophy of life as to the theory and practice of historical research. Fichte's saying, that the sort of philosophy a man chooses depends upon the sort of man he is, is verified here in the fact that whoever is content to be an outcome of general states and conditions, and is guided by these in his conduct of life, differs fundamentally from the man who is convinced that his feeling of personality is something special, and is determined to stamp this personality upon circumstances. Thus we have in historical science the theory of the *milieu*, which regards general movements as the essential thing and the activity of the individual as merely a secondary phenomenon in the total process, opposed to the older idea that it is the great personalities which make history and represent its meaning. The theory of the *milieu* is therefore close akin to Rationalism, whilst individualistic history neither can deny, nor wishes to deny, that it contains irrationalistic elements.

Considered from the purely logical point of view, the antithesis of Universalism and Individualism is directly due to the structure of the concept of things. The thing that we would definitely conceive consists of properties all of which have universal significance, and this particular thing differs from all others only in virtue of a special association of these properties. Universalism seeks the true substantial realities in the general properties which are necessary in order to give shape and secondary reality to apparent things by some special combination of them. Individualism, on the contrary, regards the synthesis itself as the substantial in a sense of value, and the properties therein associated only as mutable elements of a secondary reality of the possible. Thus, in respect of the question of substance, Universalism coincides with the chemical-mechanical, and Individualism with the organic, view of life. They differ in their selection of the elements combined in the empirical conception of the thing.

We have similar antitheses of views when we follow up the difference between the enduringly essential and

the changeably unessential in the relation of the original and the derivative. A real inequality of this kind amongst properties is often expressed by the antithesis of *constitutive* and *derivative* characters. Certain properties, it is said, belong to the thing only in so far as, and because, it has certain other and original properties. The latter are supposed to be the permanent and essential as opposed to the mutable and unessential. A tree develops leaves and flowers and fruit, and then sheds its leaves. None of these states, which give it very varied properties, belongs to its real and enduring nature. The latter consists rather in its morphological structure and physiological functions. From these arise the phenomenal derivative properties, as states conditioned by the changing relations of the environment—the seasons, climate, etc. To the same difference we may trace the scholastic distinction between attributes and *modi*. The attributes constitute the nature of the thing; the *modi* are the conditions of its appearance which arise from the attributes or are made possible by them. Thus Descartes, for instance, defined bodies by the attribute of extension. All their other properties were supposed to be derived from this as *modi*. He gave thought (*cogitatio*) as the attribute of the soul, and the various modifications of this are the psychic activities and states of the mind, feeling, and will. The *modi*, however, derive from the attributes only in virtue of certain relations or under certain conditions. They are therefore relative in regard to the nature of the thing, while the attributes represent the absolute properties which constitute the thing in itself. We constantly think and speak in the sense of these categories. The constitutive nature of things is distinguished from the changing *modi* and states which it assumes in virtue of certain relations to its surroundings. Thus the chemical nature of a body consists in the fundamental properties of the substances which constitute it, whereas such properties as colour, odour, and taste are *modi*, which are due to a relation to particular organs of sense, and so on. In the same way we speak of a man's character

as his real nature, and, in opposition to these enduring qualities, we call his several activities and states derivative and phenomenal things—*modi* of his real being.

It is evident that this distinction is fully justified as long as it keeps within the limits of empirical knowledge and the various divisions of it. It is based upon real views of causal dependence, or at least (much the same as with a man's character) on views and assumptions about it. We are therefore dealing, not with matters of formal logic, but with real relations which are indisputably based upon experience. They, however, have no more than a practical utility in this field for distinguishing between the essential and the unessential. If they are extended beyond it, they lead to insoluble metaphysical difficulties. The attributes are supposed to represent the essential nucleus in the plurality of perceived properties, and to indicate something permanent which meets the postulate of identity; and this nucleus is supposed to hold together in unity the whole cloud of its transitory modifications. We speak thus of the nature of a man as contrasted with his various states and activities. Not only in speech, however, but in thought also we distinguish even these permanent and constitutive properties, the attributes, from the thing itself, and we conceive this as what *has* the properties, essential as well as unessential, attributes as well as *modi*. The verbal expression in the predicative judgment "*A is b*" by no means implies an identity of subject and predicate, as was thought by Herbart, who derived the whole artificial construction of his theory of reality from this fundamental error. We have no idea of saying that sugar is identical with white or with sweet. The copula, which may express very different categories as forms of combination of subject and predicate, and may in some cases, as in mathematical propositions, imply identity, has in this case the meaning of the category of inherence; the words might just as well run, "sugar has sweet"—namely, as a property. To give a logical explanation of these aspects of the copula would be a more worthy object

of the zeal of the inventors of Esperanto, Ido, and similar artificial languages. And the thing is no more identical with the sum of its qualities than with any one in particular. There remains always something that possesses these qualities, and is therefore distinct from them, and may be distinguished from them. It would, of course, be quite impossible to describe the thing apart from all its properties. Every qualification would be itself a property, even if we take such a fundamental property as extension or thought: a property which the thing as such must have, and from which it must be distinguished. The thing therefore remains as an undefinable substratum of properties, incapable of representation by any quality, τὸ ὑποκείμενον, the "thing in itself"; in which we state a problem, but do not imply that it is insoluble. In this sense Locke speaks of substance as the unknown bearer of the properties, of which we can only say that it is, not what it is.

Have we then any sound reason to conceive this unknowable? It has been denied; indeed, this denial is not only the chief historical element, but a permanent source of strength, in Positivism. It began with the English idealist Berkeley. In the development of the problem of substance after Descartes the concept of thing had been more and more deprived of its contents. The things equipped with one single attribute, the *res cogitantes* and *res extensæ*, had been taken over by Locke as cogitative and non-cogitative substances, but he had gone on to the idea of unknowable substratum. When we strip a thing of all its properties there is nothing left, and so Berkeley concluded that there *was* nothing; that the being of the thing is not to be distinguished from the sum of its properties, and that it is a mere fiction of the schools, a phantom. If being coincides with perception (if *esse* = *percipi*), substance is something we have not perceived, but merely imagined from habit. It is not real. If from a cherry I abstract all that I can see, touch, taste and smell, there is nothing left. In this way Berkeley abolished material substances. For him they were merely complexes of sensations, bundles

of ideas, as was then said ; and for that reason his theory has been called Idealism. But he regarded these ideas as states or activities of spirit. He allowed the *res cogitantes* to remain. Then came his great successor Hume. He showed that what was true of the cherry was true of the self. It is a bundle of sensations. Hume expounded this in the work of genius of his youth, the *Treatise*, and then abandoned it in his later work, the *Inquiry*, apparently because it gave great scandal to his countrymen to find their beloved selves argued out of existence. In his first work he showed that the assumption of identity or substance can be explained, on the lines of the association of ideas, by our being accustomed to constant connections of ideas. The substance is not perceived, but merely gathered from the repeated connectedness of similar elements of presentation.

This development of thought may be made clear in the following way. Accustomed to distinguish, in the changing qualities of the empirical thing, between a nucleus of essential, permanent, and original qualities and the unessential, we fall into the error of supposing that we can make the same distinction in regard to the essential properties, and here also discover a nucleus within the nucleus. This illusion is the transcendental appearance which leads thought *μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, to the problematic concept of the thing-in-itself. So far the Positivist claim seems to be justified in this case. But we ask ourselves whether we can rest content here. Let us, for example, look more closely at the idea of the self. It is quite true that we cannot define it, and that in this sense the individual is certainly *ineffabile*. What can a man say when he is asked, or asks himself : " Who art thou ? " He may give us his name ; and, if we ask what that means, he may refer us to his bodily frame, his physical individuality. But this is not the self ; it belongs to it. Even quite apart from the question of immortality or the transmigration of souls, every unprejudiced mind distinguishes itself from the body which it possesses. In answer to further questions

a man gives his social position, his profession, and so on, as what constitutes his self. But he must soon perceive that all these things are shells round the nucleus, relative determinations of the nature of the self. We then seek this in the psychic contents. But these also belong to the self as its presentations and ideas, feelings and volitions; and if in the end we say that the nucleus of our being is in our views and convictions, it is clear that these do not constitute an absolutely identical self from childhood to old age. We speak of an identity of personality even in conditions of mental disturbance in which it seems to be entirely replaced by another. Religious ideas and claims, such as that of being born again, certainly imply the possibility of a complete change of one's inmost being, yet assume an ultimate identity of the self throughout. We need not inquire here how ideas of this kind—in Schopenhauer, for instance—can be reconciled with the indestructibility of man's nature in itself; but it is at all events clear how we always distinguish the self from all tendencies and contents of the mind and will. It is not these things, but has them. It is, in fine, precisely this fact which gives birth to so impracticable an idea as the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, in which it is assumed that the self decides, according to its mysterious nature, between its own motives, gives an unintelligible verdict when they are equal, and even victoriously overcomes them. What there really is in this so-called "free will" no one can tell, because an act of will is always characterised by its object. The individual will must therefore always be determined by a definite object or group of objects, and so must, as regards its content, be empirically conceived as something else; and this, again, is not the intelligible character, but has it.

We thus cannot really say what the self is as distinguished from all its properties and states. Yet our feeling of personality strongly opposes the bundle-theory and postulates that we have a real unity, even if it can never be expressed. And there is a theoretical element in addition to the emotional. The unity of

the phenomena, which is supposed to indicate the thing or the substance, cannot be merely an accidental juxtaposition, but is conceived as the reason for the interconnection of the manifold. This nucleus within the nucleus is the containing or binding element, and we may apply to all concepts of things and substances what Lotze said of the meaning of the categories; it has to feel as a connected whole what comes together in consciousness. The thing is, therefore, always the connectedness of its properties, a synthetic unity, in virtue of which they are not merely found together, but are necessarily interwoven. Thus we define chemical substances as the molecular unity of atoms which do not casually co-exist, but belong to this unity. The atom itself is a unity of functions which are usually defined as forces; a force-centre, much in the sense in which the Energetic school of physics gives a dynamic interpretation of matter. This applies also to the entelechies, the unities of the manifold in the living individual, except that here the necessity of the interconnection, or the connectedness of the elements, is conceived teleologically, as in Kant's theory of the organism, not mechanically.

In science, therefore, the thing or substance as the conceptual fundamental form for the interpretation of experience has the sense of establishing intellectually the associations of the manifold into a permanent being. All ideas of things or substances are outcomes or products of judgments about the enduring connectedness of original elements of experience. It is only in philosophy that the further question arises, What is the real nature of this coherence? Popular, and to some extent even scientific, thought treats it as an independent reality, which possesses all the properties. It must, with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, be convinced that in such case it can affirm no property whatever—in other words, nothing—about the thing itself. We then have only two alternatives. Either the synthesis of properties in the thing is a merely psychological fact, a habit of experiencing such coherences, and therefore a merely

psychic ("subjective") transformation of connected experiences into connected reality—the hypostatisation of a synthetic form of thought, the category of inherence—or we must be clear that this form of thought is of the nature of knowledge only when it has a real significance, when the connectedness presented in the category holds good for the object. That is precisely Kant's case against Hume. In either case, however, we must give up the idea that we can speak of the thing as a reality distinct from this interconnected complex of its properties. The synthetic unity is, even in respect of its formal nature, not really definable; nor is it to be conceived as something really separable from the complex of the manifold associated in accordance with it. For the practical work of acquiring knowledge, therefore, our business is to disengage from the connections given in experience the concepts of substances which, with their essential properties, lie at the root of the preliminary ideas of things in experience. In this search for the essential elements of being we have to distinguish between qualities and quantities, the intrinsic properties and the form-conditions of number and size. In this way we get further ontic problems, and these also belong to the category of substance.

§ 3

The Quantity of Being.—Number and magnitude—Simplification of the world in thought—Henism and Singularism—Monotheism—Pantheism, Deism, Theism—Immanence and transcendence—Oneness, infinity, indefiniteness—Acosmism—Pluralism—Monadology—Measurement—Finitism and Infinitism—Space and time—Recurrence of all things.

Quantity as a category represents a coherence of the most elementary sort, and in two different ways. In either case there is always question of a coherence of the manifold into the unity of the particular consciousness; and for the determination of quantity we have the correlative processes of distinguishing and com-

paring. When we count, we have always to deal with a plurality of contents, and these must in some sense be like each other or capable of being brought under the same generic idea ; they must be different from each other, yet conceived together as a unity. We see this quite plainly in the case of the striking of a clock, where we unite the strokes in a definite number. The things counted make a whole, of which each element in the count forms a part. But this quantitative relation of the whole to its parts has, in addition to the arithmetical form, a purely intellectual form of immediate application, or certain special forms in our appreciation of magnitudes of space and time ; so that *number* and *size* are the two relations with which we have now to deal.

If we turn first to the numerical definition of reality, apparent reality presents itself to our experience as an uncountable plurality. For the limitation of the mind, which can only embrace a part, and indeed a very small part, of the whole, contrasts with the endless manifoldness of what we perceive. The selection which we thus make depends not only on the limited nature of our experience, but also on apperception, which even amongst our experiences admits only a limited part according to what already exists in our memory. Even in the uncontrolled play of the psychic mechanism this linking of the new to the old leads to general ideas, and the deliberate direction of our thought tends always to simplify the world for us by omitting what is strange. The simplification in thought must always have the form of a generic idea, which scientific men use for this purpose ; but it may also consist in a general view, a means adopted in the mental sciences. In either case we drop the unessential, and the conceptual simplification is brought about by a selection, the principles of which have to be determined by methodology for the various sciences according to the diversities of their objects and aims. In the case of philosophy this tendency aims at achieving a simplification of the whole. It is guided by the assumption that there is one world, to which

the entire immeasurable variety belongs. In the last resort we think of all being and all happening as unity. We thus speak of the physical universe and the historical universe.

In regard to being, this search for the unity of the world in the numerical aspect, and in connection with the concept of substance, discloses itself as an attempt, in face of the plurality of the ordinary ideas of things of prescientific thought, and also in face of the plurality of the concepts of substance in pre-philosophic scientific thought, to postulate the oneness of the real substance. At one time this was called Monism, or a Monistic tendency of thought, but these names have become repugnant in our time, as in recent literature a timid sort of Materialism, which we will consider later, has covered itself with them. So we will choose the equivalent terms, Henism or Singularism. In the Henistic sense the one true being, the original reality, the all-embracing existence, is also called God by philosophers. Anaximander himself gave the name of the Divine ($\tau\acute{o}\ \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$) to the Infinite, in which he sought the ultimate principle of all things, and in recent philosophy we need only quote Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, etc., as examples of this use of the word; a use which, we must admit, has led to much misunderstanding on account of its confusion with the popular religious idea of God. In justification of this custom of philosophers we might plead that the prescientific mythical ideas of God, and the pre-philosophical dogmatic ideas, differed considerably from each other in content, and in part were flagrantly opposed to each other. Positively speaking, however, this right is based upon the transcendental identity of religious and metaphysical thought, to which we referred in the first section of this work. In virtue of this affinity, religious Monotheism, which recognises only one God, is an essential element and support of metaphysical Henism; though we must add that this Monotheism is itself a product of intellectual culture. It is a sure mark of a civilised religion. Just as primitive thought does not yet conceive the idea of world-

unity, so the primitive religious imagination is thoroughly pluralistic in its myths. It admits a multitude of divine, supra-mundane Powers. It is Polytheism and Polydemonism. Even the great religions, though in theory thoroughly Monotheistic, in practice made considerable polytheistic concessions amongst the mass of the people; and even in religious metaphysics the monotheistic theory finds itself compelled at times, in the interest of the freedom and responsibility of personalities, to admit an amount of metaphysical originality which cannot very well be reconciled with the strict idea of Monotheism.

We will not discuss these secondary motives here, but will follow the purely theoretical arguments for the Henism of the theory of substances. All are based upon the fact that the numerous things of experience do not simply occur together in mutual exclusiveness, but, just as they have real affinities which enable us to unite them in thought, so they are involved in a common flux of things, they pass into each other in movement, they mingle and blend with each other. In the last resort everything that we experience or can imagine is, directly or indirectly, related to everything else in these ways. Méchanics formulates this fact in the mutual attraction of all molecules. Kant found this *commercium substantiarum* most important for the development of his ideas, and finely elucidated it, in his third *Analogy of Experience*, by means of the light which plays between us and material things. Even the Stoics used to speak of *σύμπνοια πάντα*; and, though according to this a thing is where it works, in the end everything is in everything, as in the words of Anaxagoras (*ὁμοῦ πάντα*) or the common phrase of the Renaissance, *omnia ubique*. According to this view all things really form a single unity. In whatever direction the thinker looks (as Timon said in ancient times about Xenophanes), all things seem to him to blend into the unity of nature, *μία φύσις*. This alone therefore merits the name of the true thing or the substance. Apparent things are not true substances. They lack permanence;

they change, and come into and pass out of existence ; they are merely states or *modi* of the true substance, the Deity. The Deity is one, and as the *modi* all belong to him, is also everything : *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*. This form of Monotheism is known as Pantheism, and it is found in its purest form in Spinozism, the simplest and most instructive type of Pantheism. It is a theory of God-Nature, in which plurality gives the appearance and unity the reality ; and the conceptual relation between the unity and plurality is simply that of inherence. God as the primal reality has his attributes, and in these as limitations we have the individual things of experience, his *modi* ; much as we may say that a piece of wax has an extended mass as an attribute, while the various shapes it assumes are its *modi*, or as, in common speech, the human soul has will as an attribute and the various acts of will as special *modi*. Applied to the universe, this means that all the special things of experience are in their nature and essence one and the same, or merely existing *modi* of it. The substance, the God-Nature, is, as the poet has well said, the thing of all things. The secondary reality of experience consists, on this theory, of *modi* of the one true thing.

But this is only one form in which we may conceive the real unity of the apparent many. Besides the category of inherence we have the second, and equally important, category of causality. When we apply this, the unity is the cause, the plurality represents its effects. This relation will, naturally, call for closer consideration when we come to deal with genetic problems. Here we need only observe that, in applying this category, God, as the productive being, is substance in a different sense from the things produced by him which constitute the world. In this sense some have spoken of the one original substance and the many derivative substances. Thus some amount of substantiality is left to the things of appearance ; though this, as the Occasionalist movement in the Cartesian school showed, is extraordinarily difficult to understand. On the other hand, full substantiality, metaphysical originality, the aseity of the

causa sui, is reserved for the one, the divine, substance. This is Monotheism in the Deistic or the Theistic form—two shades of expression which cannot very well be distinguished historically, and must be understood from an axiological point of view. Individual things have, on this theory, only a lesser, derivative, debilitated substantiality. They are, in a sense, degraded substances.

In this way we get two relations between the one primary being and the plurality of individual things: the Pantheistic according to the category of inherence, the Deistic according to that of causality. In the one case God is the original thing: in the other case the original cause. For these two positions we use the words *immanence* and *transcendence*. According to the first the individual things of experience have no being of their own, and no other essence than the divine, of which they are the *modi*. From the second point of view individual things have a sort of being of their own; not of themselves, however, but from the Deity, yet in such a way that they retain their substantiality, especially in relation to each other. According to the first theory, therefore, God and the world are not distinct from each other; God is immanent in all appearances as their essence. According to the second, the things which make up the world have a being of their own, though it is not original, and in virtue of this they are distinct from God, who transcends all as their cause. It is clear that from the point of view of the problem of substantiality, and exclusively from that point of view, Pantheism affords the simplest and most successful solution. The difficulty was that the apparent things do not meet the postulate of identity, which holds good for true things, substances; and they are therefore, according to Pantheism, not substances, but *modi* of the one true substance. Deistic transcendence, on the other hand, would save a certain amount of substantiality for individual things, but without being able to say satisfactorily in what it consists. Hence in the controversies of the Cartesian school, which arose out of these problems, it frequently came to such a point that the antithesis seemed to be a mere

verbal quarrel as to what ought to be called "substance," or whether we should say *res* or *substantiæ*. There are, of course, axiological as well as genetic elements at work in this antithesis of immanence and transcendence, and we will consider them later.

Here we are concerned only with the common element, that both theories lay equal stress on the uniqueness of the primal being. On this account they have a second point in common in their characterisation of this primary being. The many apparent things, as definite contents of our experience, limit each other: they are finite. But the primary being, whether we regard it as primal thing or primal cause, cannot be subject to such definitions and limitations: it is infinite. Thus *infinity* is closely connected with uniqueness, as Spinoza showed with classic lucidity in the early part of his *Ethics*. The one substance of Pantheism is infinite; the *modi* are its finite appearances. The one world-cause of Deism is the infinite divine substance; the individual things of the world, bodies and souls, are expressly opposed to it as finite substances. In the end these lines of thought always lead to the conclusion that the real unity of apparent things, in whatever way we conceive it, is one single infinite substance.

We are led almost to the same conclusion by the different line of thought which starts from the affinities which we detect amongst the things of experience. We refer to the logically Universalistic line of thought which led to the conception of elements, forces, ideas—in a word, to generic concepts. It was a conceptual process which constantly abstracted from differences and concentrated on what was common. In this, however, we discovered that the process is always forced to go beyond itself. Chemical substances postulate in the end an ultimate simple fundamental substance; physical forces involve one fundamental force—the "energy," as is now said, which may change into many forms (kinetic, potential, etc.); and the idea of psychic powers points to a single consciousness as their simple common element. This simplification of the world in

thought, which, the further it carries its process of selection the more it abandons the special contents of experience, clearly follows the law of formal logic that, the more general concepts are, the richer they are in extension but the poorer in content. If we seek the true substance in this way, we end in the most general and most empty concepts, in which the extension ∞ corresponds to the content \circ . The Eleatics, who reached the goal at one stride, were the first to find this. They arrived at their idea of being ($\epsilonἶναι$) partly on dialectical lines, concluding that "to be" as a copula meant the same in all propositions. In their $\epsilonἶν$, therefore, the concept of uniqueness is identical with that of simplicity. The primary being excludes all multiplicity as well as all change. But this simple primary being is then inexpressible, because none of the predicates of the reality we experience can be applied to it. Thus we have in the writings of Plotinus, the father of Neoplatonism and of the whole of medieval mysticism, this inexpressible One, raised above all differences, as the simple primal being of unknown character. And the same line of thought has, in what is called "negative theology," taken the form of saying of God that, because he is all things, he is nothing in particular, and no name is applicable to him; he is the $\thetaεὸς ἄποιος$. Thus the primary being is raised above all the antitheses by means of which our thought discriminates between the various contents of our experience; it is, as Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno said, the *coincidentia oppositorum*. On the other hand, Spinoza's *substantia sive deus* (this empty category of inherence, which has an infinite number of attributes, but is itself nothing) is an illustration of how all individuals disappear in the thought of the One. On that account the All-One is, not merely to our mind, but in itself, "the Indefinite" ($\ἀόριστον$), and this is the same thing as "the Infinite." We see here how in the ideas offered to us the two characters of the Infinite and the Indefinite are combined, as seems to have been the case in the teaching of Anaximander. In any case when there is question

to-day of an infinite God, as contrasted with the world as the conceptual whole of finite things, this implies God's illimitability, a quantitative predicate, on the one hand, and his inexpressibility, a qualitative predicate, on the other; if one can give that name to the denial of all qualitative predicates. This conception of the infinite Deity is found developed with special strength in all mystical doctrines as the sufficient object of religious emotion, to which this empty indefiniteness is particularly suited. Thus Schleiermacher, for instance, relates the pietist's simple feeling of dependence with the Spinozistic All-One.

Nevertheless, however congenial that may be to the emotions, it is very unsatisfactory to the cravings of the intelligence. Its emptiness makes this idea of the world-substance useless for the purposes of thought. Its oneness makes it unsuitable to explain the plurality, its simplicity renders it unfit to explain the variety, of experience. The Eleatics pointed this out with extreme plainness and almost grotesque indifference to the consequences. They deny the plurality and variety. They deny even that change and movement exist. The One cannot produce them. They are only an illusion—though in the Eleatic doctrine there is not a trace of an explanation where and how this illusion is possible. This is what we call Acosmism: the world of experience vanishes in and before the truly real. It is the tragedy of this way of thinking that it denies what it ought to explain. Less explicitly, though it is not less difficult, the insoluble question, how the primary being stands in regard to the varying plurality of its appearances or its creations, lurks behind the other and later forms of Henism. How can Spinoza explain why his infinite substance presents itself in these finite *modi*? Can theology tell why the transcendental world-cause has created precisely this multitude and variety of finite things? It constantly tries to evade the difficulty by talking about some inscrutable design of the divine will, some motiveless arbitrary act. But a problem is not solved by putting it out of sight with the word

"freedom." When Fichte described the self-limitation of the All-One Self to the endless fullness of the contents of experience as an arbitrary free act, he knew well that this meant that he abandoned the idea of explaining it. All the methods that philosophers have conceived in order to explain by logical operations, in which, of course, negation as the one pure formal kind of disjunction must play a leading part, this evolution of the one into the many—whether it be the Neo-Platonist or the Hegelian dialectic—have quite failed to accomplish their purpose of deriving the finite from the infinite, the definite from the indefinite.

That is the limit of Henism, and at the same time the starting-point of its opposite, Pluralism. Most instructive in this respect is the contrast between Herbart's ontology and the philosophy of identity. Herbart reminds us that, the moment we assume a single and simple entity as principle, we cannot derive plurality and events from it. Plurality cannot be got from unity; diversity cannot be got from simplicity. On the contrary, even in empirical relations all apparent variety is based upon the plurality of the relations of each thing to many others. All properties of things are relative in the sense that they always imply a relation of one thing to other things, and never mean something which pertains to the thing alone. Physical properties, such as colour, assume a relation to certain conditions, such as light and illumination; psychic properties mean tendencies of the mind and the will to certain definite contents, and so on. The event also is quite unintelligible if it is to happen to one thing alone. There would be no beginning, no direction, no object of activity to assign, unless we think of relations to other things. Every action is conceivable only as reaction. The world, with its varied things and their actions and reactions, is a network of relations between countless individuals.

This opposition of Herbart to the philosophy of identity is clearly inspired by the idea of evolution, which the scientific theories of the first Greek investigators derived from the metaphysic of the Eleatics. The latter

excluded movement and plurality from their simple reality, but they were undeniable facts, and could not be banished from the world by logic. Hence it seemed to men like Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus that one could only retain the idea of identical being, with its qualities of eternity and immutability, by multiplying it. They gave up the numerical unity, the oneness, in order to be able to leave the simplicity to each individual being, and to explain phenomenal things with their changes as varying combinations of a plurality of substances.

This led to the various shades of scientifically-minded Pluralism. It was possible to speak of the elements, the *homoomeria*, or the atoms, as really existing things, and these scientific ideas were for a long time satisfactory in science, even though they were not philosophically worked out to the end. Thus earlier chemistry was content with the idea of matter as a body that could be divided into equal parts. Physics, especially mechanics, was content with the idea of an atom that had the sole properties of occupying space, impenetrability, and inertia, and perhaps attraction and repulsion. These things were satisfactory as long as physics wanted to study only those processes and relations of bodies which were independent of chemical constitution. Fechner himself, however, pointed out in his work on the physical and philosophic theory of the atom that these various ideas of the atom were not satisfactory. Since then the problems of physical chemistry and the questions raised by electrical research have made their appearance, and to-day we cannot find any conception of the atom which is equally applicable in physical and chemical problems. Considered from the most general point of view, the constitution of matter cannot be interpreted by different theories. This is an illustration of the relation of scientific hypotheses and research to the problems of philosophy. Special research does not need to wait for the settlement of these ultimate questions. The man who is working on benzol-derivatives or hydrostatic laws is not bound to take up a position

on the question how we must conceive the primary atom. It is a problem that arises in philosophy.

The philosophic theory of substances has, however, to meet other points of view than those of chemistry and physics. It therefore produces other pluralistic systems, though they are fewer in number and less impressive than the singularistic, which pay more attention to the scientific impulse to simplify the world in thought. But even in the field of psychic experience it is possible to sum up the world-reality, not under a single head, but in a few co-ordinated powers. Indeed, the theory of the originality of the intellectual characters or that of the independence of individual ideas at times leads in metaphysical theories to a preponderance of the pluralistic tendency, and this seems to be reconcilable with a vague Henistic background, just as the history of religions often shows us polytheistic systems with an infusion of Henism. That applies, for instance, to Schopenhauer's metaphysic, and still more to many of his followers, such as Bahnsen.

We see the fundamental type of pluralism best in Herbart's theory of the real. It considers the diversity and changes of experience to be intelligible only if the things-in-themselves, which are simple and unchangeable, furnish some reason for them. These unknowable realities have therefore to be conceived in relations by means of which we may understand the variety of their apparent properties and their changes. This implies a "coming and going" of the substances, as Anaxagoras said more or less clearly of his elements and Plato of his ideas. In the case of Herbart, however, these relations are raised to the emptiest degree of abstraction, and precisely on that account this most tortuous and unsuccessful and almost forgotten system of metaphysics shows us most plainly of all the inevitable difficulty of all pluralistic systems. For this "coming and going" of substances, which is supposed to be the real event, we have to find a reason in "intelligible space." What Herbart meant, or could mean, by that—whether in the end the relating mind alone remains as the intelligible

space in which realities are to attain their relations to each other, which otherwise remain accidental—we do not attempt to say. In any case the idea is constructed on the analogy of the empirical space of appearance, which makes possible the combinations and separations of physical things such as the elements or atoms. We thus see that every pluralistic idea, precisely because it is invented for the explanation of the variety and changes of the data of experience, presupposes a comprehensive unity in which these conditions take place and change. In the case of physical substances this part is played by empty space, and therefore the atomists found themselves compelled to ascribe reality to empty space (the $\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$ of the Eleatics) as well as to being; to the empty ($\kappaενόν$) as well as to the full ($\piλέον$). From which we begin to perceive that the fact of something happening, the fact that things are related to each other or, as Lotze said, take notice of each other, shows that they all belong to a single whole. Atoms which whirled about in different spaces could not have anything to do with each other. This is one of the chief arguments against pure Pluralism and in favour of Singularism.

These objections have given rise to a system which combines Singularism and Pluralism; a system which undertakes to reconcile the cognate elements of Universalism and Pluralism, and which we have in its most perfect form in Leibnitz's *Monadology*. The fundamental idea, it is true, goes back as far as Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno. It is an idea of impressive simplicity. Abstract unity cannot engender the manifold. There is no parthenogenesis of plurality out of unity. But a scattered and dissociated diversity is equally unable to bring forth a unity. The two—unity and plurality—are reconciled only if they are both original. We must conceive the world as essentially *a unity in diversity*.

Of the many meanings of the word unity— $\tauὸ\ \epsilon\nu$ —which were perilous to the Eleatic dialectic, and have haunted metaphysics ever since, we now get another.

In addition to "oneness" and "simplicity," we now have the idea of "unifiedness," which means that we must conceive the world as a unity in plurality, neither the unity engendering the plurality, nor *vice versa*. This condition corresponds best, indeed corresponds entirely, to the nature of our own intellect. Every state of consciousness, whether the apparently simplest perception or the most abstract thought, contains a plurality and, as it has different elements, a diversity of content; and this is combined by a form into a real and indivisible unity. Kant described the nature of this synthesis, in which neither form produces content, nor content form. Indeed, this unification of the content by the form is the typical structure of consciousness. If we conceive the world as unity of the manifold according to this model of the synthesis in our own consciousness, as the Leibnitzian Monadology requires, we see the real and profound affinity of Leibnitz and Kant. It is the root of the influence of the *Nouveaux Essais* upon criticism which begins with the *Inaugural Dissertation* and extends over the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In the metaphysical development of this in Monadology we get the relation of the part to the whole and the principle of the equality of the part to the whole. The universe is unity in plurality in the sense that each of its parts is equal to the whole and therefore to all the others. But equality does not mean identity. We get identity rather (as we saw above) in modern Atomism, since all the primary substances are qualitatively equal and indistinguishable, and differ only in position, which is quite immaterial and unessential to them. Monadology, on the contrary, represents that each substantial being—they are called monads precisely in this sense—is a peculiar form, not capable of repetition, of unification of the same for all equal contents of the world. This takes equally into account the universalistic and the individualistic element on the one hand, and the henistic and pluralistic on the other. The same life-content of the universe is supposed to be bound up in each of its parts in a peculiar

and original combination into a special unity. Hence all these parts are equal to the whole and to each other; and each has its own being. The equality and unity are in the content; the variety and multiplicity are in the form of combination. Each part is therefore a mirror of the world of special character and shade; each individual is the universe in little, a microcosm. It is characteristic that the one amongst modern thinkers who is nearest to Leibnitz, Lotze, gave this title, *The Microcosm*, to the most significant of his works.

Leibnitz calls this system "Pre-established Harmony," and it assumes that everything is present or "represented" everywhere in everything. But how can a substance be in, or represented in, others? There is only one way of imagining this by means of an element of our experience; one substance is represented in another when this "presents" it. The double meaning of *représenter* and *représentation*, which Leibnitz fully recognises, has a quite sound foundation. The world, the sum-total of the other monads, is contained and represented in each in the sense that it mirrors the world. Hence the monads must be conceived as psychic beings. The content of their presentation is everywhere the same—the universe; they differ in the intensity of presentation, on which depends the measure in which this content is in each case associated in a conscious unity.

We will not consider here the difficulties which beset this able and ingenious theory. We need only point out an element of our experience which is calculated to give us a concrete example of this abstract view. We often speak of the mind of the people, or the spirit of the times, or the civilised consciousness. What spiritual reality do we mean by this? On reflection we do not mean that this "spirit of the nation," etc., is a substantial reality, a being outside of and above the individuals. We mean a unified life-content which is common to a mass of thinking and willing individuals. This common thing, however, is felt and understood by each only in his own way. He experiences it in his consciousness according as his profession, age, position, development,

etc., but especially his personal disposition, enables him to do so. Much of this general content is quite unknown to one individual, while another endeavours half-consciously to get at the heart of it. Few have a full consciousness of it, and even amongst these few some have more and some less. The whole is not completely represented in its full extent and strength in any one individual. Even great individuals, like Goethe and Bismarck, who represent their times *in nuce*, are only distinguished by the fact that what constitutes the really valuable common element of life comes to full consciousness or conscious activity in them. Yet all these individuals, whose minds represent restricted and separate segments of the common life-content, lead a common and unified life, which, in its continuous gradation and the interlacing of its various parts, forms a connected whole. That is a unity in plurality known to us all, in which we constantly experience the meaning of Monadology.

Monadology leads us to conceive substances as perceptive beings, and thus helps us to understand the qualitative relations of being which we have to consider later. But before we do so, we have to deal with the other aspect of quantitative problems of being, the question of the *size* of the real. Appreciation of the sizes of things in the phenomenal world is, firstly, a matter of impressions in which we always make a comparison of experiences. The fact that we are restricted to making comparisons is the most important element, both really and methodically. We pass confident judgments on largeness and smallness, and are quite able to say whether the differences in size are comparatively great or slight. But in order to have a quite definite and useful estimate of sizes we need *measurement*, an act of enumeration, which expresses how often a certain unity of mass is contained as a part in a whole. Such a numerical determination of size has only one possible form: comparison of spans of space. In all measuring it is, directly or indirectly, laid down how many times the mass which

is selected for each special form of measuring is contained in a given whole. Thus we measure magnitudes of space, and even of time, by the motion of uniformly moving bodies; and, in the third place, we measure magnitudes of intensity—forces, etc.—by the spans of space over which their action is distributed, heat by the expansion of bodies, and so on. How we do this, and how it is justified, is an important subject of methodological consideration in the various sciences. In general one has to bear in mind that all this depends on definite and already acquired knowledge; that our assumptions run more or less in a circle; and that the unity of mass is in all cases arbitrary and conventional. We have to know the expansion of bodies by heat in order to measure heat by them. We have to know Ohm's law of electro-magnetic resistance in order to measure the magnetic-electric force by the movements on the dial. For the numerical determination of magnitudes of time we need bodies in uniform motion, and we cannot know that a body is in uniform motion except by comparison with another of which it holds good, and so on. Nothing but a complete uniformity of movement of all such bodies (and we may notice incidentally that our clocks go more uniformly than cosmic bodies, for instance, the earth round the sun) could guarantee the truth of these assumptions. Even in measurement of space the unit is arbitrary; a foot or a yard, or some scientific convention like the metre, which is the ten-millionth part of a quadrant of the earth between the Equator and the North Pole. For the measurement of intensive magnitudes, such as heat, light, sound, etc., the units have always to be determined on the strength of previous knowledge.

We see that there are really many small or large problems in this apparently simple matter of measuring, but we note especially that in the case of magnitudes the action of which cannot be represented by comparative stretches of space, no measurement—no numerical expression of the magnitude—is possible. This is true, in spite of all the work of the psycho-physicists, of

psychic magnitudes. The intensity of feelings and volitions is so far from measurable, even indirectly, that it has no intelligible or useful meaning to use an analogical expression (as we do in daily life) and say, for instance, that a particular pain, say a toothache, is twice, three times, or ten times as great as another. It further follows that even in corporeal things there are no absolute determinations of size; that all measurements are relative, since they are related to an arbitrarily chosen standard. In recent natural philosophy the most desperate efforts are made to justify the unprovable assumptions which are made in determining the constancy of the speed of light and its position in regard to the relativity of all measurements of movements.

Hence when we speak of the magnitude of the genuinely real, we refer, not to a numerical and comparative determination that we reach by measurement, but to the question, to be solved intellectually, whether the real, the magnitude of which plainly transcends all our ability to measure and count, is in its totality finite or infinite. In this respect human thought has, during the comparatively short time in which we can review its historical development, experienced a very interesting change, a reversal; and axiological elements have had just as much to do as theoretical with this change. That the primary reality, the substantial being of the world, must be infinite was very early seen by purely theoretical thought. Thales was driven by the metaphysical impulse *ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον*—to the infinite sea. The chief point which urged him to seek the primary matter in water was the thought, which coloured also his imagination, of the life-element of his people and race, the sea with its ceaseless movement, with its unlimited possibilities of change, upheaving and swallowing up the land, creating and destroying it. Anaximenes at a later date similarly looked to the infinite ocean of air, which plays about everything, for the primary matter. Between the two Anaximander gave intellectual expression to the fact that the world-stuff, the One, that must be all, must be conceived as infinite, as otherwise it would be ex-

hausted in the infinite transformations and generations. That this Infinitism (as we call the theory of the infinity of the world) is necessarily connected with Singularism was recognised by one of the later Eleatics, Melissos, when he said that any limitation that is supposed to exist in the One would have to be due to a second being. A limited being cannot be the sole being. Melissos was in this more consistent than the founders of the Eleatic School, Xenophanes or Parmenides. When these represented being as the rounded globe of the universe, they were expressing a thoroughly Greek idea. All that is real has form and shape, so even the highest reality, the most perfect and true reality, must have a shape. Only something definite and complete in this way is real; the infinite, the unfinished or undefined, is never real. The infinite is not only inconceivable to us, undetachable to the mind's eye, but it is so in itself; and an incomplete thing of this kind ought not to be called reality, least of all the true and highest reality. Hence for the Eleatics and their followers infinite space was non-entity. The infinite in this sense is merely the possible, the unfinished; yet this indefinite possibility is the condition of the phenomenal world. Thus the Pythagoreans conceived the universe as the drawing in or pouring out of empty space by the world-force; and the Atomists represented infinite space as that in which things moved. The real itself always has an outline, whether *ιδέαι* or *σχήματα*, forms or shapes. Hence the unlimited coincides once more with the indefinite, and we understand how the Greek word *ὅρος* could mean both limit and conceptual feature. Qualitative indefiniteness also belongs to unlimited space; it means the dark, the empty, nothing. Thus Plato says of this non-entity, empty space, that it can be neither perceived nor thought, and is totally unimaginable, yet it must serve all things as the possibility of shaping (*ἐκμαγεῖν*), the receiver (*δεξαμένη*); because they, in their secondary reality, are a mixture of the unlimited and limitation. For Aristotle, also, matter, as pure possibility, is the unlimited and indefinite, whereas the truly real is to be

sought in the pure form, in God, and in the entelechies as individual definite and limited beings. All these theories, which have rightly been regarded as a connecting link between Greek science and Greek art, are undoubtedly due to the form-loving character of the Greek mind. The Greek is a creature of eye. He lives with the eye. All his knowledge is vision, the perception of a figure. His arts are those of the eye; arts that delight in form, or in which the finite things of reality lead the life of the blessed.

Ancient thought thus regards the limited as the genuinely real, and ascribes to the infinite only a secondary existence of imperfect, incomplete reality. Since the Alexandrian age all this has been changed. Religious motives had a good deal to do with this. The Greek gods were compact, luminous shapes. As time went on, the Deity retreated further and further. What lay beyond the world of experience became more and more remote, strange, mysterious, shapeless, and inexpressible, until at last the God of "negative theology," without properties, the unbounded and indefinite One, was reached. In addition to this, in the mystical school deep religious interest came to regard the will, both in man and God, as the highest and last reality. The intellect is the limited and definite: the will the unlimited and indefinite. Hence absolute will was conceived as the omnipotence of God, and man ascribed a certain measure of it to himself; he had a feeling that his will was unrestricted. A man can will or wish anything whatever. That is what Descartes means when he says that the will, in its indefiniteness and unlimitedness, is the God-like force, the Divine, in man. When in this standard form of modern metaphysics infinite substance is opposed to finite substances, the finiteness consists in the limitation of extension or consciousness; but in their unbounded will spiritual substances have a reflex of the divine infinity. We have thus become entirely familiar with thinking and speaking of infinity as the essential thing in God, the absolute reality, and of phenomenal things as the finite.

Yet even in the time when the contrast of God and the world was most emphatic, it was possible to regard the totality of finite things as something infinite. The transcendental theory of Deism favoured this view. Even in Aristotle, who first expressly formulated the transmundane character of the Deity, the world, it is true, was supposed to be a limited sphere in point of space; but he admitted no limit of time. It was in the dogmatic theories of a later age of monotheistic religion, in the form of ideas of a beginning and end of the world, creation and last judgment, that finiteness of time played a great part. The Pantheistic reaction of Neo-Platonism, on the other hand, emphasised the point, since the Renaissance, that if the All is infinite and God is identical with the universe, even this form of his appearance, representation, or expression must also be infinite. Nicholas of Cusa, however, had already deduced from this that, if we pay attention to value in the distinction between essence and existence, being and appearance, the infinity of the universe must be different from, and inferior to, that of the Deity. He therefore distinguished between the *Infinitum* and the *Interminatum*, as others have since distinguished between positive and negative, or good and bad (Hegel), infinity. The infinity of God implies that he is raised above time and space, or at least outside of time and space, or that no space and time predicates can be applied to him; but the infinity of the world means boundlessness in space and time. In this sense the divine predicate of timelessness and spacelessness, or eternity, must be carefully distinguished from the idea of a duration in time without beginning or end. Ordinary phraseology, when it contrasts time and eternity, almost always means the wrong infinity, boundless duration; the idea of eternity in the sense of real infinity is very rarely understood.

In the singularistic idea of God the postulates of infinity have so far come to be taken for granted that we hardly see any problem in them at all. When, therefore, we speak of the antitheses of Finitism and Infinitism, we raise the question what we are to make of

the limits of the world as the totality of finite things in time and space. As is well known, these antitheses have been discussed by Kant in the *Antinomies of Pure Reason* from the point of view that the question is wrongly put, or it is at least represented as lying beyond man's capacity, since the two contradictory answers of Finitism and Infinitism are equally demonstrable and equally refutable. We must emphasise the fact that the problem here refers to the reality of time and space, and that the infinity of time and space is assumed without contention.

This infinity of time and space is not a fact of direct experience, but it is a natural presupposition of all the experiences by means of which we believe that we know something of phenomenal reality. What we perceive in detail is always a limited portion of space. The infinity of space is not experienced, even in the vast distances of astronomy. The latter are immeasurably and inexpressibly large phenomena, yet they are always relative, and we can always imagine vaster spaces beyond them. The infinity of space itself, which we do not directly experience, goes with its unity or oneness, which is also an assumption developed in the mind on the strength of separate perceptions. In this Singularism and Infinitism coincide.

The connectedness of all our fleeting perceptions of portions of space in one and the same field of vision, or the location of various perceptions of touch in one and the same space-sphere of touch, is our first step toward the formation of the idea of the oneness and unity of space. The co-operation of vision and touch, which are the two constitutive senses for the idea of space, leads us to identify the space of vision with the space of touch. The ordinary man regards this coincidence as an outcome of the experiences which he had in the earliest and most instructive years of his life, when he discovered the identity of surrounding objects and his own limbs which he touched with the same objects and limbs as he saw them. That no such identification arises spontaneously is seen in the case of those born

blind, who have to learn it. Then we locate all our successive experiences of space—here and there, yesterday and to-day—in one and the same general space; everything in the nature of space that we perceive is a part of this. And in ordinary life we identify also the various experiences of space that different individuals have; and in this identification of all as the same one infinite space, it loses the central point which each individual space had in the perceiving personality, and thus becomes infinite. Whatever experience of space anybody ever has belongs to the same one infinite space. But this oneness and identity are not directly perceived. They are postulated; though many men are never conscious of the postulate, and it is only perceived when one remembers that every attempt to find a position or direction in space has at the base of it the assumption of relations to the whole. That is precisely what Kant meant when he spoke of the apriority of the idea of space. It does not mean a kind of psychological apriority, as if we brought into the world with us an idea of some unbounded giant box into which everything in the world was packed. It means this fact, that, when we speak of contiguity, or of a limited span of space, or even of a limit which separates an enclosed space from what encloses it, we must always *assume* that these mutually limiting things, or the enclosed and the enclosing, are parts of one and the same infinite space. Thus this assumption of one infinite space always includes the metaphysical postulate that the world is a unity.

These observations apply also in part to time. The oneness and infinity of time is not a matter of direct perception, but a genuine assumption that lies at the root of our perceptions, and is due to the idea that all being and happening really belong to a single world. What the individual directly experiences is always a detached number of finite time-magnitudes and relations. For each person his individual ("subjective") time consists in the sum-total of his states of consciousness, which differ from each other in their contents. These separate elements join on to each other; for instance,

the moment of awakening and the moment of going to sleep. It is only by daily life and conversation that we learn that between the several elements of our experience there was other time, and in some cases considerable intervals of time. Here again we have a synthesis of the various directly experienced portions of time into one infinite time, of which all time-magnitudes and relations perceived by all persons are parts. It is only because bodily movements, which are fundamentally determined by passage through continuous stretches of space, also belong to what is arranged in this common objective time, that the element of continuity is superimposed upon the discontinuous idea of time which we got from our original experience. It is most important to understand clearly that there is here an essential difference between the idea of space and the idea of time. The unity of space is in itself one of continuous progress, but the experience of time is one of separate acts of consciousness, the combination of which into the familiar course of time only assumes a character of continuity which is analogous to that of space. Hence we understand how in recent times Bergson (though partly for an opposite reason) found in the space-like conception of time the fundamental error of all naturalistic psychology and metaphysics. In any case we can now recognise that the completely parallel, twin-like treatment which time and space have had in philosophy since Leibnitz and Kant must not be regarded as beyond question.

A further element of distinction between the two is the difference of their relation to the idea of the empty. Of empty space we all have a long-standing idea, and with this we picture to ourselves the changes of position of things in space. This assumption, however, is not indispensable. Not only the scientific successors of the Eleatics, but Descartes and his school also, and especially certain theories of the latest natural philosophy, have rejected empty space, and have therefore to conceive each individual movement as a fragment of a total movement. But when Kant says (in

the proofs of his transcendental æsthetics) that we can think of everything out of time and space, but cannot think away time and space themselves, this "necessity" is true for space, but not for time. An entirely empty time is absolutely unthinkable. If we fill up the intervals between the separate elements of our individual time with the events given in the objective world by the motion of bodies—if our estimate of time-lengths or of the speed of any movements, or of the shortness or length of a period of time, is always based upon comparisons of the changes experienced in ourselves and in other things, we have the idea of absolute time as it was defined by Newton—*tempus est quod æquabiliter fluit*—united with the assumption that certain uniform movements occur in it. If this movement and all happening were to cease, time would not be empty; it would disappear. We cannot speak literally of empty time, but only, on the analogy of empty space, of time which we do not know to be filled with movements or other processes, but for which we tacitly assume some such processes.

For ordinary purposes, however, space and time are, in an analogous way, presuppositions for existence; and, as all reality occurs to us as full space or full time, and empty space and time are at the base of it as possibilities, the one infinite is, as ever, the prerequisite for the manifold finite. Empty space and time are a great nothing which is nevertheless required as a basis for all; two great nothings without which we cannot conceive any reality. Quite apart from the naïve ideas of space and time as two vast boxes which are partly filled with the individual and finite, we often find this nothing not only turned into a reality, but even into a real power. In the mechanical theory it is the size of the empty space between two atoms which determines the measure of their mutual attraction or repulsion; and in this we have the motives for all the attempts to conceive this empty space as filled with ether or something of the kind. It is popularly supposed that time slows down the motion of a body,

whereas this is due to friction or something similar. We also speak of the destructive action of time, or the "healing hand of time," and so on, whereas it is reality alone which brings about these results in the course of time. The hand of time belongs really to the things which are *in* time.

These reflections naturally lead to the question whether space and time as such—that is to say, empty space and time as something to be filled with beings and events—have a metaphysical reality of their own. Opposed to the naïve idea which finds expression in this question we find in scientific discussion—in Aristotle, for instance—a disposition to treat space and time as relations or aspects of the real, the existing, or the event. But that always leads to a feeling of scepticism about our postulate of the unity and identity of the world, which are expressed in the idea of one infinite empty space and one infinite empty time.

Hence Leibnitz and Kant saw no alternative but the philosophic theory that both are forms of perception, not metaphysical realities in the naïve sense. In favour of this—to touch lightly on these noetic problems at this stage—is the fact that the problems of continuity and emptiness seem to be antitheses of perception and its needs, not realities, and that infinity in particular, conceived in the nature of a function, seems to require no longer the idea of an unfinished or incomplete reality. On the other hand, however, one may well ask whether the problems have not been evaded rather than solved by relegating them to the subjective field. For individual magnitudes of space and time are certainly given as phenomenal reality, and indeed as different apparent realities. If we now assume that as such they have, not a metaphysical, but only a phenomenal reality, we have to ascribe to them in the true reality just so many and diverse relations; and if we grant that we have no knowledge of such real relations, it follows that, as in every system of quantities, this unknowable multiplicity of true relations also involves the problems of continuity and discontinuity, as well as the problems

of finiteness and infinity. Hence by this duplication of the principles that are involved we gain in the sense that we can conceive analogous features in true reality to the phenomenal magnitudes of space and time, but we gain nothing in regard to the problems which prompted this phenomenological evasion. The problems are, in other words, not solved, but put back into the unknown.

Another line of thought amidst the mass of difficulties that arise in this field must be considered. The phenomenal nature of space has been affirmed at various periods in the history of philosophy, and it has suited the spiritualist systems of metaphysics which we will see in discussing qualitative problems. On the other hand, the phenomenal nature of time has rarely been affirmed and is much more difficult to sustain. It at once encounters the objection that the interconnection of the psychic states and activities has, though no spatial aspect, yet certainly a time-relation. It has then to meet the graver difficulty that all the changes, in part changes into the opposite of the properties of things, which now seem to us natural enough when distributed over different periods of time, become explicit contradictions if we are to attribute them as properties to the same substance with no discontinuity of time. The *coincidentia oppositorum* may suit a mystic view of the unity of the world, but it will not do for the intellectual conception of the multiplicity of real existence. In fine, the metaphysical reality of time seems to lack any proper relation to the will. Since all action and willing is directed to the future, it seems to become illusory the moment the time-change is struck out of the nature of things. A world without time would be one in which there would be nothing more to do; a world from which the will, with all its effort, with its satisfaction just as much as its restless unsatisfaction, would be excluded as quite meaningless.

On the other hand, this attempt to conceive the metaphysical reality of time brings out, precisely in connection with the will, the whole difficulty of the antithesis

of Finitism and Infinitism. The idea of Finitism implies an end of time, and therefore an end of happening, change, and volition. Infinitism, on the contrary, opens out a view of an infinite series of events in infinite time, and therefore implies that the will can never come to rest. These ideas will be, respectively, congenial to different men according to temperament. But if we look closely at them, we find it difficult to say which idea is the more intolerable: that of an absolute rest or that of a never-ending restlessness of the will. Both elements have their emotional value in relation to the finite time-aspects of empirical reality and our varying experience of it. At one time rest is welcome after long unrest; though it is tolerable only if it does not last too long. By others the struggle, even if it does not attain its end, is gladly welcomed; yet if such a state of things is conceived absolutely, it threatens to make the will itself illusory. Thus we see that the things which are certainly real in the finite world of experience become impossibilities the moment they are converted into absolute realities by metaphysical thought.

Another form of the antithesis of Finitism and Infinitism relates to the mass or the number of reality in the world, whether we think of atoms, elements, entelechies, monads, real entities, and so on. Here again the immeasurability and uncountability are facts, and the problem can therefore only be solved by theories or dialectical arguments. The ancients generally leaned toward Finitism in this matter. In modern times, for the reasons we have given above, Infinitism is predominant; though there are theories, such as Dühring's metaphysics or Renouvier's Neocriticism, which run on the lines of Finitism.

The arguments oppose each other much as in the case of space and time, and here again we perceive the great mathematical difficulties which arise from the idea of definite infinity or of infinities differing from each other. The layman can understand it by a simple illustration. If we imagine a line $a-b$ prolonged beyond b to infinity, this infinite line is longer in one direction than in the

other. In pure thought that seems to be an insoluble contradiction, yet it is quite inevitable.

In this case succession in events is most important. Infinitism grants that it is possible for the series of causes to have a starting-point, though this is by no means necessary; on the contrary, it seems to be improbable. Finitism, on the other hand, is compelled by the mathematical principles of probability to say that the group of elements of reality which is regarded as the initial stage must, after an indefinitely great but always finite period of time, be repeated. Hence the Finitist systems of antiquity taught "universal restoration," or the return of every state of things; and the poet Nietzsche gave an ethical turn to a reminiscence of this in his last years. Whether the impressive enforcement of responsibility which is involved in this attains its end must, when we examine the matter closely, be pronounced very improbable. For if the state of the will is to be repeated an infinite number of times, it must have already occurred an infinite number of times, and it thus assumes a fatalistic character, the dread of repetition being neutralised by the paralysing feeling of inevitability.

Antinomies of this kind appear if, in this case, we conceive the number of the masses as finite and the time as infinite; and we get other antinomies according to the various ways in which we may apply finiteness and infinity to space, time, and number of realities. Instead of going on with these, we will pass to another general consideration. In order to clear up these antinomies we may, as Kant did, point to the mutual antagonism of our means of knowledge, the senses and the understanding. The difficulty is that this may be done with quite the opposite effect. On the one side it is pointed out that everything perceived by the senses represents, in its vast diversity, something indefinite, stretching out beyond itself on every side; while the understanding is the principle of conceptual determination, of a mind arranged and limited in itself according to the categories as the forms of its synthesis. On the other side it may be affirmed that the know-

ledge we get from the presentations of sense always gives us a finite and definite shape, and that it is only the reflection of the intelligence upon this that, in its independence and spontaneity, has no limits. However that may be, we see that the ontic problems lead us on to the genetic on the one hand and to the noetic on the other.

§ 4

The Qualitative Determinations of Reality.—Original and derivative properties—Primary and secondary qualities—Quantitative outlook of men of science—The material world and consciousness—The soul as vital force and vehicle of consciousness—Intellectualism, Voluntarism, and Emotionalism—The Unconscious—Psychophysical parallelism—Materialism and spiritualism (idealism)—Theoretical and axiological duality—Monism.

Apparent reality exhibits an infinite variety of properties by means of which things differ from each other, and which even in the same things are constantly changing. It is just this latter fact, that one and the same thing presents itself with one property at one time and another property at another, this fact of *ἀλλοίωσις*, which gives rise to the question about the genuine and true qualities of the real. If we first consider the matter within the limits of experience, we have already frequently seen how our mind is accustomed to distinguish the persistent properties of things as the original from the variable properties as derivative. The chemical correction of the naïve idea of a thing, the discovery of the elements, was guided by this aim. Things which arise by the mixture or combination of elements have quite different properties from those of their constituents. We know that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen in a certain proportion, yet we find in water entirely different physical and chemical properties from those of the gases which compose it. In this we assume, and probably have a right to assume, that the properties of the compound bodies arise from

those of their constituents, and that the proportions in which they are combined are of importance. But, however confident we are of this dependence in principle, it is extraordinarily difficult to grasp and explain *in concreto*. No one can say why combination gives us a body of this particular colour, taste, or smell. We can only establish the fact; and this inability of the intelligence or of deduction applies also to such properties as crystallisation, atomic weight, melting-point, electrical behaviour, etc. Even our modern theories of atomic structure do not make these things clear, and we are, in principle, no further advanced than Empedocles was when he said that each single thing receives its properties from a combination of the four elements—fire, air, water, and earth—and that the blood, for instance, has the advantage of being the finest and most perfect of such mixtures; yet Empedocles was quite unable to show how certain combinations led to certain sets of properties.

It is important, however, to have this reference to the quantitative conditions of the combination. From this we get the constant effort of men of science to reduce even the qualitative differences of the properties of things to quantitative. The tendency has even led to an attempt to explain the reality of the material properties of things by relating them to the variety of our organs of perception, our senses. To each sense is allotted a certain group of qualities, which belong exclusively to it and to which it is restricted. Thus colours belong to the eye in so far as no other sense can experience them, and, on the other hand, the sensation which is peculiar to the eye is called colour. The ear has the same relation to sounds, the nose to odours, and so on. This relation has been called the specific energy of the sense-organs, and modern physiology partly explains it, on evolutionary lines, by the adaptation of the peripheral endings of the sensory nerves to receive and conduct certain movements which provide the proper stimulation for those organs—light-waves for the eye, sound-waves for the ear, and so on. Even ancient thinkers drew a distinction

between these specific qualities of the various senses and the perceptions of spatial form, position, and corporeal movement, which are common to all. It is true that they belong primarily to sight and touch, but in a secondary way they are connected also with the work of the other senses. Hence it was assumed that there was a "common sense" (*κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον*, *sensus communis*), and to this was attributed a higher value than to the qualities of the special senses. In regard to the latter it was early perceived that they represented, not properties inherent in the things themselves, but their action upon the perceiving mind. It was therefore necessary to correct popular language, which describes even pleasantness and unpleasantness as properties of things, whereas in this case it is clear that they are merely effects of things upon beings that can perceive and feel. The Pythagoreans seem to have been the first to see that it is the same with musical notes; but since Protagoras, Democritus, and Plato the subjectivity of all specific sense-qualities has been generally recognised; and, although in the Middle Ages it was put aside in favour of Aristotle's contrary view, it was restored at the beginning of modern times by the leaders of science, Kepler, Galilei, Descartes, and Hobbes, and was formulated by Locke and Robert Boyle as the distinction between *primary* and *secondary* qualities.

This theory is confirmed by our increasing acquaintance with the regular correlation between the movements that serve as stimuli and the sensations they provoke. The best known instance is the connection between musical notes and the period of vibration of the strings, or the waves in the air. We must admit that these connections can only be established as facts; they cannot be understood. The dependence of the quality on the quantity is a synthetic, not an analytic, matter. No one can tell why the sensation of red is produced by 450 billion ether-vibrations per second, or the sensation of blue by 640 billion per second. This actual co-ordination is, however, the basis of the scientific theory that only quantitative deter-

minations belong absolutely and primarily to the nature of reality, while the qualitative belong, being relative and secondary, to its appearance in consciousness. Objectively, for instance, the reality is a chord vibrating at a certain rate; subjectively I can see, hear, and in a sense, with the finger-tip, feel the vibration. A colour is a real property of a body only in the sense that it indicates a certain configuration of the body's surface, in virtue of which it reflects predominantly a particular kind of light-waves. According to this "night-theory" (as Fechner called it) the physical world is in itself colourless and soundless, merely an empty movement of atoms in space; all the varied vitality, with which it speaks to us, means merely a phenomenon developing in the perceptive consciousness.

If we seek the motives on which, especially in recent times, this choice between equal elements of perception and this difference in appreciating the qualitative and quantitative are based, we find the chief in the requirements of mathematical theory, which needs measurable magnitudes and therefore regards that as real which is capable of being expressed in quantitative formulæ. Kepler, Leonardo, and Galilei have expressly said this; and Descartes (in his sixth *Meditation*) has laid it down that, in the case of bodies, that is true which a man can conceive intellectually—*clare et distincte*—not in vague imagination—*obscuræ et confuse*.

Thus the right to make the choice sends us back to scientific theory, and we understand that it will not be recognised by men who have not an exclusive interest in this, or may not have any interest at all. Hence the above "night-theory" was opposed by Kant and Goethe, though for different reasons. Kant regarded space and time determinations only as modes of perception of the human mind, and therefore as mere phenomena. Goethe, in his theory of colour, pitted life against theory, attributing as much reality to these qualities as to the quantitative properties which we learn by abstraction. The typical contrast is seen in his detestation of Newton, and it may be traced in

the favour which his theory of colour found with such antipodal thinkers as Hegel and Schopenhauer, and even with natural philosophers of the Schelling school such as Fechner.

The whole controversy, however, presupposes on every side that, for there to be any appearance, there must not only be something that appears, but someone to whom it appears. Thus the reality of consciousness, the inner side of reality, is the completion of the various views as to what is being and what is appearance in physical properties. In this it is assumed that in *consciousness* there is a totally different qualification, and therefore a totally different reality, than in the material world; and from this fact we get the chief questions and antitheses in the philosophic theories of the quality of the real.

In a realistic and literally substantive view of the matter consciousness is called the soul, and the inquiry is consequently directed to a study of the relations of soul and body. We find the origin of the idea of soul in the riddle of life. The distinction between the living and non-living is certainly, as one notices in the case of quite young children, original and extraordinarily vivid. It is based upon the fact that a thing seems to us to be alive when it moves, without this movement appearing to be a continuation of some other movement. The non-living and the dead move only when the movement is imparted by another. The living thing, on the contrary, has the power of self-movement, and the principle of this spontaneous movement is called the soul. Even in Plato's arguments in the *Phædro* or the *Laws*, we plainly see this primitive connection. On them is based, amongst all peoples, the idea that the vital force may, as sleep and death indicate, leave the body, return to it, or definitely abandon it; that it is therefore something quite distinct from the body, which is merely its temporary residence.

But when this principle of life leaves the body, it takes with it, apparently, its capacity for all such functions as presentation, feeling, desire—in a word, all mental

operations. The sleeping, and especially the dead, body shows no further trace of the phenomena which we are accustomed to regard as the expression or the consequence of states of consciousness. Hence the idea of the soul contains from the start the two characters of *vital force* and *basis of consciousness*; two features which are closely related as capacities for sense-directed, purposive action. These two elements, however, which were originally combined in the thought of primitive peoples, have diverged more and more from each other in the course of scientific research. Aristotle's three-fold division of the vegetative, animal, and human soul cuts off the vital force as a lower level from the mind, and the Neo-Platonists expressly distinguished between two souls, one (also called *ψύσις*) related to the physical world, the other, the soul proper, related to the hyper-physical world. In the Middle Ages this dualism, which regards the vital force as entirely belonging to the body and the true soul as pertaining to the supra-sensible world, was held especially by the mystics of St. Victor; and it later became a fixed custom in speech to represent the soul (*mens*, *spiraculum*, the "spark") only as the possessor of consciousness, while the vital force, or rather vital forces (*spiritus animales*), stood for purely corporeal things or forces. This is familiar also in the philosophy of Descartes.

But the vital force became in the course of time less and less necessary for the purposes of scientific research. Many of the apparently spontaneous movements turned out to be due to outside influence. This destruction of the primitive "Animism," the exclusion of the soul from nature by science, has often been complained of by poets:

Where now, our wiser modern men relate,
Revolves a ball of flame without a soul,
Once Helios in tranquil pomp of state
Drove o'er the sky his chariot of gold.

So Schiller said in his *Gods of Greece*. The substitution of physical and chemical forces for souls has, in fact,

made continuous progress even in the science of the organic world. The more it succeeds, the more confidently it is assumed that even in organic movements we have no other forces and laws than those which we find in the inorganic world. Although, however, there has been no lack of attempts to prove this as a general truth, it has never been accomplished, and we are not surprised that the vital force continues to haunt even serious science. It is all very well to talk about ions and electrons, dominants and determinants, but vitalistic theories are always returning to the old feeling that some peculiar principle accounts for the unity of the living organism. The general tendency of science, however, is to put the vital force more and more out of the field. At times, in fact, it has looked as if the same fate, a sentence of superfluity, must fall upon the soul even in its second character, as bearer of consciousness. But even if it came to this—we shall return to the point later—we should have to admit that this psychic life of consciousness had a reality of its own, different from material reality.

Here we have the second province of reality, and it exhibits just as innumerable a variety of qualities as the physical world does. Whatever the thing or substance, the "soul," may be, it certainly has countless properties; and in this case they are rather in the nature of functions, or present themselves to us as capacities, powers, forces, activities, etc. In face of this variety we again find attempts to distinguish between essential and unessential, original and derivative properties, and to separate the substantiality of the soul from its relative and temporary expressions and effects. It is, as in the case of the outer world, a sort of simplification of the world in thought. In this connection we have first the antithesis of *intellectualist* and *voluntarist psychology*. The old controversy of the Scholastics—*utra potentia major sit, intellectus an voluntas?*—is always with us, and each side has a large number of arguments. When one reflects that each activity of consciousness is directed to a content, which has to be presented, even

if it is an object of feeling or will, we see that the presentations are fundamental functions, and the activities of feeling and will only strains or relations between the presentations and therefore dependent on them. That is the main idea of intellectualist psychology, which Herbart introduced from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth. If, on the other hand, the fact is emphasised that consciousness, as activity, differs from corporeal movement in being *willed*, we get the will as the fundamental function and presentation as the incidental method by which it objectifies itself. Voluntarist psychology of this kind was involved in the entire scheme of thought which developed in the German philosophy founded by Kant, and it found its typical expression in Schopenhauer's system. In fine, we have an attempt to reconcile these opposing theories in modern Emotionalism, which takes feeling to be the primary phenomenon and tries to show that will and presentation are equally implicit in this, and develop from it in continual relation to each other. That is pretty much the idea of Herbert Spencer; and it, perhaps, comes nearest to the truth if it is meant in the sense that the three fundamental functions are not isolated activities or strata of action, but different aspects of one and the same living being and activity.

Without this supposition the anti-intellectualist theories of modern psychology lead to a peculiar dialectic and to the self-destruction of their fundamental idea. If, for instance, presentation is regarded as the outcome of a fundamental function of the will or of feeling, this fundamental function itself must be something unconscious. Now this theory of unconscious psychic states or activities, to which many other elements of psychological science have pointed for more than a century, and which is now so strong that to-day the unconscious is often taken to be the very basis of psychic life and the region of consciousness is regarded as merely a superstructure on this foundation, is in plain opposition with the results of historical development, which always regarded consciousness (*cogitatio*) as the

essential, if not the only essential, thing in the definition of the soul. If we are to frame a new definition of the soul, we must bear in mind that the unconscious is, from the nature of the case, never experienced, never given in thought, but merely assumed hypothetically for the explanation of processes and states of consciousness which seem otherwise quite incomprehensible. This hypothesis, therefore, ought to be used only when it is altogether impossible to assume psychic realities as the conditions of those conscious states which are supposed to be explained by unconscious. In this there are methodical and real difficulties, if not impossibilities, which are mainly responsible for the imperfect condition of psychological science. They have also a metaphysical bearing in the sense that in the last resort they impel us to set up a third province, the region of the unconscious, beside those of the physical and the psychical; a region which would coincide with neither of the others, but have a separate reality, although it, being from the nature of the case not given in consciousness, can only be assumed, in regard to its contents, on the analogy of one of the other provinces, the psychical.

Apart from these difficulties, which have as yet little to do with general ideas and have received very scant attention from empirical psychologists, consciousness (*cogitatio*) is by the overwhelming majority of people regarded as *the* attribute of psychic activity; not "thought," in the one-sided intellectualist sense which is often given to it by inaccurate translation, but in the sense in which Descartes and Spinoza sufficiently indicated it, by enumeration and reflection, as the indefinable, ultimate, common element in all such activities as sensation, judgment, deduction, feeling, choice, desire, etc. And this is something quite different from bodies with their quantitative properties. Hence the Cartesian distinction, based upon the naïve idea of individual substances, between *res extensæ* and *res cogitantes*, bodies and souls or minds, is in complete agreement with the general belief, and there is no difficulty in thinking with Spinoza that extension and consciousness, or with Neo-

Spinozism that matter and spirit, are entirely separate attributes of the Deity. They represent the ultimate general concepts of abstraction working logically upon the multiplicity of qualities; beyond them abstraction comes only to an empty "something," the indefinite substance, the mere form of the category. In our knowledge of the world, however, the dualism remains, whether we put it as an antithesis of body and spirit, sensible and suprasensible, or material and immaterial. These things mean two really different and distinct provinces of perceptible reality; and in conformity with them we have, in general usage, distinguished two formally different kinds of perception and perceptive knowledge, the *outer* and the *inner sense*. Under the names of "sensation" and "reflection" Locke thought that he had reduced the metaphysical dualism of the Cartesian theory of substances to an innocent psychological dualism, presumably based upon the nature of knowledge. He calls the objects of knowledge of the inner and outer sense the "cogitative" and "non-cogitative" substances.

Now, what is the relation to each other of these two kinds of qualitatively defined reality? Can the mind rest content with the dualism? For the prescientific mind this dualism is a matter of course; but in scientific thought, and still more in philosophy, one of the fundamental ideas is, as we have seen, that of the unity of the world, the unifying impulse. It has, naturally, to be brought to bear upon this question, and this means that we must try to reduce the two kinds of reality to some sort of unity. This may be done either by regarding one of them as original and essential and the other as a phenomenon of it, or by tracing both to a third, even if this has to remain unknown, unknowable, and inexpressible. The first alternative again divides into two: either the spiritual reality may be regarded as a phenomenon of the corporeal, which is then supposed to be the genuine and original reality, or *vice versa*. We thus get the familiar antithesis of Materialism and Spiritualism.

We may take two of the chief arguments of Materialism. One is the metaphysical argument, and it holds that all reality is identical on account of its existence in space. To be real is, for the ordinary man, the same thing as to be somewhere in space. That holds good for the psychic activities and states. They are somewhere—in this particular man, in his brain, his nervous system, and so on. Even if the soul is regarded as immaterial and separable from the body, it is assumed that in the after-life it lives somewhere above in the stars. The spirits which are conjured by mediums have to be summoned from their distant abodes, and have to manifest themselves in material form at some point in space, where they may be photographed by certain especially gifted people. The religious imagination, in fact, does not take even the supra-spatial nature of God so seriously as to be prevented from fancying him as occupying the whole of space. Any man who seriously works out these ideas will see that, as Kant well pointed out in his *Dreams of a Seer*, anything which is in space fills it, and so is a body. For this reason the ancient Atomists were Materialists. So also were the Stoics, who expressly held that reality and materiality were the same thing. From them even the Church-Fathers Tertullian and Arnobius adopted Materialism, without it doing any prejudice to their religious dogmas. In recent times this Stoic Materialism has been represented chiefly by Hobbes, who indicated space as the phenomenal form of true substance (*phantasma rei existentis*), and therefore regarded all philosophy as a science of bodies, including artificial bodies like the State, which have reality because they are in space.

The second chief argument is anthropological. It is based upon the dependence of the "soul" upon the body, which we are supposed to find in all its functions, normal and abnormal. All psychic states are, both permanently and temporarily, determined by age, sex, health or illness, and degree of bodily development. We need no special soul as a distinct principle from the body to explain the activities, even the purposive

activities, of the organism. This view has been particularly strengthened since the seventeenth century by the study of reflex movements. These show in a very high degree the marks, not merely of purpose, but of adaptation and improvability. The influence of these phenomena upon Descartes and his school was so great that they regarded the organic movements in the animal body as entirely reflex movements. But if we can do this, without any "immortal soul," in the case of the animal, why not in the case of man? That was the question put in ironic reference to Descartes by Lamettrie in his *L'homme machine*, and worked out in favour of Materialism. He was followed in this by all later Materialists—by the author of the *Système de la Nature*, the materialistic physicians of France in the nineteenth century, Cabanis and Broussais, and by Vogt and Moleschott in Germany. Incidentally they replaced the mechanical vibrations of the nerves, of which the earlier physiologists had spoken, by chemical ideas, and put the psychic activities on the same footing as other secretions of the organs.

About the middle of the nineteenth century these metaphysical and anthropological arguments were combined in Feuerbach's dialectical Materialism, which turns inside out Hegel's theory that nature is the mind in its other being and its self-alienation, and represents the mind as nature alienated from itself. From this source came the whole stream of Materialistic literature which flooded the second half of the nineteenth century. Typical instances of it are Büchner's *Force and Matter* on one side, and Dühring's works on the other; and the system assumed its finest and ablest form in David Friedrich Strauss's *Old and New Faith*.

It is precisely these finer presentations of Materialism which make it clear that in the "so-called" psychic activity we are supposed to have at least a special sort of matter or of its functions; as when Strauss uses the genuinely Hegelian expression, that in these spiritual activities "nature reaches beyond itself." Democritus long ago found the psychical in the atoms of fire, which

were distinguished for their fineness and mobility. The *Système de la Nature* explained that what the ordinary man calls activities of the soul consist in subtle, invisible movements of atoms; and in recent times Ostwald maintains that consciousness is a special form of energy, like heat, motion, electricity, etc. Every such statement, however, that consciousness or psychic activity is merely some superior sort of material existence or movement, is a quite arbitrary pronouncement, and tries to give unusual meanings to the words. In face of our direct experience, which continually teaches us that physical and psychic reality are fundamentally different, the Materialistic position remains a paradox. One might just as well say: Apples are a sort of pears, or, A dog is a sort of cat. There cannot be any reasonable question of identity of the psychic and the physical. But it is just as impossible to derive one from the other: to conceive psychic states as the outcome of material, or deduce them from some sort of subtle combination of material elements. Movement and consciousness are in their nature heterogeneous. No matter how much one seeks to bring them together by refining the one and simplifying the other, one always fails to bridge over the gap which, in principle, separates them. This has been recognised by some of the most distinguished men of science, such as Du Bois-Reymond in his "*Ignorabimus* Speech." The saying about "secretions" is nothing but a crude analogy, and cannot be taken seriously. All that empirical research can establish in regard to the correlation of the stimulus and the sensation, or the perception and the purposive movement, is at the most, according to our way of thinking and speaking, a causal relation in which certain states in one region are clearly co-ordinated to states in the other. If we proceed carefully, we shall scarcely venture even to speak of causality, and shall confine ourselves to registering certain constant correlations. In no case can we say that states of consciousness are themselves states of corporeal movement. There is no question whatever of identity, but merely of some connection

which is probably of a causal nature. But this causal connection is merely established in empirical research; it is not capable of logical analysis. No one can explain how it happens that a certain physico-chemical stimulation gives rise to a certain sensation of colour.

In contesting Materialism we have to rely on these difficulties and impossibilities, and in point of fact they put an end several decades ago to the domination of Materialistic thought. It is quite foolish to attack Materialism as a theory with evil consequences. This, it is true, has often enough been done, and, unfortunately, the practice was started by Plato himself. But men like Democritus, and even Epicurus, have sufficiently proved that theoretical Materialism is consistent with a high and pure moral culture; and English thought of the eighteenth, and partly of the nineteenth, century shows us, in the typical personality of Priestley, for instance, a union of Materialism and religious devotion.

However, this purely theoretical criticism, which shows that Materialism cannot sustain its thesis of the identity of consciousness and material states, has a counterpart, *mutatis mutandis*, in the insuperable difficulties of the theory at the opposite extreme, Spiritualism. By this we mean the theory which regards the material world as an appearance on or in a spiritual substance. It used to be called, and is still called, Idealism, but this expression is so ambiguous that it is better to avoid it as far as possible. The term Idealism is, in the first place, used in the anti-Materialistic sense that bodies are merely presentations or, as was said in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "ideas" of spirits. This was the meaning of Berkeley and Malebranche, and there is no objection to this use of the word. But the word "idea" had formerly a different meaning, and it has a different meaning again in modern times. Plato's Idealism is a metaphysical theory of the higher reality of pure forms, which are conceived as immaterial, but not as conscious states or activities. Kant's Idealism, and in part that of his followers, is the theory that the meaning of the

world must be sought in those "ideas" which are not given as objects of knowledge, but postulated as values and aims of life. If, in fine, we take the secondary meaning of the "ideal" as a mental attitude which looks to the suprasensible, we have Idealism opposed to Positivism as a mental attitude which restricts itself to facts. This multiplicity and variety of shades of meaning, mostly of an axiological character, which make the word Idealism so ambiguous, compel us to avoid the word as far as possible in severe intellectual work, and we must seek a more accurate and less equivocal substitute.

In the first simple sense of the word, Berkeley's "Idealism" contended that the being of the material world meant no more than that it was perceived (*esse = percipi*). The unknown substantial basis of properties, which Locke had suffered to remain as the thing-in-itself, was supposed to be an academic fiction. The cherry was merely the sum of its properties. These properties, these "ideas," are states or activities of the *res cogitantes*, the spirits. These then—the infinite divine spirit and the finite spirits, amongst which, on the ground of experience, we include the human—are the sole substantial reality. Hence it is better in metaphysics to call this theory Spiritualism. Other forms of Spiritualism, apart from certain forms of theological dogmatism, are the Monadological Spiritualism of Leibnitz, the transcendental-philosophical of Fichte, and the dialectical-metaphysical of Hegel. They differ especially on the question of the spiritual substance—whether it is to be sought in individual spiritual beings, in "consciousness generally," in the universal Self, or in the world-spirit. To these Spiritualists, moreover, we must add the Voluntarist metaphysicians, who regard the will as the genuine reality and the material world merely as its phenomenon, as Schopenhauer, Maine de Biran, etc., do.

The chief argument of all these forms of Spiritualism was formulated by Augustine and Descartes: namely, that while all our knowledge of external things is un-

certain and changeable, we have an absolute and certain knowledge of our own existence as spiritual beings. It does not matter whether we are supposed to have this primary experience of our spiritual being in the intellect or the will; it does not matter whether we use the formula, "Je pense, donc je suis," or the words, "Je veux, donc je suis." In either case our experience of the psychic reality is held to be primary, and therefore for metaphysical theory it means the genuine and true reality.

Nevertheless all these forms of Spiritualism are exposed to an objection analogous to, though the converse of, that we found in the case of Materialism. We come always to the unanswerable question: How do the spirits get these "ideas" of a totally different kind of reality, the material world? The more, for instance, the Cartesian theory emphasises that the self-conscious substance has no trace of the attribute of extension in it, and therefore none of its possible *modi*, the more insoluble the problem becomes. No one can give an intelligible account of the origin of the idea of matter in a spiritual mind. Certainly not Berkeley, who thinks that finite spirits get these ideas from the Infinite, but has no rational answer to the question why the purely spiritual Deity should have such ideas of bodies. Neither can Leibnitz, for whom the lowest stages of consciousness of the Monads are physical states, just as the Materialist converts the subtlest movements into sensations; in both cases the *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* is quite arbitrary. Neither can Fichte, who treats the sense-elements of experience as motiveless free self-limitations of the Self, and thus merely acknowledges that the Self finds them in itself as an unintelligible something else: a non-Self. Neither can Hegel, whose dialectical pulses of the mind in its otherness are quite unable to explain the appearance of nature in its various shapes.

Thus the physical can neither be regarded as a form of the psychical nor derived from it in any way. Materialism and Spiritualism are open to precisely the

same objection, differently applied, and the only alternative is to recognise that the material and the spiritual are both primary contents of reality. As a matter of fact, that is the general way of looking at the matter, and it is usually called Dualism. But how, we must ask, is such a Dualism conceivable without injury to the unity of reality which is an inalienable element of thought? Clearly Dualism is the most prominent and most definite form of Pluralism, and it is open to all the general objections which have been urged against this in an earlier page. This Dualism, however, is confirmed when we go closely into the antitheses in the world and the theoretical relation of soul and body. We see struggle and strife everywhere in the world. War was hailed by Heraclitus as the father of all things, and he taught us to regard the world as a divided unity. Thus Dualism is reinforced by an axiological experience, which is expressed in the ethico-religious duality of values. Good and evil, lawabidingness and lawlessness, are found in every stratum of human life; and even in nature we find everywhere the senseless and aimless irrational beside the purposeful rational. The simple candour of Greek thought never attempted to explain away these antagonisms by dogmatic theories. If we are correctly informed by Aristotle, Empedocles made the theoretical duality of world-forces, which he needed for his mixtures and separations of the elements, correspond to an axiological duality, according to which love was the cause of the good and hatred the cause of evil. Everybody knows the classic saying of Plato, that, since God as the good can only be the cause of good, he cannot be the cause of all things, and we must assume another cause, imperfectness or badness—a good and a bad world-soul. Aristotle in the same way distinguished between form and matter as the principles, respectively, of purposiveness and unconscious necessity. So the process continues in ancient thought until it culminates in the dualistic religions, especially Manicheanism. Primitive mythologies, in which heaven and earth, light and

darkness, are thus pitted against each other, are confirmed by the fact that scientific research (amongst the Pythagoreans and in Anaxagoras) found unity and order, beauty and perfection, only in the heavens, while the life of man was full of strife and wickedness.

These antitheses of values were, in the development of religious ideas during the Alexandrian period, identified with the highest theoretical dualism of metaphysical thought. It is one of the most important combinations of thought in human history that spirit and matter as good and evil, as the rational and the irrational, were thus brought into antithesis. It was an outcome of the ascetic mood, which began to frown upon the flesh as sinful, to despise, abstain from, and repress the material, and to seek happiness in dread of and flight from nature, in a hatred of the material world. This blending of theoretical and axiological Dualism, just as dangerous as it is psychologically intelligible, was in principle dissolved and conquered by the Renaissance with its sound and comprehensive life, its art and science ; but it crops up occasionally and unpleasantly in our time, and we have to bear in mind constantly that the two dualities are not identical. In the spirit, the soul, we have both good and bad ; and how close they are to each other ! In nature there is assuredly much that is irrational and aimless, but how much also that is rational, that is true and beautiful in the rational sense !

From the purely theoretical point of view, which we have here to disengage from axiological considerations, the two kinds or spheres of reality, the material and the spiritual worlds, remain distinct. To reduce them to a unity, or to derive them from a unity, is quite impossible. They remain an undeniable dualistic fact, even if we attempt to conceive the constant association, the inseparable connection, of the two aspects as a third thing which we cannot further define. Such an attempt we have in Spinozism and, with certain modifications, in the Neo-Spinozism of German philosophy. In recent times it has assumed a specific form and adopted the name of Monism.

It is certainly true that the Cartesian attempt to ascribe the primary qualities of consciousness and materiality to two different kinds of substances went too far in some respects. There are neither formal nor real *à priori* reasons which forbid us to ascribe both attributes to one and the same thing. Why should not a conscious being have extension? Why should not a material being think? The rule of formal logic which declares the compredicability of disparate and heterogeneous features—affirms that they may be united in one and the same concept—is rather in favour of than against this supposition. The disjunction, “either conscious or extended,” which since the time of Descartes has been regarded as self-evident, is not contradictory; the incompatibility has yet to be proved. In Spinozism the totality of reality, the one Nature or substance, has the two attributes simultaneously. Recent thought has proceeded on much the same lines with its theory of the Unconscious, which, not given in experience itself, is assumed to be the third thing between the physical and the psychic. Hartmann’s *Philosophy of the Unconscious* runs on these lines; it is a Monism of the Unconscious.

If this is true of God or the universe, it may very well be true of the several individual constituents of reality. Bacon said that atoms had perceptions, and in recent natural philosophy since Fechner the idea that all reality is at once material and spiritual has been very prominent. If we take Monism from this metaphysical point of view, there is nothing to be said against its tendency; which, indeed, we find based in more than one respect upon the nature of our intellect. But the difficulties of this duplication of the real are not removed by this mere postulate of the unifying impulse of the mind. Some effort is made to meet them by saying that the duality belongs to the phenomenal world, and supposing that the one reality of things merely assumes in the human intellect this division into external and internal experience. Those who do this overlook the fact that this duality of the intellect then becomes a problem, and

that we have merely put back the metaphysical difficulties.

The serious objections to modern Monism begin when the duality in which the primary being and all its original constituents express themselves is declared to be real. The difficulty then is, not so much in the association of the two attributes, as in understanding what happens when the attributes develop into *modi*. If the development of the two attributes is supposed to proceed at equal pace, the simplest way to represent it is to assume that one series is a by-product, an epiphenomenon, of the other. Modern Monism is therefore disposed to regard the physical series as the original, and the psychical series as dependent thereon. Then, however, whether it admits the fact or no, it is sheer Materialism. We shall therefore have to return to these questions when we come to genetic problems; and we thus see again that ontic problems always lead us either to genetic or noetic problems.

CHAPTER II

GENETIC PROBLEMS

IN ontic questions the thing or substance is the central point; in genetic questions it is the category which is best called "the event." This is the general expression for the Greek *γίγνεσθαι*. This antithesis of the thing and the event is better than the earlier antithesis of being and becoming; for "becoming" is only one aspect of the process of happening, which means, not only that something appears which was not there previously, but also that something which was there previously ceases to exist. This opposite process to becoming was called by the older mystics by a word which we have no longer (*entwerden*) and must replace by "ceasing" or perishing. In the event, therefore, something becomes different from what it was before, and hence genetic problems may be resumed (as was done by Herbart) under the heading of *change*, the Greek *μεταβολή*, which may be either a change of place, a movement (*περιφορά* or *κίνησις*), or a change of properties (*ἀλλοίωσις*). The word "change," however, points clearly to the thing which changes, and thus we mean a thing which experiences various states in succession, yet persists in its own reality. In this we are either referred back to the problems of thingness or to the universe as the one subject of all changes.

§ 5

The Event.—Succession in time—Continuity and discontinuity of events—Immanent and transgredient events—The necessity of succession in time—Causal and teleological dependence.

Amongst the general elements of all events we at once fix our attention upon two which are fundamental and

equally essential : (1) the clear determination in time of a series of states (of which, therefore, there must be at least two), one of which must succeed another, and (2) a connection between these successive states, in virtue of which their plurality can be reduced to the unity to which we give the name of "event."

In the category of the event, therefore, we have first of all the feature of a definite succession in time. There was no such feature in the category of inherence. The coexistence of properties in the thing is in itself apart from time ; it is only by a methodological relation that we seek to recognise, within our experience, substantial inherence by the clue of permanent simultaneity. Inherence, as we may take this opportunity to observe, does not necessarily presuppose a spatial relation. It is true that we find this as the form of coexistence in our first conceptions of material things, but such conceptions as those of psychic or divine substance entirely exclude the element of space. The event, on the contrary, absolutely implies this element of time, that one is real after the other and that the series is not interchangeable. This circumstance gives us, in our experience, for instance, the criterion by which we may decide whether a multiplicity successively perceived in consciousness is a real succession or a coexistence.

Without this time-element the event is unthinkable, and therefore a reality without time would also be a reality without events. When we regard the world *sub specie æterni*, nothing happens in it. In this, clearly, there is a grave difficulty for the theory of the phenomenality of time. In a thing-in-itself which is raised above time nothing can happen. Religious ideas like that of being born again or of a total change in a man's intelligible character or innermost nature are irreconcilable with theoretical Phenomenalism, whether in the case of Kant or of Schopenhauer. Thus also in the case of Herbart, when, in order to explain the apparent event, he declares that "the coming and going of substances in intelligible space" is the real event, we see that our mind, when it deals with the event, cannot divest itself of the time-

element. In addition, our will requires that we conceive the world as a sphere in which something is to be otherwise; in other words, that something may happen. For all these reasons it is clear that if we strike the time-element out of the event, there is nothing left that could be called a real event. We see therefore that if we would remove the time-element from the causal relation, which from the first overshadows every consideration of the event, the residual dependence means, not the real relation of cause and effect, but merely a logical relation of antecedent and consequent; just as, in the case of Spinoza, *consequi* is a mathematical relation, but is as little a real relation as the equivalence of the angles of a plane triangle with two right-angles is an effect of the triangle.

However, the time-element in the event takes very different forms in the two provinces of reality, with the distinction between which we closed our survey of ontic problems: the external world and the inner world. Every event in space is movement, or change of position of bodies in space. This is the ultimate type of all happening in the chemical and even the organic world. To get from the point A to the point B, moreover, the body must traverse the entire continuity of the intermediate space, and therefore the spatial event is also continuous in time. On the other hand, we noted previously that there never is a continuity of this kind in the psychic event, which gives us our experience of subjective time; that the successive acts of consciousness, of which the individual experience consists, are discrete or discontinuous elements. We cannot therefore speak of a gradual transition in associative imagination, logical deduction, or emotional transport. As we pass from image to image, thought to thought, motive to motive, in our inner experience, these various elements are definitely separated from each other, and there is nothing between them that has to be traversed from moment to moment. Still more pronouncedly discontinuous is the psychological time-life of perception. The hearing of one noise after another, the seeing of moving pictures, the alternation of hearing and seeing,

seeing and touching, etc., takes places without any conceivable transition from one to the other. There are no such intervals covered as when a ball rolls from A to B. Experienced time is therefore discontinuous. It is only objective time that is assumed to be continuous, because it is taken from bodily movements which we measure at different points of space. Here again, therefore, the continuity is in space. In projecting time into space we make the *continuum quod æquabiliter fluit* out of the discontinuous experience. It follows from this that we shall find the ideas of the event differentiated in time, according as they relate to the inner or the outer event in its typical form.

Yet a definite succession in time is not enough for the definition of the event. A word spoken in the house, followed by the whistle of a passing locomotive, does not make an "event," no matter how objectively the succession is determined. They lack any real connection, and therefore, in spite of the succession, they do not constitute that unity of the manifold which we call an event. If we ask in what this unity consists, we get various answers which partly depend upon relations to the category of substance. One case is where the event occurs in *one* thing. In one and the same thing *A* appear the states a_1 and a_2 in a definite succession. The thing, in other words, passes from one of its states to another. We will call this variety the *immanent event*. In our experience it is found chiefly in the psychic life, in which one presentation or emotion follows another in definite succession in one and the same subject of consciousness. This immanent change of state may, however, occur in a body: in one, for instance, which continues to move in a given direction at a certain speed in virtue of inertia. As a rule the material event is of the other type: it occurs between several different things. With state *a* of the thing *A* state *b* of the thing *B* is connected in a clear and invariable sequence. If we call this the *transgredient event*, because it passes from one thing to another, we must admit that we have no experience of such direct happening between different souls. If an event is to pass from one soul to another,

it must be done by the mediation of bodies ; and we thus get two sorts of transgredient events—the physical, between two bodies, and the psychological, between soul and body or body and soul. In such cases, where is the unity of the event, which in the immanent event is based upon the identity of the thing? What in the case of transgredient events holds together the different states of different things in a unity? We conceive this unity in the sense that the sequence is not merely a fact (like the word and the whistle in our preceding example), but that the states, which together make up the event, are necessarily connected in this sequence. The event therefore implies the *necessity* of a clear and invariable succession of states. In this we assume that the one state is not real without the other which is correlative with it in the sequence, or, as Kant said in his *Analogies of Experience*, that the one determines the existence of the other in time. That is the *real dependence*, the temporal as distinguished from the ideal or logical, which is in itself timeless.

This real dependence constitutes the problem of the event, since it holds also of the immanent event. The invariable sequence of states of one and the same thing is conceived either in the sense that one of these states necessarily determines the existence in time of the other, as happens in the succession of reflections, deductions, and conclusions, or in the sense that, as in the sequence of our perceptions, the varying states of one and the same conscious being become necessary through a transgredient event—that is to say, through changes of relations to other things.

To these general remarks on the event and the problems connected therewith we have to add one more. This plain, invariable and necessary sequence of states which constitutes the event is, from the nature of time, divisible into two different and opposite classes. The linear or one-dimensional character of time allows us, from any given point, to measure time only backwards and forwards. From every present we may proceed in either direction, toward the past or the future. Thus the neces-

sity of the sequence is to be conceived either in the sense that the antecedent element determines the existence in time of the following or, conversely, that the antecedent is determined by the following. In the former case we say: If *A* is, *B* must follow. In the latter case: In order for *B* to exist, *A* must precede. In the one case *A* is the cause and *B* its effect; in the other case *B* is the end and *A* the means. The necessity therefore that exists between the elements of one and the same event is either *consequence* or *indispensability*; and the dependence is either *causal* or *teleological*. We shall have occasion later to go more closely into this distinction and protect ourselves against misunderstanding. Here we formally notify it as part of the nature of the event, and we will keep in mind in the following observations the various possibilities which it suggests. There can be no question but that to the more or less scientific mind the first of these forms of real dependence, consequence, is much the more familiar, and so from it we first develop the problems of the event.

§ 6

Causality.—Four usual forms of causality—Plurality of causes—Primary and incidental causes—Postulate of the identity of the world—Law of causality—Conservation of energy—New elements in the psychic life—Causal equation—Incomprehensibility of the causal relation—Experience of action—Universality of the time-succession—Conformity of nature to law.

The categorical relation of cause and effect is one of the most familiar, but most ambiguous, in our thought and speech, and is precisely on that account a mass of misunderstandings. It is the source of many difficult and very important, and also of many fictitious, problems. Almost everything is regarded as cause and effect in popular usage. The application of the category is especially complicated in part by its relation to the superficial ideas of things in experience, and above all by the circumstance that perception never gives us simple elements, but always complexes of them, which for the most part have already been formed and set in contrasted groups

by the category of inherence. Hence all sorts of ambiguities in the application of the causal relation on the one hand to the complexes, and on the other hand to the several elements of which they consist. If we try to make our way through this confusion under the lead of the ideas which are commonly used for such orientation, we have to take as our guide the very category of inherence which is chiefly responsible for the confusion. On this basis we distinguish, to begin with, between four types of causal relation.

1. One thing is the cause, and another thing is the effect. That is the original form of the use of the causal relation, and it is chiefly found in organic life. The flower comes from the plant, the fruit from the tree, the ovum or the young from the mother. In such expressions as springing from, growing from, coming from, etc., in using the preposition "from" for the causal relation, language bears witness to the impression which contained this first form of causality. But if we interrogate science it assures us that this relation holds only for phenomenal things, for the momentary inherence-complexes of perception. The true things, the substances, neither come into existence nor pass out of it. "The Greeks say falsely," said Anaxagoras, "that things come into and go out of existence; in reality there are only mixture and separation of incomplete and transitory elements." This idea has become such a truism in science, in much the same form as Kant formulated it as the law of the persistence of substance, the quantity of which can neither be increased nor lessened, that a man would now be regarded in scientific circles as negligible if he talked about a substance originating or being produced by another. It is only in religious metaphysics that the old idea has held its ground, in the search (as we saw above) for the ultimate cause or Creator of all things. We find this Deistic form of causality in Descartes's theory of an infinite substance which has created the finite, or in Leibnitz's idea of the Central Monad which created all the other monads and originally communicated to them their reflection of the universe.

2. The thing is regarded as the cause of its states and its activities. We thus speak to some extent of man as the cause of his actions, of the soul as the common cause of its various functions, of the body—especially the organic body—as the cause of its movements. In developing these ideas we interpose, between the one thing and the multiplicity of its effects, the *forces* by means of which the substance exercises its causality. By this we understand certain general properties, capacities, or *powers*; and in this sense the attributes are at times called the cause of the *modi*. In the inner world the will is supposed to be the cause of volitions, the intelligence the cause of opinions, and so on. In the external world we find gravity, inertia, and vital forces filling the gap. Force is expressly defined as the cause of movement, and is thus regarded as a property of the thing, the substratum, the matter, the substance. From the logical point of view all these forces are general concepts, assumed as the causes of the various functions. We easily see that this general thing, the force, is never the exclusive cause of the activity in question. In order to pass into such a special function, it always needs some occasion of action. We therefore distinguish between *efficient* and *occasional* causes: *causa efficiens* and *causa occasionalis*. It is clear that the two together make up the entire “cause”; just as in the analogous case of a syllogism the full ground for the conclusion is in the combination of the two premisses, the “major” and the “minor.” This also is a very familiar way of looking at things, and there are many variations of it; but it shows us from the start how uncertain it is which is the real cause, the efficient or the occasional or both together.

3. The converse of the preceding: states and activities are the causes of things. It is often said, for instance, that the wind (which is a state or mode of motion) causes clouds. Many people say that insects are produced by the rain, which we regard as essentially a process, without inquiring into the thing that is moved. A house is put together by a number of activities; who exercises them is immaterial, as the functions are the immediate causes

of the house. If in this way we come to treat the functions, detached from the things which discharge them, as independent causes of other things, we come in the end to the theory of the complete detachment of forces and functions. The dynamic view of nature, which Kant and Schelling held, falls into this class. Attraction and repulsion are forces of the primary reality, and matter is merely produced by them. The system is developed in a much more complicated form in Schelling's philosophy of nature,

Dynamism of this kind seems to the ordinary mind thoroughly paradoxical. It demands things of which the forces shall be functions. These functions suspended in the air, which are supposed to produce things, have no meaning for the ordinary mind, however much philosophers might like to see the contrary, in order to teach people to think philosophically. No one desired this more strongly than Fichte and his followers, for whom action was the first thing, and reality the product of action. And in Fichte's case it is particularly clear how he came to this view—from his experience of the inner event. If in the province of the inner world there is to be any real meaning in talk about a psychic substance, the Self is not from the start a persistent and rigidly self-identical thing, like an atom, but an organic and interconnected complex of ideas, feelings, and volitions, which function in the processes of apperception—that is to say, in the reception of everything new that enters this psychic organism. Every element of it has, however, been precipitated by an activity, as the content of this remains persistent and alive, active and capable of assimilation. The Self is identical with its history. In this case we must admit that substance comes into existence, and it is formed by states and activities for which we can prove no original basis that can be given in experience. The relation of substance and function is therefore fundamentally different in the internal and the external event. What is physically unthinkable is a fact in the internal world: substance originates, and from functions as its causes. The dynamic view of nature extends this causal scheme of internal experience to the external world. We find this in modern

Energetics, which means that the atoms are dissolved into movements without there being question of anything behind which moves itself or is moved. These things are clearly seen in Heinrich Hertz's *Principles of Mechanics*.

4. The causal relation is between states: one is the cause and the other the effect. This situation holds for the immanent as well as the transgredient event. In the first case it is psychic, as when we say that perception causes memory (by association), or the willing of the end is the cause of the willing of the means (resolution), or the knowledge of the reason is the psychic cause of the knowledge of the conclusion (deduction). But even in the case of the physical immanent event we have this form of causality, especially in such complex structures as organisms. The digestion, for instance, is understood to be the cause of the formation of blood, or the peripheral stimulation of the nerves the cause of the central process in the brain. From the purely physical point of view, it is true, processes of this kind are resolved into transgredient events from member to member, and ultimately from atom to atom. It is in these mechanical transgredient events that we find this fourth form of causality in its simplest shape: the movement of the impelling body is the cause and the movement of the impelled body is the effect. We may say that since Galilei this form of causality has been recognised as the only form of use in science. Since the substance is now, as it neither comes into nor goes out of existence, so far removed from the process of happening that this takes place independently in substance or substances, we have, in regard to events in the material world, only to deal with the question: What modes of motion are the causes of what other modes of motion? The answers to this question constitute what we call the laws of nature. They give us the rhythm of all events, since they determine the sequence of states in the changes of substances, either transgredient for physical events or immanent for psychological.

When we look back upon these four very different forms of application of the causal relation in our ordinary

mental life, we see how different the matter is according as the relation is between things and states; and if we further assume that our common experience has always to do with complexes, either of things or of changing states, we perceive that the causal aspect of the same fact may be very different according to differences in our direction and selection. When we clearly understand this, we see the solution of all sorts of controversies in regard to the problem of causality, which have occasioned a good deal of superfluous trouble. There is, for instance, the question, at one time much discussed, of the time-element: whether the cause ceases when the effect begins, or whether it persists in the effect. It goes without saying that if (on our fourth type) the causes are conceived as states which condition other states, the time-element is merely the moment of their mutual contact; the motion of the moving body ceases when that of the moved body begins. If, on the other hand (on our second type), the cause is sought in a force, it is clear that this force remains as a general capacity after a particular event has been produced by it.

This is true also of the plurality of causes, which, inevitable as it is in the complexity of our experience, raises serious difficulties in modern methodology. In our ordinary way of thinking and speaking we select various elements out of the complex features in order to confine our attention to them, and it may be that, as this selection is at times influenced by quite other motives than the theoretical interest of causal explanation, we can no longer clearly trace in these incomplete parts the causal relation which in reality holds good for the whole or for the correlated parts. The difficulty is especially great when we can consider an event simultaneously according to the second and the fourth form. The entire cause is always merely the force together with the occasion for its action. But, just as Plato distinguished between the *αἴτιον* and the *ἐννοαίτιον*, the latter being the condition of the real cause, we now speak of principal and subsidiary causes. In this distinction, however, it is by no means always certain what we shall

regard as principal cause and what as incidental; the matter is often determined by arbitrary interests of the dissecting intelligence, and the uncertainty is especially great when the cause is to be held responsible. In an explosion we have the powder, the material with the force and capacity to produce it, and the spark which lets loose this formidable force. Which of these is the principal, which the subsidiary, cause? And is the man responsible who put the powder there, or the man who caused the spark? Clearly, the answer may be given very differently in different circumstances. Take an inundation as an illustration. Someone has broken the dam, or left open the sluices which were committed to his charge. He is the responsible cause of the damage which the water does. We thus take the two forms of causality together in one phrase, but we cannot ignore the fact that from the physical point of view the water is the principal cause and the release of it at a given point is a subsidiary cause; but that from the legal point of view, which has to do with human acts, it is the breaking of the dam or neglect of the sluice which is the responsible and principal cause. On the same lines run the historical controversies in regard to great events: as Thucydides, in the introduction to his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, raised the question what was the cause of it and what the occasion. To this day we still dispute in the same way about Bismarck's Ems telegram.

It is the same with the magnitude-relation of cause and effect. Descartes naïvely adopted the scholastic formula, that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and in mechanics the principle of the equivalence of the two (*causa æquat effectum*) has been accepted since the time of Galilei. Yet in ordinary life we often hear people speak of "small causes of great events," or we regard a large apparatus of forces and activities as producing a very small effect—*nascetur ridiculus mus*. These differences in appreciation of size depend upon what, in any given case, we call the cause and what the effect. These are merely superficial applications of the category of causality. The real

scientific conception of the event is to be sought behind them.

The most important step in this direction is assuredly the separation of being or substance from the process of happening, which we first attain in our knowledge of the external world. Modern science thinks it meaningless to ask about the origin of reality. Yet how difficult it is to rid ourselves of the old ideas, by which we imagine things as effects, may be realised from the attempts of the Scholastics to do so. When aseity is ascribed to substance, and it is called *causa sui*, this is merely a form of words in which the idea of causedness is applied to something to which it is not applicable. Substance has no cause. We say this in other words when we say that it is "of itself" and is its own cause. We have other examples when the original, which is not necessary through another, is described as adventitious.

The really necessary we see in the event, in so far as it is conditioned by another event. This feature is very plainly seen in the transgredient event, in which the causing and the caused movement seem to be directly connected with each other. What combines them into a unity seems to the ordinary observer to be the apparently visible transmission of movement from one body to another. The striking body gives up its movement to the body that is struck. When this view is followed, as Descartes follows it in his mechanics, the movement is supposed to be something independent, which belongs to none of the three bodies, but is borrowed by one and passed on to another. Thus two movements of different bodies make up an event, when and because they are identical. The ultimate ground of this idea is, therefore, the assumption of the identity of the world with itself which we encountered in our analysis of the definition of substance. In spite of all changes of appearances the world remains the same; not only in its substances, which do not really come into and pass out of existence, but also in movement, which constitutes the event within the province of appearance. The new movement, which we call an effect, is really the old movement, the cause. This assumption

of identity is rooted in our craving for causality and in the general principle of causality, in which we assert the validity of the former: every event has a cause. This assumption of identity applies, as far as time is concerned, both backwards and forwards. When we experience something new, we ask: Whence comes it? We thus betray a belief that it must have been somewhere, in some form, previously. When something goes out of experience, we ask: Where has it gone? What has become of it? Again we seem to think that it cannot have perished. In this sense we may even so far modify the idea of mechanical causality as to say: The cause is the form of reality which the effect had previously; the effect is that which the cause now assumes. If then both things and their movement persist, if we have to add to the principle of the persistence of substance (Kant) that of the persistence of movement (Descartes), and thus get the principle of the conservation of energy in its modern form, the real meaning of the principle of causality is seen to be that there is nothing new in the world, or that the apparently new is always really the old. When the Leibnitz-Wolff philosophy derived the principle of the reason from the principle of identity, it was no mere feat of formal dialectics, but in its real meaning a typical expression of all scientific metaphysics.

Hence there is *nil novi in natura*! But do we not in this way take all rational meaning out of an event? If nothing new appears in all these changes, if the timeless primary reality remains always the same, why does anything happen at all? Why does not the matter end with this timeless identical being? Why does this being have in itself an event which changes nothing in it? Or is the timeless incomplete? Has it to become complete in time-events? These hypercritical questions seem to be of a purely theoretical character, but when we remember that the reality of time seemed to us necessary in order to make possible the event which our will seeks, we recognise once more the axiological influence at work in these ultimate and insoluble problems of being and happening.

Returning from these to purely theoretical considerations, the meaning of the event from this point of view consists in the change of combination of something that remains identical in itself. We now ask further: Whence the change, and what is the connection between the old and the new form? These questions, which lie behind mechanical causality, are the more important because we human beings are much more interested in these combinations and their changes than in the ultimate and always identical *quantum* of being and happening behind them. Our own psychic experience depends essentially on new elements. We might, in fact, say that it is here we have to seek the great and decisive difference between the internal and external event. In our simplest sensation something new comes into reality: something that did not exist previously, and can only mean a transformation of something previous. The psychic event is one in which something really new appears; and this character of it culminates in what we feel as *freedom*, though it means no more than the idea of a psychic event which was not already present in another form. Thus one of the most important antitheses in our philosophy of life, the antithesis of mechanism or freedom, determinism and indeterminism, arises from the nature of these fundamentally different types of the physical and the psychic event, and therefore we come to a parallel antithesis in genetic problems to that we found in ontic problems.

This assumption of the identity of cause and effect is, however, a postulate which is expressly opposed to what we know of the nature of our intellect. When we assume causal relations in ordinary life or in any special branch of knowledge, or when we speak of various causal laws in science, the states which are synthetically combined as events, the beginning and end of the process, seem to be very little like each other. They are most like each other in that purely mechanical event, the passage of movement from one body to another. They are very different in chemical changes or other processes, as when lightning seems to be the cause of thunder. Electric friction and

the dancing of little balls, sunshine and the melting of ice or the opening of a flower, a shot and the cry and defensive movement of any animal, the lifting of a stick and the running away of a dog—these are cases of cause and effect in which we find an increasing dissimilarity between the two. But the greater the dissimilarity, the more incomprehensible we find the relation between them. This incomprehensibility, of which so much is made in works on the problem of causality, consists essentially in the fact that no logical analysis will enable us to excogitate or construct the effect out of the cause or the cause out of the effect. Where, on the other hand, the two are similar, as push and counter-push, pressure and counter-pressure, the change from one to the other seems to offer no difficulty, and we therefore find the matter comprehensible. In this sense we have a complicated process, of which the beginning and end lie far apart, made more intelligible by resolving it into separate processes which, on account of the comparative similarity of cause and effect, seem to offer no particular difficulty ; like the transmission of movement from the wheels and cylinders of a machine to other parts of it. The causality of the dissimilar is more intelligible if it can be resolved into causalities of the similar. Hence science has an inevitable tendency to explain in mechanical terms everything that happens in the material world, or to reduce everything to the transmission of movement from atom to atom. Heat is supposed to be understood when it is interpreted as molecular movement : light and electricity when they are reduced to vibrations of ether, and so on. *The craving to understand is the postulate of identity*, and the phenomena of nature are intelligible to the extent to which they can be resolved into these simple forms of causal similarity. The whole problem of the mechanical interpretation of life or of organisms may be brought under this formula.

It is the same with the psychic processes in relation to each other. How complex presentations combine the contents of their constituent elements seems so simple as to offer no problem at all. But as soon as we compare

the beginning with the end in a long sequence of reflections or a complicated process of motivation, they seem so different that we are compelled to ask how the issue was brought about. If, however, we set out in detail the various stages of the process, we cease to be surprised. Every "psychological" poem, novel, etc., poses the problem how the hero passed from the ordinary human conditions of experience to the exceptional intellectual or emotional position which holds the interest of the reader and the author. Thus we treat all causal processes of a complicated nature as intelligible if they can be reduced to familiar elementary functions of causal similarity.

That is why complete causal similarity is in principle unintelligible; and that was the problem of the Cartesian school. It did not call into question the comprehensibility of the physical or of the psychical event, but it emphasised all the more the incomprehensibility of the psycho-physical event—that is to say, the reciprocal causality between states of the body and states of the soul. From this point onward the problem became more serious, and it was Arnold Guelincx who further developed the incomprehensibility of the causal relation. This incomprehensibility means, in the logical relation of cause and effect, that the content of the one is not present in the other. But this analytic incomprehensibility holds also of movements transmitted from one body to another. It is not logically intelligible why one state must necessarily be followed by another which is really distinct from it, no matter how similar it may be. This is just as true of the immanent as of the transgredient event. The causal relation is in every case of a synthetic character, and therefore incomprehensible. It cannot be rationally established or analytically proved, but only synthetically experienced. Only where in some way empirically known causal relations combine together can we foresee and construct *à priori* an entirely new effect; and even here only because and in so far as we know all the elements in advance. In the end, therefore, causality is analytically not comprehensible; the identity which we assume in

it as the link between cause and effect is not rationally discoverable.

From this point we survey the various positions which modern thinkers have taken up in regard to the problem of causality. When we take away the rational element which is always thought into the actual experience, nothing remains but the time-relation, which we really experience. What we perceive is the *post hoc*, and the right to turn it into a *propter hoc* is questionable. We no more perceive the necessity of any issue from the sequence than we perceive the thing as a link that holds the properties together. Hence causality is not to be known either rationally or empirically, and from this it seems to follow that it cannot be known at all. Those are the arguments we find in David Hume. Strict Positivism also holds that the determination of the sequence in time is all that we can legitimately do. Even our knowledge that such sequences in time are regularly repeated is confined to the synthetic relation. For if in individual cases the time-sequence alone tells us nothing about its necessity, it cannot tell us anything, no matter how often it is repeated. Hence for strict Positivism the only thing that has any claim to scientific recognition is the registration of the detailed facts of the sequence and of the "general facts" of regularly repeated sequences.

Yet it is beyond question that we can distinguish amongst sequences in time some which claim to be causal in character and ascribe to them alone the feature of necessity. We may adjust ourselves to this fact in various ways, and thus give a different emphasis to different elements of our idea of cause. One of these lines was followed by Hume when he sought the origin of the idea of cause, which is given neither in reason nor experience, comprehensible neither analytically nor sensuously, in the internal experience which arises from a repetition of similar sequences. The habit of passing in presentation from *A* to *B* makes it easier for the associative imagination to pass from *A* to *B*, so that when the impression of *A* is renewed we feel a sort of compulsion to pass on to the idea of *B*. This feeling of compulsion is the source

of the idea of the necessity which we assume in the causal relation, not now between the presentations of *A* and *B*, but between *A* and *B* themselves. What we really experience is that one of our presentations necessarily brings the other into consciousness. We thus experience internally the action by means of which the cause determines the existence in time of the effect. This experience of action pointed out by Hume is later pushed aside by other experiences. A man seeks something in his memory, and what he seeks comes into being. Here my will is the cause of an idea; I do not know how it can accomplish this, but I experience it as a fact. Further, I wish to raise my arm and I do so; again I do not know how I do it, but I experience it—the action is a fact. In other cases my will meets resistance, partly in my own body and partly in other objects. What the other cause of this resistance is I know not, but I experience it; it is a fact. In both cases I have in this experience of action an internal feeling of the necessity with which the cause produces the effect. This is, as a matter of fact, the real origin of the idea of force, and if we try to define it, in its significance for our knowledge of the external world, as the cause of movement, we have a real interpretation of external experience by means of internal. The external experience, taken strictly, gives us only sequences in time, some of which are repeated with more or less frequency; and the Positivistic mechanics, as represented in Germany by Kirchhoff and Mach, would confine itself to the description of these individual or general facts of succession in time. It would exclude the ideas of force and work from the science of the material world.

In opposition to this the necessity asserts itself as the decisive element in the relation of cause and effect; for it alone combines the various elements into the unity of the event, and by it alone we select from the immense mass of time-sequences the particular connections which we describe as causal. This necessity is, as we saw, primarily given psychologically in the feeling of work. But it has also a logical aspect, and this consists in the *universality of the time-sequence*. When I say that *A*

necessarily follows *B*, this implies a real and unambiguous connection between these two elements ; and this involves the consequence that, wherever and however *A* may appear, *B* must appear as an effect of it. In this sense of the causal necessity it is quite immaterial whether *A* is active only once or several times, and whether the sequence *A—B* is or is not repeated. It is therefore no use objecting that the logical aspect of the causal relation would not be verified in cases where the processes cannot be repeated. The causal necessity always involves the assumption that, *if A* is repeated, *B* must inevitably follow. Causal relations are, therefore, those time-sequences which are special cases of general time-sequences. The methodological character of our knowledge justifies this logical sense of the causal relation. Intuitive perception often enables us to convert a single experience of a succession directly into a causal relation. That happens, in part, with a sort of instinctive correctness ; but, on the other hand, it is exposed to many illusions and mistakes. To avoid these we have, in the last resort, no means except observing the repetition. The more frequently the same *post hoc* appears, the more confidently we may claim it as a *propter hoc*. Yet, we must repeat, we get from this repetition no sort of analytic proof of the causal relation. The regular repetition gives us an occasion and a right to assume a causal relation only because it is itself a fact for which, according to the general law of causality, a cause must be assumed. This may consist in the causal relation between the two phenomena which always appear in succession ; but it may have to be sought in more remote causal connections which are an indirect source of the combination in time. Hence the constant succession of two events (a familiar example is day and night) is not *eo ipso* of a causal character, but merely one of the methodological reasons for assuming it ; and, on the other side, it is not indispensable in cases in which we feel ourselves justified in gathering a causal relation inductively from a single observation. The chemist, for instance, unhesitatingly expects to find the same behaviour in the substances with which he is experiment-

ing in cases of repetition. Hence the element of necessity in a single experience seems to us justified by a general principle, a rule of succession; and it is in this sense that Kant defined the causal relation as such that "one determines the existence in time of another according to a general rule." In this general principle we have the link which holds together the two elements of cause and effect in the unity of the event.

A rule of this kind is called a *law*; and therefore this special causal thesis points to a causal law, according to which certain states have other states connected with them as their consequences. In virtue of this connection the principle of causality, according to which every event must have a cause, takes the form of a *principle of the uniformity of nature*, or the conformity of nature to laws. For modern scientific thought this connection has in the course of time become so evident that the axioms of causality and uniformity are quite interchangeable. In itself that is not necessary; it depends on how we formulate the category of causality. In the sense of work, for instance, the causal relation is chiefly applicable to isolated cases which do not admit repetition, and which therefore entirely ignore or even deny the uniformity of nature. In such ideas as creation and miracle causality is not denied, as is generally said in scientific circles. They expressly involve a cause of the origin of the world or of some extraordinary process. All that is denied is that in the particular event there was conformity to law. In the same way the isolated events of the course of history are not calculated in their totality to bring out this causal relation to uniformity. The unrepeatable individual structure of any such event in the world-process makes the idea that the world is ruled by law seem meaningless for the whole of these isolated cases. We do not find regular repetitions and similarities between the complex states which we experience as a whole, but only between the elements of which the complexes are composed; these exhibit comparable repetitions and similarities. Just in the same way as all the presentable properties of a thing are of a general character,

and the individual always consists of a unique and un-repeated combination of a certain number of these generalities, so the event, in its experienced totality, is composed of various connections which may be repeated in other and very different complexes, and therefore have the significance of laws. As the individual properties have a permanent being as generic concepts or Platonic ideas, which we have to extract from the variety of phenomenal things, so the causal rules which, as general principles, express the necessity of the time-sequence between different states have to be elicited by abstract knowledge from the rich variety of the individual complexes of the real event. It is only in such knowledge that the law in its generality contains the reason why the individual event is accomplished. But this assumption is at the root of all our predictions of future phenomena, all our inductive thought, investigation, and proof. To this extent the postulate of causality coincides with that of uniformity. The necessity which makes a causal relation of the sequence in time consists mainly in the capacity for constant repetition, the uniformity.

The dependence of the particular on the general, as it is conceived in the idea of law, is the logical shape of the principle of causality, and this must take the place of that analytic connection of cause and effect which we sought in vain. General synthesis is the essence of the necessity which must bind the elements of the event. Thus we find in the category of causality two elements which are inseparably united: the individual experience of work and the logical assumption of a dependence of the particular on the general. It is the stronger or one-sided emphasis of one or the other of these elements that gives us the different ideas of cause in ordinary life and in the various sciences.

§ 7

Mechanism and Teleology.—Convertibility of natural laws—The mechanical and the organic whole—Originality of action—Aim and purpose—Sound and spurious teleology—Unconscious teleology—Teleology and vital capacity—Development—Causality in the service of teleology.

The more carefully we consider the scientific application of the category of causality, the more emphatically we must abandon the superficial ideas which look upon these things as direct and self-evident data of experience. In particular we must rid ourselves of the assumption that there must be between cause and effect such simple relations as equivalence or similarity. One of the most important witnesses to the inexpressible multiplicity of reality is precisely the inexhaustible variety of the causal relation. Hence the more carefully we apply this causal relation, the more convinced we are that we find in the outer world all the forms of ordered and purposive activity which we seem to experience constantly in our own rational life. The conception of the material world as the theatre of purposive forces is one of the oldest and most widespread of human ideas. The phenomena of life, of the organic world, with their evolution and building of frames, seem especially to the plain mind to be a field of purposive events. As to its relation, however, to the purposeless causality of movements, reflective thought has taken many different lines, some of which have been obscured by verbal misunderstandings. We have already, in considering the general features of the event, pointed out a fundamental difference in this respect; though it by no means coincides with the popular idea of the distinction between mechanism and teleology.

The unambiguous succession in time which is essential to every event left us free to choose two alternatives in the specification of work: the beginning might determine the end, or the end might determine the beginning. The necessity, we said, is either consequence or indispensability. In the first case we mean that, given *A*,

B is bound to follow ; in the second case that, in order to produce *B*, *A* must precede. That is not always the same thing, because *B* might follow upon *C* or *D*. Motion may be caused by pushing, pressure, heat, magnetism, or design. It is the same with real dependence as with logical : given the ground of it, the result always follows, but the ground is not always correlated with the result, as the same result may follow from various grounds. We might pursue this as far as the interesting problem of the convertibility of natural laws. We have clearly every reason to assume that the same causes will always produce the same effects. But it is quite different with the question whether the same effects must always have the same causes. Yet this is assumed as an integral part of the principle of the uniformity of nature, which is the fundamental presupposition of all inductive thought and reasoning. This clearly applies in the highest degree to the most general forms of the event and the most intricate complexes of our experience. Hence this reciprocity has become most familiar in our ordinary life and in scientific research. In the provinces of physics and chemistry we naturally express ourselves in mechanical terms : in the province of biology in teleological language. When oxygen and hydrogen combine in the proportion 1 : 2 we get water ; but we may just as well say, if there is to be water, oxygen and hydrogen must, etc. On the other hand, we say that if an organism is to have differentiated sensations of light, it must have a peripheral structure like the eye ; and in this case a converse mechanistic expression would not suit our purpose, at least unless we express the invertibility of the causal relation by adding the word " only." Thus we may say : Only at a moderate temperature are organisms produced, and therefore, if organisms are to be produced, a moderate temperature is needed. This form of expression is most frequently found in connection with the complex isolated events of history. Only where we have a spiritual atmosphere like that of Germany in the eighteenth century and a genius like Goethe is a *Faust* possible ; in order to have a *Faust* we need, etc.

When we inquire into the correctness of these expressions, we must first make their meaning quite clear. Let us take the classical illustration of the organism. Its vital activity and its development are made possible only by these definite organs and their no less definite functions. But these definite organs and functions are, in turn, only possible in this organism. Hence the whole, which causes the effect, determines the parts which are required for it. They are only in it; and it is possible only through them. In this reciprocal dependence of the whole and the parts Kant has given us the classic definition of an organism. A watch is a whole that may be put together out of pre-existing wheels, etc. But the organism must itself produce the parts of which it is to consist. From this we get two fundamental types of the construction of a whole: the mechanical and the organic. In the one the parts precede the whole and produce it by being put together. In the organic whole, on the other hand, the parts themselves are conditioned by the whole and are only possible in it. In the organic whole, therefore, the end, which is to come out of it, determines the beginning.

This latter formulation is at first sight too much for our ordinary views of causation. The determination of the beginning by the end seems paradoxical and impossible. That the pre-existing should determine the present seems natural enough, though it is not quite so self-evident as it seems at first sight; but how can the future, which does not yet exist, do anything? How can it itself determine the process of an event to which alone it will owe its existence? It seems to be, not merely incomprehensible, but impossible. We may, however, at once weaken the force of these objections by a few general considerations. In the first place, it has already been shown that causal determination by something pre-existing is, though a very common idea, yet one that proves logically incomprehensible when it is closely studied. Then there is another thing. If we, for instance, regard the time-relation as phenomenal, we see that pre-existence or post-existence is merely a thought-form of our restricted

intellect, which ought not to make so much of the paradox of teleological dependence; the less so, as this way of looking at things is found to be impossible for certain groups in the phenomenal world. Both Aristotle and Schelling laid stress on this principle of indispensability, and Fichte, when he so clearly grasped that what ought to be is the reason of all being, pointed out the source of the prejudice against teleology: it is based upon the concept of substance and the assumption, connected therewith, that something must exist if anything is to come into being. The opposite conception, which regards *original action* as directed toward its achievement and therefore determined by it, is the true, genuine, and pure teleology of the organic view of the world.

But the whole problem has been perverted by a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. The problem of the future reality which is to have some effect on the pre-existing seems to be thrust aside when it is not the future reality itself which acts and determines, but the idea of it—when the effective thing is not the *end*, but the *design*. When the idea of the future, together with the corresponding act of will, determines the existence in time of its content, this seems to be the kind of action of the future which we know in our own experience; in so far, that is to say, as it is preconceived and willed. It can then act because it is already there—namely, as an idea and volition. But this design precedes the effect; it is therefore a kind of cause, and so this sort of teleology merely means a form of causality—the causality of the design.

We must, in the interest of clearness, distinguish these things very carefully. The genuine and true teleology is that of the end; and it affirms that this end, as the future reality, itself determines the means which precede its realisation and are necessary thereto. The false and perverse teleology is that of the design; and it affirms nothing more than that amongst the causes which precede their effects there are some which consist in the idea of the future reality and acts of will directed thereto. How difficult it is to keep these things apart, and how easily they run together, is best seen in Kant's position in the

Critique of Judgment. His philosophy recognises only *one* kind of scientific explanation of events—that of mechanical causation. Now it has to be made clear that, not only in view of the actual implements of human knowledge, but as a matter of principle and from the nature of the case, the purposiveness of organic life cannot be understood on the lines of this mechanical causation. In this case, as a matter of fact, the future form, which it is to produce, conditions the apparatus which is to produce it—the end conditions the means of its realisation. The only way to understand this causally would be to assume, on the analogy of man's technical activity, the existence of forces working with a purpose: a form of causation which is familiar enough in human life. But nature, even organic nature, is the kingdom of the unconscious; it has no designs. All the causes which we know and can understand in it are mechanical. If, therefore, we are forbidden to assume the existence in nature of technical forces working with a purpose, we have no alternative, in face of its purposive structures, but to give up the idea of knowledge and simply "regard them as if" nature worked according to design in them. Kant found himself driven to this transcendental view only because he could not fit into his system of categories the genuine teleology, the real determination of the pre-existing by the future; because his system was based upon the philosophical substructure of the Newtonian theory of mechanics.

Now if one is not prepared to recognise the teleological in the proper sense, as Aristotle and Schelling formulated it, yet is not satisfied with the problematic "as if" of Kant's system, the only alternative is, as we see in modern Vitalism, to assume unconscious purposive activities in organic nature. We are thus driven once more into the intermediate realm of the unconscious, which is supposed to be neither physical nor psychic, neither experienced nor perceived, but merely hypothetically introduced in order to explain our experience. Whether the unconscious is brought in as a psychological or a metaphysical hypothesis, according to the various shades of meaning

we find in Leibnitz, Fichte, and Hartmann, it always means that the explanation of processes given in experience requires us to suppose that they are not conscious, yet cannot be regarded as physical. We are not lightly to suppose that everything that is not in consciousness is unconscious. For some time the physiology of sense-perceptions worked fairly well, with the assumption of unconscious reasoning and similar phrases, which meant no more than that men were content with words. From the point of view of psychology I can see only two lines on which it seems necessary to assume the unconscious. On the one hand it is the condition of the mental contents that may be recalled to mind; they are not conscious and cannot be nothing, yet cannot be conceived as a physical something in the brain which would explain the reproduction of impressions. On the other hand we have volitions and states of feeling without conscious motive, in the case of which we are very largely exposed to self-deception as to our own feelings and views. Hence, since there is a psychological basis for the assumption of an intermediate realm of the unconscious, it may be, with proper caution, extended to the provinces of natural philosophy and metaphysics. If organic purposiveness compels us to assume conditions which we cannot satisfactorily regard as physical, yet they are not, as far as our knowledge goes, conscious processes, we seem to be justified in supposing that they are unconscious purposive powers, whether we call them vital forces, entelechies, dominants, or anything else. But we must be quite clear that in either case the unconscious is only a name for something that is assumed on the analogy of the psychic, without anybody being able to say, apart from this analogous feature, what it really is—in fact, only a name for an unsolved problem. The causal-mechanical thought of science must always endeavour to find a way out of this difficulty, and it therefore rejects the vital force and all such hypotheses.

With Kant we may formulate the problem of teleology in a different way. The purposive is always one amongst many possible combinations of atoms. That there is

such a combination at work is logically immaterial, and it can therefore be regarded as necessary only in the teleological sense of being indispensable. In this respect it had often been pointed out before Kant, and has often been pointed out since, that according to the principles of probability (particularly on the lines of Finitism) the purposive combination must arise at some time like all other combinations. Thus we have been referred to the purposive regularity of the stellar world, and Empedocles long ago pointed it out in the organic world. We have, further, Fechner's theory of the tendency of nature, and especially of the organic, toward stability; and, in fine, that is the meaning of the Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest. To many it seems that in this way the teleological problem has been solved, or explained away, mechanically. It is a question, however, if this is not merely playing with words. What is the purposive in this connection? In astronomy purposiveness means merely a regularity which leads to the stability of its contents; in the biological theory of evolution the purposive is only that by means of which the organism preserves itself and its species—fitness. It is not overwhelmingly astonishing that the fittest survive. These theories mean nothing but the survival of the fittest. The illusion of supposing that they give us some further synthetic knowledge is due to the fact that another meaning is put upon the word "purposive." It is an idea of value, and means the realisation of something that, without respect to vital fitness, corresponds to an idea, an object, an ideal. It is now said that the discovery of the survival of the fittest has also proved that everything purposive in the wider sense of the word is an outcome of mechanical evolution and means a selection of the fittest. That is really not the case; the purposive as an idea of value is not the same thing as the purposive as the biological principle of vital fitness. The processes of biological necessity very often lead to the survival of structures which must be described as purposive—as fitted for the purposes of life—in this sense, yet have no positive relation to purposiveness in the sense of value.

The predominant elements in modern biological theories of evolution, and partly in the philosophical theories which depend upon them, seem to represent a surviving fragment of the naturalistic optimism which regarded a natural event as *eo ipso* purposive and of value.

In this respect a good deal of mischief is done with ambiguous terms. By *evolution* (apart from the mathematical idea of evolution, such as that of a fraction or of a sinus in a series) we understand chiefly two closely related types of event which must be clearly distinguished from each other. In the first place we call evolution the process by which all the possibilities in a given complex are realised in their several forms: a process the purely causal nature of which is entirely independent of any ideas of value. In this sense the original gaseous sphere evolves into a manifold planetary system; and in this we have merely the distinction between the simple and the complex. But in our ordinary way of looking at these things we have a tendency to regard the more complex state as the higher, that is to say, of higher value, and thus to conceive the process of evolution as an advance from the simpler and lower to the more complex and higher. That is, in effect, the whole artificial structure of Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution. As a matter of fact, if the unfolding of possibilities is thus to be regarded as a progressive "evolution," an idea of value must in some way be introduced to provide a standard. If, for instance, we say that the organic is something higher than the inorganic, and if, within the organic world, we distinguish between lower and higher forms of life, we have a pronounced idea of value in this theory of evolution in the gradual approximation to psychic life and to the human standard. If evolution is to be a process toward an end instead of a merely physical development, we are regarding the event from the point of view of a judgment of values. Causal changes are only advances, and in this sense evolution, when they are successfully adapted to the end which provides a standard for judging them. That holds good in politics, literature, or agriculture just as much as in botany and zoology.

The only thing needed is that one shall understand clearly what is to be regarded as end and standard of judgment. Not every change that means development is an advance; Auguste Comte reached the acme of phraseological vagueness when he indicated "progress" as the "aim" of the historical life of society.

The realisation of such an era of evolution is always accomplished by causal processes, and this opens out a final consideration which we must now analyse. We invert the causal relation teleologically when we say that, if *B* is to occur, *A* must precede it; and in this we imply that *A* is the sole possible cause of *B*. In order therefore to express a teleological relation of this kind, we must know, or at least think we know, the reciprocal causal relation. All reflections on the means with which we would attain our ends work with known causal ideas. We assign *A* as the means for *B* because we know or assume that *A* is the cause of *B*: is in general, and will be in any particular case. All purposive teleology therefore implies conscious and willed causality.

We thus place causality in the service of teleology; and in practice machines are the familiar type of this state of things. Their functions are purposive because we are in a position to control with perfect confidence the causal connectedness of their activities. This, as is well known, seemed to the great naturalists of the seventeenth century, such as Boyle and Newton, to be the solution of the teleological problem of metaphysics; the teleology of divine action was confused with the real and true teleology which we defined above. Amongst the philosophers Leibnitz, and in recent times Lotze, adopted this idea, in order to reconcile a universal mechanism with an equally universal teleology. The decisive element in this is the contrast between the theory of nature which ascribes to it an indifferent causality, entirely devoid of value, as essential and the purposiveness of nature which we perceive, or think we perceive. It is true that this purposiveness of the natural order must not be assumed without good reason. To an impartial observer it must always seem to be restricted; and hence the dysteleologi-

cal facts of reality conflict, as we shall see later, with the development of the problems of theodicy. We are brought back to the dualism to which we referred on an earlier page; in this case it is the antithesis of purposiveness and determinism. The candour of the older thinkers led them in this matter to be content to say that the world is good within the limits of the possible (*κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*); and we have an echo of this dualism in all those ideas of religious metaphysics which lay special stress on the need of amelioration by means of miracles. The world, it is true, is regarded as the most perfect of all machines; but even the best machine is more or less thrown out of order at times and needs the hand of the divine artificer.

§ 8

The Psycho-physical Event.—Psychic and corporeal events—Psycho-physical causality—Psycho-physical parallelism—Conservation of energy—Consciousness as an epiphenomenon—Reflex movements—The brain as an *asylum ignorantiae*—Discontinuity of the psychic event—Psycho-physical duality as appearance—Panpsychism—The unconscious.

Amongst the dualistic elements of thought which are thus constantly recurring the most important, even in connection with problems of the event, is the antithesis of body and soul. There are, in point of fact, such profound differences between corporeal and psychic events that their union and their interaction form one of the most difficult problems that ever confronted, and will continue to confront, the philosophic mind.

In recapitulating the more important of these differences we think first of all of that which relates to continuity. The material event as movement is always continuous, since it is a change of place in space. To pass from *A* to *B* a body must cover every part of the intermediate space. There is no such continuity of transition, apparently, in the psychic event. The successive acts of consciousness are discrete events, between which there is no gradual transition: it has no meaning for them.

We hear one sound after another. Each is distinct in itself and not connected with the other, as is the case with the positions of a ball that rolls from right to left. Hence the time we personally experience is a sum of discrete points, and our idea of objective, continuously flowing time arises only from our need to understand the events which we are compelled by our external experience to interpolate between the elements of our personally experienced time. Hence our way of looking at these things: time does not stand still, nor do bodies in space, but our consciousness stands still, for a longer or shorter time. On this are based all our ordinary estimates of time, in which we compare the proportion experienced by ourselves with that of continuous objective events. An hour is short if we experience a good deal in it: long if we experience little or nothing in it.

A second main distinction is that the movement of spatial substances—whether we speak of visible bodies or atoms—is external and passes from them the moment it is over, whereas the content of the psychic event persists, whatever kind of experience we had. There is a certain medium between these extremes when we find in such material complexes as organisms something analogous to the psychic life—a trace or a habit of the function remaining after the event. It has been called the memory of matter. The real material substance, however, the atom, has nothing happening to it; it remains the same whatever its movement is, and when it leaves the complex to which it belonged for a time it is just the same as before, as if it had experienced no movement whatever. Hence the immutability, the persistency, of material reality, whereas what we call the substantial content of ideas, the spiritual existence, the apperception-masses of feelings, and volitions, only come into being gradually in the course of our psychic experience. In the individual, and not less in the entirety of cultural development, there is a permanent deposit from the event. Hence souls, as we have seen several times, are not substances in the same sense as bodies, and, if we press the category of inherence explicitly in its physical application, psycho-

logy has to be "without soul." For the external world we are bound to assume something in the nature of a thing, if we would have a clear idea of a function, an event. For the psychic life the fact is that the event is the primary experience, and the substantial reality is to be regarded as an outcome of it. This is very clear in the case of the socio-psychological process, which in recent times has again received the infelicitous name of "folk-psychology." For the life of the individual soul ordinary thought easily finds a substratum in the physical organism. For those general states and movements which we attribute to the spirit of the nation or of the times we do not, in these terms, indicate any substances that can be proved to exist or even be intellectually defined. In those cases it is notorious that the substantive expressions have only the value of functions.

A further distinction between material and psychic events is found in the way in which we define progress. From the material point of view it depends entirely on the spatial features of position and movement. Chemically and physically, and in the end even organically, position and motion are the decisive factors whether there shall next be rest or movement, persistence or change. In psychic events, on the other hand, the consequent is determined by the antecedent according to rational relations which have, in principle, nothing to do with spatial conditions. In the association of the dream the predominant elements are similarities and contrasts; in judgment and reasoning, real connections between the contents of the mind; in conviction and will, the relation of means to end, and so on. These differences in the progress of the event enable us to understand how it is that from common points of departure, such as we have in sense-perception, the two series of events, the physical and the psychic, follow quite different and very divergent directions.

In fine, one of the greatest differences is the manner in which the variety of simple or elementary impulses are connected in a complex event in the two cases. In the physical world we have the scheme which is expressed

in the parallelogram of forces. The components fade out of recognition in the resultant. From the diagonal, which may be the same for any number of pairs of cathetes, we can never tell what their components will be in any given case. In consciousness, on the contrary, the elements which enter as parts into a complex idea remain unchanged, and they are only bound up in a new unity by some form of relation. This closely agrees with the feature of the psychic event in virtue of which all its elements persist as such, so that, if they enter into a further event, they do not lose their identity, but remain unchanged. This is, perhaps, the most important and most radical difference between the two kinds of event.

As we saw above, the causality of similar things is supposed by ordinary people to be intelligible and self-evident, and each of the two series of events, that of movements and that of states of consciousness, seems to offer no difficulty as long as each series is complete in itself. It is only when they cross each other, or disturb and interpenetrate each other, that we get the great problem of the psycho-physical connection as, in the strict sense, an incomprehensible causality of dissimilar things. We must observe, first, that in point of fact we experience this psycho-physical causality just as much as we do the others, the psychic and the physical. We experience them in the same degree as facts which we understand in the same degree—that is to say, they are no more capable of analysis. The change of stimuli in perceptions or of designs in purposive movements is just as certain to our perception as the transition from one form of material movement to another or the advance from one psychic state to another; but the real nature of the connection of cause and effect is incomprehensible in each case.

We experience psycho-physical causality mainly in ourselves, and it is primarily an anthropological problem. So it seemed to Descartes and his immediate pupils, the Occasionalists. It seemed to them an exception to the general separation of the two worlds, that of consciousness and that of extension. It was soon found, however,

that this relaxation of the exclusiveness of the two worlds was really a metaphysical problem of the first magnitude. On the one side, by means of psycho-physical causality there enter into consciousness states of presentation, feeling, and will which would never arise simply from the nature of consciousness itself. Descartes thinks it important to trace all that is obscure and confused, erroneous and sinful in the soul, to this disturbance of its pure intellectuality by influences of the material world. On the other hand, the purposive acts with which man reacts on the influences of the external world lead to these changes, which they could not do by the mechanism of their own movements alone. Would the elements unite, without the intervention of mind, to form houses and cities, bridges and ships, sewing-machines and airships? The world is changed wherever mind deals with it, just as the mind is changed whenever it takes the world into it. These facts are undeniable, and therefore we have to adjust ourselves to the causality of dissimilar things, however incomprehensible or even impossible it may seem.

Recent science has found a way out of the difficulty in a theory which was started by Guelincx and Spinoza, and was introduced by Fechner into modern psychology and metaphysics. It is the hypothesis that, as a matter of fact, each of these worlds, the psychic and the physical, is complete in itself, and there is no influence from one to the other, but that events in the two worlds proceed step by step in complete agreement with each other, since the same primary reality evolves, expresses itself, and appears in each series. This we call psycho-physical parallelism. Perhaps it would have been better to call it psycho-physical correspondence. Many of our modern men of science cautiously regard it as merely a working hypothesis, useful in investigating the facts of the psycho-physical connection and not implying anything further, but it naturally, in the course of research, becomes a metaphysical theory which makes the same claim to interpret the world as Spinozism once did. This theory is that each of the two worlds, that of *cogitatio* and that of *extensio*, the psychic and the corporeal, passes through

various stages, in accordance with its general laws, without being influenced by the other ; in other words, that it would develop just the same as it does even if the other world did not exist at all. The appearance of psycho-physical causality, therefore, is merely due to the fact that each *modus* of one world is exactly correlated to a *modus* of the other. This is supposed to be true of the relation of soul and body from the point of view of reality, and the relation of consciousness and movement from the point of view of function.

From the extensive discussions of this theory which have taken place during the last few decades—so extensive that it is impossible to suggest any new philosophical consideration—it will suffice here to quote the main argument that has been used in favour of the metaphysical soundness of psycho-physical parallelism. It at the same time introduces us to the most general correlations, and leads from the anthropological impulses which lay, and lie, at the root of the problem to the ultimate metaphysical consequences on which it is to be decided whether the hypothesis is to be accepted or rejected. It is a question of its relation to that supreme postulate of modern science which goes by the name of the Conservation of Energy ; though its special scientific meaning is not always correctly understood. From the point of view of this principle the theory of psycho-physical parallelism seems to be quite impossible. For if, according to the principle of the conservation of energy in the physical world as a self-contained whole of material reality, the distribution of kinetic and potential energy is plainly determined from moment to moment according to the direction and intensity of movements, and is regulated by mechanical laws, it is certainly unthinkable that these physical movements should have other causes than physical movements, or that they could be caused by psychic states. And if the processes of organic life, in which, on the theory of psycho-physical causality, there seems to be a reciprocal change of designs into movements and movements into sensations, constitute an infinitesimal part in proportion to the enormous mass of inorganic events, we should have

here, if we admit psycho-physical causality, a transgression of the principle of the conservation of energy which deprives it of its axiomatic validity. Hence theoretical physicists naturally have a strong bias for parallelism.

We do not get rid of these difficulties by pretending that there is no danger to the conservation of the quantum of energy as long as we confine psycho-physical causality to its *distribution*. The sensory processes and the inner processes of the nervous system have, it is argued, stored a sum of energy in the brain, and this is converted by the motor processes into purposive movements. We must bear in mind that the psychic states which we call purposes, and which consist of ideas of the future and functions of the will directed thereto, decide in what direction this potential energy is guided in order to be converted into motor functions and therefore definite actions; and, on the other hand, that the vital force which is released by the stimuli in the sensory nervous system is directed by psychic elements along the paths by which it accumulates in central nervous states. The principle of the conservation of energy is not called into question if the distribution which they experience in the brain is ascribed to psychic causes. But this is certainly not the case. In its mathematical-physical sense the principle of the conservation of energy applies plainly and inexorably to its distribution, its division into potential and kinetic energy, from moment to moment, and it therefore leaves no room for any other principle. It is only the vague popular idea or formulation of the principle that makes possible dilettante arguments of this sort. The exact mathematical-physical definition absolutely excludes them.

Still more childish is the attempt at evasion once made by Robinet and repeated by many in recent times: the mind is supposed to play the part of a special form of energy. Just as movement is converted into heat and heat into movement, so the energy of the stimulation of the sensory nerves is supposed to pass into consciousness, and, as psychic energy, to undergo all sorts of changes until at last it is, in the final form of a purpose, recon-

verted into movement. The organism is thus supposed to be really a grave of physical energy and a cradle of its rebirth. The various types of organisms are distinguished from each other in the greater or less quantity of energy which undergoes this occasional conversion from the physical form to the psychic ; but in the last resort the loss and gain are always equal, so that the integrity of the principle of the conservation of energy is preserved. We need, however, little penetration to see that in arguments of this sort we have, once more, a metaphysical dilettantism playing with the various meanings of the word "energy." Psychic reality can never be described as substance or function in the same sense as physical reality in our formulation of the principle of the conservation of energy.

The strict definition of the great physical principle forbids dialectical performances of this sort, and it is no less irreconcilable with the idea that consciousness is a by-product of the physical process, an epiphenomenon, as is said. By this is meant that the conversion of the sensory energy into motor, which is the chief performance of the organism, and especially of its nervous system, may very well take place in accordance with the principle of the conservation of energy ; that the peculiarity of the organic world is merely that these movements in the brain have, besides their physical causal relations, states of consciousness, from sensation and perception to purpose and volition, as accessory phenomena. But from the point of view of the conservation of energy even this means an unthinkable and impossible release of force ; and this weak compromise is not more fitted to meet the need of a recognition of the psychic activity. An accompanying consciousness of this sort, not itself a cause, but merely a continuous mirror of an active and independent causal series of bodily states, is one of the most superfluous and tedious things in the world. It would be condemned to be a sinecure, in flat contradiction to the most valuable witness to the physical in our experience ; for the psychic is to us the active, the very principle of movement in the world—*mens agitat molem*. What

is called Monism, which often tries to make capital out of this epiphenomenal idea of consciousness, is merely concealing with it its Materialistic tendency.

None of these subterfuges helps us. We must grant that, if the principle of the conservation of energy is affirmed as a metaphysical principle of reality, if it is regarded as really valid for the world of material reality, psycho-physical causality is inconsistent with it, and therefore psycho-physical parallelism is the simplest and best substitute for it. But, on the other hand, what monstrosities arise when one attempts to take this theory seriously and think it out in detail! In the first place, the course of physical events, all the movements that occur in the body, must be regarded as entirely independent of any psychic cause, and the course of the psychic life must be equally independent of any causes in the material world; and their complete and invariable correspondence, in spite of their utter heterogeneity, has then to be explained in some way or other.

In regard to the corporeal processes it is sought to make this view plausible and attractive by referring us to reflex movements, which are well known as functions of all organisms, especially the human organism, and which occur, with fine shades of transition, either without consciousness or with that "epiphenomenon." To an astonishing, and sometimes alarming, extent we have the experience of processes, which properly and originally had the character of conscious, voluntary movements, and were therefore ascribed by the plain mind to psycho-physical causes, so changing in certain circumstances that they are no longer accompanied by consciousness, and could not possibly be attributed to psycho-physical causality. Purposive movements like writing, shooting, piano-playing, etc., which have been learned and practised, are accomplished in such a way that consciousness needs only to give the initial impulse and does nothing more; in some cases, indeed, it seems to be absolutely excluded as the cause. We know quite well that we can at times make quite coherent and satisfactory speeches while our mind is taken up with something quite different,

To many questions we give, as we say, purely mechanical answers, the contents of which, however relevant to the question, do not seem to be in the least dictated by consciousness. Facts of this sort may be interpreted in the sense of the general possibility that the physiological process which takes place between the states of stimulation of the sensory and motor nerves takes the same course, in the same sense and with the same results, as the psychic process which simultaneously goes on in the mind. But that process does not help us out of the difficulty. On the one hand, we cannot confidently show to what extent half-conscious, to say nothing of unconscious, psychic processes, which determine these physiological processes, may accompany those which are in the foreground of consciousness and seem to occupy it exclusively. It is, on the contrary, a fact that different ideas may be at work in different strata of consciousness at the same time, without interfering with each other. We can simultaneously dictate and read a letter, play the piano and listen to a conversation. It is not necessary to assume that we have here a jumping backward and forward of the mind from one activity to another; each train of thought goes its own way, uninterrupted by the others. That may hold good for unconscious processes as well as conscious, and in the above cases it is always possible that we have the psycho-physical causality of conscious or half-conscious functions. Moreover, in all these instances there is question of acquired movements which owe their appearance of reflection to laborious practice, and every such act of practice had to involve a conscious relation of stimulus and reaction. Hence these automatic processes presuppose an initial performance in which there is no room for the theory of the accompanying action of consciousness, and it is repeated in virtue of an idea of which we are conscious as a psychic act. All these arguments, therefore, do not get over the fact that in these purposive bodily movements we have physical processes which, if not at the time they are performed, at all events in their remoter causes, compel us to assume conscious

functions amongst their causal elements. Wherever in the material world organic beings, especially human beings, are at work, the purely mechanical-physical process is interrupted by psychic functions.

It is all very well to urge against us the inexpressible fineness and the unimaginable intricacy of the structures which the organic elements exhibit, particularly in the brain, and say that these seem to make an explanation of purposive movements as reflex actions not impossible. In this we are simply once more taking the intricate structure of the brain as an *asylum ignorantiae* to which we can always retreat and bury ourselves under suggestions of possibilities which no man can get to the bottom of. It remains, however, extremely probable that the bodily mechanism, in the sense-stimulations which need a psychic interpretation, accomplishes the purposively adapted movements only in virtue of its reflex habits, its associative connections, and its differentiated reactions. All these intricate arrangements of the nervous system itself are best understood as an outcome of psychophysical causes. When, in the "telegram" argument which was first advanced by Albert Lange, the purposive reaction to the reading of the words is supposed to be explained in the sense that this releases all the connections in the brain which are, in their corresponding psychic forms, meanings, recollections, considerations, and resolutions, it is unintelligible how all these states of the brain themselves could come into being without the action of the psychic states, merely by spatial storing and in accordance with physico-chemical laws. But however improbable the Materialistic interpretation may be, we have to admit that in view of the unlimited possibilities of the cerebral structure it can never be proved to be wholly impossible.

Much more grotesque are the demands on our credulity of the hypothesis of parallelism if we start from the consideration of the internal life and psychic causality. This internal life seems to proceed in its own inevitableness as if it were not accompanied by or dependent upon any bodily process. Our imagination, our thinking,

our practical reflections, go on with a certain continuity of purely psychic causality. In this it is to be noted that the psychic elements which are found in such a movement are, as to their origin, only intelligible as a reaction upon the external world. Apart from this, however, we have the difficult question: When these processes are suddenly interrupted by a pain, for instance, which the plain mind traces to a knock or a blow as its cause, what is the *psychic* cause of the pain and the interruption? The discontinuity which characterises the psychic event as distinguished from the spatial, the intermittence and recommencement of the course of the psychic life, is never intelligible in itself; it needs always to be explained by influences from the external world—that is to say, by psycho-physical causes. This is at all events true of the inner life-process in the individual consciousness, and it is true of this especially in view of those influences which it experiences from the mental life of other persons. These are always brought about by psycho-physical processes. Of any direct causal relation between different persons without corporeal mediation, of a psychic causality that works purely internally and without a physical medium between soul and soul, of any telepathic possibilities of this kind, we may hear from poets and visionaries, but we learn nothing whatever from experience. This shows us that all the recommencements of which we are individually conscious are connected with influences of the physical world. If, in spite of this, we regard the psychic process as purely immanent and self-contained, we have, in the case of those interruptions which naïve thought attributes to psycho-physical causality, to assume unconscious psychic causes corresponding to the bodily processes which psycho-physical causality regards as the cause of the discontinuity.

The hypothesis of parallelism, therefore, would have to be developed, not merely as a psychological or anthropological theory, but, as in its original Spinozistic form, as a metaphysical philosophy, universal Panpsychism. It must be assumed that to the entire system and course of spatial-corporeal states there corresponds an equally

continuous system and an equally uninterrupted series of psychic states—of which our consciousness knows nothing whatever! That is making a very large demand on our credulity. A psychic causality of meanings, values, and purposes, and parallel with it a physical causality of position and direction, with their various forms of motion; and the two supposed to correspond at every step! That is the strangest adventure we were ever asked to believe; indeed, to believe it would be an act of despair. Hence it is the lesser evil, the smaller miracle, to admit the common causality of the dissimilar in the action of body on soul and soul on body.

The Monistic defenders of Parallelism cannot concede that for them the physical and psychic systems are two separate realities, in some inexplicable correspondence to each other. They say that the two systems are merely parallel phenomena of the primary reality, and in this we are supposed to find precisely the reason for their invariable correspondence. In opposition to this we may observe, first, that we by no means get rid of the paradox of the hypothesis by removing it from the realm of primary reality to derivative reality, from the essence to the appearance. On the contrary, we are now confronted with the very serious question *why* the one reality develops in two entirely different modes of appearance. This question is for parallelistic Monism just as prejudicial and insoluble whether we take the idea of "appearance" in an objective or a subjective sense. If the two realms are conceived as two sorts of derived reality proceeding from the one primary reality—which is then incomprehensible—all the difficulties return which we saw previously in the discussion of ontic problems; and if the appearance of the psycho-physical duality is restricted to human consciousness it is not one whit more intelligible, as we also saw previously.

The most important point in these problems, however, is that here again we find ourselves compelled to assume unconscious states which are not physical, yet are not in the proper sense of the word of a psychic character—in the sense in which the idea of the soul has come to be

identified with that of consciousness. In modern thought this has had the peculiar result of interpolating a third realm, the realm of the unconscious, between the realms of *cogitatio* and *extensio*, into which the Cartesian school distributed reality. However, the fact that all the arguments in favour of this intermediate realm are derived from psychology and its attempts to explain conscious phenomena necessarily implies that this unconscious must be more closely related to the psychic world than to the physical. The hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism therefore combines the unconscious and the conscious in a unity which is independent of the physical world. All these problems, in fine, are metaphysical problems, and the difficulties which were experienced by the hypothesis of parallelism that was based upon the older metaphysics merely show that the ultimate solution depends upon the question how far human knowledge can be confident of passing beyond the two kinds of experience, the external and the internal, and attaining to the nature of reality.

CHAPTER III

NOETIC PROBLEMS

THE obvious postulate for all ontic and genetic problems, from the simple assumptions of the untrained mind to the mature theories of science, is that our ideas must be knowledge, and at the same time true knowledge. This postulate is so obvious that it does not always, especially in the beginning, come into consciousness at all, yet it is the driving force in the progress of thought. For the element of dissatisfaction in our first impressions, which is always the stimulus to the formulation of problems, is the feeling, or even the fear, that these immediate ideas, which we regard as knowledge, may not be true. From this we understand how it is that we have at first very inadequate and in part untenable ideas as to the meaning of that feeling, the meaning of the value of truth. Yet these ideas are amongst the last to be unsettled and called into question. Rational reflection turns last of all upon itself. The Greeks called this rational reflection *νοεῖν*, and we therefore call these problems, which arise from the direction of knowledge to its own task and the means of fulfilling this task, noetic.

§ 9

Truth.—Theories of knowledge—Science and knowledge—The judgment—Transcendental, immanent, and formal truth—Truth as value—Pragmatism—Opinion, belief, and knowledge.

The first of these problems is the definition of truth itself. Unsettlement on this point occurs only in a mature stage of mental life, and the questions which it

suggests are therefore the latest in historical development. At first we are content with the simple confidence, the "courage of truth," which accompanies our mental operations: we simply think, ask, inquire, investigate. In the course of time the inevitable antitheses and failures baffle our mind, and we ask whether we can accomplish the task of attaining real knowledge. As soon as this stage is reached, our intellectual conscience feels that it must settle the question of the possibility of knowledge before acquiring anything further. It is as well that the sciences have generally accomplished, and to-day accomplish, their work before asking this preliminary question, as it is these sciences themselves which must provide the material for answering it. As a subsequent question, however, the noetic problem is quite inevitable.

The necessity of it is so obviously based upon the nature of things that it is quite independent of the question what position is assigned in the system of sciences to the solution of these noetic problems. As a special and coherent inquiry it is now often called "the theory of knowledge" or Epistemology (or, sometimes, Noetics), and it is assuredly the *final* science in the sense that it presupposes all the others. There must be knowledge before it can be the object of a theory. Thus, in the history of philosophy noetic questions were first raised by the Sophists, and then by Socrates and Plato, and they had been preceded by a long and fruitful development of scientific knowledge which had at length turned upon itself. This beginning led to the Aristotelic logic, which is the culmination of the self-consciousness of Greek science.

The starting-point was the Platonic distinction between knowledge and opinion, *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα*. It contains a first glimpse of the various kinds of verification; and the more proudly knowledge opposed itself to opinion in this distinction, the more confident science became as to its own nature and procedure. From that time onward there has been included in the inventory of every complete philosophical theory a discussion of the nature

of knowledge, its vindication, range, and limitations; and in most cases the views on this subject were the final result, in a certain sense even the crowning test, of the whole philosophical system. The renewal of the conflict of metaphysical systems in modern times has thrust the question of the theory of knowledge into the foreground. Locke demanded that, before any discussion of the difficult problems of metaphysics, the range of the instrument with which we hoped to solve them should be investigated—that is to say, the human faculty of knowledge. Then Kant claimed that this inquiry into the possibility of knowledge should precede all knowledge, at least metaphysical knowledge, and therefore be the *first* science.

We will not go further into the question whether the theory of knowledge should be the test or the foundation of all metaphysics, but will select from the discussion of this matter a point which is of very great importance for the understanding of these things. Kant's claim, that an assurance of the possibility of knowledge ought to precede actual knowledge, seems at first sight extremely plausible, yet it is open to the objection that it involves a vicious circle: an objection that no less a person than Hegel urged against Kant. The theory of knowledge, it is said, *is* knowledge, and so it assumes the proof of that very possibility which it sets out to prove. To attempt it is much the same as the case of the man who wants to learn to swim before he goes into the water. This objection would be justified if the theory of knowledge wanted to make a *tabula rasa* of the mind and begin to think *ab ovo*, from an entirely new starting-point. That is impossible, because every thought is permeated with relations to others. Hence the theory of knowledge cannot be isolated from the contents of the sciences, which were acquired without it. The formal suspension which Kant required for the solution of the critical question referred only to metaphysics. The results of the other sciences have to be used by the theory of knowledge as the only available arguments for the solution of its problems,

We can explain the situation best by examining an unsound defence which was put forward, against Hegel, on behalf of Kant's claim. It was said that knowledge is a fact; and if science is to explain all facts, it must explain this fact also, if not before any others. The theory of knowledge has the same relation to science as physiology has to life. We will not inquire here whether that was Kant's view. It is, at all events, a bad defence of his position, because there is no room for an inquiry into the possibility of knowledge if you postulate in advance that it is a fact. Whatever exists is possible; the only question, then, is how it is possible. If the theory of knowledge, moreover, were something like a physiology of knowledge, it would be neither psychology nor metaphysics, and would therefore be not the beginning, but the end, of knowledge. But the question precisely is whether there is such a thing as knowledge. The fact from which the theory starts is not the fact that we have knowledge, but that in our science we claim to have it; and the task of the theory is to investigate whether the claim is sound. Theory, therefore, in this sense means, not an explanation of a given fact, but philosophical theory, a critical inquiry into the soundness of the claim. It means something quite different from the explanatory theories which have to show the possibility of a reality. Physiology never raises a question about the justification of life.

The situation of the theory of knowledge is therefore this: for a number of ideas which in science represent facts we make the claim that they are knowledge, and the question is whether this science of man is really knowledge. Formulated thus, the question presupposes that we define knowledge differently from science. Science is something that we actually have: knowledge is a task which this actual science has to fulfil. Thus in noetic problems we have the fundamental antithesis of reality and value, the relation between being and the norm of judgment upon it, in a very pronounced form; and on that account they are a transition from theoretical to axiological problems. Science is in this connection the

historically given content of ideas to which, as distinguished from the opinions of individuals, we ascribe a general validity and normative necessity; and the philosophical question which we here approach is merely whether this claim, which we implicitly grant, not only in ordinary life but in the course of scientific research, is justified. The claim is, in sum, that these scientific ideas have the value of truth. Thus truth is the central idea round which all noetic problems turn.

The distinction between truth and falseness in our ideas is so familiar and taken for granted in our intellectual life that the great majority of men never reflect what they really mean by it. It is certain—it is beyond question on all sides—that the predicate “true” is a predicate of value which we grant to certain ideas in preference to others. But when we look closely into it, both the meaning of the valuation and the form of the ideas to which it is to be applied are very difficult to define. We shall come to an agreement first, perhaps, as to the form which the ideas must have in the strict sense for us to receive them as true or reject them as untrue. The untrained mind, it is true, speaks of the truth or falseness of particular ideas and concepts, as when we ask whether the concept of the atom is true or not; but we see, on looking more closely, that this use of the word is derivative. Originally the predicate of truth—as Descartes developed it for modern philosophy—applies only to the connections of ideas which we verbally express in propositions and logically call judgments. As a psychological process, however, judgment is a highly characteristic structure, in which we have, perhaps, the clearest and most complete expression of the whole spiritual being with its two typical features, the theoretical and the practical. To judge means not merely to connect ideas with each other, but to affirm this connection as valid and true; or, in negative judgments, to reject it as false. We have therefore in this *ἀξίωμα*, as the Stoics very well called it, not only the intellectual element of bringing various contents together in a certain relation, but also the voluntarist element of affirming or denying

this relation. The act of will which in judgment is associated with the action of the mind was called by the Stoics "assent" (*συγκατάσθεσις*), and we now ask what this assent means. Naturally the untrained mind approaches this question by taking for granted the meaning of assent—namely, the sense of truth must always be the same and capable of definitive determination.

That is not the case, however, and it needs very little consideration to show that truth is taken in very different senses. The truth of a mathematical proposition, the truth of an historical hypothesis, the truth of a natural law—can we describe these things in the same way? We shall, perhaps, find this question answered by the untrained mind in the affirmative; we shall be told that in every case truth is the correspondence of an idea with reality. But it is easy to see that this is scarcely the case even in the three examples we have just given. For an historical hypothesis we might be able to use this criterion of correspondence with reality, but if we want to apply it to mathematical propositions, or such intellectual constructions as laws of nature, we shall have to use very strained methods. As a matter of fact, this superficial meaning of truth is derived from ordinary empirical thought, and from this it has been extended to the idea of things and their activities. This definition of truth implies a relation of pictorial correspondence between man's idea and the reality which it regards as its object. In this we probably have the most complete expression of the naïve view of things, which supposes a perceptive mind in the midst of a surrounding world that is somehow reproduced in it. All the sensory images with which we verbally express the process of knowledge—to reproduce, mirror, embrace, grasp, etc.—and which are taken from the action of the various senses, show only the many ways in which the reproduction may be imagined.

Now the theory of sensitive perception has completely destroyed this supposition that external reality is reproduced internally, and the *transcendental* truth—as this

first and naïve conception of truth may be called—cannot be sustained in its original sense. Moreover, every attempt to prove seriously the correspondence of experience and reality shows only the agreement of presentations of different origin, and never shows the correspondence of the presentation with the thing. We can compare presentations in our immediate experience with memories or with imaginative pictures, and refer them both to the same object ; but we can never compare a presentation with the object itself. However, the main idea of transcendental truth, as a relation of the thought to a reality which is supposed to be reproduced in it, is found in a more or less attenuated form in other ideas of truth, and it can never be wholly suppressed.

When, for instance, we find offered to us an *immanent* definition of truth, which affirms only the agreement of presentations with each other, this hope of finding them in agreement is always based upon the expectation that they will therefore be related to the same object. We have, in fact, the subtle influence of the feeling that the two magnitudes are equal to each other because they are equal to an unknown third, or at least “correspond” to it. If the ideas which we form in scientific theory are to agree with those we gain in experience, the real reason for our seeking this is the thought, lurking in the background, that in both the same reality is presenting itself to the mind. Thus the “picture theory” is the most primitive and the most persistently active form in which truth is represented as a relation between the presentation and the object which it signifies.

This, however, by no means exhausts the realm of truths. There are some in which there can be no question whatever of an object in this original sense of the word—the sense of a reality which is supposed to be reproduced in thought. To this class belong all mathematical, logical, ethical, and æsthetic truths. The only criterion of truth in those cases is the necessity and universal validity with which they present themselves in consciousness, and which in the case of the other truths seemed to be due to the relation to the object. We must, however,

very carefully define the two characters of this *formal* conception of truth, if we are to avoid misunderstanding. Universal validity, in the first place, which is related to the plurality of the knowing subjects, cannot be conceived as an actual fact; it is quite impossible that concordant recognition of any statement could be empirically attained and proved even for all members of the species *Homo sapiens*. On the contrary, the actual validity of all truths must be very restricted, or they suffer the fate of being born as paradoxes and ending as trivialities. Moreover, universal validity, as far as it can be approximately attained empirically, does not guarantee a truth, because it is notoriously often attained in the case of errors—a fact so well known that we need not trouble to heap up historical instances. Hence the universal validity of which there is question in the definition of formal truth is merely one that is desired: one which ought to be found, in virtue of the necessity, in all normal thinking subjects. This necessity in turn, however, is not the same thing as the necessity of a law of nature. The processes of presentation which lead to error are subject to the same necessities of the psychic laws as those which lead to a knowledge of truth. The necessity of thought, therefore, of which we speak in logic, is not psychological, but is rather the immanent and actual necessity of the contents of presentation. And in this element of actuality the conception of formal truth also returns to the relation to the object, even if it no longer conceives this relation in the crude form of an assumption of a reality outside the mind, but modified in a way which we shall consider later.

Thus the purely theoretical relation of knowledge to its object is by no means free from ambiguity. Even if we consider only the three forms of truth given here, we understand why it is that the later ancient philosophy had such an extensive and fruitless contest about “the criterion of truth.” The difficulties which were then brought to light will always reappear if it is sought to give one single and quite universal definition of truth which shall be applicable in all cases. The only thing

we can do is to say that truth is in all cases that which *ought* to be affirmed. From this it will be understood that in modern logic the theory of truth is treated as a part of the theories of value or duty. This, however, leads to new difficulties. It is at least doubtful, and probably a matter of temperament and character rather than of intellectual decision, whether this theoretical "ought," which constitutes truth, is absolute. The duty to affirm the truth is not recognised by everybody as of complete universal validity. The logical imperative is hypothetical, not categorical. I can only expect a man to recognise the truth on the condition that he knows it, or ought to know it. And since knowledge means thought deliberately directed to truth, we find ourselves once more in a vicious circle.

An attempt is made to meet this by assigning to knowledge a different aim, so that the truth seems to be only a means for the attainment of this aim. Hence axiological theories of truth have in recent times shown the tendency which goes by the name of Pragmatism. The chief idea on which it is based is that thought, to become knowledge, is exercised by man for the sake of action (*πρᾶγμα*), for which he needs the lead of presentations. It is true that originally a man thinks only in order to act, and that the psychological process which leads to judgment, to affirmation or denial, is entirely of an emotional character—that is to say, is permeated with processes of feeling and volition. The element of assent, the voluntary element in judgment, requires motives for the affirmation or denial; and these motives, for the individual as for the masses, are feelings of desire and aversion, hope and fear, and also the volitions which are at the root of these feelings. But we have hitherto given the name of *opinions* to this natural process of finding a sanction in feelings and needs; and, even in regard to opinion and its mode of origin, we have considered that its validity was merely relative and restricted to the individual. Even when these emotional motives of assent arise from the persistent and consciously fixed tendencies of feeling and will which we call character, and when we

therefore speak of the opinions as convictions—a kind of assent which is usually called *belief*—they are still valid in the sphere of emotional verification. It is the remarkable feature, and at the same time the moral significance, of scientific knowledge that it will acknowledge no other means of verification than the reasons which are contained in the object of presentation and the laws of thought. Such an attitude, to desire truth for its own sake and not for the advantages it may secure in the struggle for life, is an outcome of psychological processes of transference which have developed in the course of human history, but have obtained influence as yet over relatively few individuals. Pure motivation of assent of this kind we call *evidence*, and for this a theory of truth like the Pragmatist is wholly unsuitable and inapplicable. For, however clearly it may be shown that men are actually influenced in verifying their opinions by their needs, and hold that to be true of which they can make some use, even here the utility is not identical with the truth, but merely a feature which determines the appreciation of truth. From the logical point of view Pragmatism is a grotesque confusion of means and end. From the historical point of view it is an entirely different matter, as it represents a victory of noetic individualism which, in the decay of our intellectual culture, would release the elementary force of the will and let it pour itself over the realm of pure thought. It calls into question one of the greatest achievements of civilisation, the purity of the will to truth.

Under the lead of the definition of truth the theory of knowledge has to understand human knowledge in its development and in regard to what it has done for the value of truth. It has therefore first to deal with the actual origin, and then with the validity and objective relation, of knowledge.

§ 10

The Origin of Knowledge.—Thinking and perceiving—Rationalism and empiricism (sensualism)—Hominism—Apriorism and aposteriorism—Psychologism.

The antithesis of knowledge and opinion has developed out of the self-consciousness of great intellectual personalities who opposed the results of their own reflections to the traditional views of the majority. Even when they diverged so widely from each other as did Heraclitus and Parmenides, they were always conscious that their scientific thought was due to some other source than the direct experience which they shared with the despised majority. Hence in the earliest days of science the Greeks opposed reason (*νοῦς*) and rational thought (*νοεῖν*) to perception (*αἴσθησις*); and, however much this antithesis was weakened by psychological and metaphysical theories, and in the end destroyed, it remained unchallenged in methodology and the theory of knowledge. It reached its culmination in Plato's theory of knowledge as memory (*ἀνάμνησις*). In this the vision of ideals is, it is true, represented as a perception of the true incorporeal reality, but a perception raised above terrestrial and fundamentally different from corporeal experience. In their psychological theory the Greeks always regarded the intellect as passivity, or as a receptive activity, and to them the reception or mirroring of reality in the soul, not mingled with any disturbing or distorting activity of one's own, was so peculiarly knowledge that this unresisting reception would find its religious completion in the vision of the mystic.

This psychogenetic view of knowledge corresponds entirely to the picture-theory which is contained in the naïve transcendental idea of truth. But it was partly corrected by the very nature of perception. However we may imagine this as an impression which the soul, like a wax tablet, receives from the environing world, nevertheless such expressions as "grasping" and "conceiving" (*συλλαμβάνειν*) show that even in this sphere of sensory

knowledge of truth a certain activity of consciousness is not to be ignored. Indeed, quite early, in the Sophistic teaching, we find the theory that all perception arises from a double movement, of the object on the subject and the subject on the object. We further clearly see that in sensory perception we have rather an effect of the object and a subsequent reaction of the soul, whereas in thought the nature of the soul itself is active, and from the object it receives only the stimulus to concern itself with it. Hence the ancient and ever-new question, which Goethe thought the nucleus of Kant's criticism, whether our knowledge comes more from without, from things, or from ourselves, from the ordered nature of the soul.

The answers to this question are radical if they insist on the Either—Or. On the one side we have Empiricism, which leans to the formula that all knowledge comes from experience; on the other side Rationalism, which finds all knowledge based upon rational thought. The earlier centuries of modern philosophy, the movements from Bacon and Descartes to about the end of the eighteenth century, were characterised by this contrast of Empiricism and Rationalism, and were filled with the struggle about "innate ideas." In the refined terminology of the later Scholastics the word "idea" had become so vague in meaning as to be applicable to all sorts of presentations, and thus the noetic problem came to a point in the question whether there were ideas which did not come directly from experience, but belonged to the nature of the soul. Empiricism denies this, and it has therefore to explain all knowledge as originating in perceptions. The classic form in which this is done is Locke's theory. It assigned two sources of empirical knowledge, internal and external experience, the soul's knowledge from its own activities and, on the other hand, from the impressions which it receives through the body from the environing world in space. This is the theory of knowledge of the plain mind cleverly grafted on the dualistic metaphysic of the distinction between consciousness and extension, spirit and matter. Moreover, there were two main arguments in this rejection of innate

knowledge. On the one hand, if there was such knowledge given in the very nature of the soul, it ought to be common to all men; which is certainly not true as regards the conscious life of the majority. On the other hand, we could not speak of an unconscious presence of these ideas as long as we regarded the idea of the soul as identical with that of consciousness (*cogitatio*). Even Empiricism, however, must take account of some elaboration of the data of perception in knowledge, and Locke had therefore to fall back upon the capacities, faculties, and forces of the soul, which develop in connection with the contents of the presentations and are supposed to reach consciousness in the inner perception. In this way he thought that he had taken sufficient account of the rational element of knowledge; but some of his followers pointed out that even this development of inner perception always presupposes the external perception, so that in the end the latter alone provides the contents of knowledge. If it is meant that in these contents we have all the elements which Locke traced to functions of the soul, Empiricism becomes Sensualism, or the theory that all knowledge comes from corporeal, sensory, external perception. Sensualism would derive from the mere combination of the elements in consciousness all those relations between them that we find in knowledge. It has to hold that it always depends on these contents themselves what relation between them can or ought to exist. But, however true this may be, we must urge against Sensualism that these relations—for instance, the elementary relations of comparison and distinction—are not given in any single datum, and therefore not in the sum of them; but that they are something new and additional to these contents.

We then have the contrary position of Rationalism, which derives these relations, which combine and work up the contents of experience, from an act of the soul, and therefore thinks that we have aboriginal knowledge and innate ideas in these forms of combination. The Neo-Platonists of the Renaissance, following the example of the Stoics, had regarded this aboriginal knowledge as

belonging to the soul from its very nature and in virtue of its divine origin; and Descartes and his school had adopted the view, although in the main body of the Cartesian philosophy innate ideas had passed as, not properly psychological, but logical, as self-evident truths. Now if these ideas were to be described, especially in the case of Descartes's followers, as psychogenetic, it was clear that they could not be given actually as conscious ideas, but functionally or virtually, as unconscious capacities, as Leibnitz afterwards fully developed in his *Monadology* and the criterion of knowledge in his *Nouveaux Essais*. In this, however, Empiricism and Rationalism had come so close to each other that the conflict between them had become almost meaningless. Empiricism must grant that the data of perception only become experience through a rational elaboration which is not contained in themselves; and Rationalism cannot ignore the fact that the relating forms in the reason need a content that must be given in perception. The classic form given to this situation is when Leibnitz, taking the Scholastic thesis which the Empiricists repeated, "Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu," added, "nisi intellectus ipse."

In a sense we might say that this settles the psychological question of the origin of knowledge, as far as the answer to it concerns the theory of knowledge. But we must not omit to notice a modern variation of this ancient controversy. Empiricism cannot deny that in an advanced stage of civilisation there is for each civilised adult direct evidence of rational truths which can never be based upon his own experience; for instance, in the confidence with which, in accordance with the principle of causality, we assume a cause for every event. In this case the Empirical theory now calls in the aid of the evolutionary interpretation of this virtually innate knowledge. These truths, which have not been acquired by the individual, must have been acquired by the race in the course of its evolution, and implanted in the individual by heredity and custom, imitation and language. This is the more likely as, according to the Pragmatist principle, these

habits of thought which have in time assumed a character of self-evidence have a use for man's knowledge and conduct, and they thus owe their validity to a survival of the useful. Any person who adopts this interpretation divests rational truth of its real nature, and represents it as a useful intellectual habit of the empirical man; and it is only in this sense that Pragmatism is also called Humanism—though, in order to avoid confusion with an older and better use of the term, it would be advisable to say Hominism. According to this all "truth" is based upon human needs, and is merely a human value. Clearly this modern form of Relativism does not go beyond the saying which the ancient Sophist formulated much more clearly and forcibly: Man is the measure of all things.

The psychological antithesis of Empiricism and Rationalism is raised to a higher level when one bears in mind the logical meaning which is at the root of the contradictory positions. Experience, as the sum of presentations, consists in the long run of particular acts of knowledge, whereas the rational view, which pre-exists for the work of elaborating these, always contains more or less general propositions. Empiricism therefore formulates the statement that in the last resort all knowledge originates from particular experiences, whereas Rationalism seeks the final ground of all knowledge in aboriginally evident general principles. But it is clear that these extreme statements are at the most restricted in their value to a very small sphere. There is very little in our knowledge which indicates merely a particular experience; and, on the other hand, there is just as little in the nature of a general principle not based upon experience. In the totality of human knowledge we always have the two together; the particular and the general are not found singly. In this logical respect we speak of the antithesis as that of Apriorism and Aposteriorism. These expressions are due to the changes which the Aristotelic terminology underwent amongst the Schoolmen. Greek logic distinguished between general being, the earlier in reality and later in knowledge, and the particular

appearances, which were later in reality and earlier in knowledge. But in Scholastic language the inductive course of thought, which rises from the particular to the general, was *à posteriori*, and the deductive process, from the general to the particular, *à priori*. Even in modern methodology we thus distinguish between *à posteriori* empirical reasoning and *à priori* rational reasoning. Empiricism may, however, concede a relative *à priori*, while denying the absolute. For when we have once attained general principles by inductive methods, particular knowledge may be derived from them *à priori*. Rationalism, on the other hand, cannot dispense with empirical elements; it needs them indispensably in order to get from general to special knowledge.

In this modification of the ancient antithesis we realise the uselessness of the psychogenetic point of view for the solution of noetic problems. It is clear that the way in which a man actually arrives at a judgment, or at the assent which is the essence of the judgment, is quite irrelevant to the justification of the judgment or assent. Most of the statements which men make are imitative and due to authority—though they are often quite the opposite, and purely personal. Hence it is that the actual judgment is, as we have seen in other connections, generally emotional and based on feeling and volition; and all these natural processes which result in judgment by no means justify it. We give the name of Psychologism to the artless notion that would determine by their origin the value, in either a logical or æsthetic or ethical sense, of psychic states. It was the main idea of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, and was typically expressed by Locke, the leader of this philosophy. In systematic elaboration it seemed essential in the theoretical field as an evolution of the “ideas” from their sensory beginnings to their subtlest and highest developments, and therefore the narrowing of philosophy in virtue of this method in France was called Ideology—a word which led to calling philosophers Ideologists, though it ought to have been confined to its original meaning. To-day Psychologism still lingers in a sort of

dilettante form, but it has not been taken seriously in philosophical circles since the time of Kant. In the theory of knowledge there is question, not of the causes, but of the justification, of judgment. The former is a matter of fact which proceeds according to psychological laws; the latter a matter of value, subject to logical norms. It was the essence of the Kantist development to advance from the psychogenetic (or, as he said, physiological) treatment of the problem of knowledge with increasing confidence to the logical (or, as he said, transcendental) treatment. The essential connecting link between the beginning and the end of the development was the influence of the *Nouveaux Essais* of Leibnitz, in which the conversion of the psychological antithesis of Empiricism and Rationalism into the logical antithesis of Aposteriorism and Apriorism was accomplished. Hence in the mature form of the critical philosophy the familiar phrase *à priori* never has the psychological, but always the logical, meaning. All wrong versions of Kant's teaching are due to a confusion of logical apriority with psychological apriority. The noetic question was definitively transferred by the critical philosophy from the field of psychological struggle to that of logical inquiry. It is no longer a problem of the origin of knowledge, but of its validity.

§ II

The Validity of Knowledge.—Psychological and logical validity—Validity and being—Consciousness in general—Theory of knowledge as metaphysics—Dogmatism: naïve realism—The controversy about universals: Realism and Nominalism—Scepticism—Problematicism and Probabilism—Phenomenalism—Mathematical Phenomenalism—Semeiotics—Ontological Phenomenalism—Idealism—Solipsism—Spiritualism—Absolute Phenomenalism: Agnosticism—Conscientualism.

The word "to be valid" [*gelten*], which occurs in ordinary language but received at the hands of Lotze a special meaning, has become of great importance in recent logic. We must not, however, suppose that by merely using this convenient word we can escape all the difficulties which it covers. We must, on the contrary,

distinguish all the more carefully between the *psychological* and the *logical* meaning of the word. In the former sense to be valid means a recognition of a fact ; as when, for instance, we speak of a valid or existing law as distinguished from a desirable or conceivable law. In this sense it is always related to a particular mind for which it is valid ; as, psychologically, all values are related to a mind for which they are values. But the meaning of truth demands a validity in itself, without relation to a consciousness, or at least to a particular empirical consciousness. For the postulate of general recognition is so surely at the root of the logical meaning of validity that it is based upon the actual condition of the content of consciousness. Thus mathematical principles are valid, and compel general recognition, because they necessarily follow from the nature of mathematical conceptions. Hence this philosophical idea of validity always points beyond the process of knowledge in empirical subjects. The validity of truth is independent of all behaviour of fallible and evolving subjects. A mathematical truth was valid long before anybody conceived it, and it is valid even if an individual erroneously refuses his assent to it. For this reason the meaning of validity-in-itself has become one of the main problems of modern logic. In this there is especially a question of the relation of validity to being. The more we think of being as empirical or sensible reality, the more pronounced is the contrast between being and validity. Even a psychic reality does not suffice for the claim of the logical idea of validity. On the other hand, the independence of validity of all the psychic processes in which it is recognised is a measure of its own character, and for this there is no better word than highest reality. Hence it is paradoxical to speak of the valid as unreal, and that is why such inquiries can scarcely avoid regarding validity-in-itself as validity for an absolute consciousness, a "consciousness in general," and therefore interpreting it metaphysically. This, then, becomes the chief problem. What separate problems may be implied in it we shall see later. We have first to consider the various

methods by which it is sought to make clear the validity of knowledge.

The most original of these forms is the picture-theory involved in the transcendental idea of truth. On closer consideration, however, it proves to be only one of the possibilities which we find in the chief principle which is assumed for the purpose. We may, for instance, in virtue of what we have already seen, formulate as follows the task of the theory of knowledge. The sciences offer us in the sum of their results an objective picture of the world—which we expect, and ought to expect, every normal thoughtful person to recognise; and we find it recognised wherever there are not antagonistic influences of other views and convictions. The theory of knowledge, which does not in the least enfeeble the actual validity of the sciences, which adds nothing and subtracts nothing from them, has no other task than to investigate the relation of this world-picture to the absolute reality which it is supposed to signify; that is to say, its problem is to find out what is the relation of the objective in our consciousness to the real. In other words, it is the relation of consciousness to being that constitutes this last problem of all scientific thought. The value of truth consists in some sort of relation of consciousness to being, and in the theory of knowledge we have to discover this relation. From this it follows that we cannot deal with knowledge without at the same time dealing with being; and, if the science of the absolute reality is called metaphysics, the theory of knowledge neither precedes nor follows it—is neither the presupposition nor the criterion of metaphysics, but is metaphysics itself. That is the consequence which Fichte's *Theory of Knowledge* and Hegel's *Logic* deduced from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

There are therefore as many tendencies in the theory of knowledge, as many answers to the question of the relation of consciousness and being, as there are conceptual relations, or categories, that are applicable to it, and we may deduce the various points of view from the system of categories. The fundamental category, which is up

to a certain point decisive for all the others, is identity ; and this in the present case gives us the transcendental idea of truth. Consciousness and being are opposed to each other, according to it, yet declared to be identical in their contents. A true idea is supposed to be one the content of which is real *extra mentem*. We see at once the difficulty that is involved in this apparently plausible theory. Consciousness, presentation, judgment, and knowledge are themselves real, and this naïve idea of truth supposes that something is repeated in consciousness that happens in another being. This other being is conceived in the naïve view as originally the corporeal reality which surrounds the knowing mind ; and from this it follows that such an idea of truth becomes useless as soon as knowledge extends to other than physical realities.

Undisturbed by these considerations the naïve mind clings to its idea of truth, and, in view of its persistency, we may, with Kant, speak of a Dogmatist theory of knowledge, which without further criticism affirms the validity of its ideas as a grasping or picturing of reality. We thus have in the first place the Dogmatism of sense-perception, which yields the world-theory of "naïve Realism." The world is as I perceive it. The various illusions of sense-perception ought not to lead us to make a mistake about this view, because these illusions are themselves corrected by other perceptions. More serious for naïve Realism are the objections which we had to notice in connection with ontic problems : the considerations which led us to see that all the content-determinations which in perception we ascribe to things belong, not to them, but to the perceiving consciousness. All these considerations, however, which seemed to justify us in running counter to the impression of our own experience, were based on the fact that we relied upon our conceptual reflection, on which scientific knowledge depends, rather than upon our naïve perception. In this we have the Dogmatism of conceptual thought which dominates our whole world-view in the axiomatic belief that the world is such as we necessarily think it.

This conceptual Dogmatism finds its most important development in the classical controversy as to the validity of general concepts, the struggle over Universals. The antithesis of thought and perception, to which the attention of the earliest Greek science was directed, came to a head in Plato's theory of ideas. In this the things of external perception were granted only the same fleeting and imperfect reality as the perceptions with which we reach them. On the other hand, the enduring and self-contained results of conceptual thought were granted the validity of a higher and absolute reality. It is well not to be misled by ingenious modern misinterpretations into thinking that Plato did not wish to ascribe to the ideas—as he and his school called the contents of the general concepts of scientific thought—a validity in the sense of material reality, or that he taught anything about any other kind of validity. It is only in this way that we can understand that his theory brought out the critical inquiry how these contents of concepts can be real and indeed condition all other reality. From this, in antiquity and also in the Scholastic movement, there developed the antithesis of the two points of view on the theory of knowledge which we call Realism and Nominalism. Realism (*universalia sunt realia*) affirms, in the terms of Plato, that, as our knowledge consists of concepts and must be a knowledge of reality, the contents of the concepts must be regarded as copies of being. This Realism is maintained wherever our views recognise in reality a dependence of the particular on the general. Hence the knowledge of laws of nature is the chief form of Realism in this sense of the word. But from the time of Plato onward the serious difficulties of Realism arise from the fact that it is impossible to form a satisfactory conception of the sort of reality that ideas can have, or of the way in which they condition the other reality, that of the particular and corporeal. These difficulties have driven thought in the opposite direction, into the arms of Nominalism, which regards the concepts as intermediate and auxiliary constructions in the reflecting mind, not as copies of something independent of the

mind and existing in itself. Their importance is still further reduced if they are supposed merely to be common names of similar objects (*universalia sunt nomina*). Nominalism will freely grant that the particular elements of our perceptive knowledge have a direct relation (either as copies or in some other way) to reality, but it declares it inconceivable that the results of conceptual reflection, which is a purely internal process of the mind, should have an analogous truth-value. It must, however, concede that this purely internal reflection is actually determined by the contents which it combines in its entire movement and its outcome, and that, on the other hand, the process of thought with its concepts leads in turn to particular ideas which prove to be in agreement with perception. It therefore finds itself confronting the problem, how the forms of thought are related to those of reality: whether they, as belonging to the same total system of reality, point to each other and are in the end identical, or whether, since they belong to different worlds, nothing can be settled as to their identity or any other relation. We thus see that in the last resort it is metaphysical motives which must pronounce in the controversy about universals. All the forms of world-view which we describe as Henistic or Singularistic are from the logical point of view Realistic; whilst all forms of Individualism must have a Nominalistic complexion.

The two forms of Dogmatism differ generally in the sense that that of perception—naïve Realism—belongs rather to the prescientific mind, while that of conceptual thought is found in science. Both have to be disturbed and called into question in some way before the noetic problems arise. We speak of this disturbance as "doubt," and therefore the inquiry which issues from the doubt is the first and essential phase of the theory of knowledge. We give it the Greek name *Skepsis*, and we call Scepticism the attempt to remain at this point of view of doubting inquiry and to hold that it is not possible to get beyond it to any permanent results of knowledge. Scepticism of this nature is revealed even in prescientific thought by the numerous complaints about the narrowness of

human nature and the limitations of our knowledge. These limitations are first conceived in the quantitative sense ; they are the limits in space and time which confine our knowledge, in so far as it depends upon experience, within a very narrow circle. A simple scepticism of this kind is, it is true, quite reconcilable with a claim to empirical knowledge. But it is quite otherwise when, after we have attained scientific knowledge, the question is raised whether this really fulfils its aim, and when the outcome of this query is a negative answer.* Even in this case men of science usually mean that they have complete confidence in their knowledge, and merely regard every effort to pass beyond positive knowledge and solve final problems as futile. As a systematic conviction, therefore, Scepticism always refers to questions of general views—in the philosophical aspect to metaphysics ; and in ordinary life the sceptic is first and foremost the man who will not accept at once the metaphysic of religious belief. The phrases in which ancient Scepticism, with its doctrinaire tendency and its rhetorical habit, asserted that there is no knowledge whatever—that man cannot attain any real knowledge either by means of perception or of thought or, least of all, by using both, and that his mind and reality may be two completely separated worlds—may not, in their general sense, have been meant seriously ; for, if they are scientific statements, and not mere rhetorical phrases, they must profess to have some foundation and must therefore contain some sort of knowledge. On that account, as we saw above in formulating the task of the theory of knowledge, the positive contents of the various sciences do not fall within the province of the sceptic's plaint, which is directed rather to problems transcending the positive, such as are given, partly in science, but chiefly in philosophy. This philosophical Scepticism is not only the necessary transition from Dogmatism to any general view of things which has any scientific or extra-scientific confidence in itself, but it may in cases cease to be merely temporary and become an established conviction. More than once in our discussion of ontic and genetic problems and the solution

of them we came to a point where different, and eventually contradictory, solutions, with arguments and counter-arguments, could be advanced. If we draw from this the antinomian inference that no conclusion is possible in such cases, we have Problematic Scepticism, or Prob-lematicism; a position which one has a perfect right to maintain.

From this point of view there are again many shades reaching to the various forms of prudent and inconclusive statement. Naturally, where argument and counter-argument are equal (*ἰσοσθένεια τῶν λόγων*), there can from the purely theoretical point of view be no assent, and therefore no assertion, and judgment must be suspended (the *ἐποχή* of the ancient Sceptics), but the will, in the shape of needs, wishes, and tendencies, may throw its weight into one of the scales. We have here a guarantee by interest, and the interest may be of many different kinds; it may be a need of the individual or of an empirical community, or it may be an interest of the reason. For the purely theoretical judgment all these practical considerations have no justification whatever, and all are open to the same severe censure. They do indeed relieve the intellect from the discomfort of doubt, but they do this at the risk of leading it into error. This risk, however, has to be faced in commerce, which often requires a decision, and in many respects in practical life a man has to do it because it is the lesser of two evils; but we must not infer from this that these substitutes are real knowledge, or behave as if they were.

A certain measure of a theoretically sound means of dulling the edge of Scepticism may be found where the relation of arguments and counter-arguments is of such a nature that the one group is in its entirety decisively stronger than the other. In these cases one proceeds, as all knowledge (even philosophical) does, by way of probability. We give the name of Probabilism to the view which abandons the idea of attaining a full and complete solution of philosophical problems, but regards it as possible to come to probable conclusions. In ancient times what was called the Middle Academy, the Platonist

school of the third and second centuries B.C., gave this Probabilistic turn to Scepticism ; and this is the character of the men-of-the-world philosophising adopted by the Romans through Cicero, and in the Renaissance taken up as " Academic Scepticism " by such a general thinker as Montaigne. It combines the positive knowledge of the special sciences with a smile and a shrug of the shoulders at the ultimate problems. It is the chief preparation for Positivism, as we find it in David Hume.

Problematicism as a general theory culminates in the thesis that we can tell nothing about the relation of knowledge to reality, and that, in particular, we cannot say whether it is a relation of likeness. But it easily passes on to another position, which it dare not strictly appropriate, yet which seems to most people to be very like it, namely the statement that the relation is one of *unlikeness*. For if this unlikeness cannot be proved for the same reasons and in the same measure as likeness, the doubt about the likeness easily passes—not with a logical, but with a psychological, necessity—into a belief in unlikeness. Moreover, there is in favour of unlikeness, in regard to one's general view of things, the assumption of a difference between consciousness and the remainder of being, and we thus reach the attitude which is known as Phenomenalism ; the theory, namely, that human knowledge is indeed related to a reality independent of it, but it is not a copy of this, and must not be cited to serve as such. In this, however, the ordinary idea of truth is left so far behind that such an attitude seems always to be tinged with a certain resignation. The statement that our knowledge reaches appearance " only," that it is " merely " presentation, easily carries the secondary meaning that it ought properly to grasp and contain reality, and that it is regrettable that man's faculty of knowing is unable to do this.

But the basis of the Phenomenalistic theory of knowledge varies considerably according to the extension which it claims to have. Partial Phenomenalism contains an appreciation of the value of the different strata of human knowledge, claiming the transcendental truth of

agreement with reality for one and assigning the character of phenomenality to the other. In view of our earlier distinction between percepts and concepts we may recognise two forms of Phenomenalism. The first is the *sensualistic*, according to which the contents of sensory perception are real, while the concepts are regarded as mere ideas or names—at all events, as something the validity of which is restricted to consciousness. This is a view that comes very close to the popular attitude of naïve Realism, but it also belongs to medieval Nominalism, and it is repeated in many echoes of this in recent philosophy. As an example we need quote only Materialism in the form in which it was expounded by Feuerbach. Opposed to this sensualistic Phenomenalism we have the *rationalistic*, which, on the contrary, regards all sensory presentations as only appearances of reality in consciousness, and finds reality in the concepts, the contents of thought (*νοούμενα*). This form may have either a mathematical or an ontological complexion. Its mathematical form is the view of scientific theory, which takes all the sensory qualities of things to be appearances or phenomena, and grants real validity only to the quantitative relations which are amenable to mathematical treatment. We have fully expounded it, and considered it in its various aspects, in an earlier chapter. In this the category of causality has gradually displaced that of likeness as the relation between consciousness and being. Presentations are supposed to be effects of things on consciousness, and physico-physiological theory shows the strict and graduated correlation that exists between the real and the perceived, being and consciousness. As far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, the centre of gravity of this view of the relation of consciousness and reality is in the fact that, according to it, the presentative forms in consciousness are not reflections of reality, but represent it, as a drawing represents the thing drawn. Hence this form of Phenomenalism has been called the “Drawing Theory,” or Semeiotics. In ancient times it was held chiefly by the Epicureans; in the Middle Ages by Occam and the

terministic logic ; and in modern times by Locke and Condillac. It forms the groundwork of the philosophising of modern men of science, such as Helmholtz.

The other form of rationalistic Phenomenalism, the ontological form, is the attitude of conceptual metaphysics, as it was founded in Plato's theory of ideas and re-echoed in Leibnitz's *Monadology* or Herbart's theory of reality. According to this the entire world of the senses, in its quantitative as well as its qualitative relations, and therefore including also its mathematical determinations in time and space, is merely an appearance of an incorporeal or supra-corporeal reality. A special importance attaches in this shade of Phenomenalism to the determinations, given in experience, of inwardness, the qualities of consciousness. The two forms of experience, external and internal, are clearly not open in the same way to the Phenomenalist argument. This is best seen in the history of the word Idealism, which, as we saw, leads to so much misunderstanding. The sensory properties which perception shows us in things are supposed not to be realities, but "merely" presentations or "ideas." Hence Idealism originally meant this theory which reduces the external reality to presentations. But the ideas as such are something real—real activities, real contents in real spirits ; and this metaphysical aspect of the matter, which really ought to have been called spiritualistic, has been called Idealism. That is the chief reason for the change of Phenomenalism, which we so often encounter in history, into spiritualistic metaphysics. For if anything is to appear, there must not only be a reality that appears, but something to which it appears ; and that is consciousness. Thus of the two forms of experience the internal is constantly predominating over the external. External perception, which is supposed to be merely a knowledge of the states into which the perceptive being is thrown by the action of the external world, thus appears to be only a province within the entire domain of internal perception. The originally and indubitably certain thing is the reality of consciousness and its various states, while, on this theory, the reality of the external world

is supposed to be believed only on the ground of various more or less unsafe deductions. On this chain of thought depend all the philosophic systems which regard any fundamental qualities of consciousness—whether intellect or will—as the true nature of things, and the entire external world as merely a phenomenon of this. The preponderance of the internal sense is a remarkable fact in the whole of modern metaphysics and theory of knowledge. In this the fact is expressed that the quality of truth as a copy of reality is refused to our knowledge of the external world on the lines of Phenomenalism or Semeiotics, but this quality is only affirmed the more emphatically in regard to the mind's knowledge of itself and its states of consciousness. In point of fact, the self-knowledge of the soul is, if we do not interpolate into it some metaphysical transcendence with the aid of the concept of substance, the only knowledge in which we can be convinced beyond doubt of the likeness between knowledge and its object. All psychological knowledge is based upon this self-perception, which in the long run means a knowledge by means of memory, and in this we confidently assume that in this memory of self-knowledge the psychic experience is perceived precisely as it is in reality.

We have thus come to what Kant called a "scandal" in the history of human knowledge: that we could seriously call into question the reality of the external world as contrasted with that of consciousness and then reaffirm it without any indubitable reasons. The predominance which the internal life has thus, for purposes of theory, gained over corporeal reality led to the setting up of another category, that of inherence, between consciousness and that which, as a corporeal reality distinguished therefrom, was called "being." In this Phenomenalistic (or, as was wrongly said, Idealistic) metaphysic consciousness played the part of substance, and its states and activities were supposed to be the ideas, the presentations, to which the reality of the outer world was reduced. The fantastic form which this theory assumed is theoretical Egoism, or Solipsism, which would

retain only the individual philosophising subject as substance. Certainly this was hardly ever seriously affirmed; it was rather used as a piece of intimidation in the conflicting arguments about consequences. To affirm it strictly is merely a "monologue," which refutes itself by the very fact that it seeks to prove its position to other knowing subjects. Far more plausible was this Phenomenalism when it disguised itself in the Berkeleyian form or in Leibnitz's Monadology. But we have already clearly shown how even in this form it is quite unable to deduce a foreign content like the external world from the nature of consciousness. A last form of Phenomenalism is that which seeks reality in a super-individual consciousness, or "consciousness in general," as has been attempted in the metaphysical elaborations of Kant's teaching. These, however, no longer keep to the original and purely logical sense in which Kant himself constructed "consciousness in general" as the correlative of the validity-in-itself which he claimed for knowledge attained by reason.

All these views are based upon the old idea of the antithesis of the spiritual and material; they regard the latter as appearance and the former as the reality which appears therein. This position can only be evaded by regarding both, the psychic and the corporeal, as appearance; and then we have behind them only an entirely unknowable (because inexpressible) being, the thing-in-itself. This Absolute Phenomenalism, which later received the name of Agnosticism, is partly found in Kant's theory of knowledge. It is, in fact, one of its characteristic features that the soul, as the substance of the phenomena of the internal sense, must be just as unknowable as bodies, as the substance of the phenomena of the external sense. But this holds only in so far as this theory of knowledge is directed polemically against metaphysics, and particularly against its spiritualistic forms (Berkeley and Leibnitz). In this respect it is quite true that in Kant even the mind's empirical knowledge of its own states, its presentations, feelings, and volitions, does not grasp their absolute nature, but their phenomenal nature,

their self-appearance in consciousness. With this development, however, if it is left incomplete, Phenomenalism dulls its own edge and digs its own grave. For since everything we can present belongs in its content either to the world of the external sense or the province of the inner sense, the thing-in-itself remains a postulated nothing, to which no real definition and no formal relation can be applied. It is then an assumption of no use whatever to thought; not the slightest explanation can be given of it. From the unknowable thing-in-itself we get no meaning either of the appearances of the external world or of those of the internal world; the very division of appearing reality into the two profoundly separated, yet constantly related, realms of matter and spirit cannot be in the least understood from the unknowable thing-in-itself. This agnosticistic thing-in-itself is merely a dark chamber into which people cast their unsolved problems without obtaining any light whatever upon them. Hence in the metaphysical respect Kant has rounded his theory of knowledge by distinguishing between the theoretical insight of knowledge, which is supposed to be restricted to phenomena, and the "guarantee by an interest of reason," for which the theoretically unknowable is now supposed to present itself as the suprasensible world of the good and holy. He converted an absolute and agnostic Phenomenalism, of which the main lines were given in his criticism of knowledge, into a spiritualistic Phenomenalism.

This, it is true, by no means exhausts the significance of the Kantist theory of knowledge, but merely shows its relation to metaphysical problems. We shall deal later with other features of it. We have here still to point out a new ramification of absolute Phenomenalism in recent times. The ground of it is the uselessness of the idea of thing-in-itself. When Kant declares that it could not be known, but must necessarily be thought, our perception of its uselessness raises the question whether we really *have* to think this unknowable, or even whether we *can* think it. When this question was answered in the negative, it followed that the relation of reality and

appearance could not in principle be applied to the relation of being and consciousness; and as all the other main categories—likeness, causality, inherence—were inapplicable, there remained only *identity* as the fundamental relation of consciousness and being, or the theory that all being must somehow represent a consciousness, and all consciousness must somehow represent a being. In the further evolution of the theories of “consciousness in general,” which we mentioned amongst the forms of Phenomenalism, this theory of identity was developed as the standpoint of Conscientialism, which gives itself the name of the “immanent” philosophy, and which has in recent times been decked out afresh and proclaimed as “the new philosophy of reality.” In its rejection of the idea of a thing-in-itself, its refusal to seek behind appearances any sort of being distinct from them, it is of a thoroughly Positivistic character; but it incurs the very serious difficulty that an identification of consciousness and being makes it absolutely impossible for us to understand discriminations of value between knowledge and objectless presentation, between the true and the false. For the variations in actual recognition, the quantitative graduations of assent, to which alone we could look on this theory, do not suffice to give us a firm definition of truth, and therefore for the solution of the noetic problem. Hence the solution must be sought in another direction, and that is the direction which Kant took in his new conception of the object of knowledge.

§ 12

The Object of Knowledge.—Transcendental method—Function and content of consciousness—Being and consciousness—Synthesis of the manifold—Objectivity as real necessity—Abstraction—Selective synthesis—Rational sciences: sciences of nature and culture—The position of Psychology—Knowledge without and with value—Autonomy of the various sciences.

All the various conceptions of the theory of knowledge which we have as yet considered depend on the naïve

assumption of the transcendental definition of truth, according to which the knowing mind stands opposed to a reality which is its object. Whether this object is taken into consciousness, whether it is mirrored in it or represented by a drawing, are merely different shades of the same fundamental idea; and all the theories derived therefrom, no matter what category they seek to apply to the relation of consciousness and being, are doomed by the impossibility of restoring the connection between thought and its content once they have been metaphysically torn apart. Phenomenalism tries to disguise this unsolved fundamental problem under vague phrases such as "relating" and "corresponding," but it always returns the moment we look closely into the words. To have delivered noetics from these assumptions and put it on its own basis is the merit of the critical or transcendental method which Kant opposed to the psychological and the metaphysical; though he himself only gradually discovered it, and developed it out of earlier methods. Thus he found the formula for the problem of the theory of knowledge in the well-known question: "What is the basis of the relation to the object of what we call in ourselves presentation?" Without adhering too closely to the academic forms of Kant's system, we can best explain its nature by a consideration which starts first from consciousness alone.

In all consciousness we encounter the fundamental antithesis of the *function*, the activity or state, and the *content*, in which this function is discharged. In the experience of consciousness the two are inseparably connected; function is impossible without content, and content is equally impossible without function. But psychological experience shows in the facts of memory that it is possible for the content of consciousness occasionally to have a reality without the function of consciousness entering into activity; and on the other hand, the distinction between true and false proves that many a content of consciousness has no other reality than that of being presented in the mind. A simple analysis, however, of what we mean by this shows us that we can

only speak of any particular content as real in the sense that we relate it to some sort of consciousness as its content. From the empirical consciousness of the individual we rise to the collective consciousness of any historical group of human beings, and beyond this to an ideal or normative culture-consciousness—in the end, metaphysically, to an absolute world-consciousness. The final limit of this series is a reality which needs no sort of consciousness for its reality. This *being* is reality in the sense of naïve Realism, and ultimately also in the sense of the philosophical idea of the thing-in-itself; and that is what we mean when we speak of the object to which knowledge is supposed to be related. From this point of view we then distinguish between those objects to which it is essential that they be contents of consciousness, and those for which entering into consciousness is something new. Psychic reality is one in which being and consciousness *eo ipso* coincide; but to the extramental reality, we say, it is immaterial whether it be taken into consciousness, since it exists without any activity of consciousness. As a matter of fact, a reality of this sort without consciousness can never be thoroughly thought out, because when we attempt to do so—when it is to be known at all—it becomes a content of consciousness. It follows that in the long run we cannot conceive the objects of knowledge otherwise than as contents of a consciousness. It is very interesting to test this idea by the question in what consists the truth of our knowledge in regard to the past or the future. At first sight the past seems to be no longer a reality; and if all knowledge is to mean an agreement of the idea with the reality, this criterion of truth in the ordinary sense of the word is inapplicable to all our historical knowledge. Yet something must be assumed that constitutes the “object” even of this kind of knowledge and decides as to its soundness or unsoundness. A past that forms no content in any way of any consciousness could never become an object of knowledge. And that holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for our knowledge of the future. Indeed, it may be extended to all that is assumed to be real in space without being perceived anywhere

or being perceptible. In fact, that which would pass as real in such conditions, which would exclude all relation to a perceiving or knowing mind, would have to be considered as not real at all for consciousness. It could neither be thought nor spoken of.

We must therefore define an object otherwise than is usually done on the lines of naïve Realism, and this was first done in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In consciousness itself we always find, as soon as we ask what is given in and with it, a multiplicity of content bound up in a unity. In this synthesis consists what we call the object of consciousness; for the multiplicity of elements thus gathered into a unity becomes in this way something independent, in which the movement of the presentations may further develop. These elements, however, which are gathered into a unity, never arise from the unity itself; they are parts of the great whole of the real. They only become objects of the mind when they are brought into a unity. Hence the object is not real as such outside the mind, but merely in virtue of the form in which the mind brings together the various parts of its content in a unity; and the whole question is, in the long run, under what conditions this synthetic unity of the manifold has the value of knowledge. Here we must notice that in our inquiry it is a question of *human* knowledge; we are dealing with the question under what conditions the objects which arise out of the synthetic unity in the empirical consciousness have a significance that goes beyond the play of presentations in the individual and in the species. Clearly they can have this only if the form of combination is really based upon the elements and is to be regarded as the norm for each individual form of the accomplishment of the synthesis. It is only when we think the elements in a connection which really belongs to them that the concept which a man has is a knowledge of an object. Objectivity of thought is therefore real necessity. But in what elements this will be done depends always on the empirical movement of thought. It is only in the latter sense that Kant meant that it is "we" ourselves who produce the objects of knowledge.

All the groups which the elements of the real form in the empirical consciousness, excluding the empirical self-consciousness of the individual himself, are sections of the whole immeasurable domain of the real. Whether they are ideas of things or of events, they are always only a very restricted selection out of the total reality, and all the thousandfold relations, in which everything that can be an object of consciousness and knowledge finds itself, can never be presented together in an empirical consciousness. Even the mature mind of civilised man, in which the work of many generations is condensed into a unity, or the scientific conception, in which many potential pieces of knowledge are packed with all the economy of thought—even these highest products of the theoretical mind can never embrace the totality of the real. The synthesis of the manifold is in the human mind, and therefore for human knowledge, inexorably limited. In perception itself there is always only a selection out of the possible sensations even of the empirical consciousness, and every advance from perceptions to concepts, and from concepts to higher concepts, is won only by abandoning differences and concentrating upon common features. Logic calls this process abstraction. All the results that are based on it have the value of a selection from the immeasurable fullness of reality. This simplification of the world in the concept is, in fact, the one means by which a limited mind like that of man can become master of its own world of presentations.

In this sense it is generally true that the mind produces its own objects, and creates its own world out of the elements of the real which it finds in itself as its contents. For the ethical and the æsthetic mind this fundamental feature is, as we shall see later, so obvious that it almost goes without saying. Its significance for the theoretical mind could only be discovered from the fact that, under the influence of the untrained mind, the idea arose that it is the aim of knowledge to picture a reality independent of itself. But the more clearly we realise that this knowledge is itself a part of reality, and indeed one of the most valuable parts, the more we see that the knowledge

itself is nothing but a synthesis of the elements, which reveals itself in their selection and arrangement. At first this selection and arrangement take place involuntarily, as in the case of perception, and the entire shaping of our objective presentation issues in the production of our world as a section of reality. What we call object, even in simple perception, is never real as such; the elements which enter into our object as constituents have innumerable other relations which do not come within the narrow limits of our consciousness. To that extent we ourselves make the objects. But they are not on that account something other than the reality—not the appearance, known to us, of an unknown thing-in-itself. They are just as much a part of reality: a part that is real as such, though it can never stand for the whole of reality. Not only its constituents, but also the forms in which these combine to form objects, have their roots in the reality itself. In this, and in this alone, consists the truth of our knowledge, that in it we produce objects which, as regards their content and form, do actually belong to reality, yet as regards their selectiveness and arrangement arise from it as new structures. Hence the production of these objects in knowledge itself is one of the valuable structures of reality, and if the formation and shaping of these objects in the process of human knowledge is to be called “appearance” (but an appearance which in this case is quantitative, not qualitative, since it cannot represent reality, but only a selection from it), we may quote the saying of Lotze that, if our knowledge is supposed to contain only appearance, the efflorescence of this appearance in consciousness must be regarded as one of the most valuable things that can happen between the constituents of reality generally.

If we thus conceive the essence of knowledge as a selective synthesis, which produces in the human mind a world of objects out of the immeasurable fullness of the universe, we shall be best able to orientate ourselves as regards the number of the ways in which this essence of knowledge is realised. The simplest thing to do is to distinguish first between prescientific and scientific know-

ledge. The first, the simple and naïve action of the impulse to acquire knowledge, is an unscientific production of its world of objects. Not only in perception, but also in the opinions that are based thereon, the objects seem to take shape so much of themselves, so much without any action of our psychic powers, that they seem to be something foreign, introduced, seen, reproduced and pictured in the soul. It is only in scientific knowledge that the objects are consciously engendered, and therefore deliberately shaped. But the way of doing this differs according as it starts from the forms or the contents of consciousness. We therefore distinguish (not in the psychogenetic, but in the logical sense) between rational and empirical sciences. The synthetic character of the knowledge, which engenders the objects, is plainer in the rational than in the empirical sciences. Hence amongst the rational sciences it is especially mathematics that has, since the time of Plato, been the guiding star of the theory of knowledge. In the case of mathematics it is quite clear that its objects are not as such taken over by consciousness, but are its own, and are engendered from within. That is true of numbers in the same way as of space-forms. However much experience gives the occasion of forming one or other arithmetical or geometrical idea, these ideas themselves are never objects of experience. Hence even in the naïve view of things the mathematical mind is not supposed to reproduce, embrace, or picture some existing reality in the ordinary sense of the word. Mathematical knowledge is entirely independent of the question whether there is or is not something corresponding to it *in natura rerum*. And precisely for that reason it reflects the real nature of knowledge. For once the object appears, whether it be produced from an empirical stimulation or by deliberate direction of the sensory imagination, such as a circle, a triangle, a logarithm, or an integral, all the knowledge that is derived from it is necessarily bound up with this self-engendered structure, and depends as to its soundness or unsoundness upon the objective nature of this.

Apart from mathematics, the only rational science we now recognise is logic, which is related to the forms of thought just as mathematics is related to the forms of perception. Here again we find the peculiar relation between the self-production of objects and the dependence upon them which thought experiences. But the validity which we claim for the formal conceptions of mathematics and logic is not restricted to the fact that, once conceived and fixed in scientific definitions, they demand general and compulsory assent from every normal mind. They seem to us also to be conditioning powers in the totality of things. The regularity of numbers and spatial magnitudes, the knowledge of arithmetic and geometry, is confirmed in the texture of the material world, and is reproduced in the natural laws in which science represents it. The validity of logical forms has such real significance for us that we cannot imagine the world otherwise than entirely conditioned by them. To this extent the two rational sciences are wholly parallel in their type of truth, and this analogy between them holds further in the sense that both sciences, being restricted to the forms of reality, cannot deduce therefrom for our knowledge the content-determinations of reality. In regard to logical forms there is an illusory idea that they yield an interpretation of the actual nature of reality. This gave rise to the Rationalistic Dogmatism of metaphysics, the untenability of which was proved for all time by the Critical philosophy. Since then we may regard the homogeneity of the two rational sciences as a firm foundation for the theory of knowledge. Both relate to the forms of reality; and in this respect the mathematical forms hold good for reality just as much as the logical. But metaphysics is, precisely on that account, only conceivable as a theory of knowledge: as, that is to say, a critical inquiry into the logical forms of the real, from which we cannot deduce its content-conditions. We halt at this distinction between the logical-mathematical form and the content of reality which depends on it as a final and insoluble dualism. We may hope and suspect that the two, which we always find in relation, have somewhere a common root in some ulti-

mate unity. But this would have to be sought in the absolute totality of universal reality, from which we can never do more than build up a fragment as the work of our own scientific knowledge. All the real perceptions of science or of daily life are based upon experience.

Yet the empirical sciences themselves reveal in their own way this selective character of human knowledge; in them it is a deliberate, if not always fully self-conscious, selection from the immeasurable richness of reality. While we distinguish between rational and empirical sciences according to the difference in their starting-point, we divide the empirical sciences themselves according to the different purposes of the various branches. For some of the empirical sciences this purpose consists of a purely logical value, generalisation. The logical values of generalisation are represented by generic ideas of things or events, types or laws; and the real "validity" of these ideas in regard to all that is grouped under them is the fundamental relation which we sum up in the word "nature," the totality of things and of whatever happens between them, the cosmos. All scientific investigation seeks in the long run to ascertain the forms of this cosmic uniformity, in so far as they are amenable to our knowledge with its limitations of space and time. The absolute validity, transcending subjective recognition, of mathematical and logical forms, under which the contents of experience are combined in synthetic structures, and ultimately as the cosmos, proves to us that here we have to deal with an order which goes beyond the specifically human conditions of presentations and raises their objective significance to the status of full reality.

Opposed to this study of nature, as that form of empirical knowledge which has to build up the cosmos out of the chaos of our perceptions, are those scientific activities which have to establish and thoroughly study particular realities. But these particular things, since they lack the logical value of generalisation, can only be objects of knowledge when there is some other value inherent in them; and all other values are known to us only in such structures as in their empirical appearance belong

to the life of man, and relate to what man has elaborated from his experience of the surrounding world. These are the structures of civilised life, which, engendered and perfected in the course of human history, we regard as the historical cosmos as distinguished from the natural. It is true that there is in this historical cosmos the same universal rule of law, and in it, as a single part of the universal reality, we find the same broad feature, that the individual is subject to the general. But it is not on that account that historical events and institutions form the object of a special investigation, differing in principle and method from that of natural science. The real reason is that we would interpret the sequence of the historical life as the realisation of values which, in their turn, transcend in their validity the life of man, in whose mind they attain recognition. The study of civilisation, or the science of history as it used to be called, is an appreciation of values, whereas natural science has in mind only the logical value of generalisation, and otherwise regards itself as indifferent to values. However, the appreciation of values in historical research does not consist in some feeble moralising over and evaluation of its objects, but in the fact that here again the objects only come into being in science by relating them to a standard of value. Certainly everything that happens is not historical. The object of historical science is always something that stands out from accompanying events by reason of its relation to some high standard of value in life, and is thus converted into an historical object. Such an event is never real in this outstandingness; it is only in science that it becomes a definite structure or institution. Thus both the natural cosmos and the historical cosmos, as they are ultimately attained in empirical science, are new structures of scientific thought. Their truth does not consist in their agreement with something that is precisely such *extra mentem*, but in the fact that their contents belong to the immeasurable absolute reality; not as the whole, but again as parts selected and elaborated by human knowledge.

This division of scientific research according to its

objects is not entirely the same as the usual distinction between natural and mental sciences, the best known and most established of the many attempts to classify the sciences. Such a distinction is based upon the metaphysical dualism of nature and spirit far more than on the psychological dualism of external and internal experience, and it therefore does not regard the objects of scientific research in the critical sense of the modern theory of knowledge. Our theory is aware that from the same groups of the absolutely real we may elaborate either objects of natural knowledge, which aims at emphasising the uniformity of nature, or historical objects, the shaping of which is based upon a selection of elements according to value. But the distinction between the two branches is particularly important in regard to psychology. The relation of psychology to the two branches is not simple ; it is complicated by the fact that their aims, as formulated in modern times, range from the psycho-physical studies of individual psychology to the most intricate structures of social psychology, the analysis of which touches the frontiers of historical research. In the middle between these extremes we have the knowledge provided by the inner sense, the self-perception of consciousness, which is also the chief requisite in all auxiliary studies on the part of both extremes. Judged by its chief material and its essential character, psychology is natural research in the ordinary scientific sense. It passes into historical science only in so far as it seeks, as a sort of character-study, to interpret psychic individuals as such, whether in their individual occurrence or in their typical structure. On the other hand, if the sciences are divided into natural and mental, psychology has some difficulty in finding a place amongst the latter. We often speak as if it were the chief of the mental sciences, because all of them, and particularly the historical, deal with processes which we recognise as belonging to the human mind. But phrases such as these have nothing to do with the realities of research. The results of scientific psychology, which are summed up in the formulation of general laws, are of no consequence to the historian. The great historians

had no need to wait for the experiments and research of our psycho-physicists. The psychology they used was that of daily life. It was the knowledge of men, the experience of life, of the common man, coupled with the insight of the genius and the poet. No one ever yet succeeded in making a science of this psychology of intuitive understanding.

However we may try to divide the sciences according to their objects, we shall always encounter the difficulty that these objects are not given simply as such, but are shaped by the scientific work of the concepts themselves. Hence it is impossible to make a clean division of sciences according to what we call their objects. It can only be done on the basis of the scientific procedure itself. In the practical work of science we find the various branches marked off from each other, and then (very much as in the rest of academic life) reunited in groups; but in each branch, whichever we choose, we find scientific trains of thought crossing each other, in which ideas, types, or laws are sought, with investigations of an historical nature, which have the value of the individual as the principle of their objectivity. Such elements are most finely interwoven everywhere in establishing the causal relations of the individual event of value. In this natural and historical research unite in seeking to determine the regular course of events in which the ultimate values of the world are realised.

On the whole, however, we find that the theory of knowledge cannot go too far in recognising the autonomy of the different sciences. In methodology the illusion of a universal method, which might hold good for all the sciences, was abandoned long ago. It was realised that the difference of objects demands a difference in scientific procedure. And while the theory of knowledge has grasped the fact that these objects themselves arise from a selective synthesis of scientific thought, we must not refuse to recognise that all the elements of the conception of truth are conditioned for each science by its own peculiarities, and that here again we cannot compress the richly varied vitality of human thought into an abstract formula.

PART II

AXIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

(QUESTIONS OF VALUE)

THE scientific form in which we most clearly conceive the meaning of the distinction between theoretical and axiological problems lies in the fact that the propositions which we enunciate, affirmatively and negatively, are either *judgments* or *verdicts*. In spite of an identity in grammatical form, the two have very different meanings. In the one case the relation of subject and predicate is said to be a relation of two contents which are theoretically connected in the mind, the relation being either assigned to such contents or denied them. In the second case the predicate does not represent any theoretical content of consciousness, but a relation to a purpose or a value, which is granted or refused to the subject. It is only a quite untrained mind that treats such purposive relations as the pleasant or the beautiful as properties that inhere in the subject as other properties do. The slightest shade of reflection discovers that these predicates of value do not belong to the things themselves as properties, but accrue to them by their being related to some standard in the mind. If, however, verdicts of this nature are to claim general validity like judgments, it can only be because they express or presuppose a relation to some standard that is generally valid. But it is one of the natural necessities of psychic life that each empirical mind regards its own standard of values as independent and valid for all, and that here again experience of life

must disturb this naïve confidence before valuations can become problems, first of practical life and then of science. Hence the idea of value is now the centre of any further discussion of problems.

§ 13

Value.—Psychological axiology—Valuation as feeling or will—Primary feeling—Primary will—Reciprocity of values—Conversion—Morality—Valuation of values—Conscience—Postulate of the normal consciousness—Logic, ethics, and æsthetics.

Axiology, or the science of values, has only been recognised in recent times as an independent and extensive science. The frequent appearance of the word "value" in modern philosophical language began with Lotze, and it has grown because theories of philosophy and national economy have been based upon it. This, however, has led to many complications and misunderstandings, and we can only avoid these by endeavouring to understand how value or valuation may and did become a problem, and indeed a philosophical problem.

Valuation appears first as a psychic process described by psychologists, and a proper study for psychologists. There is so little to be said against this that, as a matter of fact, axiology readily seeks a psychological basis. The Voluntarist and Emotionalist tendencies in recent philosophy lean toward a predominantly psychological treatment of their problems. The contents of the theoretical consciousness, with their mainly objective features, only gradually and indirectly betray their relation to the psychic processes. They have at first an appearance of transcending and pointing beyond the human mind, and this seems to demand that they be treated purely as facts. The "practical" functions of the mind, on the contrary, always show a predominant character of inwardness, of subjectivity. They are so intimately bound up with what is specifically human that they must necessarily be approached from the psychological side. That is true above all of the

generic idea of these practical functions, value ; and our inquiry into it must start from the facts of valuation.

We find the idea of value everywhere defined either so as to mean anything that satisfies a need or anything that evokes a feeling of pleasure. The latter, taken from the emotional side of consciousness, is the broader definition. It includes the narrower, which looks to the life of the will. In view of this double relation, to the will and the feelings, the question arises whether one of these functions can claim to be original rather than the other. The two species of valuation are certainly intimately connected psychogenetically, so that it is often difficult to say confidently in a particular case which was prior, the will or the feelings. From this we understand the one-sided claims of the Voluntarist and the Emotionalist psychologists. They have even, as we saw above, occasionally given a tinge to spiritualist metaphysics. We must admit that it would be difficult to make out as good a case for feeling as is made out for the will as the essence of reality. This is the more remarkable as precisely in recent psychology we notice a tendency to see in feeling the fundamental psychic activity or psychic state, and regard thought and will as derivative functions. If, in spite of this, we scarcely ever find in metaphysical circles, which affect to take the typical contents of reality from the psychic life and inner experience, the idea of seeking the primary reality in feeling, it may be that this is because in feeling we have always, and quite unmis-takably, a reaction to something more fundamental.

• There are certainly very many emotional valuations which can be traced to the will or to needs. Hence pleasure is often defined as the satisfaction of the will, and displeasure as the dissatisfaction of the will. This is particularly clear when the volition is conscious. But even the unconscious volition, which we generally call an impulse or craving, is the origin of such feelings a hunger (as displeasure) or satiety (as pleasure). These observations have inspired the theory that all pleasure or displeasure presupposes a volition ; not necessarily in the shape of a deliberate purpose, but at least in that of

cravings or impulses as forms of an unconscious will. Kant lent a certain sanction to this view when, in his *Critique of Judgment*, he expressed the opinion that pleasure and displeasure are related to the purposiveness or non-purposiveness of their objects. Purpose is determined by the will, whether conscious or unconscious, and is therefore always something willed. Hence all feeling must be preceded by a volition which, according as it is satisfied or no, gives rise to the reaction, pleasure or displeasure. But against this Voluntarist theory of feeling we have, in the first place, the elementary sense-feelings, the sensations of colours, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. In their case there is often, not only no relation to any purpose of a conscious will, but none even to a craving or an unconscious impulse. The artificial hypotheses of physiological psychology about some normal state or middle state of excitation, which purport to explain sensory feelings as the realisation or non-realisation of a purpose, entirely fail; they break down before the facts of anti-purposive pleasure, which is to them an insoluble problem. We are bound to grant that there are primary feelings of a totally unintelligible nature; and, as the relation of the quality of sensations to the objective properties of the stimuli cannot possibly be deduced synthetically,—that is to say, logically—so we can never understand from these qualities why they are partly characterised by feelings of pleasure and partly by feelings of displeasure.

Hence the opposite theory, the Emotionalist interpretation of the volition. Here again it is notorious that frequently our desire or aversion arises from some past pleasure or displeasure, some experience of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Hence the old question: "How can a man will anything that he does not regard as good? And how can he will this unless he has already experienced a feeling of pleasure in it?" Generalising in this way leads to the Eudæmonistic or Utilitarian theory, that all volition springs from an experienced feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Here we have a decisive counter-instance in instincts, in which there is undoubtedly in the individual an *original volition*, without any knowledge

of pleasure acquired by experience. There are even cases of bad disposition in which this primary volition, directed to acts and objects, seeks fulfilment in spite of all experience of unpleasantness arising therefrom. There are some who think that they evade the difficulty by the usual appeal to the unconscious, and try to explain the intensity of the instinctive volition by unconscious expectations of some pleasure which the subject promises himself; or by the evolutionary theory, regarding the experience of feeling, which the individual cannot possibly have had in this case, as an experience of the species, and speaking of an inherited reaction of the will. In neither way can we escape the fact that there is in the individual a primitive will to act without any conscious regard to pleasure or unpleasantness in the future.

Thus in our psychic experience there is the fundamental fact of a reciprocity of the two kinds of valuation, that of feeling and that of will. For each there are original functions as well as functions which are conditioned by the other kind. In particular states we may observe that they are completely separable. Just as there are border-cases, states of the disinterested intellect in which the content of consciousness is merely presented without being subjected to any valuation—states of imagination which are in part ingredients of the æsthetic life—so there are on the other hand border-cases of temperament (the melancholic, for instance), more or less permanent states in which our conscious experience of the environment is bound up with strong feelings of pleasure or displeasure, but no wishes or efforts to react voluntarily on these. In the average life, however, the valuations of feeling and will are always intermingled. In this there is no feeling which does not entail a desire of pleasure or a shrinking from disagreeableness, and no volition that does not become pleasure or displeasure according as it is or is not satisfied. In the psychogenetic development the chief part in this is played by the law that all that is firmly connected in any way with a thing of value in the mind passes under the same valuation in the course of time.

This principle of transference is developed not only in the teleological relation of ends and means or the causal relation of causes and effects, but in every categorical connection of the contents of experience, particularly in the combinations of an association of contiguity. We need take as examples only two of the most familiar of these. On the one hand there is the psychogenetic explanation of greed or avarice by the fact that money, which in itself (as scraps of paper, for instance) has no value at all, becomes of value, and is highly esteemed, as the general means of securing valuable things and satisfying one's wants. On the other hand there is the well-known and basic fact of experience that things that are of no consequence in themselves are esteemed because of rewards attached to them or avoided because of penalties. Education can go so far, as everybody knows, as to completely invert the value of things, so that what was once esteemed is regarded with disgust, and what was hated may become desirable. From the same formal development we thus get, on the one hand, something so irrational and evil as unnatural passion, and on the other hand the creation of states of feeling and will to which we attach the greatest pleasure. From this it follows that for a theory of value which is to settle the question of the vindication or rationality of values the psychogenetic origin of any particular value is entirely irrelevant and can never afford a decisive criterion.

To such a theory, transcending all psychological explanation, we are driven irresistibly by all the experiences which we have in the development of our appreciations of value. The simple confidence with which at first we ascribe to all others our own way of appreciating things, is very soon disturbed by our experience. We quickly notice that what is pleasant to us may be very unpleasant to others, and *vice versa*. We learn that what is good for us is injurious to others; and we later, as we get on in life, realise that even what we regard as good or evil, beautiful or ugly, is not judged by others in the same way. At first we are reconciled with this great diversity in ideas of value because in the circles to which we look

there is, in spite of these individual variations, a certain amount of a generally recognised standard of values, which we usually call *morals*. In many forms of inner and outer experience, of our own and others, we grant this code of morals a sovereignty over the personal feelings of the individual. The generally recognised standard is the correct standard; the individual decision must be subject to and in agreement with it. In this we may see the psychological nature of conscience. It is the voice of the general consciousness in the individual, and from it we derive the law of the subjection of the individual to it. Here we already perceive the intricacy of the process of appreciating values. The primary processes of the individual cravings, feelings, and volitions, each of which contains its own appreciation of an object, are themselves subject to a higher and more deliberate type of appreciation, which approves one valuation as sound and condemns another as unsound. The norms according to which this secondary appreciation is conducted will be considered later. We see at once, however, in what direction this consideration and the question of the validity of value take us. In the sphere of the pleasant and unpleasant, and also of the useful and harmful, there is no such higher appreciation. Here the question of the justification of our valuations has no meaning. In this case all the phenomena of valuation take place with the same psychological necessity; even the great diversity of individuals and individual states and conditions leaves no room for wonder whether what appears to one pleasant and desirable may be unpleasant and undesirable to another. Hence there is no philosophical hedonism as an inquiry into the validity of our ideas of pleasantness or usefulness. On the other hand, the two provinces of life which we find described in the predicates good or evil, and beautiful or ugly, are of such a nature that the validity of the primary valuations of will and feeling is called into question by the general consciousness and its claim to set up a universal standard of value. Thus the philosophical problem here is to study and establish the value of values. It cannot simply be satisfied with this

judgment of the individual appreciations by the general moral consciousness. Morality itself is, in the long run, a fact, and the privilege which it claims in its validity over the individual feelings and volitions is not an obvious right. We know, in fact, that morality itself is just as liable to err in its verdicts as the individual. Hence conscience, in this first form of a relation between the actual individual mind and the actual general mind, is not something final. We have first to settle difficult questions about the soundness of our most treasured appreciations.

This is the commencement of the real problems of philosophical axiology. At first every value meant something which satisfies a need or excites a feeling of pleasure. It follows from this that valuableness (naturally, both in the negative and the positive aspect) is never found in the object itself as a property. It consists in a relation to an appreciating mind, which satisfies the desires of its will or reacts in feelings of pleasure upon the stimulations of the environment. Take away will and feeling, and there is no such thing as value. Now morality is a standard of appreciation of the general mind set over the individual appreciation, and from this arose new values beyond the original appreciations. These also, nevertheless, when they are examined by the historian and ethnographer, show just as great diversities as individual appreciation did. Ethical and æsthetic judgments display, in the mind of any unprejudiced observer, an extremely great diversity when one surveys the various peoples of the earth in succession. Here again, however, we try to set up a final standard of values; we speak of higher and lower stages of morality or of taste in different peoples and different ages. Where do we get the standard for this judgment? And where is the mind for which these ultimate criteria are the values? If it is quite inevitable to rise above the relativity in individual appreciations and the morals of various peoples to some standard of absolute values, it seems necessary to pass beyond the historical manifestations of the entire human mind to some *normal* consciousness, for which these values are

values. There is just the same compulsion as we found in connection with the theory of knowledge. As there are objects only for a presenting and knowing mind, the object which is to form the standard of truth points to a "consciousness in general" as to that for which it must be the object. It is just the same with value-in-itself as with the thing-in-itself. We have to seek it in order to get beyond the relativity of actual appreciations; and, since there is value only in relation to a valuing consciousness, the value-in-itself points to the same normal consciousness which haunts the theory of knowledge as the correlate of the object-in-itself. In both cases this implication is at the most a postulate, not a thing meta-physically known.

This analogy has a far-reaching significance. This normal consciousness to which the theory of knowledge leads us means, at the bottom, only that the truth of our knowledge and the guarantee that in our knowledge we perceive reality are based upon the fact that therein we see the emergence of an actual order which transcends in its validity the specifically human order. In the same way our conviction that for human valuation there are absolute norms, beyond the empirical occasions of their appearance, is based upon the assumption that here also we have the sovereignty of a transcendent rational order. As long as we would conceive these orders as contents of an actual higher mind, on the analogy of the relation we experience of consciousness to its objects and values, they have to be considered contents of an absolute reason—that is to say, God. These relations are in the long run based upon the fact that noetic problems themselves have something of the nature of the axiological in them, and they thus afford a transition from theoretical to practical problems. For in the theory of knowledge we deal with the truth-value of ideas, with its definition, with the question how it becomes psychically a value, and therefore, how, in what sense, and by what method, it is attained. In the affirmative and the negative judgment there are the same alternative elements as in the affirmations and denials of the ethical and æsthetic

judgment, and thus to a certain extent logical, ethical, and æsthetic appreciations are co-ordinated, and we get the three great philosophical sciences—logic, ethics, and æsthetics. That is the division of universal values which Kant made the basis of the distribution of his critical philosophy. It proves, moreover, to be also a psychological guide, as it starts from the division of psychic states into presentation, volition, and feeling. This guarantees the completeness of the division, and the few attempts that have been made to replace it by some other systematic distribution always come to the same thing in the end.

However, the relation of the theoretical world-order to the practical demands a final synthesis. It consists in the question how the two orders are related to each other in the entire frame of things: that is to say, how the world of things, which exist and are recognised as existing, is related to the world of values, which ought to be, and must be, valid for the things as well as for us. This is the question of the supreme unity of the world; and if we find the solution in the idea of God, we get a final group of problems—those of the philosophy of religion. Our second part must therefore be divided into three sections, and these will successively deal with ethical, æsthetic, and religious problems.

CHAPTER I

ETHICAL PROBLEMS

OF the two types of psychological attitude toward the idea of value we start first with the Voluntarist, when we approach the domain of moral philosophy or, as we just as commonly say, ethics. In this province value appears essentially as end, the τέλος, the principle of conduct. The philosophical inquiry we make into it is not a science of the ends toward which the human will is actually directed—that is the work of psychology and history—but a theory as to how the human will ought to be directed. In accordance with the terminology invented by Aristotle we call this branch of philosophy ethics, because it has to show how human life, as a result of man's own activity, is to be shaped in virtue of the natural and customary ideas of morality. It is the science of what man can and ought to make of himself and his world: the science of the values which he owes to the activity of his own reason (τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν). The ancient philosophers distributed these considerations in three parts. In so far as values are the ends which must be attained by the activity of the human will, they are called *good*. The determination of the dispositions, actions, and rules needed for this gives us what we call a man's *duties*. And the qualities which guarantee the fulfilment of duty and attainment of the good are called *virtues* (ἀρετή, *virtus*). We thus get the threefold division into the theory of the good, the theory of duties, and the theory of virtues. It is not entirely a good division, as it really implies only three different methods of treating the same material. To-day much more importance is attached to a division according to the subject of the

moral action. The entire problem of ethics, which has on that account been called practical philosophy, is man in so far as he acts voluntarily; and it is in this sense that Aristotle occasionally calls it the science which has especially to deal with human affairs (*ἡ περὶ τὰνθρώπινα πραγματεία*). At all events no other branch of philosophy is so intimately concerned with the sphere of man's life as ethics, and therefore the chief danger in treating it is that it may not be able to find the way from this sphere to the transcendent validities of the rational order. In human life, moreover, the subject of moral conduct is partly the individual, partly the social community, and partly the species in its historical evolution. Hence we get the three sections of practical philosophy which we may distinguish as morality, social science, and the philosophy of history.

14

The Principle of Morality.—Imperativistic and descriptive morality—Many meanings of the moral principle—Universal moral law—Teleological fundamental law—Eudæmonism—Egoism—Hedonism—Epicureanism—Morality of soul-salvation—Altruism—Utilitarianism—Morality of perfectibility—Rational morality—Definition of man—Emotional morality—Morality and legality—The categorical imperative—Moral order of the world—Morality of personality.

Empirical and rational morality—Morality of feeling—Intuitionism—Morality of authority—God, the State, and custom as legislators—Heteronomy and autonomy.

Reward and punishment—Altruistic impulses—Sympathy and fellow-feeling—The beautiful soul—Strata of morality.

The freedom of the will—Freedom of action and choice—Determinism and indeterminism—Responsibility—Metaphysical freedom as causelessness—Practical responsibility.

The psychological assumption of the ethical problem, and one that runs counter to all parallelistic hypotheses, is that there are voluntary acts: that is to say, purposive movements of the human body which are caused by will and are meant to produce something in the environment which the will pursues as a value or end. To this we must add a second, specifically ethical, assumption: the basic

fact that some of these actions are liked by us, either because of their content, their causes, or their results, and some are not liked. The former are considered "good," the latter "bad." This valuation, however, means no more than that they respond or do not respond to the expectations of the acting subject. Hence as a norm of ethical judgment one thing is desired, another forbidden, and a third is indifferent. In any case, even in ordinary life, we set up a command for every actual event, in so far as it represents human conduct, which it has to fulfil, and on the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of which its moral value depends. Wherever there is ethical judgment amongst men, the validity of such a command is assumed, even if its content is not quite clearly realised or one is far from clear as to the legal basis of the command. This command we call duty or the moral law. In view of the very various situations, however, in which men may be called upon to act, there are clearly numbers of such duties and moral laws, and the question may be raised whether they can all be reduced to a fundamental type which we may then call *the moral law*.

From this we get a broad divergence in the treatment of ethical problems; in the question, namely, whether the moral law and its various ramifications were established by the scientific research of ethics and appointed over man's actual voluntary movements, or whether this moral law was merely discovered as the actual norm which determines the decisions of moral life. In the former case we may speak of an *imperativist* ethic; in the latter it is, in the long run, merely of a *descriptive* nature. But, however sharp this antithesis may appear, it is increasingly lessened in the development of ethical theory. We rarely get the extremes. Very rarely has the ethicist set out to pose as the moral legislator, or to represent himself as the founder of a new moral law in face of the existing moral life. In modern times we find this claim of being a legislator in its most pronounced form in Nietzsche; who, however, was quite conscious that in this he was discharging a personal mission and

rendering what he believed to be a service to civilisation rather than expounding a scientific theory. There is something of an imperativist ethics, rightly or wrongly, in the work of all reformers. And precisely on that account it is anything but scientific. Where ethics is found as a science in the imperativist form, as, particularly, in the case of Kant, it does not lose sight of life. It remains conscious that it has not to create the moral law, but to discover it and formulate it as the most intimate principle of actual morality. Hence Kant himself was most careful in formulating his moral law to keep in sympathy with the ideas of the ordinary man. To that extent even the imperativist ethic has a descriptive character, since it establishes the laws of moral conduct and judgment. It seeks to develop the principles which constitute the real moral consciousness. On the other hand, a descriptive ethic will never be satisfied with merely establishing descriptively that amongst all the possible modes of human conduct and judgment there are some which we call moral. It seeks to test the interrelation and foundation of these modes of action, and it cannot avoid, while it justifies and reconciles them, making into a compact system what in reality comes from a number of different sources and is not always in perfect harmony. It is much the same as the process known to the jurist in his science; it has not to create a new law, but to describe and codify the existing law, and in doing this has to work up the law into a compact structure.

But whether we lean more in ethical inquiry toward the imperativist or the descriptive side, it is the same basic problems which occupy the science with their complications. It must be regarded as a considerable merit of the great moral philosophers of England in the eighteenth century that the structure of moral problems was clearly put together and the way prepared for their distribution. We may, for instance, speak of the moral principle in four different senses. First we have to define what we really understand by moral; what it is that appeals to us as good, and what we avoid as evil. In view of the great variety of duties and moral laws it may be asked

whether they are all to be brought under one formula, under a general moral law : whether there is any criterion by which in every case, under any conditions, we can decide what is morally prescribed. In this sense the moral law is the *substance* of the principle of morality. In the next case, we may ask on what our knowledge of the moral law in general and its application to particular cases is based ; what sort of knowledge constitutes what we usually call "conscience." In this sense the principle of morality is the *source of our knowledge* of the moral law. Thirdly, when we oppose this law as a command and demand to the natural impulses and movements of the human will, we have to ask what right we have to do this ; where in the world we must look for the basis of such a claim. In this sense the principle of morality becomes the *sanction* of the moral law. Fourthly, in fine, the more closely we consider the antagonism between the natural will of man and the claims of the moral law, and the more secure we find its foundations, the more we are bound to make it clear how it is that a man is brought to will or to do, in obedience to the moral law, something that his will does not of itself desire. This question is all the more urgent in proportion as the demand of conscience is opposed to a man's natural inclination. If a man regards this as in itself morally indifferent, or as really immoral, we have to show how he is induced to carry out the command he experiences. In this sense the principle becomes the *motive* of morality.

The first and greatest difficulties are connected with the contents of the principle of morals. Here it is a question of the material definition of the moral ; the formal definition is found by reflection on the fact that amongst the great mass of human dispositions and acts some are approved as good, and others condemned as evil, with a claim of general validity for this secondary valuation. What is affirmatively recognised in this—what is laid down as a rule or duty, and must be contained in a general way in the material definition—we call the moral. In German there are two expressions, *Sittliche* and *Moralische*, and Hegel endeavoured to dis-

tinguish between the two, restricting the latter to the province of motives of the personal life and claiming the higher value of the former for the realisation of the practical reason in the entire life of the State. There was good reason to maintain this distinction, but it has not been maintained and is not likely to be renewed. On the other hand, it is to be regretted that the practice has grown up in recent years of confining the meaning of the word "moral" to sexual matters. It is not merely in journalistic language that we find sexual conditions and crimes alone meant when there is a reference to moral conditions and transgressions. That is a perversion of the word which ought not to be encouraged.¹

The material definition of morality touches one of the most difficult points at which the contradictions of life are converted into philosophical problems. Every man finds in time his untrained moral judgment called into question by the experience that the moral principles are not the same in various circles even of ordinary life. In different strata and classes and professions amongst the same people there is considerable difference as to what is forbidden and what is allowed. Certain general rules may seem to be independent of these variations, but even these have different shades in different circles. And our scepticism about the general validity of the standard we have adopted is enlarged and strengthened when we pass over our limits in time and space and survey the whole life of humanity. Different races and peoples have unquestionably their different codes of morality. Historical development, again, shows further variations. We need not here enter into a consideration of them. On one side we have the view that in all this we trace an advancing development, and that modern man is superior in his morals to primitive man. But on another side we find complaints that civilisation deprives man of his

¹ We may add that there may be a different sort of ambiguity in the word "moral." In French and English "moral" sometimes means psychic or spiritual as opposed to material. This has led to many misunderstandings in translations. The same erroneous use of the word crept into German literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as when writers spoke of "moral victories."

primitive simplicity and purity, and that the complexity of the conditions of life is prejudicial to morals. However that may be, we can no more ignore the diversity of moral principles in history than we can in ethnography. We may try to find a number of general elements which may serve in all cases as criteria of moral judgment, and draw up certain propositions which are recognised everywhere, such as the ten commandments of the Hebrew tradition. But even in the case of these, and supposing that we have actually proved the universal recognition of them, we find a multiplicity which leaves us very uncertain as to their real number. We thus see that we cannot by inductive research draw up any general moral law from the existing individual laws. In this we disregard the fact that an induction of this kind would have reference only to the actual validity of moral rules in the great groups of historical humanity. Of an absolutely universal validity in all individuals there can be no question whatever because immoral men contest the validity—in practice at least, and partly in theory—of the rules which they transgress.

We have next to consider that all the various duties and rules from which an inductive inquiry into the moral law could start are related to the endlessly diverse conditions of human life and are conditioned in their contents by this. But we cannot conceive anything that is, in respect of moral disposition and action, prescribed for every single occasion in life. Hence the moral law cannot be related to the various duties as a generic idea is to its species; indeed, if there were such a relation of all moral precepts to a supreme principle, we should have to determine it, not by a logical, but by a teleological subordination—a subordination of means to the common end. Thus in our first excursion into the province of practical problems we are confronted with the fundamental teleological law. It seemed to have only a doubtful and restricted application in our theoretical interpretation of the world, and here we find it in the proper sphere of its supremacy. In the province of values the chief relation is that of means and end; and therefore

the highest value, or the highest good, as the older philosophers said, can only be the final end to which all the elements in the various duties and rules are subordinated as means, and to which they all owe their value.

In the psychological introduction to axiology we have referred to the teleological series which are evoked by the reciprocity in the origin of feelings and volitions, in such wise that one is always appreciated for the sake of another. We now ask if these chains have anywhere a last link, a value of all values, a value for the sake of which all other values *are* values. If there is in the necessary process of the life of value such a link, which we might with equal justice call the last link or the first link, the determination and maintenance of this would make the contents of the moral law, and all particular duties would be only means of its realisation suited to various conditions of life.

Hence the next point in ethical theory must be to see that in the psychological mechanism this ultimate end of all volition has a recognised validity. There is a very widespread belief that happiness has this significance. This psychological theory of morals is known as Eudæmonism. It seems to suit the general feeling, and it therefore dominated the ancient mind to a great extent. Its principle is expressed in the well-known Socratic-Platonist saying that nobody willingly does injustice. It means that every man of his own nature seeks happiness, and only at times makes a mistake as to the means of attaining the end. Hence the theory of virtue which was much disputed in Platonist circles, and interpreted in many different ways, became the first principle of Eudæmonism. Morality may be taught, since it has only to point out the correct means for the attainment of an end which every man spontaneously and entirely aims at. The Eudæmonistic principle is at the root of all ordinary moralising from ancient times until our own; in domestic education, in the school, the pulpit, or literature. It is always an appeal to the desire of happiness, a recommendation of the right means to attain it, a warning against wrong means that might be adopted. Who

does not know Xenophon's superficial allegory of the Prodicos who represents Heracles at the crossways, equally beset by virtue and vice, each of which promises an abundance of happiness! From this point of view morality is, as Kant said, a system of prudence, the business of which it is to tell us how to attain happiness in the best and safest way. No one will underrate the human significance and the social value of these well-meant disquisitions. Man is, when we reflect on the thousands of millions who pass over this planet in the course of ages, really a pitiable creature, and none will resent it if in the short span of existence he seeks whatever satisfaction of his desires he can attain. Whoever shows him the best way to do this is a benefactor of the race; as is the man who warns him against the many errors in regard to this search for happiness with which nature and life are beset. The effort to refute Eudæmonism in many theories of morality is not very successful. We must remember that in practical philosophy we have to deal with the living man, who cannot be imagined without pleasure and pain; and that no moral principle is conceivable that would forbid men to be happy. It would, moreover, be a contradictory state of things if the happiness of the individual were a value that all others had to respect, yet he himself were forbidden to cultivate it. Happiness has therefore an indisputable right to a place in the discussion of the values of which ethics treats. But it is another question whether it can take the dominating position of the highest and final end which Eudæmonism claims for it.

There are many objections to this. In the first place the psychological assumption, which seems so plausible, is really wrong. Pleasure as the feeling of the satisfaction of a desire is undoubtedly always the *result* of a fulfilled wish. But, as Aristotle rightly said, it by no means follows from this that the desire of the pleasure should be the general motive of willing. Happiness is the outcome of satisfaction of the will, but certainly not either its motive or its object. We have already seen that there are, not only in the primary but even in the more complex

states of the will, purely actual forms by which it is directed immediately to its object without any presentation or any regard to expectation of pleasure or unpleasantness. To this extent it is impossible to say that happiness is the final end, for the realisation of which all other volition is only a means. We are the less entitled to do this as, if we wish to speak with psychological accuracy, no one really wills happiness in the generic or abstract form. Every volition is related to some definite willed object in which a particular happiness will be found. From the desire of happiness we could never deduce how it is to be attained.

Further, the psychological assumption in virtue of which happiness is set up as the principle of duty really shows of itself that this is impossible. On that view happiness would be the natural and general termination of all teleological series and would be obvious in all actual volition. But there would be no meaning in seeking an obvious thing of this nature and setting it up as a duty. According to the Eudæmonistic view it is quite unnecessary to demand of a man that he shall seek happiness. The only thing we can do is tell him the best means of attaining it. But even this appeal to his prudence gives us no test of value for the contents of the individual volition. Since every volition, no matter to what content it be directed, brings pleasure or happiness as soon as it is fulfilled, all objects of the will are in this respect of equal value. If one man prefers wine and oysters, and another devotes himself to social questions, each of them will be happy when he has attained his object. Differences in value in objects of the will are, on this theory, not qualitative, but at the most quantitative. They consist in the intensity, the duration, and the attainability of the pleasure. In regard to intensity and duration the moral competence or virtue consists in an art of weighing one thing against another (*μέτρησις*), which the great Sophist Protagoras made the central point of his system of morality; and the further development of this theory leads to some such quantitative morality as Bentham sketches in his table of the good. On the

other hand, the test of attainability long ago led to the interesting result that the logical consequence of Eudæmonism is the morality of having no desires. As things go in the world, a man can only expect the realisation of his wishes when they are confined to the most necessary and simplest things. The more a man wants, the more probable it is that he will be rendered unhappy by the non-fulfilment of his wishes. A man finds the surest way to happiness in asking as little as possible of the world and of life. In ancient times Antisthenes deduced this consequence from Socratic Eudæmonism. It led to the safest, but to the poorest and most pitiful of all moralities, the sour-grapes morality of cowardice, which does nothing from fear of failure and disillusion. On the contrary, the natural impulse is to regard that life as of more value which is directed to great and important aims, even when it cannot attain them.

The question next arises *whose* happiness is at stake, and the first answer we get is that the willing and acting individual must regard his own happiness as the supreme end of his efforts. When this side is particularly stressed, we have the development of Individualistic ethics; part of which is the ancient ideal of the wise man—the mature man who knows how to control his will and conduct in such wise that he will attain perfect happiness. It is a thoroughly Egoist ethic: the morality of enlightened interest, by which a man turns to his own profit all the conditions of life and all his relations to his fellows, so that everything contributes to his own happiness. It is the morality of actual life: the theory that the great majority of men have held in all ages, and will continue to hold. The only difference we find is in the degree of candour with which the fact is acknowledged and defended. This candour does not often rise to the height of coolness which it reaches in the “Selfish System” of Hobbes in the early days of modern philosophy, which has rightly been rejected by all schools.

Egoistic Eudæmonism has various shades, according to the nature of the object in which the individual seeks his happiness. In its simplest form, it is sensuous en-

joyment or bodily pleasure that is raised to the position of the highest good. This is the theory of Hedonism, the chief exponent of which in ancient times was Aristippus. In cases where the theory was revived in modern times, as it was by Lamettrie, it lost the character of healthy naturalness, and was elaborated into an insipid coquetry which could only be tolerated as a reaction against the equally unnatural ascetic theory. By the side of, or in place of, pleasure of the senses later and riper forms of the theory put mental enjoyment—the enjoyment of science, art, friendship, and all the finer things of life. That is the ethical tendency which acknowledges Epicurus as its leader. In his own case, and in the school which was called after him in antiquity, the two elements—sensuous and intellectual enjoyment—are combined, perhaps with a certain predominance of the latter. In the eighteenth century there was a pronounced Æsthetic Epicureanism, founded by Shaftesbury, in which the ideal was the artistic cultivation of personality. In the case of Shaftesbury himself it, in virtue of the metaphysical background which he gave to it, approaches the morality of perfection, which we shall consider later. When the ideal was adopted in German poetry, it again assumed a psychological form, and eventually it was used by the Romanticists for the full development of their aristocratic and exclusive theory. The self-enjoyment of the spiritually developed personality is the finest and highest form that the moral life has taken, or can take, on the lines of the Eudæmonistic theory.

The individualistic form of Eudæmonist ethics goes beyond both forms of enjoyment, sensuous and mental, when it takes on a religious complexion, and regards the salvation of the soul as the ultimate object of moral precepts. Sometimes it is now said that “felicity” is the aim rather than happiness, and this ethic of soul-salvation sometimes assails the other forms of enjoyment very vigorously. In its extreme forms (of which Plato gives some indication in the opening part of his *Phædo*) it not only despises pleasure of the senses, but it sees even in the enjoyment of the intellectual and æsthetic life

grave obstacles to the attainment of the highest good. In this case, especially as these ideas are generally connected with the belief in immortality and the hope of "eternal life," we may call it otherworldly or transcendental Eudæmonism, or even Egoism—in so far as duties toward other men and things are at times forgotten or thrust aside in the zeal for one's own salvation. To this theory corresponds practical asceticism; though in general nature has taken care that these interests of another life do not unduly preponderate. The extreme form in which transcendental morality is often preached on the theological side has always tended to cause the other forms of Eudæmonism to emphasise more strongly the this-worldliness of their ethic. This is particularly true of Materialism and Socialism. We need quote only Saint-Simon, Dühring, and Feuerbach, and even Guyau and Nietzsche, as examples.

The egoistic forms of Eudæmonism only include a concern for the happiness of one's fellows amongst the duties of the individual in so far as he actually needs the others. Hence in regard to its main principle this theory of morals is sharply opposed to the system which regards the community, not the individual, as entitled to the happiness which it is a duty to create. We give to this system the name Altruism, which was invented a century ago. It regards as "good" all intentions and acts which aim at promoting the happiness of one's fellows. As far as the principle is concerned, it is immaterial whether the Altruism is based psychologically, as regards motives, on egoistic foundations or on the assumption that there are original social impulses. It is also immaterial whether it seeks the sanction of the altruistic command in the divine will or in the political and social order. For, since men become happy only by the satisfaction of their needs and desires, whatever be the burden of those desires, Altruism must, to be consistent, and unless it brings in other standards of value, come to the conclusion that every man is to be satisfied by the fulfilment of his wishes; and in cases of conflict, which necessarily arise, there is nothing left but the majority principle. The conclusion

in this case is that that intention or action is moral and acceptable which results in the greatest amount of pleasure for the largest number of one's fellows. In this formula, which was evolved in the course of the eighteenth century, altruistic Eudæmonism assumes the form of Utilitarianism. This also seems to the untrained mind a very plausible system of morals, and there is no doubt that its principle is quite justified in every application in which there is question of the good of the majority. The most impressive form of this Utilitarianism, indeed, that given us by Bentham, sprang from a legislator's modes of thought. Here again, however, the uselessness of the principle as a basis of ethics is made clear by a few comparatively simple questions. We have no need to ask to whom the sum-total of happiness really falls, or who feels the general felicity, which, while made up by the addition of individual happinesses, cannot be perceived by any other mind than that of the individuals. The Utilitarian is reduced to silence by the pupil who objects that, if there is question only of a sum-total of felicity, and it is immaterial how it is distributed amongst the individuals, he thinks it best to begin with himself, since in that case he knows best what is to be done. It is a much more serious objection that Utilitarianism, precisely because it lays such stress on the quantity of happiness, must inevitably accommodate itself to the lower cravings of the masses, and so confine its moral interests to their good in the sense of the furtherance of pleasure and avoidance of the unpleasant. It purchases its democratic character by the abandonment of the higher advantages which lie beyond the vicissitudes of the pleasant and unpleasant, the useful and injurious—in Plato's words, beyond the entire commercial business of pleasures and desires—and represent a higher region of life.

So much for the exposition and criticism of Eudæmonistic morality. Related to it in some ways, yet differing in principle from it, is the morality of perfection. This purports to have a metaphysical, not a psychological basis. It regards improvement or increasing perfection as the ultimate standard which determines the various

moral precepts. By perfection is generally meant the full development, on teleological lines, of the resources of nature ; and thus, corresponding to Egoism and Altruism, the morality of perfection has a singularist and a universalist form, since it may regard the perfection either of the individual or of the species. Psychologically this form of ethic is connected with Eudæmonism in that it maintains that what improves us gives us pleasure, and what restricts us gives us displeasure. So said Spinoza, Shaftesbury, and Christian Wolff. This is generally true, apart from abnormal cases of injurious pleasure or useful unpleasantness. But when this side of the system is stressed, there is no need for any imperativist complexion of the ethic. Since it is obvious in the case of man, as in the case of all beings, that he seeks what promotes his development and avoids what restricts it, there is no need to impose this on him as a special task. Spinoza saw this most clearly. He is on that account the most pronounced representative of a purely descriptive ethic, and he has given the classic form to its method, that it must speak of human feelings and actions just as if it had to deal with lines, surfaces, and bodies. Its business in relation to the actual moral life is to understand it, not to detest or smile at it (*nec detestari nec ridere, sed intellegere*).

In the main, however, the principle of the perfection-morality is a teleological theory, which assumes that there is in man a certain disposition for it that is realised through his moral life. Since the realisation of this disposition leads to happiness, the theory approaches Eudæmonism, even when it expressly rejects the psychology of Eudæmonism. This was so in the case of Aristotle, who regarded reason and rational conduct as man's disposition, and contended that in realising this disposition he would become as happy as it was possible for any activity of his own to make him. Shaftesbury also places morality in the full development of human nature with all its impulses and resources. However varied these may be—egoistic and altruistic moods, bodily and spiritual cravings, sensuous and suprasensuous forces—the moral task is to bring them all into perfect harmony. The fully de-

veloped personality must also develop its relations to the universe, in which again there is an infinite harmony of contrasts. The perfection-morality assumes a rather different form in Leibnitz's *Monadology*. Here the human soul is a being that pursues an end which it has to develop, from a primitive obscurity and unconsciousness, to a clear and conscious form. The monad is conceived as essentially a presentative force, and its perfection is therefore intellectualistic, consisting in the evolution of a clear and lucid vision, from which rational conduct will inevitably ensue. In the case of Leibnitz's successor, Christian Wolff, who abandoned this metaphysical background, the perfection-morality sinks on that account into an intellectual Eudæmonism, which, since it intimately connects utility with the perfection of the intelligence, returns to the original psychological foundations.

German Idealism has more profoundly developed the idea of a disposition on the part of man. Fichte and Schleiermacher, in their different ways, gave us the same formula, that man has to fulfil his disposition, and they found this disposition in the incorporation of the individual in a total structure of peoples, ages, and humanity generally. Here again, it is true, the perfection-morality (though more pronounced in these metaphysical types) sometimes loses the imperativist form. In many of these systems the moral life is supposed to be the spontaneously developing completion of the natural disposition of man; the moral law seems to be, as Schleiermacher expressly said, the completion of the natural law—something that in the main is self-evident. If this is so, it is very difficult to understand the antithesis of the "ought" and the natural "must." Moreover, this idealist theory, with the disposition that it ascribes to individuals as well as to the whole race, dissolves into metaphysical and, in part, religious speculations which are matters of conviction and faith, not intellectual knowledge. The total life of mankind is for scientific knowledge a final synthesis, beyond which conceptual thought can prove nothing which might serve as a principle of morality. Hence,

although in this form of ethical speculation we have a special effort to represent the moral order as a world-order, in which man and humanity are a necessary link, nevertheless the special forms in which this situation must be conceived are no longer of such a nature that they can lay claim to the general and necessary validity of scientific knowledge. How easy it is for such ideas to take a fantastic turn is best seen in the work of C. F. Krause, who in his ethical philosophy of humanity tries to connect terrestrial humanity with a humanity on the sun, and all in a general community of spirits as a part of the world-order.

All the answers we have hitherto considered to the question of the substantial principle of morality agree in seeking it in the consequences of moral conduct ; whether these consequences be the happiness or the perfection of the individual or of the race. And precisely on that account they are incompetent to discover any simple and general content for the principle. Even the perfection-morality gives us only the formal definition of fulfilment of a disposition, without giving us the least definite idea of the nature of this disposition, which ought to be the guide of will and conduct. This is clear first in the case of Aristotle, who found in " reason " the principle for that reconciliation of extremes which constitutes the nature of virtue. It is from the lack of this that we understand the two features which distinguish Kant's ethic from all others. The first is that he relates the ethical judgment and the moral precept only to the disposition which lies at the root of the action ; the second is that he abandons the attempt to define the content of the moral law, and he can therefore give only a formal definition of it. In the first respect Kant very vigorously pointed out that the moral verdict, which even in ordinary conduct only bears upon actions in so far as they proceed from intentions, ought in the proper sense to be restricted to the intentions. " Nothing in the world is good except the good will." This intention-morality stresses the distinction between morality and legality. It points out that there are actions which are entirely in conformity with

the moral law in their form and their consequences, although their motive is not the fulfilment of the moral law. Actions of this kind may be very useful and agreeable in the course of life and in view of their effects. They may in this sense have anthropological value ; but, since they did not issue from an intention in conformity to the moral law, they are morally indifferent, and they can merely claim the value of legality. From the nature of the case Kant, in discussing this antithesis, was disposed to exclude this legality from the ethical sphere and depreciate its value ; although there was no reason in his philosophy to reject its significance entirely. It was left to his successors, especially Schiller, to mitigate the sharp contrast by the reflection that legality itself has a large moral significance as an important helpful element, not only in the education of the individual and the race, but also in moulding the entire circumstances of common life. Even if many, perhaps most, of these actions by which the moral law is fulfilled are not done for their own sake—out of regard for the moral law, as Kant says—but from other motives, in view of which they are merely chosen as the best means, there is precisely in this fact some recognition of the moral law, preparing the way for and securing its sovereignty in life. The individual becomes accustomed to seeing his will obey the rational command, and this may be converted into a good disposition ; the external features of the life of the community become more and more conformable to the claims of reason.

From the methodical point of view there is much more importance in the other special feature of the Kantian ethic, which we find in its formalist character. It is based upon the idea, to which we have already referred, that, in view of the infinite complexity of the relations in which man's will and conduct are involved, it is impossible to find any common content that could be definitely indicated as the necessary object of the will. There is no generic concept of the content of duty. Ethical reflection, however, finds significance in the fact that there is no moral life without a consciousness of duty, no matter

how much the content of the duty in each particular case differs from all others. In this sense the conformity of the will to duty is the general and supreme duty. As is well known, it takes the form in the Critical philosophy of the categorical imperative. The significance of this is its express opposition to every other system of morals. These presuppose a will for the precepts and demands which are expressed in the various duties, and they merely teach what is to be done in order to attain the end of this will. Thus all moralising, as we have said, appeals to the desire of happiness, which is assumed by Eudæmonistic ethics as the basis of its prudential theory. Thus, again, the perfection-morality deduces from the natural craving for self-development the various means that are necessary for its realisation. Hence all the imperatives which they lay down are hypothetical. They depend upon the condition that this will or desire is consciously or unconsciously present, and they lose all meaning if this is not the case. In their dependence upon given relations they are, Kant says, *heteronomous*. But it is the peculiarity and dignity of the moral law that its claims upon man are quite irrespective of his wishes. The moral precept demands obedience in all circumstances. It creates an entirely new volition, independent of any existing empirical volition. It is in this sense autonomous. This is the categorical imperative : a precept, independent of any circumstances, in which Kant finds the meaning of the moral law.

Since this formal moral principle is not conditioned by any given content, but of itself, it amounts to a principle of the imperativeness of precepts without determining the contents of the precepts themselves. The most remarkable and significant thing about the Kantist ethics is that this purely formal definition has to be completed by reference to a rational order that far transcends the empirical human world. Kant discovered the categorical imperative as the general definition of the conscience which teaches each individual to submit his will to a law, a command, and tells him that this command is entirely independent of whatever tendencies and objects the indi-

vidual finds already present in his will. It was therefore necessary to conceive this law as valid quite independently of all the variations of individual will and therefore equally valid for all individuals. This independence of the categorical imperative of every empirically existing will gave it a universal validity for all rational beings. And although the Critical ethic sought the source of its knowledge in the disposition and its sanction in the self-determination of the individual, nevertheless every duty thus learned and based had to be considered a constituent of a moral world-order which was equally binding for all. The world-law of morality had to be discovered in the individual mind without any empirical intermediaries. In Kant this was a direct relation of individual and universe, soul and world, which was characteristic of the whole period of the *Aufklärung*. The fact that the individual gives himself the moral law, which is to be valid for all others, shows that he bears in his own personality the dignity of the moral law.

In this enhancement of personality we have a common bond between the Kantian ethic and the earlier perfection-morality. Whilst, however, Eudæmonism, whether in Shaftesbury's or Leibnitz's form, regarded personality as that which had to be developed out of the natural and given individuality, Kant puts personality in the sovereignty of the general law of reason over all individual volition. For the former of these theories of personality it was difficult to pass from empirical individuality to a generic legality, and they incurred the danger, as the Romanticists did to some extent, of regarding the survival of the natural individuality as the ultimate and supreme moral value. In the Critical theory of personality, on the contrary, individuality seemed to be in effect obliterated, and the moral essence of personality seemed to mean only that in its will there ruled certain precepts which ruled equally in the lives of all others. It was in the end the task of the morality of personality to fill the gap between the natural disposition of the individual and the universal moral law by connecting the personality with the general texture of historical life, which has to

realise the moral law in the phenomenal world. The Idealist moral philosophy of Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel attempted to achieve this object, and it is only along these lines that ethics can hope to connect the empirical elements which arise from the real nature of man with the tasks which emerge from a transcendent rational order. Eudæmonist morality, with its interests of pleasure and pain, weal and woe, remains at the confines of the empirical life of man. Perfection-morality would build upon a metaphysical knowledge of man's nature, whether it be formulated in philosophical or theological terms. Critical morality derives the consciousness of the moral world-order from the conscience of the individual or, as Kant says, from practical reason. The Idealist morality of the historical theory tries to understand how the contents of the categorical imperative emerge from the historical institutions of civilisation, collaboration in the construction of which constitutes the good disposition of the individual.

The conception of the principle of morality according to the source of our knowledge of it has a good deal to do with these differences. The question how we know what really is to be considered good and to serve as a norm of judgment may find an answer either in experience or in a direct pronouncement of the reason; and in this sense we may speak of *empirical* and *rational* or *apriorist* morality. These antitheses themselves, however, are not sharply defined. If the ethical empiricist wishes merely to decide what in point of fact is moral, he has to sift and compare the facts in order to get as near as he can to a general standard. If the ethical rationalist wishes to lay down the imperatives which are to hold, he has to confine himself essentially to the actual moral consciousness of humanity; otherwise he adopts the arbitrary position of the superman, who announces new values, yet has to wait and see if the rest of men will agree. Moral theories are, therefore, once more only *predominantly* either empirical or rational. Empiricism has either a psychological or an historical complexion,

and in either case, if it confines itself to a mere registration of the facts, leads to Relativism. In the former respect we saw this happen to all forms of Eudæmonism. In the second form the Empirical ethic tries to evade Historism by a method of consequences, pointing out how the principles of moral precepts have been made clearer and stronger in the course of historical development. Hence in ancient times the Stoic theory of the *consensus gentium*. In modern times the same result is reached on the lines of biology; it is sought to show, as was attempted by Spencer, that what appears in the individual as a directly perceived and self-evident standard has been produced and established as a purposive habit in the evolution of the race by heredity and adaptation. On none of these lines, however, does one reach the absolute validity of the norms which the claims of the moral consciousness set up. If, on the other hand, a man chooses to start, rationalistically, from the general rational order itself, we see precisely from the example of Kant that one is thus restricted to the formal law, and can only get by devious ways from that to substantial imperatives—by the idea of the dignity of personality in the progressive application to the empirical conditions of life.

Far more important than this question of the method of scientific ethics is the actual problem, whence in daily life the plain conscience of man derives the knowledge of his duties as the norms of his judgment. Here it is clear in the first place that we do not in the practical reality of moral life consciously use that supreme principle which moral theory seeks; otherwise the search would not be so difficult, as we saw above. In actual consciousness of duties, and especially in our continual verdicts upon each other's conduct, we apply the rules from case to case, generally without being conscious of any definition. In this sense it is true that the source of knowledge of the various precepts or moral principles of ordinary life is in feeling far more than in any sort of explicit knowledge. It is certainly one of the most important distinctions between men, considered in this respect, whether they have predominantly in their morality the rational element

of intellectual control or the irrational force of instinctive and emotional decision. On the whole, we shall not go astray if we ascribe the far greater predominance to the emotional element. We thus understand how the English moralists, with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson at their head, treat feeling as the essence of conscience and the source of all moral consciousness, and leave to moral philosophy only the task of enlightening these feelings as to their own content and meaning. As a matter of fact, it is, as David Hume and Adam Smith pointed out, only in complex situations of life that the intelligence is called upon to clear up the difficulty. Even in those cases, however, the rational conviction must wait for the right moral feeling in judgment or decision. We are quite aware that moral preaching is useless unless it can appeal to feelings that already exist, in however rudimentary a form; otherwise it would be easy to make men moral simply by giving them ideas.

The theory that the principle of morality is to be sought in feeling, as far as our knowledge of it is concerned, is very closely connected with the assumption that in man's nature, whether in a rudimentary form or as a more or less conscious power, there is a knowledge of rules ready to rise directly into consciousness on every occasion that the varied circumstances of life produce. Our knowledge of the moral law is in this sense of an *intuitive* character, and not based upon either theoretical considerations or any sort of external influence. But if the moral feeling is thus ranged amongst our empirical states of feeling generally, as the psychological ethic used to range it, we end once more in the relativity of all that is empirical. On that account Kant lifted the moral feeling into the region of the rational and universal by seeing in it the "fact of the purely practical reason." He was of opinion that in this directness of the moral consciousness, which shows itself in every man independently of the measure of his intellectual cultivation and capacity, we have the emergence of a higher world-order. Intuitionism in this form leads to an emphasising of the direct emotional evidence with which the norms of con-

science enforce themselves upon the mind on every occasion. It was this main line of practical philosophy which induced Herbart to treat ethics as a part of general æsthetics. He started from the fact that all judgments may in the long run, when they are relieved of any intellectual accessions, be reduced to the original pleasantness of different situations. This original pleasantness, which is found in feeling, could not be grasped by or based upon any theoretical speculations. It is, he said, in each case a primary fact which makes itself felt as a reality in the mind as soon as the mind turns to such a relation as its content. Herbart was especially of opinion that psychogenetic speculations could not form a basis of this direct evidence. He thus came to his theory of the five moral ideas as the directly illuminative forms for the judgment of acts of the will; and it must be added that he was unable to furnish any systematic justification of this plurality of ultimate principles.

Thus theories of the source of our knowledge of morality lean to its emotional side, but the voluntary side becomes prominent as soon as we speak about the *sanction* of the principle of morals. It is in any case clear that conscience is not merely, retrospectively, a judgment of actual dispositions and acts, but, prospectively, a demand on the existing decision of the will; and this demand asserts itself over against the will as a precept. We ask therefore what is the basis of this right to command; what in the world has power to impose a command on our will which is different from its own natural contents. Naturally, a sanction of this sort is only requisite in so far as the moral law is opposed to the natural will. We need no sanction when the duty is regarded as the self-evident outcome of our own nature. Hence Eudæmonism properly speaking needs no sanction, for the impulse to happiness itself sanctions all its phenomenal forms, and the intelligence legitimises the moral precepts before the tribunal of this impulse to happiness as prudent and nicely calculated ways of realising it. The perfection-morality also needs no sanction, since the process of

amelioration is natural and rational ; or, as Wolff said, it is the natural disposition and self-evident bias in the structure of man, who has merely to be instructed as to the correct development of this impulse.

On the other hand, the more alien ethics makes the moral law to the natural will, the more urgently morality needs a principle of sanction. On what ground is something demanded of me that I do not myself want ? The origin of such a demand on my will can only be sought in *another will*. We call this alien will, which imposes duties, authority ; and so we give the name of authoritative ethics to the theory which seeks the sanction of the moral law in a will which is higher than and authoritative over the will of man. Of this authoritative ethics we may say that it also corresponds to a deep craving of human nature. Man, as he is, has a feeling of weakness from his constant experience of erring, and casts himself into the arms of a more powerful will in order to receive from that the direction which he cannot find in himself. On that is based the power, and in part the right, of authority for all time. Surrendering oneself to authority is the best resource for the masses, perhaps for the overwhelming majority of men ; and we find it adopted precisely by those who either remain sceptical in the failure of their efforts to come to decisions, or have allowed themselves to be driven by clearness of thought into some mystic vagueness. We thus understand the craving for authority by a sense of weakness of intelligence and will, and we understand still better the profound immorality which results from the abuse of authority.

Authoritative morality may, as Locke showed, assume three different forms, according as the legislative power is discovered in a divine command, in the claims of the State, or in the prescriptions of custom. Theological ethics, the first type, has often assumed very exaggerated forms, making an arbitrary command on the part of the Deity the foundation of the force of moral rules. The spiritual Franciscans of the Middle Ages, such as Duns Scotus and Occam, taught that nothing is good or bad of itself ; it is only made so by a divine command. God

could, they said, if he had so willed, have enacted entirely the opposite in moral acts. This naturally led to a belief that there could be no rational morality, no intelligent basis of its contents, and that the sole source of our knowledge of morality is the divine revelation. And as for these men the divine revelation only came through the Church, it followed in practice that we could not know by personal conscience, but only from the teaching of the Church, what was good or bad, allowed or forbidden.

Other ethical systems replaced ecclesiastical authority by the State, and derived the sanction of morality from this. The Egoistic ethic of enlightened interest granted that, on its theory, the individual could of himself recognise no other distinctions of value in his actions than such as were Eudæmonistic—that is to say, such as were related to his own comfort or discomfort. A different kind of valuation could only arise from the circumstance that the acts of individuals might, through their consequences, have a significance for the weal or woe of others, of the whole community. Hence the sanction of the moral precept derives from the social authority, either in the definite form of a State-prescription or in the more or less indefinite form of a custom. With such a basis we lose the distinction between morality and legality; for in such cases we are concerned with the action and its consequences for the general welfare and the disposition or character only indirectly and in so far as they have to bow and, in the course of time, adapt themselves to these claims which are imposed upon them from without.

In all these types of authoritative morality there is a pronounced element of heteronomy: that is to say, the conditioning of the will by a law enforced upon it from without. In opposition to this Kant stressed the autonomous character of conscience as a self-conditioning of the rational will. But Kant also, in seeking the content and the various precepts of this self-conditioning in a moral world-order, equally valid for all rational beings, did not really require any special sanction of this self-lawgiving. The most that one can say, in a certain sense, is that for the Critical ethic the dignity of the personality, which

identifies itself with the moral law, is the true sanction ; or, rather, that it makes superfluous any other and external sanction. But this autonomy of the personality must not be quoted, as was done by some of the Romanticists, as a sanction of the arbitrariness of a superman. It should never be forgotten that according to Kant the autonomous sovereignty of conscience only holds as long as the individual gives himself a law which is suitable for becoming a universal precept.

The theory of the motives of moral conduct also depends upon the extent to which the demands of the moral law are opposed to man's natural feelings and impulses. The psychology which is at the root of the Egoistic ethic, and professes that man can never in any circumstances desire anything but his own happiness or the avoidance of unhappiness, separates man so profoundly from nature that it must find it very difficult to understand how he ever comes to behave properly. It has often been observed that an alien spirit coming upon our planet and studying the impulses of men would be greatly astonished to see that they so often do things which are no use to them, even things which are contrary to their own interests. Anybody who says this betrays that he regards man, in the main, as a fool ; and he has to speculate what the egoistic motives can be which induce a man to desire something other than his own interest as an individual requires. When we seek the motive or motives of moral conduct in this sense, the ethic of enlightened interest is quite ready with the answer that an action conformable to moral law can be based only upon either fear or hope. Authoritative morality adds that the subjection to an alien will is because this will has the power to reward and punish. It is the familiar practice of moralising theologians to point to the penalties which God fixed for transgression of his commandments, and make a parade of the rewards that await the obedient. In the other forms of authoritative ethics the same part is played by the penal power of the State and the social influence of custom. The function of the State is restricted to palpable advantages and disadvantages of the external

life, and authoritative ethics has in its appeal to the social force of custom a means of dealing with subtler and very interesting aspects of the internal life. The collective life gives rise psychologically to the very considerable values of public opinion, the psychological meaning of which was studied by the English moralists in their theory of the emotions of reflection. The praise and blame which our actions incur from other men do not merely mean that they influence the conduct of others toward us, and that they may thus lead to very positive advantages and disadvantages in our external lives; by a sort of transference praise and blame, even when we merely conceive them as possible, become independent values or depreciations. They thus represent one of the values on which is based, psychogenetically, the self-judgment which is part of the nature of conscience. In this reciprocal play of judgment and self-judgment ambition becomes a very powerful motive, and is much considered in the social forms of authoritative morality. In the eighteenth century the French moralists of this school, such as Lamettrie, Montesquieu, and Helvetius fully discussed the significance of ambition.

It is quite clear that actions which are conformable to the moral law will, if they are based on such motives as these, never have a moral value; they have merely the value of legality. Hence in the proper sense of the word they have no moral significance, though, as we said above, they may have in many respects an anthropological and social value. We may be confident that what seems to be morality in the case of the great majority of men is no more than legality based on fear and hope with respect to various authorities. But it would be quite a mistake to say that the whole moral life of mankind may be understood in that sense. On the contrary, it cannot be doubted that this one-sided psychology of the "Selfish System" must be corrected by the facts, which show that in the natural disposition of men there are social impulses just as deeply implanted and as effective as the egoistic impulses. They are direct motives of moral conduct, and do not need to be induced by psychological

considerations. Amongst the states of the will which influence with original force an action that presupposes as its motive no personal experience of pleasure or pain we must count, in the first place, these social or benevolent impulses; and they are in point of fact the motives which inspire a very large part of our moral actions. Biology explains the gradual development of these motives in the race. But it is, as far as we can historically survey the evolution of humanity, very doubtful if the social impulse has arisen in this way; indeed, it might be possible to defend the view that it began earlier. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to derive this altruistic disposition from egoistic motives on the lines of individual psychology. Even Hume's theory of sympathy presupposes the existence of the general capacity for sympathy as a necessity of social life. In this case it is not suffering and joy, but the sharing of suffering and joy (sympathy), that is the motive of moral conduct. Whether it is participation in suffering or in joy that takes the foremost place is a psychological issue that partly depends on differences of temperament, and is expressed theoretically in the antithesis of optimistic and pessimistic views of life. Schopenhauer regarded sympathy in the sense of sharing suffering as the principle of morals as far as motive is concerned: Feuerbach said that it was sympathy in sharing joy. Schopenhauer sought a metaphysical foundation and sanction for the motive in the supremacy of will: Feuerbach, the anti-metaphysician, was content with the social-psychological significance of sympathy.

However, even this motivation of moral conduct by a natural social disposition was not secure against being claimed as leading to mere legality. No less a person than Kant wanted to regard it as a perhaps pleasant feature of nature, but devoid of any moral merit in the proper sense of the word. The more intensely he sought morality in the disposition alone, the more it seemed to him to be opposed to any natural impulses; and if at times the motives of natural social feeling, such as sympathy, issue in acts such as are demanded by the moral

law, it seemed to him that these acts had no moral value whatever in the strict sense. He saw a danger to morality itself in the satisfaction of any natural craving, even when its end coincided with that of a moral precept. He feared that in such cases Eudæmonistic motives would insinuate themselves amongst the causes of the volition. In point of fact, in the actual life of men the fine threads by which the natural craving for happiness is connected with the consciousness of duty are very numerous, and they leave all sorts of ways open to the sophistry of the human heart. We must admit that the close connection between the thirst for happiness and morality which has been brought about by the customary moralising, with its promises of mountains of gold to virtue, is responsible for man's disposition, even when he has done his duty quite honourably and unselfishly, to stretch out his hand involuntarily and wonder if there is not some sort of reward for him. This "morality of tips" finds expression in the feeling which demands that goodness shall be rewarded with happiness and evil shall be punished: a demand that Kant himself did not hesitate to use as an argument in deducing his postulate of immortality.

The rigorism which would convert natural social feeling from morality into legality must regard as the sole spring of moral conduct "respect for the moral law" and "a feeling for the dignity of personality." In this it incurs the risk of pride in virtue which appeared prominently enough in the Stoic morality. At the same time its self-satisfaction of the moral act has in it something of that very reward against which it most energetically protests. Hence it is that Schiller attacked this rigorism in his *Ernst und Scherz*; though in Kant's ethic it is perhaps more in the strength of the language than a real rigorism. In opposition to it the poet-philosopher set up the ideal of the beautiful soul, which has got so far in moral development that it can trust its own feelings without any risk of being brought into conflict with moral law. In all cases of conflict between duty and inclination this secures the domination of the moral maxims. The higher perfection consists in the fact that a man has

learned to think so nobly that he does not need to brace his will.

In view of all this we may distinguish various strata of motivation in the moral life. The most primitive is that of natural social feeling, in which the adjustment of the individual will to the general will follows as a matter of course. Next above this is the stratum of legality, which is quite conscious of a contrast between the claims of the general will and the individual will, and finds its motives in the latter for its subjection to the former. Above this is the most complex stratum psychologically, in which the command is recognised by the individual on its own merits and is adopted in his own will with the effect of overcoming its opposition—the stratum of, in the strict sense, the morality of merit. Finally there is the stage in which experience of life has brought about an identification of the individual will with the general will—the stratum of morality pure and simple.

Amongst the questions which are much discussed in this connection there is a problem which in the course of human thought has led to an extraordinary amount of confusion, misunderstanding, and unfortunate blundering. This is the problem of the freedom of the will. The needless difficulties that have been created in this field are due to the complication of psychological questions by questions of moral, legal, and religious responsibility ; and this confusion can only be avoided by stating clearly the different meanings of the word and the various problems to which they give rise.

In the first place, there is no problem of the freedom of the will in cases where it means freedom of action, or the capacity to translate the decision of the will into a corresponding purposive movement of the body. Freedom of this sort is a fact, a universal condition of human nature, a power that can merely be restricted or destroyed in certain circumstances by disturbances in the bodily organism or by social or other external compulsion.

The difficulties are more serious when we consider freedom of choice ; yet it is comparatively easy to get

over them as long as we confine ourselves to the province of psychology. Choice means that, while there are different and conflicting desires in consciousness, the action may be exclusively determined by one or other of them. In a conflict of motives, however, we have to consider, not only the stimulations of the moment and the desires they evoke, but also the constant tendencies of an individual's will which are due to his entire development. If we call this a conflict between the momentary provocations and the character, all are agreed in the psychological theory that the issue of the choice is determined by both together according to the respective strength of each. If we pay attention to the fact that it depends on diversities of character to what extent the stimulations of the moment will influence the will, and if we speak of these stimulations only as the motives, we come to the idea that a man as a character is, in the process of choice, independent in his decision of the motives—he is free. This is usually called Indeterminism. If, on the other hand, we emphasise the necessity with which the volition, according to psychological theory, results from the collated totality of elements, and we call them all motives without distinction, including the constant volitions which really constitute character, we come to the conclusion that the will is inevitably determined by the motives. This view is known as Determinism. In the end, therefore, Indeterminism and Determinism are psychologically at one; they differ only in the extension which they give to the meaning of the word "motive." Hence there would be no occasion whatever for the heat with which the controversy has been conducted if the parties had not brought against each other the charge of destroying responsibility.

In order to explain this we must first clearly understand what we mean by responsibility. Any man who reflects dispassionately on the matter will easily perceive that it is a question of psycho-physical causal relations taken from the ordinary ideas of daily life. We must premise that there is no meaning in making something else responsible, such as a cause for its effect. There are certain

foolish and irrational ways of attributing responsibility, as when one who brings us bad news is held responsible for the unhappy event which he announces, but certainly did not cause. Rationally a man can only be held responsible for his action in the sense that he—that is to say, his nature as a more or less settled character—is the cause of his actions. But, on the other hand, there is the practical meaning of responsibility that in some way the unpleasant consequences of an action are visited upon the agent by making him suffer. Whether we see the practical meaning of responsibility in the punishment alone, or in intimidation, or in improvement, it always means that the doer of evil deeds is to have counter-motives implanted in him in the shape of unpleasant feelings, the aim of which is to restore the due position of normal consciousness in the offender. The whole process is clear and simple in itself, yet it is the source of the whole complicated problem of the freedom of the will. It is generally put that responsibility assumes that it is possible to act otherwise; and this conditional power is then described as freedom in the sense that the acts for which a man is to be made responsible cannot be “necessary.” Hence the unfortunate idea of freedom as causelessness, the metaphysical difficulties of which then combine with the psychological difficulties and form an almost inextricable confusion.

That a man might have acted differently from what he actually did obviously means, supposing that he were a different person. In the end it comes down to the question whether a man can be held responsible for his own nature. If we begin with a consideration of causes, which is one aspect of responsibility, we have three alternatives. We may regard as the author of the man’s nature either, on the lines of theological metaphysics, a divine creator or, on sociological lines, the social fabric; or we may, again in a metaphysical sense, regard the man’s individuality as one of the primary positions, the ultimate elements, of reality, in which case there is no longer any question about its cause. In the first case any impartial person will ascribe the responsibility to the Deity, and it

is quite impossible to evade this conclusion by talking about permission, etc. In the second alternative the responsibility falls upon the community, upon its conditions and institutions; and in the modern theory of penal legislation this idea is very familiar. It is only in the third case that there remains any metaphysical originality and personal responsibility; but no one will question that a theory of this kind opens the door to unthinkable metaphysical vagaries which could not be reconciled with any form of metaphysical or theological Henism.

Thus the theoretical study of the question whether there is a freedom of the original volition in the sense that it is uncaused comes to an end when one follows the causal series of the volition beyond the individual into a field of insoluble metaphysical difficulties. The identification of causality with uniformity, which we saw in its main features in dealing with theoretical problems, led to ideas such as we express in statements like, "There is nothing new in the world"—to the view that every event is necessarily based upon some preceding event. On the contrary, the postulate of causal uniqueness is a need of human nature. A man is conscious that in his responsible activity he introduces into his surroundings something new which would not be possible without that activity. From this it seems to follow that human conduct must be in a position to inaugurate new causal series and incorporate them in the subsisting general causal process. It is interesting that this postulate was first expressed in history in a metaphysical form, being used to explain the origin of individual structures in the uniform mechanism of the world. It was Epicurus who put forward this typical conception of the freedom of the will as the arbitrary and uncaused initiation of causal series. He explained the origin of different worlds from the uniform fall of atoms by the occasional deviation, however slight, of some atoms from the general direction, and he expressly drew a parallel between these deviations and the arbitrary acts of men. The point of comparison between the two is the causal uniqueness of an uncaused event. The capacity for this in the psychic world is called

the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, and it is supposed to cover motiveless acts of will which are believed to be experienced as facts in the process of choice between apparently "indifferent" alternatives. This idea of freedom as a volition which has no antecedent cause, but has endless consequences in later events, is the real difficulty which no amount of theorising seems able to solve. Kant showed this most clearly of all. In his system freedom is theoretically quite unintelligible, but absolutely indispensable in practice from the consciousness of responsibility.

As a matter of fact, the practical aspect of the problem of responsibility can only be dealt with from the practical standpoint. Here there is question, on the one hand, of the share which falls to the individual in the division of labour of social life, and which the interest of the whole requires that he shall fulfil; and, on the other hand, of the observance of the rules which the conditions of community life demand. And in this sense holding a man responsible merely means that the proper motives will be strengthened in his mind by setting up rewards and punishments. These are psycho-physical causal processes that have their root in social life and their sanction in its collective interests. For if the individual were to turn upon this responsibility with the claim that he must act in his own way according to universal law, the answer would be that according to the same universal law the community is required to react in *its* own way. The appeal to mere causal necessities does not extricate us from the difficulty. We must treat the matter as a practical process which we cannot in any way trace to general theoretical considerations of a metaphysical nature. This is true also of the refined and intimate form of responsibility in which a man makes himself responsible to his own moral or religious consciousness. In so far as this intimate responsibility does not belong to the province of advantages and disadvantages, the sphere of weal and woe, as social and legal responsibility does, it has the significance of a self-education in virtue of its analogous inspiration of counter-motives or its confirmation of positive elements.

All this, however, as something justified in itself and ethically necessary, is entirely independent of the metaphysical problems of the causelessness of the volition with which theory has unnecessarily complicated a comparatively simple situation.

§ 15

Communal Will.—Individual and common will—Voluntary and pre-existing unions—Natural and historical unions—The family, nation, economic community, State, and Church—Custom, morals, and law—Era of voluntary communities—Civilisation—Sociology—Natural law and jurisprudence—The definition of law—Legal duty, legal claims, legal rights—Law as the ethical minimum—Purpose of the State and law—Liberalism and Socialism—The national State—Object of the State—Real rationality of the legal order.

In all forms of morality, although it has to be valid for the dispositions and actions of the individual, yet has to find a basis in his conscience, there is question in the long run of some relation between the individual and the general community. This community is opposed to the individual as a complex of willing, and harmoniously willing, other individuals, hence the centre of gravity of all ethical problems is in this relation of the individual to a community, or of the individual will to a universal will. Even where the personality appears in its most intimate independence—in conscience—it shows its dependence upon a regard for the general will. On the other hand, where the life-forms of the community develop in their historical shapes as institutions, their significance is, in some measure at least, restricted to the value which they have or acquire for individuals. These are the poles in all voluntary life; it is always a question how far the will of the individual and that of the community coincide or diverge, and in the end the chief question is, what is the nature of this whole that has the right to act as a counterpart to the natural will of the individual. Even in the most extreme cases to which this antagonism leads, the individual must not ignore the collective will,

nor the general will entirely sacrifice the individual. This fundamental relation is based upon the incomparable position which man assumes in virtue of his remarkable combination of individuality and sociality. We know man only as a social being, and it is in view of this that Aristotle has described the whole of practical philosophy as "political science." But it is not this which specifically distinguishes man. There are many animals which not only have a social life, but a social life much more complex and perfect than that of man—from the corals to the bees and ants. In the case of these the height of their sociality consists in the unqualified and complete absorption of the individual in the collective life, so that we may question the very existence of an individual will differing from or opposed to the general will. In the case of man, on the contrary, a difference between the two is customary, and this power of the individual to oppose his will to that of the community is a characteristic feature of our species. It is on this selfishness of individuals that the specifically human thing, history, is based. It does not consist merely in the cumulative change brought about by the addition of individual variations, which we find as a general biological fact in the case of all animals, but in spasmodic changes due to the strong wills of personalities. It has been well said that man comes into the world as the most helpless of creatures and is the most adapted for social life. That is certainly true; yet, on the other hand, he is even better fitted, as a unique and incomparable reality, to attain an inner independence and from this standpoint to react upon the whole. The entire historical process is an accentuation of this strain between the individual and the whole, and therefore it is a misconception of the elementary features of history to conceive its end as a return to the animal sociality which may have suited the lowest prehistoric condition of our race.

The super-individual whole in which man finds himself incorporated is a voluntary community, directed to purposes of the will. Hence the principle of ethics requires something more than the purely formal conception of

an incorporation in the hierarchy of the organic structure, at which we glanced in dealing with the problems of teleology. It is a question of a whole that is full of life-values, and therefore of value as a whole; and this is found only in a compact totality of wills. We may speak of a common will, but we must say of this what we occasionally said of a common consciousness when we dealt with theoretical questions. An attempt has been made to ascribe some substantial reality beyond the individual minds to this common spirit—we hear of the spirit of the nation, the time-spirit, the spirit of commerce, etc.—but in social psychology even more than in individual psychology it holds that the synthetic unity of consciousness is, as far as empirical knowledge goes, of a functional, not a substantive, character. In the case of the collective mind we lack the definiteness of a bodily organ, which is certainly the empirical foundation of the individual mind. In the case of the spirit of the people or the time-spirit we have no such thing in a specific form. We have to have recourse to Fechner's idea of the spirit of a planet in order to find anything of the kind. Apart from metaphysical vagaries of this kind, and looking more closely into the relation of the collective spirit and the individual spirit, we have to admit that the collective mind has no other physical basis than the individuals, and that it merely indicates psychic processes which occur in the individuals, and occur in them because they live a common life. The measure of this biological connection determines in particular cases whether more influence comes from the totality or from the individuals which grow out of and in it. In any case the development is that the individual mind filled itself first and foremost with those contents which are common to it and its entire social environment, and that the peculiarities with which it at times opposes itself to the whole arise from this. We all know that our ideas, our whole theory of the world and of life, develop spontaneously as the theory of our living environment, and that only out of this in the course of time, when the circumstances are favourable, do we get individual thought and judgment that may differ

from and conflict with the traditional. Psychogenetically, we should never forget, the collective mind precedes the individual; it is the womb in which the latter is moulded.

From this standpoint, in order to state clearly the ethical problems which arise in this connection, we will first consider the various types of voluntary communities which are within our actual knowledge. They have been called societies or federations, though these are superficial terms with a not very clearly defined significance. Perhaps the best term is that used chiefly by Giercke, associations. We distinguish between them genetically in virtue of their relation to the individuals. Either the individuals pre-exist and form the associations, or the association comes first and determines the will of the individual. The association may be, as far as the individual is concerned, voluntary or involuntary. We may therefore speak of constructed or of pre-existing voluntary communities. Compare, for instance, a league with a nation. I belong to the league, having been invited to do so, by a declaration of my pleasure; but I belong to the nation without being invited and whether I will it or no. The league has as a whole no other element of will than that which its members give to it; the nation has a will as a whole and expresses it in all the individuals who belong to it. The distinction is best understood on the analogy of the difference between mechanical and organic development. In the one case the parts precede the whole and constitute it; in the other case the whole precedes the parts and produces them by its vital action. We quite understand why we speak of an organic theory of the State when this association is regarded as a totality antecedent to the individuals; whereas the "contract theory," which would attribute the State to an agreement of individuals, treated it as an association like any other. In reality all theories of the nature of voluntary communities take one of two directions: the universalistic-organic or the individualistic-mechanical.

From these genetic differences between associations

we get at once important differences with regard to the position of individuals to them. To a league belongs only so much of my will as is needed for the purpose of the union. I have no further obligation toward it. The individual member may will whatever he likes outside of it. He may belong to other leagues provided that does not affect the aim of the first league. The main point is that my belonging to the league depends on my own will. When it no longer suits me, I leave it. But I cannot leave my nation. It embraces and determines my will from youth onward. I belong entirely to it, and my connection with it is up to a certain point indissoluble. It is a totally different kind of membership; there is more of "must" than of "will" in it. In earlier ages the bond was almost absolute, especially where State and nation were the same thing. Even in foreign lands a man did not cease to belong to his nation. And internally that is in a sense still the case. The individual may oppose or alienate himself from his nation; but in his nature and character he cannot obliterate the main features of his nationality, and often does not wish to do so. If in this example of so general an association as is that of a nation we see something vague about the relation between the individual and the whole, it is clear where our problems lie. The one extreme, that of artificial and voluntary associations, is realised entirely in the league; the other is not found in absolute purity in empirical conditions. In this respect one might reduce the ethical problem to the formula: Is there a voluntary community which a man cannot leave, and which therefore still has a claim upon the will even when the will is disposed to reject it? In his "Community of Rational Beings generally" Kant has, in his formulation of the categorical imperative, given us the idea of such an ideal voluntary community which a man cannot leave. For the claim of the moral law is positive and independent of any pre-existing will of an individual. This community of rational beings is, however, a postulate of the moral consciousness, and not an actually existing association. Amongst actual associations, leagues

and all sorts of societies with a definite practical purpose have various degrees of value within the limits of the interest of our ordinary life. They must be appreciated according to the values which they are framed to promote. They are only means in the mechanism of motives, and they therefore do not constitute an ethical problem.

It is quite otherwise with pre-existing associations. In regard to these the individual raises the question of the sanction of the claim which the common will, which he had no share in producing, makes upon him; whereas in the case of a league he supplies the sanction himself by becoming a member. Involuntary communities may be either natural or historical associations. This apparently sharp antithesis, however, proves to be anything but sharp when we consider the facts. We may take first the family as a purely natural association. On looking closely into the matter, we must grant that the ethical community which we respect under the name, and regard as the very type of voluntary associations and the germ of civilisation, is in the last resort a product of history. The connection between mother and children, in the first place, is older than mankind; and what we learn from sociologists as to the matriarchate and the associations of men dependent thereon shows quite clearly, however much one may contest details of the theory, that the family in the modern sense is an outcome of the time when the human herd ceased to be nomadic. When we consider also the innumerable forms of polygamy of which we read in history, we see that the monogamous family, with which ethics is concerned, is really an evolutionary product of civilisation. We owe it to the Caucasian race, while other races have remained nearer to the natural condition of polygynous associations. This origin of the monogamous family does not prevent us from regarding it as the first and most sacred of voluntary communities and, in spite of its imperfections and occasional evils, the absolute type of the ethical life, adumbrating all social relations in a simple and admirable form. One may say, indeed, that in this first construction of a totality all those relations of

subordination and co-ordination, which are indispensable to a voluntary community, have their finest and firmest expression, and we therefore know what to think of the reactionary movements in which modern individualism endeavours to destroy this great achievement of history.

On the families is based the community of the people, in which we find the same relations between natural and historical origin on a larger scale. We may recognise that, as is expressed in the meaning of the *natio* as the totality of the *cognati*, community of descent is one of the conditions of the unity of the people; but this can never be taken absolutely. It cannot be controlled, and our modern peoples, who have passed through countless wars and are in constant *commercium* and *connubium* with each other, have ended with an indistinguishable confusion of blood in their veins. It is only in lower races without any history that we may find a unity or purity of race, though even in these cases it is diluted at the frontiers. All peoples in the course of their development take into their midst other peoples whom they have brought under their yoke, and, on the other hand, various sections are detached from their own body. Hence a people is never merely a physical community. It is psychic, produced in historical movement, a community of mind, heart, and will. Even the country, in spite of its importance in the popular mind as the home of the nation, is no indispensable element of a community; as we see in the case of nomadic peoples or those which maintain their community independently of any particular country. The decisive external expression of this psychic union is the language; just as the Greeks distinguished themselves from all other peoples on the ground that these were "barbarians," or stammerers. In the language the spiritual community is expressed as the elaboration of a definite historical life-content, the finest shape of which is found in its literature. Thus language and literature form the essential characteristic and, at the same time, the highest possession of a people: the outcome of its spiritual activity and the measure of its contribution to civilisation. Whoever deprives a people

of this possession, or destroys its love of it, is its real and most dangerous enemy.

While the association of the people, being a half natural and half historical phenomenon, has not quite definite outlines, this is even more true of the forms of the economic community, to which it was long customary to give the name "society" in a specific sense. It is the loosest and least organised of all. Whatever shape it has, it owes partly to the unions which individuals form for definite purposes and partly to the co-operation of State-forces. It is itself, it is true, not bound up with any of these special unions, or with any particular people or State. In it we have an expression of the common will by means of usages, customs, and traditions which can only partly attain an organised form. It contains the mechanism of economic life, to meet and initiate fresh paths for which is the task partly of individuals and their various combinations, and partly of the State or States. We need not inquire here how much is to be expected or desired from one side or the other. That is a matter of life and, as far as science is in harmony with it, of the national economy. But it is clear that this also, together with the establishment of aims, which must be assumed for economic communities, has its roots in the general principles of ethics.

The State has quite a different position amongst the types of voluntary communities, in so far as they represent pre-existing life-unities. For the individual it pre-exists, and is only in a very slight degree natural; its nature is, indeed, historically determined, since it is not the same thing as the people. The German people does not live entirely in the German Empire, but in Switzerland and Austria also; and these States in turn include others besides Germans. For the State the external condition is the country, its territory, hence it has a precision of frontiers which a people never has. Yet a State is not merely a community confined within a definite country; its characteristic feature and its inner condition is a predominating will, which holds the physical and psychic power. When there is no such psychic power,

the State is in a condition of decay; it merely lives on the relics of its physical power, which, moreover, is always based upon psychic power, upon authority. How this power came into existence, whether by usurpation or contract, by force or by law—in what persons it is embodied—what is the purpose of its exercise—these are all qualitative differences between States which may be very considerable. There are similar differences in their quantitative aspects, the extent of a State varying from the ancient City-State to a structure like the United States of North America. What is essential to the nature of a State is the domination of will, which extends to every external function of the life of the subjects. Hence the State is a visible organisation by means of which a common will presses into its service the activity of individuals. Out of this organised nature of the State we get law, as the form in which it expresses and formulates its will. It is, in respect of its tendency, the common will developed from its primitive haziness to a definite form, and is therefore the highest shape in which such a common will can develop.

The Church occupies a special position amongst the pre-existing communities into which a man is born. We must distinguish it from the more general idea of a common religious will, which embraces many other forms. These differ in virtue of the differences of religions, which may be either evolved or founded religions. In the case of evolved religions the religious community coincides in the main with the people, as we see in the classical instance of Judaism. Membership of the people means also membership of the cult: communion with the great ancestors, heroes, and gods. Here again large associations do not exclude smaller ones. Thus there were cults for the two sexes within the common cult, or cults of particular City-States along with the æsthetic national religion, in ancient Greece. Vague intermediate forms also arise in the shape of mysteries, and to some extent these assume the character of unions or founded associations (*θιασοι*). They are fraternities for the purpose of salvation with all the features of leagues; they leave it to the individual will to enter or leave them.

Of the founded religions Mohammedanism arises as a tribal religion, and combines with a conquering and subjugating political power, so that, for a time at least, the community of religion coincides with the community of the State. It was otherwise with Christianity. At first it was one amongst many religious associations in the Roman Empire: a founded association, which the individual was free to enter or leave, as is the case with recent sects such as the Quakers, Methodists, Memnonites, Mormons, Salvation Army, etc. But what are now called Churches are quite different. They are very far from calling themselves mere unions or associations. As they have historically developed, they are now for the individual pre-existing associations, almost in the same sense as is the State. A man belongs to them from birth, without being invited, and the declaration of membership which one makes in childhood, at confirmation, is as a rule anything but an act of free will. In theory membership of the Church is as indissoluble as membership of the State. In certain historical periods, such as the Middle Ages, this indissolubility was asserted in practice; no one was free to leave, or could leave except by way of expulsion. In modern times it is possible to break one's connection with either Church or State, but it is [in Germany] rarely done, and it is made difficult by social usages and legal regulations. The result is that many are counted as members of both Church and State who in their own hearts and convictions do not belong to them. The Roman Church insists on the principle that membership cannot be surrendered, or regards the "apostate" as still belonging to it.

All this shows marked analogies between Church and State; and as a matter of fact, although the Church has the aim of giving reality to the religious life on earth, it has one essential feature in common with the State—domination. The organised will of the ecclesiastical regiment, assuming different shapes (monarchic or democratic) in different organisations, always means power over subjects, and sometimes it assumes the character of an entirely worldly rule. The analogy with the State

is further seen in the fact that the Churches create their own law, which ought to be the prerogative of the State. They frame a constitutional law, penal law, and even, to some extent, parts of the civil law—a marriage law, for instance—and for the purpose of seeing it carried out they have organised officials, institutions, and property. This is just the same as in the State; yet the Churches are not, and do not wish to be, States. The power of the State is both physical and psychic: that of the Church is of itself psychic only. It becomes physical only when the State lends the Church its power. It is very difficult to assign the limits between the two in this respect, for the State's physical power rests ultimately on psychic power—on its authority over subjects, on their convictions, confidence, obedience, subjection, and, where necessary, on fear. In the case of the Church the characteristic thing is that its physical power depends always on the State. It is made up of concessions by the State, and is not really sovereign, but delegated. There is no valid Church-law except in the case of "recognised religious associations," or Churches, as is commonly said. If a sect wished to lay down rules for its members which conflicted with the law of the State—take the case of the Mormons—they would be just as ineffective as the rules of any other society would be. This is the situation as far as the facts go. Ecclesiastical theory, it is true, bases the power of the Church on a divine institution; but this naturally holds only for the members of the Church. It is from this character of the Church as a semi-State that it becomes involved in difficulties with the State. At times it appears as a political power like any State; at times it emphasises the fact that its aim is different from the State, since it lies beyond this world. But this is not the place to discuss arguments of this nature and subject them to the test of history and fact.

This survey of the known types of associations, especially of the differences between voluntary communities which the individual finds pre-existing, was necessary if we are to understand the way in which they become ethical

problems. Each of us at first finds these associations, which precede our existence, set before us as something of self-evident validity ; indeed, in the strict sense they are not set before us or above us, but we experience them as elements of our conscious will in common with our fellows. Of the ground of their validity we have a very vague idea, in fact scarcely a conscious idea at all. They rule us by custom, the involuntary observance of inherited and traditional usages. They are a mode of feeling, willing, and acting in which we find ourselves involved, and with which we co-operate, without asking any questions about their basis, perhaps not even about their meaning. The main source of custom is in natural associations, even when these have only attained their full significance in the course of time—in the family, the people, and the social community. Hence custom is, in its involuntariness and its vague influence, the primitive form of the spiritual community ; not only in feeling and will, but also in ideas and views. It does not rely for protection and sanction on any visible authority, but on public opinion or the general mind, which assumes a dominating position in each individual mind.

This primitive state of custom, however, undergoes an historical development, and every people that passes into the historical phase inherits the process which we find with grandiose simplicity in the period of the Greek cultural advance—the emancipation of the individual. It is partly based upon the energy with which the will of the individual resists the pressure of prevailing custom, but partly on a perception of the contradictions in which custom becomes involved owing to the fact that the individual belongs to many different associations with different aims. When the claims of the family, the State, and the people differ from each other, or are even antagonistic to each other, the individual has to decide for himself, and he thus becomes partly freed from the semi-conscious tyranny of custom which had at first ruled him. By this process custom is divided into two parts. On one side, the intimate side, custom becomes personal morality ; on the other hand, the external

side or external life, it takes the form of State-regulations in the shape of law. The more morality and law take over the work of custom, in their different ways, the more custom falls into decay. It becomes to some extent superfluous, and is confined to what is of no consequence from the moral or the legal point of view. The relation between these three ethical powers—custom, morals, and law—determines the far-reaching variations of social life. How much law leaves to custom, and how much law and custom leave to individual morality, is characteristic in the highest degree of a people or an age. There is no rule by which this is determined. It has to be studied historically in each case. The broader the rule of custom, the poorer personal morality is and the cruder and more external the law. The broader, more subtle, and more intimate the law is, the more zealously individual morality, which grows stronger in opposition to it, guards its province against law and custom. In the end the two great developments of custom stand face to face with each other, and give us the main problem of civilisation: What is the frontier between the province of moral personality and that of legal government?

In such a situation the mind recalls the difference in value of the many voluntary communities into which the individual is born, and the inevitable question arises, whether there is a standard, by which we may appreciate these differences of value, that may claim universal and necessary validity. In the personal decision of the individual it is always his interests, partly his convictions, which influence him in each case of conflict. But the distressing doubts into which he may or must be driven impel him to look for some such ultimate standard of judgment. It can be found only when a man bears clearly in mind the function which these communities have to discharge. In the case of deliberate associations, leagues or unions, the function may be any of the very varied purposes of daily life, amongst which the Eudæmonistic or Utilitarian feature is a common element. When this is met, the tasks of these various pre-existing communities go further, and their claims on the individual

are sanctioned by the duties they have to discharge. These duties, however, differ considerably in character, and it may be asked whether we can bring them all under one common formula.

An attempt is made to do this by indicating the welfare or advancement of the individuals as the aim and task of these associations. In doing this, however, we put them on the level of leagues, and there is no justification for their assuming a dominion over the individual to which he does not consent. On the other hand, the attempt may be made to seek the aim of these pre-existing communities, beyond the social fabric, in the higher nature of man. The solution which was obvious in the case of the Church seems to some to apply also to the State, and even to the people and the family. But the principles involved in that solution lay beyond the limits of scientific knowledge, in the ideas and claims of faith. The only alternative, if in explaining this task we may neither sink to individual utility nor rise to metaphysical hypotheses, is to seek in the nature of these communities themselves some immanent indication of their function; and for this purpose we find some assistance in the evolution of custom into morals and law. This shows us that at the base of every existing community there is a psychic collective life, especially a collective will, in a form that is obscure, vague, and unconscious of its own grounds. This collective element must be fully understood and must have an external shape. This elaboration of the vital order for the purpose of collective activities and for the construction of visible institutions in which they are expressed is what we call civilisation. As opposed to nature and natural powers, it means that which man makes with conscious power out of his environment. In the work of these vital tasks the individual as such, and in his independence as regards traditional customs, takes a part, and strives to bring on the common life, in which he arises, to a conscious improvement and external form. Thus the task of voluntary communities, and therefore of individuals, is the creation of these vital orders and therefore the production of civilised institu-

tions; for the work of each individual is to co-operate in the realisation of the task in the position assigned to him by all the elements and particular features which constitute individuality.

We must leave it to special discussions of "practical philosophy" to deduce from this the consequences for ethical theory and the philosophic science of society. All that we had to do here was to indicate the philosophical point of view from which alone these voluntary communities must be treated. Those who are not clear on the matter remain in the sphere of social psychology and its genetic explanations. Since the name Sociology—a good name in itself—was introduced by Auguste Comte, it has generally been applied to inquiries which are of a social-psychological, or, as is sometimes said (just as infelicitously), folk-psychological character; inquiries which borrow all sorts of facts from ethnography, pre-history, and history. That is in itself a very worthy subject of scientific research, but for philosophy it provides only the data from which the problems arise. We can speak of a philosophical sociology only in the sense of a research into the value of the various types and strata of voluntary communities and the functions on the discharge of which such value may depend.

The contrasts of scientific attitude toward the problems presented by associations are most clearly seen in the treatment of the most advanced of vital orders: namely, in dealing with theories of law. A philosophy of law is greatly distrusted even by jurists; and that is easily understood, because they fear that there is question of some other law than theirs, a law that holds nowhere, a Utopian law—the so-called "law of nature." Let us see first how the idea of a law of nature arose, and what sound and unsound elements there are in it. Antiquity did not expressly attempt to set up a philosophic or normal law, or, as has been said, a just law in face of the existing or positive law; though there are approaches to this in the Sophistic distinction between what is valid by nature and what is valid by promulgation (*φύσει ἢ*

θέσει). Even the Roman jurists, in spite of their relations to the Stoics, took little notice of this distinction. Where they speak of a *jus naturale*, a *lex naturæ*, a *detiora naturalis*, they mean either the positive consciousness and feeling of law or the logical consistency in the series of legal propositions. For them the *jus naturale* is one of the sources of law or one of the motives of the positive law with which they deal. The antithesis of natural and existing law comes later ; to some extent in medieval philosophy, but particularly during the Renaissance. Modern philosophy, which mainly took its conceptual apparatus from science, derived its knowledge from general conceptions and judgments with their timeless validity. It therefore believed that it could deduce law philosophically from general nature, or at least human nature, by a purely rational process, whilst historical knowledge was restricted to the various phenomena of positive law. In this way there emerged the idea of a general rational law which was, and ought to be, naturally valid, as distinguished from positive law with its actual validity within certain time-limits. Hence the difference in value which determined that in a case of disagreement the higher validity should belong to the rational or natural law. The general concept becomes the judge of the individual phenomenon ; the natural becomes the standard for judging the historical ; the idea becomes an ideal. A distinction is drawn between the law that is and the law that ought to be. The science of actual law is jurisprudence : the science of ideal law is the natural law.

This antithesis is not convenient for the jurist. The law with which he deals is a fact, a tangible reality. The other, which does not exist, seems to him a creature of fancy or of wish. It is law as the professors, perhaps, would like to see it. If that were true, all philosophy of law would be in a sorry plight, and therefore we must at once remove this misunderstanding. It is not an ideal and artificially constructed law that is the subject of a philosophy of law, but actually existing law, the law with which jurisprudence deals. It is just the same as

in all other sections of philosophy. Natural philosophy does not speak about an ideal nature which it itself creates, but of the same nature with which physics and chemistry, physiology and psychology, are concerned. Logic is not expected to bring science into existence; it investigates knowledge and science which come into being and work quite independently of logic. Moral philosophy is not imperativist in the sense that the philosopher undertakes to create new values; he deals with the actual moral life. *Æsthetics* has not to invent a new art; it discusses existing art. Above all, the philosophy of religion has no intention of thinking out a philosophic religion; it has to deal with religion as we all experience it. It is not the object, but the mode of treatment, which distinguishes philosophical theory from that of the other sciences. When this distinction is forgotten, when philosophy attempts to encroach upon the genetic theories of the other sciences, it becomes superfluous and meaningless.

In this way the philosophy of law has to recognise jurisprudence in its entirety. It is the business of jurisprudence to state the actual law and show its logical connectedness. That is its dogmatic function. It has to study the origin and development of law. That is its historical function. It has to work out the system of its application to particular cases. That is its practical function. Thus the interpretation, history, and technique of law always presuppose an existing law in its various historical manifestations. Philosophy does the same, but it regards the subject from an entirely different point of view; and this is the sound element in the old idea of natural law. It is an undoubted fact that we study the actually existing law. Do we not speak at times of an unjust law? Every advance in law, every change in legislation, is based upon some such censure, which in some way recognises the unsatisfactoriness of the positive law. In practice these censures are very individual, very variable, and inspired by very different motives. In face of this we see in the principle of a natural law a desire to make these censures objective

and universal, to give them a scientific basis. Hence here again the philosophic standpoint is that of an appreciation of values of universal validity. We have not to enlarge our knowledge of reality and its causal relations, but to discover how it is possible to determine values. This was the aim of natural law, but it was carried out in quite a wrong way, as an ideal law which was valid without restriction of time was set up, and the value of every positive law was measured according to the measure of its agreement therewith. Instead of this ideal we must conceive our task as one for the fulfilment of which the law already exists, and for the sake of which it has been produced. Once we define our task and aim, the means of realising it cannot be deduced logically—this was the error of the old natural law—but the aim can merely be used as a standard to apply in considering actual laws. Here again, however, we must guard against a certain confusion. We may consider whether the law is, having regard to its purpose, fitted to carry out the intention of the legislator. This consideration of the technical satisfactoriness of legislation is in every case the business of jurisprudence. Hence there is no question of empirical work of this kind when the philosophy of law discusses the aim of law; for opinions on this subject may be sound or unsound, and even contradictory. We might say that in certain circumstances even an abuse of law may technically be admirable. From these opinions we appeal to what opinion ought to be—to the ethical end of law.

In general we may understand by law a system of rules which an organised voluntary community has laid down for its subjects as the indispensable minimum of the claims it makes upon them for the realisation of its cultural function; and it has laid these down in the sense that an official executive will see that they are enforced, will punish transgressions, and will decide in case of dispute about them. Amongst the characteristics which we include in this definition there are two which may be differently interpreted according to certain individual or general tendencies. The value of legal

clauses as norms is based upon the fact that the duties of the individual are settled by the whole—the State—and it follows from this that the claim upon law is merely the correlative of the duty to law. My claim upon law consists of the duties that my fellows have toward me in virtue of the law. In this it seems to individualistic thought that the originality of the claims which individuals have upon the State is not sufficiently recognised. We may, however, meet this objection by observing that the *ethical* claim of the personality, which we may call a moral right, does not arise from the law itself, but is one of the antecedent sources of the law, whilst the claim upon law can only be something that arises from the law itself. The same arguments will suffice to settle the controversy whether law is to be defined as the limitation of an original right. A right in this original sense means the sphere of those functions which are not regulated by law, and the free discharge of which is therefore protected by law ; though on the condition that they do not disturb the legal order. In all these matters the Kantist principle holds that law represents the sum of the conditions in which the freedom of the individual can be adjusted to the freedom of his fellows under a general rational law. If law determines by means of a general enactment what I have to do or to omit, it *eo ipso* determines what the others have to do or to omit in regard to me. My legal claims are laid down at the same time as my legal duties. However, this mutual limitation of the life-spheres of individuals extends only to those interests which fall within the province of law—of State regulation. These are always only a part of the entire activity of the will. And the settlement of the matter depends upon what one regards as the end of the State, and therefore of its legal regulation. In our definition of law we have given this element a general formal expression which results from what we said previously about the evolution of custom, morals, and law. We saw that custom is quantitatively, and morality qualitatively, greater than law. The fulfilment of his legal duties is the least that life asks of a man : custom and morality demand far more.

If one does not comply with their demands, he is not held legally responsible, but he is all the more visited with the penalties of social life and the moral censure of his fellows and his own conscience. On the other hand, there are cases in which the law makes demands which conflict with custom, or even with mature personal morality, but it never demands more than they. A man may be a scoundrel, yet legally unassailable; the converse case, in which one might be in the grip of the law, yet morally right, is an exceptional happening in certain tragic conflicts. The claim of law, therefore, extends only to the indispensable minimum which the State must have from everybody. Hence Jellinek's definition: the law is the ethical minimum.

This minimum, moreover, is not definitely fixed in relation to the whole of man's interests. The limits are subject to considerable variations. The minimum, in fact, has its own maximum and minimum. The content of the legal regulation depends, both in theory and practice, on what one conceives to be the end of the State. The extreme limit in this respect was the theory that the legal order of the State has nothing to do beyond protecting the lives and property of individuals. That was the sentiment of modern individualistic Liberalism, which started from the originality and self-mastery of the individual, and regarded the State as a technical product of the common consent of the individuals. This is the tendency of what is called the contract-theory, which, if it meant more than an explanation of the origin of the State, got into the vicious circle of maintaining that, while a valid contract is not possible until the State is formed, there was at least a regulative idea in the sense that the State had the right only to lay down things to which its subjects would agree if they were asked if they cared to be members of it. It follows plainly from this that the individual concedes to the legal order only as much as it finds absolutely necessary; and that ought to be the protection, as far as external conditions are concerned, of the independent activity of the individuals. The historical weight of this theory comes of its connec-

tion with the Protestant conscience and the agitation for tolerance. The idea of religion as a private affair of the individual rose in rebellion against the State-organisation of religious life in the Church, and the first sphere of life which claimed freedom from the State was that of personal religion. Other spheres, such as trade and commerce, science and art, which are equally based upon the free activity of the individual, wished to be free from the State, yet protected by it. On these lines the State is in itself a matter of indifference to the individual. All the main interests of personality, its external and internal possessions, lie outside it. It is a necessary evil which a man keeps at a distance as far as possible—the “scavenger-State.” When this extreme is developed, law and State have no positive roots in the individual; there is no State-sentiment. From the theoretical point of view it appears that even the discharge of this function of the State is a technical matter, and it may be essentially the same everywhere. That is a fundamental element of the old law of nature. In this the function of being a genuine inner voluntary community and an external ordering of life based thereon is most imperfectly realised. It is, as Schiller and Fichte said, the State for necessities only. All cultural resources were to be sought in the individual with his self-expression in religion, art, science, industry, trade, etc.—in a word, all that we call civilisation.

Now, ought the State and the law to be cut off from these and have no ethical inwardness? Here we have the other extreme, which claims that they must have all these things as the essential elements of their aim. This is the “organic” conception of the civilised State. It must be based upon a complete community of will, and this must be realised in the full extent of public life. In the long run this becomes the Socialist ideal. The practicable elements of this are suited only for small associations like the City-States of ancient Greece. It is true that even these were very far in their real features from the ideal form which Plato gave to their principle in his *Politeia*. In developing the idea of a complete commu-

nity of will the philosopher found himself compelled, on the one hand, to underrate and reject the family, and, on the other hand, to restrict government to the aristocratic section of ancient society, which was to leave the inferior and necessary work of daily life to an army of slaves much more numerous than itself. Far different are the civilised States of our time, which have the basis of their community of will in the historical evolution of peoples, and are therefore National States. In their case the adjustment of the interests of the whole to those of individuals has in principle succeeded so well that the individual can enter even with his most valuable work into the activity of the State without any prejudice to his inner independence. In all these various forms the State and its legal order have become the vehicles of civilisation to such an extent that the State-institutions sustain the progress of the collective spiritual work. The most important of these institutions is, as Plato perceived, education, by means of which the State ensures the continuity of the common will throughout the succession of generations. The moment the State relinquishes education it ceases to be a civilised State, and sinks to the position of a State merely endowed with power and looking after the welfare of citizens.

When we compare the two extremes, we see that they agree in placing the end of the legal order of the State somewhere in the field of cultural activities, and merely differ as to the means. Individualism would restrict the legal order to securing to the individual the possibility of exerting his cultural activity. Universalism demands that the legal order shall directly contribute thereto by an organisation of the common life. A way has been sought out of this formal contradiction, without going into their many ramifications, by the purely formal theory that the legal order must be regarded as an autonomous end, not as a means; as if it were necessary that State and law must exist somehow, no matter in what form. Certainly the legal order has its ethical value, but it always derives this from the content which it has to realise. Hence the theory of the State and law as an

autonomous end, which is really a relic of the old law of nature, is unsatisfactory ; though it contains an element that is always worthy of consideration in connection with the question of the validity-in-itself which has to be claimed for the types of voluntary communities.

As a matter of fact this question is one of the chief points in the philosophy of law, and, neglecting a number of special problems such as that of the sanction of the right to punish, which we touched in connection with responsibility, we turn to consider it. All these vital orders, and particularly law, are the work of men. Behind them is the living man with his interests, feelings, and desires, even his affections and passions. No one denies that. But in view of the emphasis which is sometimes put on it, we may ask whether these orders are really *only* the work of man ; whether, from the very fact that man develops the necessary activity from his interests, transcendental orders are not involuntarily realised ; whether here again there is not something of what Hegel called " the cunning of the idea "—namely, that higher contents emerge unsought from the play of the movements of earthly life, and develop in them of their own inner necessity. That certainly happens in other fields. Knowledge also is the work of man, born of human needs ; but it does not end there. In it the transcendental comes into consciousness : realities of a higher order. That is the validity-principle of actual necessity, which is the real nucleus of the transcendental philosophy. We cannot think without combining valid contents in valid forms, and it is only a question of our becoming fully conscious of it.

It is the same with the various orders of community of will. Wherever there is a voluntary community, and whatever its purpose, it is bound to have certain forms and rules, however scanty and loose they may be, as they are in the case of leagues, unions, etc. This element of indispensability, which is in the nature of things and is essential in every form of voluntary community, was certainly part of what people aimed at in the law of nature. It corresponds, on the highest stage of abstrac-

tion, to the element which is pursued by rational theories of jurisprudence, in part, as opposed to the historical schools. In both cases there is a conviction that in this we have the rule of necessities which are independent of the arbitrariness of individuals or the chance of circumstances, and are rooted in the reality itself—in the reason of things. From another side the comparative science of law is on the track of these necessities in an empirical way, as it attempts to discover by a collection of the facts what the general element is—what law in general is.

If in these ways we find that some community of will given by nature and history as an obscure rudiment seeks distinctness, conscious self-comprehension, and firm external shape in the legal order, the aim is still very imperfectly realised. All realisation of law in legislation, government, and executive is limited by the individuals whose business it is to take part therein. Even the meaning of the collective will of the State is a problem that constitutional law can never clearly solve, and that is, perhaps, best expressed, with Rousseau, in the formula, how the *volonté générale* is related to the *volonté de tous*. For the "general will" can never be simply the will of all, otherwise all injustice ceases. The general will, therefore, is not a natural fact, but an historical task; and it is a superstition that the modern method of securing it by adequate majorities has solved the problem. If we further consider the men employed in carrying out the law, how there must always be weak, fallible, and blundering officials in the government and executive, we see how little one can speak of a complete realisation of the collective will by any single historical legal order. But even if we flattered ourselves that we had overcome these difficulties, even if in some fortunate case the restrictions which a people experiences in the development of its legal order, partly on account of inimical relations to other peoples and partly by the division of parties at home, were removed, even then, in the case of this most perfect phenomenal form of the realm of morality (to speak with Hegel), the vital order would still be bound up with the special historical features

of a single people or State. None of these historical special phenomena fully realises humanity as a community of will. Yet the life of peoples, States, and even of individuals has no other meaning than this, to realise in the collective life and in outer form what is implanted in the nature of man as an unconscious and obscure collective will. That is the very meaning of the word "civilisation" in its modern sense. We understand by it, not merely a cultivation of the mind, but the self-realisation of the rational germ, the conscious comprehension and elaboration of what a man finds given in himself. The living man makes himself in the course of time what he is according to the outline laid down in him. "Become what thou art" is the supreme law of the individual. It is the law also of peoples, which are summoned to realise their inmost being in the creation of their State and its legal order. But humanity as a whole is not realised in any single people or State. Its realisation is history.

§ 16

History.—The philosophy of higher research—What happens in and around man—Individuality and personality—Self-consciousness—Emancipation of the personality—History of language—Collectivist and individualist history—Superpersonality of values—Unity of the human race—Concept and idea of humanity—Historical unification—Moral order of the world—Progress in history—Indefinite perfectibility—Intellectual, moral, and hedonistic progress—Old age and death of humanity—Life as the greatest good—Reality with and without time.

The philosophy of history has, like the philosophy of law, to reckon with the special science which deals with the same subject, and it has to see that it incurs no risk or suspicion of encroaching upon it. For historical research as a whole has to investigate and arrange the historical cosmos as thoroughly as natural science does with the natural cosmos. What philosophical standpoint is there, apart from this, from which this broad province of knowledge can and ought to be further con-

sidered? Let us first lay down a negative qualification and limitation. The philosophy of history has often been conceived, especially in its beginnings, as we find more or less in Herder, and is still often conceived, as if its business was to sum up the results of research in a survey of universal history. But a universal history of this kind is and remains an historical science, and philosophy must not attempt anything new in this line. Either it would have to be identical with the empirical science—in which case it would be superfluous—or it would have to teach something different from the historian about these ultimate truths of history—and in that case it would be false. This, therefore, is not the task of the philosophy of history; nor, on the other hand, is it restricted to being a mere theory of knowledge for the historical sciences. It would not, indeed, be wrong for it to seek the achievement of its aim by a kind of investigation that has frequently been attempted in modern times. Just as natural philosophy in its first stages may be construed as a philosophy of the sciences—that is to say, a theory of knowledge for scientific research—so one might make the philosophy of history a philosophy of historical science—that is to say, a theory of knowledge for historical science. But just as natural philosophy has, after this preparatory work, to enter upon its proper problems in its own way, so the philosophy of history also may and must, from its special point of view, go on to a conceptual treatment of the actual problems of the evolution of civilisation.

As far as the theory of knowledge for historical research is concerned, the essential points have been considered when we discussed noetical problems. We saw that the principle of selection and synthesis in the science is always a relation of value. An event becomes historical when, in virtue of its individual significance, it is directly or indirectly related to values. Thus the empirical science of history creates its objects, since it gives prominence amongst the immense variety of events to those which may be of interest on account of their relations to value, and it then combines the separate elements in constructions

which in turn are related to values. But this relation to value—we must constantly emphasise this in order to avoid very unfortunate and frequent misunderstandings—is by no means a judgment of value. Moralising valuations have no more to do with historical than with natural science. Both are scientific presentations, without regard to value, of what is—what ought to be or has been. Hence when it is said that the theory of knowledge of historical science must be sought in ethics, we do not mean ethics as the theory of individual duty, but ethics as practical philosophy in its entirety, in which sense it includes the philosophy of history. This relation to value is found in every individual fable or story, and in the traditions of the family, the tribe, or the people, owing to the interests of the narrator. The tale is told and repeated; not about the trivial things that occur daily, but about something that has occurred once and awakened an interest that may prove permanent. That these tales shall be true—that they shall describe the event as it really happened—is claimed by historical science as distinguished from fiction, which may merely tell how it might have been (*οἷα ἂν γένοιτο*, says Aristotle). Yet we must bear in mind that what any memory, and therefore the historical in the form of historical research, may contain as a real event, was never a solitary reality; in its actual form it was entangled in and overgrown by a mass of trivial and familiar things from which it was extricated by historical selection and synthesis and made into a self-contained whole, that is to say, an historical object. And if the pre-scientific elements of history, ordinary memory and tradition, are conditioned by the interests of the narrator and related to his particular valuation, it is clearly the duty of man's scientific memory that the selection and synthesis in it be conditioned by values of a universal character. The determination of these values is precisely the aim of ethics, and in this sense, and this alone, we attempt to find in ethics the principles of the theory of knowledge of historical science.

Now these values of historical science are always

human values, and therefore man is at the very centre of historical research. It deals with the human event, the event in and about man. Physical processes are introduced into the historical selection and combination only in so far as they may be brought into relation in some way to the human life of values. Hence the empirical foundations of historical research are values in so far as these are psychic facts¹; and the philosophy of history goes so far in its character as theory of knowledge as to understand and determine the actual procedure of historical science. Ethical valuation, however, is not content, as we have repeatedly seen, with a determination of the empirical validity of values. It further asks to what extent the actual valuations are well grounded in the case of the higher orders which transcend the empirical course of human life. It works out this postulate first in personal morality, then in the philosophy of voluntary communities, and lastly in the philosophy of history. It seeks to determine whether the orders in which the civilised activity of the human race is embodied are similarly based upon higher orders of reason; just as one regards as general necessities of reason the uniformities which are attained in the theoretical knowledge of nature. In other words, the ultimate question is whether the logos, the world-reason, rules in the historical cosmos as it does in the natural cosmos.

This proper task of the philosophy of history demands above all things a conceptual analysis of what is characteristic and distinctive in the historical process. Auguste

¹ But we must again emphasise that it by no means follows from this that, as has often been said and still more often thoughtlessly repeated, psychology is the foundational science of all historical culture. This is not at all true of scientific psychology, which as to its method belongs to the natural sciences, and in its content is an inquiry, apart from value, into the uniform movements of the psychic elements. Its theories are no nearer to the interest of historical research than those of other sciences are. The psychology which the historian uses is a very different thing. It is the psychology of daily life; the practical psychology of a knowledge and understanding of men, the psychology of the poet and the great statesman—the psychology that cannot be taught and learned, but is a gift of intuitive intelligence, and in its highest form a genius for judging contemporary life and posterity. This sort of psychology is an art, not a science.

Comte called it sociological statistics. This leads us to the strain between individual and whole, to which we referred above. For the first basic principle here is that individuality is far greater in the human race than amongst animals, and greater in civilised man than in savages. We may say, in the naturalistic sense, that each organic being is an unrepeated individuality, both in its physical and its psychic features. One wether is fatter than the others; one dog cleverer than others. Even midges certainly have differences of form as we do, but they do not interest us, and so we take no notice of them. If our attention is drawn to them, we perceive them. The shepherd knows each member of his flock. In a foreign people, where at first all seem to us alike, we soon learn to distinguish one individual from another. This natural individuality, however, which we share with all organic beings, is as such only an objective individuality: a peculiarity for another, for the comparative judgment of another, not for itself. Thus plants and animals may become individualities to us in virtue of the special value which we ascribe to their particular features; even, in fact, a house, a chair, a stone, or a mountain. All these, however, are not individualities for themselves. It is only man who acquires this sort of individuality, and we then call him a person. Personality is, therefore, individuality which has become objective to itself: individuality for itself. Hence all men are individuals, but not all are persons. We speak of people becoming and being persons, of the child and of the incurable lunatic. Personality again has various degrees. The great majority, who seem to be there merely for the propagation of the race, have only a potential personality. We respect them legally and morally, but in them we see only the beginning of the transition from individuality to personality. This transition is brought about by consciousness, though this is certainly not identical with personality. They, however, have the same gradations.

Self-consciousness is the greatest marvel in psychology. We can establish the fact, but we cannot comprehend it. We can analyse the conditions and prerequisites

for its appearance. They consist, from the point of view of individual psychology, in apperceptions in which memory and character are precipitated as constant ideas and appreciations; from the point of view of social psychology, in language, which treats even organic beings as substantives and brings out the reflection of the self in the mutual play of the Thou and I. This eventual result is, however, not to be considered a product of the psychic mechanism. There is between self-consciousness and the other contents of consciousness no analytical, but only a synthetic, relation, just as between nervous movement and consciousness, or between inorganic and organised matter. Psychological theories of self-consciousness leave it an entirely obscure problem in philosophy. And just as obscure is the content of the self, which distinguishes itself from every content that it can present as that which *has* this content, and precisely on that account is not it. Thus this synthetic function appears as something self-producing: something that is not there until it creates itself. The self is, as Fichte taught with great energy, not first there before it comes into consciousness; it becomes through its own function. It is a new thing in the world of substances. We learned when discussing theories of causality to recognise it as something that resists every attempt to clothe it in the doctrine of the conservation of energy. This inexpressible element of personality, as individuality for itself, is freedom; and that is the only sense in which ethics can adopt this much-abused word. This originality of persons must not, it is true, be taken in the sense of a metaphysical power. On the contrary, the Henism of metaphysical thought, as well as of the religious mind (as we saw in dealing with problems of substance), inexorably removes the aseity of individuals. Yet the feeling of moral responsibility and historical thought just as inexorably require it; for this synthetic freedom alone introduces new elements into history.

This significance is only attained by personality by self-consciousness in the individual becoming self-criticism and creating the free position which the personality adopts

over against itself. As logical conscience it determines the value of one's own ideas, and as moral disposition it determines the value of one's own valuations. Man was once subtly defined as the being who deceives. As a matter of fact, deception is only possible as an act of a mind that is able to weigh its own value in free judgment against those of others. But the self-criticism that is found even in this presupposes in every case a division in the consciousness and in the self-consciousness of the personality. If in an animal or a child, as a becoming personality, and in the lower classes of every nation and age some recollection of an injury suffered or a pleasure enjoyed is the motive of action or counter-motive, this is only the psycho-mechanical preparatory stage to the self-consciousness and self-orientation of a conscious personality. In its self-criticism this divides itself into the determining and the determined part; and Fichte has profoundly explained this by supposing that in every personality there is a vital stratum of clear consciousness which is contrasted with a stratum of obscure feeling—a situation that is found in its most perfect form in the genius. The stratum of obscure feeling is the background of the general mind, and the stratum of lucid consciousness is the sum of all contents in which the personality has comprehended its own peculiar nature. Whenever it asserts this against the domination of the general mind and manifests itself in an external act, it enters into that antagonism to the whole on which the historical process is based. The essence of personality is, therefore, that the individual must be more than a mere specimen of the species. In this sense Kant has said that the Fall was probably the beginning of human history. This is not only an interpretation of the Hebrew legend, but an allegorical description of the fact that the emancipation of individuals is the essence of human history as so many repetitions of the Fall—not as an hereditary sin, but as ever-new acts of personalities. Every advance in knowledge, in morals, in the life of the State, in art, or in religion is a fall from the previous state of things: a fall which, through struggle and sacrifice,

alters the mind and the collective life. This is the ultimate meaning of the fact that it is only by the initiative of personalities that the general mind evolves from its obscure, stupid, and subconscious rudiments to a clear and free spiritual form. And that is, in the last resort, the entire meaning of human history. As a natural species man, *Homo sapiens*, shows an infinite variety of possibilities of spiritual life and a high degree of sociality, which in the earliest and lowest stages of life is almost equal to what we find amongst such invertebrates as the bees and ants. But in the course of human history there is a rebellion against this sociality in the sense that the work of personalities has to give form and clearness to the common content of life. Of history as an objective process, therefore, we may speak wherever individual functions of personalities bring about permanent changes in the general condition of the common life.

We see this best in the development of the chief natural function of human sociality, speech. Its changes—and in this we find all developments of man as the speaking animal—are based as a natural process partly on phonetic necessities, and they proceed on physiological laws like those of the permutation of consonants; though from these alone no one could deduce the history of literature or the entire history of language. Individual variations and personal acts have a part in it. It is not the people as a whole that speaks, but the individuals. Every innovation was first uttered somewhere, then repeated and established. That is true in detail and as a whole. The significant personality grows into the prevailing speech; has received everything from it, and shapes it afresh for new generations. That is what we find, for instance, in the case of Luther and Goethe in the history of the German language. Then we have the accumulation of small changes, all of which can be traced to an individual origin and have been shaped by adaptation in the course of time. Thus we see the historical change in the easy and gradual flow of accumulating small alterations and, at the same time, in the abrupt action of new creations. The common substratum

of the entire movement is, however, the mutual understanding of all individuals that have the same language, and this is, perhaps, the most remarkable and obscure phenomenon in the whole of collective life. For speech is very far from expressing the full meaning of people when they speak. It conveys a good deal more meaning in its forms, in the secondary meanings of words, in tone and emphasis ; in this, in fact, we not only express most of our meaning, but the most important part of it. That we understand each other in this—that what is not said is fully appreciated—is the great mystery that we can only regard as possible in view of the half-conscious collective psychic life which forms the substratum for the development of the complexes of the individual mind and the conscious activity of personalities.

All these features of linguistic life are typical of every other form of the historical development of humanity, and we thus understand what is sound and unsound in the onesided views which we call the collectivist and individualist conceptions of history. Collectivism rightly emphasises the fact that all history is a collective movement, and that its meaning is to be sought in the changes of the collective life. It affects to treat personalities, however, as mere transitory phenomena in which the collective process incorporates itself and in time dissolves again. It admits the significance of the influences which proceed from these concentration-points of the common life, not only because the energies of this are particularly incorporated in them, but also because they are thus combined for the realisation of a new and peculiar impulse. Collectivism treats personalities as if they were merely individualities. Individualism, on the other hand, rightly emphasises the creative elements which issue from the activity of the individual, especially the great individual, the "hero." But it runs some risk of overlooking the fact that in these influences the collective forces have a share, and that the extent and permanence of the influence of the deeds of heroes can only be understood on that account. Both conceptions, however, miss the most significant thing in human history—the ever-

changing strains between personalities and the collective life—and they therefore fail to perceive the essential point in the construction of the vital orders which give us the meaning of historical development.

For the relation of the emancipation of personalities to the whole varies in an extraordinary degree. Often enough it assumes the character of a "Fall," in the sense that it is a sort of running off the rails which depends upon individual variation or motives related only to the individual. In this case it may, it is true, have for a time a far-reaching influence on the general life, but viewed in relation to the whole it is never more, in such circumstances, than a temporary change. The influence can only be permanent and real in the historical sense when the elements which slumber in the general mind and are unconscious of their power awaken to clear consciousness in this insurgence of the individual. All great actions of historical personalities—as Hegel has excellently said—are based upon the fact that the passionate energy of their will is directed to precisely the same ends as the driving energies in the ferment of the collective life which have not yet become fully conscious. In the case of heroes the most valuable element of the collective life is at work, apparently in contradiction to itself. The solution of the great historical problems and conflicts is that this situation breaks out and determines the decisive form of things. The end, it is true, is never fully attained, and there are all sorts of obstacles and difficulties provided on the way. It follows, nevertheless, that in the personal element of historical development it is not really a question of the arbitrariness of individuals and their particular qualities, but of that part of them in which the most valuable element of the collective life takes clear shape. It is not obscure singularities which make up the historically significant; it is the achievements of personalities through which the general mind presses on to its fulfilment and realisation. Hence the more the personality attains to conscious clearness, the more it destroys in itself the merely individual element in which its natural endowment consisted. Thus the whole of this strain between the

personality and the entirety comes to the dialectical issue that all that is highest and most valuable that the individual can attain has in it something impersonal and superpersonal. If the outbreak of a new truth in the mind of the individual seems at first a fall from the current condition of thought, nevertheless the energy of its influence consists in this, that in its own nature it shall be valid for all, and shall be completely independent of the accidental features of the mind of its discoverer. This superpersonality belongs to all great deeds of heroes in every department of life, and thus the personality attains its historical significance from the fact that it is more than itself. What constitutes the power of the significant personality is that it develops superpersonal values in itself and externalises them. The independence of these values of the individual features of the man who bears them may also be expressed by saying that they are independent of the accidents of time—they have an eternal validity. We may therefore say that eternal values emerge from every historical strain between the whole and the individual that is due to the action of personalities. In the conflict of the general in time and the personal the real necessity of the vital orders enforces its validity, and thus logical and ethical uniformities realise themselves as eternal values in the temporal struggle of the historical life. For the personality, therefore, the highest aim is, "To sacrifice oneself is good." For the whole the ultimate gain is that its vital orders approach more and more maturely and perfectly to the rational orders which they are expected to realise in time.

When, from this point of view, we speak of the history of the human race (which is often wrongly spoken of as the history of the world) as a self-contained whole, we have in our minds an idea of the unity of the species, the meaning and justice of which we have now to examine. It involves the assumption that humanity as a natural entity is an organic unity. But this biological conception of mankind is by no means sufficient for a critical inquiry into the nature of history. Whether mankind really is

such an organic unity is a question that cannot be stated or answered either from the point of view of history or of the philosophy of history. It is not historical, since it cannot be decided by traditions which, in this case, cannot contain the matter itself, but merely myths and legends about it. Neither is it the business of pre-history or ethnography to decide it. The controversy about the origin of races and unity of the species belongs to natural philosophy, and can at the most be decided by scientific research. On the one hand the unity of the race is affirmed as probable on the ground that crossings between different races are fertile. Also, there seems to be some indication of such an original unity in the philological evidence of relationship in space and time of different peoples, so that at one time an ideal primitive people was imagined. On the other side, however, philology shows that its material gives us no clue whatever to an original language. We have great intellectual diversities (which need not be diversities of value) between races, but we have also an extraordinary diversity of gradations between them in all their physical and psychic qualities, reaching from the heights of civilisation down to the depths of an almost animal existence. We may say that the lowest human tribes, everything considered, are nearer to animals than to civilised peoples, so that here again we have an argument against the unity of the species *Homo sapiens*.

However that may be, the question of the natural and genetic unity of the human race is irrelevant in history. At the beginning of our history, as far as tradition takes us, we find the human race as a scattered group of tribes and peoples who knew nothing, and could know nothing, about their unity. These hordes and tribes fell fiercely upon each other, and upon the stranger they turned as if he were a wild beast. They killed and ate him. It does not matter whether an originally homogeneous race was scattered over the earth as a consequence of some "Fall" and its results, and so its members were estranged from each other, or whether, having had several different origins, its division is natural; the beginnings of history know nothing of a unity of the human race. We cannot

say that it ever existed as a natural state. All that history teaches us is dispersion, conflict, struggle. The modern idea of a unity, solidarity, and common evolution of the human race is rather itself a product of history; and indeed so essential a product that we may see in it the chief meaning of the historical development. We might almost formulate it: history proceeds from the conception of humanity to the idea of humanity. This idea is not something given and pre-existing, but something worked out in toil and misery. We can understand it best on the analogy of personality. This also is not given by nature and pre-existing. Only its elements are given in the scattered achievements and movements of the nervous system and the psycho-physical vitality. The personality makes itself out of them. Thus humanity also finds itself scattered over the planet in peoples and races, and out of these it makes itself as a self-conscious unity. That is its history. Hence even if there had been a biological unity of descent of the human race (as to which biology and ethnography must decide on scientific grounds), it was lost in the wanderings of the species which form the content of prehistoric development, and history has created it as something new. That is its deepest meaning.

This is not the place to trace this process of unification. We need only recall the extensive minglings between conquering and conquered peoples, which, in the struggle for food, women, luxuries, domination, and freedom, have repeatedly combined in new forms and obliterated older tribal differences. If the various peoples or races are not autochthonous, but derived from a single stem, this was a prehistoric process that is reversed in history, since it brings before us the physical mingling of races. The more important element in this is, however, the spiritual adjustment: the mingling of the spirits of peoples to form a common civilisation. This gives us the great culture-groups of the course of history in the three main centres: Central America, the Chino-Japanese Sea, and the Mediterranean. If we care to glance at the future, we are confident that the Mediterranean civilisation will

ultimately prevail, because its chief offshoot is the culture of North America, and this gives promise of a great Atlantic civilisation in the future. The most valuable and decisive centre of crystallisation in this story of the unification of the human race has been the Mediterranean civilisation, which is based upon a fusion of Aryan and Semitic elements, and which seems destined, in its blend of Greek art and science with the political and legal organisation of the Roman Empire and Semitic religion, to provide a foundation for the civilisation of the future. Here the unity of the species does not merely consist in the vast fusion of nations which migrations have brought about as physical and psychic facts ; it reaches consciousness for the first time. The self-consciousness of humanity appears first in Greek science. Under its influence the antagonism of Hellenes and barbarians, of masters and slaves, disappeared. Thus the idea of humanity was revealed in the Stoic plan of a world-State of the wise, and it sought its realisation afterwards in the conception of the Church as the one salvation of the human race. All that we have to do here is to indicate the way in which mankind attains self-consciousness in the form of scientific conceptions and dogmatic theories. It is for universal history to expound in detail the varied fortunes of this idea in the course of its realisation. We would add only that the lines of this realisation, which point toward the infinite, never point toward any abstract unity or singularity. The age of world-empires is over ; and no world-religion can ever again attain supreme rule. The domination of any ultimate political or religious unity becomes less and less probable in historical movements, as far as we can survey them. Everything points rather to a system of equilibrium of differentiated orders as the only possible form of unity. A community of interests and of the normal consciousness ought ultimately to be created above the spirits of peoples and spirits of the times as the idea of an absolute collective mind of humanity, to which, as their highest good and final aim, all the special vital orders of the nations ought to be referred in their details as well as in their most compre-

hensive features. This idea of humanity is realised in all who, scattered over the whole planet, entertain it and work for its fulfilment in the collective life; and it is further realised in all institutions which give expression to the community of the tasks of civilisation. In the last resort we ought to say that individual peoples have the same relation to this idea of a single mind of humanity as personalities have to the various forms of the collective spirit which are found in nations, States, and religious communities. We thus get a picture of the construction of vital orders which we find realised by some inner necessity in the historical process, and in which we have to see the phenomenal appearance of what, with ideal insight into the spiritual cosmos, we call the moral order of the world. The growth of this construction of vital orders in the various systems of civilisation is one of the subjects that are on the frontier between the research of universal history and the philosophy of history. For the ideal of a life-unity of humanity extends to all its rational activities. In the province of intellect arises science, in the province of feeling art, in that of will morality, and in that of action the organisation of State and society. In all these forms of civilisation the various peoples and ages create their special systems, all of which point beyond themselves to the general human, the realisation of humanity. It is precisely the mission of personalities constantly to renovate this relation in the mind, and thus to improve and strengthen it. Thus between the people and humanity, between the restricted and merely temporary form of the collective mind and the idea of the unity of the human race, there interposes a new and important function of the personality, the position of which in the vital order of the whole can only be fully understood from this point of view.

Hence the self-forming of humanity is for us the ultimate meaning of historical progress; and, if this self-forming means also self-determination, we may adopt Hegel's formula that the history of progress is in the consciousness of freedom. In this idea we have the end without which it is impossible to speak of progress. The

more we talk about progress in dealing with historical questions, either particular or general questions, the more necessary it is to be quite clear as to the standards by which we measure the amount of progress or reaction in the changes which present themselves to a knowledge which is devoid of values. These standards naturally depend in detail upon the needs and views which hold sway in the historical conditions and forces themselves, and at times seek to realise themselves through a struggle. Success or failure decides whether we are to speak of progress or reaction in the case of any particular movement. If we apply this to the whole of history it can only mean that in some way the idea of a task which the historical process had to fulfil has won ; or that at least we have in mind a number of such tasks in relation to which the various movements are to be judged successes or failures. Of progress in itself, without indicating any goal to which it tends, we cannot reasonably speak at all, as we saw above in dealing with the biological conception of evolution. Then we have to consider the variety of the interests in which the historical life is involved. There is, therefore, no such thing as a simple progress of humanity. History reveals rather a very tortuous movement backward and forward. Most of the opinions about the matter are falsified by assumptions as to what ought to be ; they differ according to the individual tendency. On the one hand we have enthusiastic theories of an indefinite perfectibility of man, such as were inspired about the time of the French Revolution by the feeling that some new politico-social era was dawning. On the other side we have the depressing idea, as in the preaching of Schopenhauer, of an eternal monotony of history, in which the same tragi-comedy of human misery is played over and over again with new costumes and scenery. The truth is in the middle between these extremes, and the question of progress in history cannot receive a uniform answer in all cases, but must be considered according to the different directions in which development necessarily moves.

These different lines of the historical movement are

dependent upon each other in various ways, and the question may be raised whether one of them has a decisive significance for the others, and therefore for progress in general. The philosophy of history of the *Aufklärung* and the French Revolution give this position to the development of "ideas," the development of knowledge, especially knowledge of nature; and this ideological and expressly intellectualist conception tried to show that the historical movement on all other lines depended upon changes of theories and convictions. In extreme contrast with this we have now what is called the Materialistic philosophy of history, which finds in the change of economic conditions the fundamental process which determines all other changes in the social, political, moral, religious, scientific, and artistic life. In face of these conflicting views we may recognise that there are ages in which one or the other interest stands out prominently in the foreground and determines the development of the others, but in general we must say that the various threads of the evolution of civilisation are interwoven in a net of reciprocal relations, and yet at times are in many respects quite independent of each other.

It is sometimes assumed that we cannot question intellectual progress in history, but we have to draw a distinction. That in the course of time, and with tradition accumulating experiences and the results of research, we have gained a considerable sum of knowledge with which we orientate ourselves in the world, and in turn react upon it in our various spheres of life, is clearly a fact that no one can dispute. It will also be granted by everyone that in virtue of the same tradition the child of to-day easily acquires, by speech, custom, and education, the outcome of the thoughts of its ancestors. These, certainly, are advances. But in part they relate only to a very thin upper stratum of social life, and it is not so easy to decide whether in general there is a greater capacity for knowledge, a higher power of thinking, or, especially, a better average judgment. The great decisions of human history do not favour the ideological dreams of the philosophers of history. They show the insignificance

of the intellectual culture of our thin upper stratum as compared with the elementary passions of the masses. In regard to scientific knowledge we are accustomed to say that, by means of our inductive methods of natural research and the critical methods of history, there has been a marked advance; but even this is true only of the very slight percentage of scientifically minded men. In the majority there is the same hasty generalisation and blind confidence in whatever is said and handed down (particularly in the shape of a respect for print) as formerly. On the whole, perhaps, the human view of things has experienced some elaboration through the imagination as a certain self-consciousness of judgment; but from the eighteenth century onward it has been usual to follow reactionary movements in which man, stung by his own uncertainty, falls back into the mists of mysticism and fantasy or into the arms of authority. Right in the heart of civilised nations we see, as in the primitive days of the race, the spiritual flocks—they are now called "parties"—following authority more blindly than ever before.

The situation in regard to the moral progress of the race is peculiar. In this connection a fact of great importance is the circumstance that the idealising of the natural condition of man could give rise to an idea of his original goodness and of the degeneration he has suffered in his historical development. Such a statement as that man is naturally good is in this crude form as erroneous as the opposite opinion, that he is naturally bad. Good and bad are predicates which one can ascribe to particular actions and intentions, and to the predominant tendencies in the value-life of individuals. But no man is entirely good or entirely bad. One must be devoid of all psychological insight to be able to divide men into "wise and fools" or "sheep and goats," as is done in the interest of moralising or theological theories. As a matter of fact, good and bad are mixed in an extraordinary degree both in the natural disposition and the development of men; and it is very difficult to say whether in the course of time the preponderance is on the one side

or on the other. We may grant that the establishment of a political and legal order has promoted conduct in conformity with the moral law, and that therefore legality has been to some extent furthered in the course of time. But we have to realise on the other hand that the naïve sociality which forms the natural disposition of man has been more or less enfeebled during the historical process. As opposed to these two forms of legality, it is true that in respect of inner morality a higher personal life has been developed, and this means higher stages of morals which go far beyond the primitive condition of the race ; but here again there is question of an extremely small minority. The moral character of the average human, with his strong tincture of legality, is very much the same in all ages. We must, indeed, admit that the refinement and complication of the conditions of life have led to a refinement and interiorisation of crime which at times express themselves in deeds that make us shudder

The question of the hedonistic progress of the race, which was for a time strongly affirmed, is in a very ambiguous position. Many take it for granted that men are better off because of civilisation and its technical achievements. We may, as a matter of fact, call this into question. It is true that in the course of time the general level of life has been raised and improved, but our needs have increased at least in the same proportion, and thus personal satisfaction is by no means greater. One might say, on the contrary, that the contentment of the individual is much better provided for in simple and primitive conditions of life than in the complex struggle to which civilisation has led, and will increasingly lead. The gain to individual comfort of our mastery of nature is, on the whole, very doubtful. Aristotle once said that if the weavers' shuttles would go of themselves, there would be no need for slaves. They almost go of themselves to-day ; but are our workers better off for it ? Their legal and moral position has been greatly improved by the abolition of slavery, and they have won human dignity ; but their feeling of contentment, their personal

comfort, have not been improved. It is only the condition of the whole that has been raised and ennobled. In the vital order, the aim and dignity of man have been recognised and have won supremacy. But this has been purchased in part at the cost of the simple contentment which accompanied the state of nature. Kant has emphasised precisely this fact as a decisive refutation of the Eudæmonistic theory of morals. If pleasure and the satisfaction of one's desires were the meaning of human life, the aim would be much better realised by Rousseau's state of nature than by the whole of the work of history; and from this it follows that the vital orders which represent the achievement of history must be in themselves higher things than happiness, which history has not increased.

Considerations of this kind, which might be extended in other directions—for instance, in respect of the development of art and religion—must make us sceptical about the claim of indefinite progress and distrustful of the belief in an illimitable perfectibility of man. The theory, no doubt, has its advantage, but it is rather a judgment of value than a piece of theoretical knowledge. We might, indeed, say that all analogy is against it. Peoples grow old and die, just as individuals do. New blood may circulate, and the future seem to hold infinite possibilities, but it is certain that the planet, and man along with it, grow older. Is there to be no old age, no period beyond the bloom, for man before he dies? We certainly cannot say whether we may not now be in the ripest period, or may even have passed it. There is no longer any room for doubt that our civilisation in many respects shows signs of age, as the Roman once did. Who knows whether it has still the strength to strike new roots in peoples that are not yet used up? And will not the supply of fresh peoples at length be exhausted? In many respects it may be suspected that we have already passed our highest point. We need not think pessimistically about the possibility of new forms of art in order to realise that certain types of artistic achievement reached heights in the history of the past which, from the nature of

the case, can never be overtopped. Such creations as the Homeric poems, the sculptures of the Parthenon, the dialogues of Plato, the madonna of Raphael, Goethe's *Faust* or Beethoven's music, will never be surpassed, or even equalled. At the most they may be replaced by something different. If, on the other hand, we turn our attention to public life, we see everywhere, and to an increasing extent, the overwhelming need of associative forms which in their cumulative effect destroy individuality and lead to the death of personality. There is not much said in our time about personality. People speak more about what they want, and have not got. Everybody complains that originality is dead or in decadence. Everything is aiming at bigness, but it is mere bigness in quantity. This depreciation of personality is, from the point of view of what constitutes the essential thing in history, the most dangerous of all reactions. It threatens to thrust us back into the primitive condition of sociality without personality. That is in part the effect of the all-round democratisation of life. It restricts more and more the influence of the essential factor in history, the personal element. Any man who studies the movements of our time from this point of view must be apprehensive about the future; unless he consoles himself with the hope of unknown possibilities of which we have at present no conception. In this respect we may find some relief in the fact that the historical cosmos is the world of new and unexpected things.

In the end we have always the painful fact that the entire rich world of forms is destined to pass into the night of the infinite. We cannot get beyond this tormenting idea of the death of mankind except by seeking in the temporal achievements of man's history the traces of eternal values which, independently of all time and duration, have a validity in themselves and therefore need not be regarded as final products of the historical process; or by seeing in life itself, apart from its contents, and in its constant affirmation the highest of all values. This is another way of formally defining the highest good—by placing it in life itself. It amounts to an idea

that the way itself is the goal of the way ; that the end and value of life are to be sought, not in the realisation of eternal contents, but in the restless affirmation of life and of will. This is an axiological tendency that has in it, perhaps, an element of decadence and exhaustion and ennui, and arises from these very features of our life by a sort of contrast. When life froths and flowers, it has contents which determine its value. It is only when these are languid, or lose their significance, that life in itself is regarded as a value, even the greatest of all values. It is not therefore surprising that our age, on various sides, imagines that it has discovered the ethical principle in life itself, for the sake of life and will. The modern mind leans to this view in the form in which it was expressed by Nietzsche, who is supposed to have transcended all the content-values of history and placed the new valuation of the superman in the supreme affirmation of the great personality, the unfolding of the power of the will, and the self-development of life. Even in the biological forms of modern ethics, as in that of Herbert Spencer, the quantitative principle of valuation is adopted, and the chief criterion of progress and improvement is the extent of the affirmation of life together with the complexity of vital functions. Much more finely and delicately than Nietzsche, and with more ability than is usual on the biological side, Guyau has developed his enthusiastic optimism, which places the meaning of life in the extensive and intensive advancement of it ; a doctrine which he preaches with glowing zeal. In contrast to all these theories we may quote the ethic of Schopenhauer, which, on metaphysical grounds, finds its principle in the will to live—that is to say, the will of will, and the life of life—and then perceives that this life itself has no meaning or value, precisely because it is not directed to any content of value in itself. The formal definition of this will for will's sake in Schopenhauer might be traced to the teaching of Fichte, in whose metaphysic action for action's sake takes the highest rank, but we must not forget that in this conception Fichte refers to the Kantian autonomy, the self-legislation

of reason, and thus sets up as the content of the self-contained will a world-law of the moral order and the timeless values of morality.

Thus the ultimate problems of ethics bring us back to the metaphysical problems in which it is discussed what meaning the temporal course of the event has in relation to the timeless reality as the genuine being. It remains an unsolved problem why this timeless reality needs realisation in the temporal course of the event, or why it tolerates in itself an event in the temporal course of which there is something that differs from its own nature. We do not understand why that which is nevertheless has to happen ; and still less why something different happens from that which is in itself without time. This is the case in metaphysics, and ethics reveals the same unintelligibility in its special questions of the human will and conduct. If timeless values of higher orders of life are realised in them, how is it that they are not at once and absolutely real in their timelessness ? And, on the other hand, if in all the restless pressure of our will throughout history we have only the temporal interests of a race that is doomed to extinction, how can we speak of values manifesting themselves therein with timeless validity ? No metaphysical theory helps us in regard to this fundamental antithesis of the temporal and the timeless ; nor does any ethical postulate. It is the basic feature of the insoluble problems of the religious mind.

CHAPTER II

ÆSTHETIC PROBLEMS

HOWEVER true it may be that in the moral life and in ethical theories we may catch a glimpse of higher orders of life and timeless pronouncements of reason, nevertheless the moral life as a whole is always related to needs which shape our conduct through our will. No matter whether we seek the end of life in happiness or in welfare or in co-operation in the cultural self-formation of the time-spirit, we always keep within the limits of human needs. It is of the very essence of will and conduct that they presuppose some craving, some state of incompleteness and dissatisfaction from which we strive to emerge. Hence there is always something anthropological, some earthly residue of the human, in ethical values, even when they rise to a rational world-order. The power of desire rules in the entire realm of the "practical." Even when there is no sensuous desire on the part of the individual, and no quest of use or advantage, there is always a straining after something that is to happen. We therefore ask finally whether valuation is to be confined to this region of the will, or whether there are kinds of values that may be free from all desire and expectation. The new and higher province of axiology which is thus demanded must be a life of values that is not based upon the needs of the will. Pleasure and displeasure must now be complete in themselves, and must not point beyond to the province of desire. It must be a pleasure that satisfies the mind with its own contents, and the mind must neither wish nor expect anything from these contents. To this province belong the noblest of all values—all that Schiller meant when he spoke of "the noble in

the moral world"—the objects of love without desires: persons, things, and relations the value of which does not depend upon what they do, but on what they are and mean. The saying of Goethe, "I know that they are eternal because they are," is true of these. Here at last we reach values in themselves, and therefore valuation is now raised above the region of specifically human needs and interests into the higher realm of the universally valid.

§ 17

Concept of the Æsthetic.—History of the word "æsthetics"—Disinterested pleasure—Freedom of wish and will—Toward a system of values—Beauty in nature and art—Æsthetics from above and below.

The values without desire which, having no wish for their motive and engendering no wish as their effect, constitute this realm detached from needs, go by the name of the æsthetic life. Etymologically the meaning of the name is not obvious. The Greek word involved in it originally meant something else, and it is the vicissitudes of theory that have, in devious ways, given it the new meaning. The preoccupation of the mind with questions about the nature of the beautiful and art has in the course of time been occasioned, sometimes by metaphysical interests, at other times by elements of the artistic life, and at others by psychological considerations; but for some time now it has been embodied in a special branch of science or philosophy. Its development into a special discipline has, curiously, been due to the arid interests of scientific systematisation, which has scarcely anything to do with the subject in itself. About the middle of the eighteenth century a pupil of Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, found a gap in the well-arranged system of the sciences that was then current. The whole group of the rational sciences was preceded by an inquiry into the right use of the intelligence in scientific knowledge. This was called "logic." But besides the superior faculty of knowledge, which was known as the intelligence,

man had a lower faculty, sensory perception, which provided the facts for another group of sciences, the empirical sciences. Ought not these also to be preceded by a theory of the faculty of knowledge, of the completeness of sensory knowledge? Being a theory of sense-perception (*αἰσθησις*), it would have to be called "æsthetics." And while Baumgarten undertook to bring into the world and develop this younger sister of logic (as Lotze has called it), he was guided in regard to its contents and subject by a theory of Leibnitz. For Leibnitz beauty was the perfection of sensory presentation just as truth was the perfection of rational thought. In his mind this means that in the beautiful there is a sensory preliminary stage of the true or the sensory substitute for truth: an idea to which we will return later. In accordance with this theory Baumgarten converted his æsthetics, which ought to have been a sort of methodology of sensory perception, into a theory of the beautiful, of the enjoyment and production of beauty. Hence the word "æsthetics" came to have the meaning which is now always attached to it; and in the history of the reception of the term an interesting and decisive part was played by Kant, who at first hesitated and then accepted it.

Moreover, the framing of the problem, with which we have introduced æsthetic questions, was determined by Kant's æsthetics. In this—as everyone will acknowledge, no matter how far he dissents from the theory in detail—we have the decisive element, which makes æsthetics a special province of the realm of axiology, traced with all the confidence of genius. In order to distinguish clearly between the beautiful and the agreeable, between the æsthetic faculty and the hedonistic or the ethical, Kant formulated the criterion of disinterested pleasure. This does not say anything about the content of the æsthetic object, but it very plainly indicates the formal element which enables us to mark off this province from its neighbours. Kant's expression, "disinterested," was, perhaps, not as fortunate and as free from misunderstanding as he supposed. Schiller, and then Schopenhauer,

discovered a better expression which indicates the really significant element as *the freedom of the valuation from wish and will*. They succeeded in getting this definition so firmly established in general usage that Herbart's attempt to take the word "æsthetics" in a more general sense and apply it to the whole of axiology, and make this enlarged æsthetics a second part after theoretical philosophy, was unsuccessful. The attitude which began with Baumgarten remained in such general favour that we now use the name even for the objects of the new science, and we speak in this sense of the æsthetic life, æsthetic temperament, æsthetic enjoyment, æsthetic production, and so on. There is only one respect in which this has given rise to differences and difficulties: Schopenhauer—and perhaps Schiller had foreshadowed this—put truth as well as beauty in the province of æsthetic valuation as will-less pleasure, and he therefore included science as well as art under the heading of the redemptive cultural functions of desirelessness.

Here we touch an essential problem of the theory of values generally. As a matter of fact, truth and beauty, as forms of valuation which are independent of the needs of the empirical consciousness, and are in virtue of their peculiar and original nature far from all will and conduct—all that is *practical*—differ considerably not only from hedonistic, but also from ethical, values, which in the long run are always related to weal and woe. Hence truth and beauty prove to be the higher values, which transcend the specifically human in a pronounced and obvious manner, whereas, though these higher manifestations are not entirely lacking in the province of ethics, they have to be detected as the ultimate foundation. The general mind in which the absolute validity of morality has its roots is the mind of the human race; but truth and beauty presuppose a higher and more important relation. In the scheme of Hegel's philosophy this is expressed by treating morality, society, the State, and history as phenomena of the objective spirit, and art, science, and religion as forms of the absolute spirit. In recent times theories of judgment, which emphasise

the axiological element in it, have led to the recognition that logical values form, with ethical and æsthetic values, a considerable problem, which plays, and must play, a part in these questions about the system of values which we seek. We must be content here merely to indicate these subtle questions of axiological systematics. They do not so much arise from the simple considerations of the prescientific mind as from the ultimate needs of philosophical systematics. When we turn from these to the questions of æsthetic valuation which arise from life itself and artistic activity, we see that here, differently from in the case of ethical problems, which cover the whole of human life in all its heights and depths, we have to deal with a smaller sphere, which cannot claim the same general interest and understanding. Moreover, what we call the specifically æsthetic in the historical reality is never pure, but always embedded in a multitude of other interests. In the living æsthetic judgment there are always hedonistic and ethical elements at work. They give the æsthetic object the stimulation that we cannot avoid, the significance that holds us. Whether there is any specifically æsthetic effect depends upon properties of the particular object, which may not appear altogether. Nevertheless, however narrow the circle may be in which this specific element comes to conscious realisation, the beautiful as a whole is, though rarely found in a pure form, yet distributed wherever the eye of man can reach; and there are effects of art, such as great religious ceremonies, which fill all men, without distinction of social or intellectual condition, with elementary transports. Nay, one may say in this regard that, whilst the appreciation of the good is very general, the appreciation of the beautiful for its own sake is even more widely spread than that of truth; and how exclusive truth is in its innermost nature is best seen by the pragmatical imitation of it.

We call the object of the æsthetic attitude the realm of the beautiful. In this an unmistakably distinct province is that of art. We distinguish between beauty in nature and beauty in art, the latter being produced by man.

Hence æsthetics develops along two different lines. Either it starts from natural beauty, and goes on to understand artistic beauty, or it gathers its definition from an analysis of the beautiful in art and passes on from this to beauty in nature. In the one section we deal rather with the enjoyment, in the other with the production, of the beautiful, since the enjoyment of artistic beauty is in principle not different from that of natural beauty. We sometimes find it said that these two lines lead to different theories. Perhaps it is best for the philosopher to start from the enjoyment he derives from artistic beauty. He is himself no artist. Personal union between art and philosophy, such as we find in the case of Plato, is very rare; and artists generally ignore æsthetics altogether. We then find that the enjoyment of artistic beauty can only be understood on the analogy of its production, and the principle may be extended to the enjoyment of the beautiful in general. If, however, æsthetic thought starts from artistic beauty, it will be tinged by the predominant interest which the philosopher takes in one or other branch of art. We can show historically how the classical theory of æsthetics since Winckelmann was influenced by a dominating regard for plastic art; how its further development in the idealist philosophers, especially Schelling and Hegel, was influenced by regard for poetry; and how, finally, certain tendencies of the Romanticist æsthetic were determined by the predominance of musical interests.

These differences are traversed by a second, which has been mainly characterised by Fechner's description of an æsthetics from above and an æsthetics from below. By the latter Fechner meant the purely empirical registration of the pleasure felt in the several elements of æsthetic enjoyment, and he thus initiated the kind of treatment which has gradually developed into the quantitative research of modern empirical psychology. As distinguished from this, the æsthetic from above is a conceptual inquiry. Such an inquiry might be of a metaphysical character, as was that of Schelling and Hegel, which Fechner rejected. But it may also be analytic-psycholo-

gical, when it seeks merely to determine clearly by means of reflection on our experience in æsthetic enjoyment what the characters of this are. This psychological establishment of the actual features is far more important for philosophical æsthetics than the facts of quantitative research. Even this analysis, however, does not suffice to meet the demands of a philosophical æsthetics, the conceptual task of which it is to understand, with the aid of this material, the conditions under which a disinterested pleasure can be general. It is only in this sense that the æsthetic inquiry becomes part of the philosophical theory of values.

§ 18

The Beautiful.—Differences of taste—Criticism of the idea of equal diffusion—Majority and authority—Play of the intellectual forces—Formalistic æsthetics—Play of the feelings and moods—Emotional sympathy—Importance—The sensuous and suprasensuous—The beautiful as a symbol of the good—The sublime—Freedom in the appearance—Illusion—The æsthetic object—Sensuous appearance of the idea.

By the beautiful in the broader sense we understand the æsthetic object generally. If we attempt to draw up a definition of it by comparing everything that comes under the head of "beautiful" anywhere, our inductive procedure will not be as fruitful as in the case of goodness. Not only different nations and ages, but even different individuals in the same environment, vary so much in æsthetic judgment that no consistent principle can be discovered in their ideas. The only result we can reach in this way has been justly formulated in the trivial phrase that a thing is beautiful if it pleases anybody—the bankruptcy of æsthetic investigation.

We now frequently speak of the æsthetic faculty as "taste," and differences of taste are so proverbial that we say there is no disputing about such a matter. It is not a question of such deep feeling as in differences of moral judgment. In that case it is a question of weal or woe, a question of vital interest; but questions

of taste refer precisely to things in which no interest is involved, and they are irrelevant to the great issues of life. We take contradictions on such matters with comparatively greater tranquillity. Yet we do not like them, and we try to impose our taste on others; and in doing this we distinguish the beautiful from the agreeable and useful. There are, however, no firm limits in this respect. Even a difference of "taste" in the original sensuous meaning of the word excites in the untrained mind a surprise that only gradually disappears with experience. In the æsthetic field we seek to claim, as far as possible, general validity for our taste. When, however, there is a quarrel about it, we cannot appeal to definitions, norms, maxims, or principles. We oppose impression to impression, feeling to feeling. We can give no proof or definition of æsthetic universal validity. That is the logical difficulty of the æsthetic problem. We find particular judgments, which are valid only for the individual thing and person as emotional impressions; yet the question arises where there is in this something that transcends the individual and his validity. In any case there is the consequence that Kant drew: æsthetics is not a normative doctrine. There is no æsthetic imperative, as there is a moral or logical imperative; and we can work out a critique of the æsthetic attitude only in the sense that we can draw up the possibilities and conditions of the general diffusibility of the æsthetic judgment. These, then, are the limits of our science; it has no rules. For the various arts there are technical rules, and an observance of these is an indispensable condition of artistic achievement. But for æsthetic creation generally there are no more rules than there are for æsthetic enjoyment. The proportion of universal validity in this field is therefore of the scantiest, and on that account it is the chief department of life for personal activity.

From all this it is intelligible why in this province psychology looms so large and there is so little left for philosophy. Hence æsthetics is much nearer than the other two philosophical disciplines, logic and ethics, to the frontier between philosophy and psychology,

and it must on that account pay all the more attention to this frontier. We must not suppose that we can pass from a registration of the facts of pleasantness to a normative science. At the most we may reach a relatively normal—a standard that is actually valid within the limits of a period or a nation or some even narrower range, and almost as changeable as fashion. From the empirical point of view there are only two ways of doing this: the way of majority and the way of authority. The rule of the masses is, however, more brutal and deadening in this field than in any other. In the masses, one may say, there is almost no specifically æsthetic element; it is there only in so far as it assists the expression of some other content of value, and this may just as well be common pleasure as religious or ethical conviction. It is better on the side of authority. The æstheticist must credit himself with good taste, and assume it on the part of those whom he addresses. We do not speak necessarily of what are called connoisseurs, who go ways of their own and follow certain tendencies (especially in technical matters) in the province of plastic art or of music. We are thinking rather of consulting men of considerable intellectual cultivation who have experienced this enjoyment without desire and found in it a new life; though their judgments are in the first instance only psychological facts, and they are therefore part of the broadest and most extensive field of material to which the critical mind addresses itself.

The task of this critical mind is to discover in æsthetic pleasure the special element which has a super-individual, super-anthropological, super-empirical value. It is from the start clear that beauty as a predicate of value does not mean a property in a thing or state or relation which is to be described in theoretical knowledge, but it is something that arises in the judgment of an emotional subject. That, however, does not prevent us from asking what properties must be present in the theoretically determinable object in order that it shall excite the æsthetic judgment of value in a receptive mind. Kant did this, for instance, in the case of the sublime, but in his analysis

of the beautiful he tried to confine himself almost entirely to the subjective world.

Kant found the super-individual element in the play of the two faculties of knowledge, sensitiveness and intelligence. This was an effect of the analogy with logic out of which æsthetics historically arose, and it laid the foundation of an intellectual development of æsthetics. It is a question mainly of the type of presentation, and this, Kant said, was conditioned by the forms of knowledge. All content, he thought, was related to interest, whether hedonist or moral, and therefore disinterested pleasure pertained to the form. The important point in this relation of the æsthetic attitude to the mere presentation and its form is its indifference as regards the empirical reality of the object. It acts only in virtue of the way in which it is presented. We must not, however, suppose that it is necessary for the object to be unreal in the ordinary sense of the word; otherwise there could be no beauty in nature as such. What is meant in this respect is merely that we do not get as far as the empirical reality. In popular psychology we might express it in the sense that the æsthetic object is realised, not by perception, but by the imagination, and that in such case there is question of a purposive co-operation of the sensory perception and the intellectual comprehension of its contents. But purposiveness of this nature can only be found if these two elements, presentation and imagination, balance each other, or, as Kant said, are in harmony. Thus vitality and diversity of the sensory material and lightness and transparency of its arrangement would be equally necessary in all beautiful things.

Another consequence of Kant's theory was the tendency toward a formal and formalistic æsthetics. From this point of view Herbart defined the aim of this general æsthetics to be a theory of the original pleasure in relations and situations. These in turn may certainly be divorced in presentation from the realities in which they are found, and so here again the æsthetic pleasure is not necessarily related to the reality of the object. The application of

this general principle to the special questions which we call æsthetic in the usual sense of the word was made, according to Herbart, by his pupil Zimmermann, and to music in general literature by Hanslick. The latter point brings us to a burning question in the development of modern music: namely, whether the play of the airs has its æsthetic value solely in itself, or whether it acquires this, or increases it, by its relation to what it means. In Kant's theory the weakness in regard to its formal application was the meaninglessness which he had to ascribe to the real object of æsthetic pleasure on account of the immateriality of the content; and in this respect Herder's polemic was not altogether without justification. Kant had found himself compelled to distinguish between free and dependent beauty, and to see free or pure beauty only in flowers, arabesques, and similar meaningless structures in nature and art. How far this meaninglessness applies to the various arts—music, for instance—we need not determine here, but will be content to mention it as an important problem of modern æsthetics. Formalistic æsthetics can only be impugned when it claims this meaninglessness in principle for all beauty and in all art. It will then encounter the difficulty, that Kant himself was compelled to exclude from the province of free beauty, and relegate to the category of dependent beauty, precisely the beauty which is to us the most valuable of all, and particularly all that is connected with the life of man. This shows that the æsthetic object in the vast majority of cases acts, not only as such, but by its content-elements, and these are in some way dependent upon the relation to reality.

In this respect we can understand why we do not seek the super-individual element of the æsthetic effect on the intellectual side, but find the element of significance precisely in the connection of values. But from this field volitions are excluded because of the peculiar nature of the æsthetic state, and there remained only the province to which Kant had already relegated the æsthetic problem in his systematics: the province of feeling. For the play of the faculties of knowledge,

therefore, must be substituted a play of feelings and dispositions. That would, in fact, be the decisive direction, corresponding to the systematic position of æsthetics in regard to feeling as the third psychic function, after presentation and will. Kant had misplaced it because, in view of the rationalistic character of his teaching, he could not regard the irrational as the essential element in a rational function. But it is precisely this which recent psychological æsthetics aims at wherever it speaks of in-feeling. The object, we are told, becomes æsthetic as soon as we read into it or out of it a certain movement of our feelings and disposition. Its theoretically determinable properties must in some way be of such a character that they can excite in us these feelings and moods and their varying movements. Psychological theory distinguished between after-feeling and feeling at the time, but these are two elements which, though they may be in different proportions in the various æsthetic effects, must nevertheless both be present. There must be something in the object that excites after-feeling in us, although we have to trace this mood as feeling at the time to the object as the æsthetically significant thing. Hence the principle of in-feeling is fully justified as the psychological expression for the element of significance in the æsthetic object; and in this psychological form we find an answer to the question which feelings and moods it is that are generally shareable, and therefore may be valuable in the æsthetic sense. The philosophy of art of Christiansen has recently attempted to answer this on the lines of the Critical method, but it meets a check in the relation between man's sensuous and supra-sensuous systems of impulses and the moods and feelings that arise therefrom. From this four strata of the æsthetic life develop in a very interesting way: the hedonistic, the comic, the beautiful, and the sublime. But in this construction the æsthetic disposition is always related to the antagonism between two impulses, which we may call the vital and the moral, the sensuous and the supra-sensuous. Hence, though in the æsthetic life there must be question of the play of feelings and moods, yet

this theory is voluntaristic on its psychological side, and it is foreshadowed to some extent in Schopenhauer's æsthetics of music, which purports to have explained music as the pure perception of the life of the will and therefore as the genuinely metaphysical art. Even this attempt, however, leads to the opposition of the sensuous and suprasensuous elements in man's nature; as it was for Kant the basis of the antithesis of sense and intelligence, the harmony of which is the beautiful and the clash of which is the sublime. Both these theories rest upon the strain between the two natures in man. The æsthetic relation presupposes a being that reaches from sensuous existence up to a transcendent world of reason. In the case of Kant, however, the suprasensuous is essentially the moral; as it is the same in this latest attempt at a philosophy of art. It ends, as did Kant's theory, in the conception of the beautiful as a symbol of the good, and finds therein the guarantee of a super-individual universal validity in the play of feelings and moods.

In this reduction of the æsthetic to the ethical the sublime is conceived as a special type of æsthetic relation, not subordinate to, but co-ordinate with, the beautiful. Psychologically the way was prepared by Edmund Burke, and Kant followed on the lines of the Critical method. If the sublime is explained by the triumph of the ethical-suprasensuous in man's being over his sensuous nature, it seems no longer to be a purely æsthetic relation, but an ethical-æsthetic combination; or it is at least one of the most important types of dependent beauty. For if this is to depend, as Kant thinks, upon the presentation of an "idea," we have in the sublime the highest of ideas, the moral law.

We find a moralising tendency also in the chief pupil of Kant in this field, Schiller. In his *Kalliasbriefen* he sought an objective standard of beauty, and tried to raise it above all that is specifically human; whereas at other times he proclaimed that, if not beauty in general, at least art was the characteristic property of man as

contrasted with higher as well as lower beings. In his objective theory, however, he again took the Kantian dualism of freedom and appearance as his starting-point. The autonomy or self-orientation which constitutes the essence of the moral super-world is never found as real in the appearance; but there arises a semblance of "freedom in the appearance" whenever the sensuous shape presents itself to us as so complete and self-contained that it seems to need nothing further for its reality. So it is with the æsthetic object; it is determined in itself, and it looks as if all its categorical relations to its environment were broken off. Hence Schopenhauer also, for whom, as is well known, causality was the only category of importance, characterised the æsthetic life as observation free from causality, and found the difference between art and science in the fact that science was observation from the point of view of causality. Self-sufficiency is the essential feature of the beautiful. Here the idea of an analogy to ethical self-determination departs from Schiller's formula of freedom in the appearance. The æsthetic autonomy is no longer voluntarist or moral; it is rather intellectual. This self-sufficiency, however, is not real as such; it is enjoyed in the appearance, and thus we have again an emphasis of the unreality of the æsthetic object. In the art-product the detachment from the rest of reality is particularly instructive; in natural beauty the detachment is not real, but exists merely for the "beautiful semblance."

This element of unreality has become very prominent in the modern theory of illusion. It is quoted most profitably for the explanation of the enjoyment of artistic beauty, particularly in regard to the plastic arts and the drama. Here, in fact, a conscious self-deception and a vacillation between deception and the consciousness of deception play a great part; and it must be particularly noted that in all these cases the coarse as well as the refined imitation which gives a substitute for reality rather enfeebles or destroys than enhances the æsthetic effect. "Art shall never attain to reality": that applies particularly to certain excesses of the modern theatrical

world. There are therefore fields in which illusion is of the very essence of æsthetic enjoyment and can never be entirely excluded. But it is very questionable if this feature is indispensable to all beauty, or even for all art. In architecture, for instance, illusion seems to have hardly any significance; and when we admire a fine tree or a noble cliff in nature, there is no question whatever of vacillation between deception and the consciousness of deception. For beauty in general the only consequence of the independence of reality of the object is that it arises, not so much in direct perception as in the imagination, as by the latter it is freed from all the associations which it would otherwise have for our knowledge and will. In this detachment the æsthetic object is, in fact, something new, something not real as such alone. It is just the same as with the object of scientific knowledge, the elements of which belong to reality, as we saw, though in its selection and new construction it must be taken as something independent. The only difference between the noetic and the æsthetic object is that what in the former is done by conceptions is done in the latter by the imagination. The reasons for this detachment of the æsthetic object from the great mass of experiences are often given by the elements of personal presentation. If they are to have general validity—if the æsthetic object is to become an independent value—that which detaches the object from all others must be determined by the nature of the matter. Here again the transcendental element of necessity and universal validity is given only in conformity to reality. The process of the æsthetic construction and enjoyment passes from the casual phenomenon to the true nature of the object and endeavours to grasp this with luminous clearness. If this sounds like an intellectualist version, as if æsthetic contemplation were in the long run an act of knowledge, we must remember that in this we merely indicate a condition of the universal validity of the æsthetic object; and this can be reconciled with the fact that the æsthetic state itself is based upon a play of feelings and moods which may arise in connection with such contemplation.

And in the second place we must emphasise the fact that the penetration into the nature of things which is achieved in the æsthetic contemplation is never a conceptual vision, but always an intuitive experience.

If, however, we seek the decisive mark of the beautiful in a vision of the essence of things, we pass beyond experience into the realm of the metaphysical. There is already a tendency of this sort, to some extent, in Schiller's formula. Freedom is in the Kantist sense the suprasensuous, and the beautiful is the appearance of the suprasensuous in the sensuous. That was implied in the metaphysical theory of the beautiful which modern philosophy has borrowed from antiquity. It was merely indicated by Plato, and developed with great energy by Plotinus: the beautiful is the sensuous appearance of the idea. This translucence of the suprasensuous in the sensible object was so strongly held by the Neo-Platonists of the Renaissance and by Shaftesbury that it persisted, enriched by the Kantist critique, in German idealists such as Schelling, Hegel, Solger, Weisse, Vischer, etc. We find this metaphysical æsthetics in its most characteristic form in Schelling, for whom art thus becomes the organon of philosophy. Science, he shows, in its ceaseless progress seeks the idea in the appearance without ever attaining to it; the moral life in its similar ceaseless advance *forms* the idea in the appearance without ever bringing it to full realisation. It is only in the vision of the beautiful that the idea is entirely present in its sensory appearance. Here the infinite has passed wholly into the finite, and the finite is wholly filled with the infinite. Thus every work of art exhibits what is otherwise given only in the totality of the real: namely, the realisation of the infinite idea in finite appearances. Hence for Schelling the universe is God's work of art, the incorporation of his idea in the sensory appearance; and beauty in nature is the art fashioned by God. And if the fact is emphasised that in all man's creations the infinite idea must struggle with the inadequacy of the sensory finite in which it has to manifest itself, this is the basis of Solger's theory of tragic and romantic irony. In all these specula-

tions, especially in Schelling and Hegel, the metaphysical theory of the beautiful was directed to art, particularly to poetry as the art in which the manifestation of the idea can be most visibly accomplished. In these circumstances, however, æsthetic enjoyment can only be understood by an analogy with artistic constructions: the origin of the æsthetic object in the imagination of the man who enjoys it must proceed in the same way as the creation of a work of art. When, in order to enjoy a landscape, we look for a point from which it is best seen, we compose lines and colours just as the artist does in painting a picture of the landscape. There is the same selection, the same new-forming synthesis, in both cases. We can only enjoy the beautiful as such in so far as there is something of the artist in us.

§ 19

Art.—Imitation—Entertainment, education, improvement—Play and the impulse to play—Aimless self-presentation—Genius—The unconscious-conscious in art.

Art, as we discuss it here, is generally distinguished as fine art from the other arts which have useful functions. Here again the essential feature is the absence of purpose. Every artistic activity creates; but fine art does not, like the others, create objects for use in daily life. There are, however, intermediate developments in which the frontiers disappear: as when we compare ordinary house-building and architecture, or a political or forensic speech with an æsthetic oration. Every manual work of art, in particular, is near these frontiers. Art in respect of its quality of not being needed is, like science, the offspring of leisure. Aristotle finely described this cultural value of leisure. Free from the pressure of daily needs, man creates for himself the new world of the beautiful and true. And precisely on that account the work of the artist has no value for the needs of daily life; which marks off the fine arts in general clearly from all other artistic activity and its products. It is remarkable that

scientific thought seems to have found the essential feature of creation (τὸ ποιητικόν) in a higher degree in the useful arts than in the arts of leisure. It could not resist the impression of inventiveness in face of the technical production of useful objects, and it regarded fine art chiefly as imitative art. It is, in fact, astounding that the Greek theory of art never got beyond this point of view, and that it never learned to appreciate the creative element which was just as abundant in the plastic art of the Greeks as in their poetry and music. It is more surprising than that Greek philosophy missed the creative or, as Kant says, spontaneous element in the object of knowledge, in which it is more difficult to detect. The peculiar subjection of the mind to what is presented, which the Greeks show in their theory of knowledge, is seen also in their conception of art as imitation. It was with this that Plato forged his weapons against the artists and formed his depreciatory judgment on art; it was supposed to imitate objects which are themselves mere imitations of higher types, the ideas. What we know of Aristotle's theory of art, from the surviving fragment of his *Poetics*, shows that he also held the theory that art is imitation. The whole of the critique and theory of art in modern times followed this path at first, and the final result of it was the Positivist conception of art formulated by Diderot. This naturalist theory expects of art, as of science, only a "true" description in harmony with reality, and it thus obliterates the frontiers between art and science.

As a matter of fact, imitation is indispensable to fine art. Even what is called the productive power of imagination is productive only in the sense of giving new combinations, but reproductive in regard to the elements of the inner and outer life, which as such cannot be created by the imagination, but must be experienced. To that extent, therefore, there is imitation in all art. On the other hand we must not forget that all imitation means itself a selection and re-combination, and that this is precisely the essential æsthetic element in it. The material is imitated, but the æsthetic shaping of it is never mere

imitation. Moreover, imitation is a natural impulse and is one of the fundamental features of all animal sociality, as modern mass-psychology has shown ; but the carrying out of this impulse excites only a feeling of pleasure like the satisfaction of any other impulse. In that, therefore, we have not the specifically æsthetic element. Joy in the capacity for imitation and its purely technical and often very difficult use means something in which the feeling of pleasure is neither more nor less than in the case of any other capacity. To paint cherries so well that the sparrows will peck at them—to carve marble so well that the spectator will try to take the lace from the lady's shoulders or feel the velvet of her dress—to compose music so that one seems to hear the blood drip from the head which has been cut off—all this may very well be an object of technical ambition, but it is rather a piece of art than art.

In no case is imitation a value of universal validity in itself. If therefore art were merely imitation, its value could not be in itself, but in what it does with the imitation. As a matter of fact, that is the idea of the theories of imitation. First entertainment is taken as a fitting occupation of one's leisure ; and for many men this is still the whole meaning and value of their interest in art. What people seek and find in the theatre and concert, in picture-galleries and exhibitions, or in reading novels, is much more a pleasant way of passing the time than an enjoyment of art as such. Somewhat higher aims have been assigned to imitative art in education and moral improvement. The idea of the *Aufklärung* was that art and the æsthetic life generally should be pressed into the service of intellectual or moral improvement, and aims and rules of a pedantic educational nature and a moralising tendency were to be assigned to it. To this corresponded the psychological theory of the æsthetic life generally, which regarded it as a happy transition from a state of sensuous impulses to one of rational activity. The enjoyment of the beautiful tames the savagery of the sensual man. It teaches him to observe without desires, and thus makes him free for the higher values of truth and

morality. It agrees with this that art and the æsthetic life generally appeal only to the two higher senses, the senses concerned with things at a distance, vision and hearing, which remove the stimulation from one's own body and are far from a sensuous enjoyment of the object. In this is correctly indicated the æsthetic distance by which, in every case, the enjoyment of the beautiful shall be removed from its object. In the imitative theories this was considered only a negative and preparatory element. The positive value of art was supposed to consist in what it did for morality and knowledge. It had therefore no intrinsic value.

Schiller, taking his stand on the Critical philosophy and going beyond these theories, sought the proper value of the æsthetic in the adjustment of the two natures of man, and this he found in play. It is true that he meant this in a sense which seemed to give great prominence to the anthropological element. Schiller took the sensuous and the moral impulses to be an original antagonism in man's nature, as Kant did, and thought that he found in the impulse to play that which brought about a reconciliation of our dual nature. Hence art was supposed to be specifically human, and peculiar to man :

In industry the bees surpass thee,
A worm could feats of skill to thee impart,
Exalted spirits in thy science share—
But thou alone, O man, hast art.

That is based upon the metaphysical assumption that these exalted spirits are devoid of sense ; that they have not the sensory experience of the inner life. It follows that it is in man alone that the great antitheses of reality are combined.

Apart from this, Schiller's theory of the impulse to play has been entirely confirmed and much developed in modern biology and psychology. In the play of children, animals, and primitive peoples we see the evolutionary preparatory stage of art. Dancing, singing, and adornment are the rudiments of it ; and in unconscious co-operation therewith

we have, as important elements in its development, the erotic play of courtship on the one hand, and on the other the social forms of play which, especially in the shape of rhythm, ennoble daily toil and relieve what is otherwise tedious and joyless. The impulse of play has also been called the function-impulse, to the satisfaction of which there is attached a pure pleasure, even when it seems to have no aim and no serious meaning. In the proper sense, however, there is no æsthetic significance in play of this description, and we may ask what must be the nature of its content to give any æsthetic value to play. All play is a copy of something serious. It imitates a vital activity which is seriously concerned with real things and purposes. Hence it is that play so easily turns into earnest, as one sees in the case of children. As long as it remains pure play, we are at some distance from the serious life which it imitates, and we thus freely enjoy the proper content of life at a distance. Hence play is higher according to the value of the life-content which is represented in it, detached from the seriousness of real willing. Æsthetic play is, therefore, when the deepest and highest reality of life is copied in it. Hence all art, as æsthetic production, is self-presentation and self-forming in play. The inner content expresses itself, where it claims the seriousness of life, desire and conduct, by means of action and enjoyment. Where there is neither of these things, the inwardness breaks out in a sensuous shape which gives pure joy. Hence art is, as Benedetto Croce says, expression endowed with intuition itself, and life passes into appearance more purely and perfectly in this purposeless expression than when it develops in serious work and the restriction of this to the casual and particular by action and enjoyment. In this sense art is, Guyau says, the most intensive enhancement of life that we know. Here, then, is the real meaning of what we found called the unreality of the æsthetic object: all idealising and style aim in the long run at giving a pure and perfect expression of one's own life in the sensory appearance.

The capacity to do this is the power of æsthetic production, or what we call genius. This idea again has

changed a good deal in the course of time. It was defined *ex eventu* when it was said that genius is a model and standard for posterity and critics. One goes a little deeper in pointing out that the genius does not create according to rules, but produces the new and beautiful out of itself ; and Kant saw deepest of all into the nature of the æsthetic life, from which he was so remote, when he said that genius is an intelligence which acts as nature does. In this much-quoted phrase both the inward necessity and the undesigning purposiveness of the formative power of the æsthetic personality are expressed. The inward necessity means the impulse and force of the undesigning self-presentation. The impulse and the force: both together make the genius, but it does not follow that they are both given together. Rather, there is, perhaps, nothing in the world more difficult to endure, nothing that is more disturbing, than the unhappy condition of the half-genius, in whom the impulse is found without the power to carry it out. That is a misfortune of the artistic life that even the greatest experiences at the limits of his productive power. It is a deep shadow cast from the heights of human life. These limits cannot be passed by any toil and exertion, because the creative power of art is rooted in the unconscious. That is why the artist is usually averse from theory and philosophising. It does not help him ; indeed, it threatens to disturb him. It is we others who need to understand his nature and activity and determine its place in the general fabric of civilised values. And in attempting to do so we stumble against the irrational in the creative work of the artist.

Hence Schelling gave a happy turn to Kant's definition when he defined genius as "the unconscious-conscious." The artistic activity exhibits a mutual play of conscious and unconscious processes which can never be rationally explained. The artist must create because of an impulse to self-realisation of which he is not the master. From this unconscious depth there emerge into his consciousness the images of what is to be. How he embodies them, what particular shape he gives them, is again determined by something in the unconscious depths. The creation

is accompanied by conscious criticism, but the positive element of achievement is not a matter of cunning and calculation ; it comes as a fortunate chance from the unconscious depths of life. This is what the Greeks felt when they spoke of some divine madness, the *μανία* of the poet. The affinity of genius to madness refers only to this mingling of conscious and unconscious functions, which evades all control of analytic thought ; it by no means contains the pathological element that has at times, on the strength of this analogy, been wrongly ascribed to the nature of the genius. On the contrary, the self-realising of the genius is, precisely because in it the conscious reaches into the sub- or super-conscious, the personal into the super-individual, the human into the metaphysical, the redemptive power which men have always felt and prized as the divine in art. This significance, however, pertains to the genius only in the highest stages of his creativeness, and the artist himself is, like all his activity, in the general affairs of life hampered by all the failings of humanity, from which a transcendent value emerges only in his most perfect achievements. He must constantly wrest this value from reluctant reality, and he finds himself oppressed by it in his self-realisation :

The noblest thing that spirit e'er conceived
Is with some foreign stuff adulterate.

CHAPTER III

RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

LOGICAL, ethical, and æsthetic values make up the entire range, for philosophical inquiry, of the human value-activity which, as distinct from the amenities and utilities of ordinary life, can lay claim to general recognition and the necessity of actual unconditionedness. In them we have traversed the three provinces of the psychic life—presentation, will, and feeling—and in each of these provinces we have explained how the valuation of the empirical mind has a significance that transcends the mind itself. The normative general consciousness which is thus indicated is in its empirical form the collective consciousness of any particular historical structure in the human chronicle: in its ideal form the cultural unity of the whole race: in its metaphysical significance a rational community of spiritual primary reality that transcends all experience. There can be, as regards content, no further universal values beyond these three, because in these the entire province of psychic activity is exhausted; and we cannot, in point of fact, name any value that does not belong to one of these provinces. When, in spite of this, we speak of a realm of religious values, which may be comprised under the title of the sacred, we mean that all these values may assume religious forms. We know a religious guarantee of truth, religious motives of conduct, and religious feelings of many kinds. Even sensuous enjoyment may in some circumstances, as in the case of orgiastic conditions, assume a religious form and become sacred. From this we get that universal significance of religion in virtue of which it embraces the whole life of man; and from this also we understand why the treat-

ment of religious philosophy must always be one-sided if it is subordinated to or incorporated in one of the special philosophic disciplines—logic, ethics, or æsthetics—as a derivative part. Religion was for a time treated philosophically, from the point of view of theoretical reason—that is to say, as knowledge. Its centre of gravity was then put in the province of practical reason, and it was converted into a species of ethic. Lastly, its home has been sought in the province of the æsthetic reason, and it has been represented as mainly a mode of feeling. But the comprehensive content of religion cannot be understood in any one of these ways, without—consciously or unconsciously—using the others at the same time.

If we seek the common feature in all the valuations which can thus assume a religious complexion, we find that it is always the relation of the values to a supramundane, superempirical, suprasensuous reality. This element of otherworldliness is so characteristic of the essence of religion that, when it is excluded, we get some such caricature as the Positivist Religion of Humanity. This is not the place to resume the various elements which lead to this enhancement of the essential valuations. That is the business of the history and psychology of religion, and they have a broad and far from exhausted field for their investigations. Philosophy is concerned only with the question where we must, in all circumstances, seek the reason for this change of the sensuous into the suprasensuous. We shall not find it in the contents of particular values, but in the character of universal validity of these values.

§ 20

The Sacred.—The sacred not a special province of values—Conscience as an otherworldly phenomenon—The superempirical union of persons—God as a suprasensuous reality—Ejection of the mythical from religious philosophy—Relation of religion to the other provinces of culture—The classification of religions—Pious sentiment and its influence on ideas—Two meanings of the suprasensuous.

By the sacred we do not mean any special class of universally valid values, such as those which constitute

the true, the good and the beautiful, but all these values together in so far as they are related to a suprasensuous reality. We seem to be justified in assuming such a relation by the experiences which our consciousness sustains from the exercise of its own activity and from the aspiration, based thereon, after ultimate and absolute principles of valuation. In our mental life we cannot be satisfied with the empirical forms of the general mind to which we are conducted by an inquiry into logical, ethical, and æsthetical values. The division within itself which conscience means, since it opposes the judged subject to the judging, suffices up to a certain point for the sociological explanation of the actual and approximative universal validity of the valuation. That is supposed to be true which corresponds with general opinion: that false which contradicts it. Thus also every violation of custom is bad, and every feeling that runs counter to tradition is perverse. In this way it might seem as if the division in conscience were reduced to an opposition between the normative general mind and the special functions of the individual whom the general mind finds to be part of itself. But this is only apparent. It might be true if this general mind were, as an actually general mode of presentation, will, and feeling, something fixed and absolute. That it is not. It not only varies in the different historical phenomenal forms of society, but it is gradually changed by each of them. Progress in the evolution of the general mind consists, as we saw, in an original sin on the part of the individual, who rebels against the current valuation. In this, however, the individual does not rely upon his arbitrary will. He appeals to a higher court. He ascends from the temporal to the eternal and divine law, and is the champion of this against a world of contradiction. The investigator or the thinker defends his new result, the reformer his ideal, the artist his new form; and in them conscience transcends the social phenomenal form of the general mind and reaches transcendental and metaphysical reality. There are, of course, innumerable illusions in this. But, however much false prophets may err, the undeniable right of appeal to

the highest court remains. We usually recognise this situation in the province of knowledge, and why should it not hold also for conflicts of the ethical and æsthetic life? If it does, it provides a proof of a vital connection of personalities which transcends experience. Just as conscience as a social phenomenon is possible only through the reality of the common social life, so conscience as a consciousness of value beyond all the chances of space and time is possible only in virtue of a still deeper connection. There is revealed in it a spiritual depth of life which presupposes, not merely the collective social mind, but a supramundane court. And since this social mind forms the ultimate and highest synthesis empirically, this absolute reason of conscience must be sought beyond experience. Augustine claimed that the distinction between true and false, which makes judgment possible in us, implies the reality of the highest truth as the principles on which this judgment rests. Descartes similarly said that our appreciation of different degrees of perfection in all finite things and in ourselves can only be based upon the reality of the most perfect being. Even in Plato's theory that all higher knowledge is recollection we have this belief in the reality of value, and of the norm of the idea and the ideal, which transcends life in time. It is the Socratic feeling that truth is not our discovery or our illusion, but a value that is rooted in the ultimate depths of reality; that in it we experience something that goes beyond the empirical existence, not only of the individual, but also of the race.

In this sense the life of values demands a metaphysical anchorage, and, if we give the name God to this super-empirical vital connection of personalities, we may say that his reality is given in the reality of conscience itself. God is just as real as conscience. The life of values which is conscious of these connections may be called the life of man in God, or religion. It is, of course, clear that this chain of thought is not a proof in the sense of empirical thought; but it contains a postulate that is rigorously involved in the nature of valuation the moment it would rise above individual and historical relativity.

Hence this metaphysical anchorage of valuation is more than a feeling of conviction or a belief, which might be merely an opinion or an illusion. Kant's theory, that this superempirical connection of life is not a matter of knowledge that is restricted to the world of the senses, but of a rationally necessitated belief, has been conceived in the sense that this postulate of the belief contains an ideal that holds only as a guarantee in the interest of reason, and that it might therefore very well be merely an illusion or fiction for a practical purpose. Albert Lange weakened the force of Kant's idea in this way, and the recent "Philosophy of the as-if" followed him. In point of fact, however, this relation to a supersensuous reality is found in the content of conscience, which is just as real an experience as any other that we use in constructing our knowledge of the world. Even if all the ideas we form of it are figurative and inept, even if they are illusions or fictions, the relation itself is unquestionable; it is, as Kant said, the fact of pure reason. And on this we rely when we would be certain that the religious problem is real, and not a fictitious problem of philosophy.

What we have here tried to make clear indicates the way in which philosophic thought is led from its own highest problems to the problem of religion. Prescientific thought approaches the problem in quite other and very different ways, and it raises questions so many of which are scientifically unanswerable by philosophy that we must seek some principle which will enable us to exclude from consideration those constituents of religious thought that are alien to philosophy. The mythical faculty, without which there can be no religion, is provided by the pressure of imagination and of empirical wishes with an abundance of contents which, though they may here and there offer possibilities of interpretation in detail, are quite beyond scientific explanation. These imaginative elements of the religious life, which have not, and cannot claim, any general validity as facts or, still less, as norms, must be studied by the history and psychology of religion. The philosophy of religion can

only take them into account as side-issues, when it considers religion as a sociological fact and interprets it, on critical lines, as an historical phenomenon, showing how its conceptual nature is realised in the empirical vital forms of society. The core and proper sphere of the inquiries of the philosopher of religion are the questions which consider how far this superempirical connection of personalities is related with a rational realm of values.

We reach the same result when we start with a conception of the task of philosophy as a philosophy of civilisation. We are accustomed to count religion as one of the great cultural forms together with science, art, morality, law, and the State, but the consideration we have just given teaches us in principle that there can be no question of the complete co-ordination of religion with the other forms. These others have each their peculiar kind of value in the content which they realise in the life of humanity, but religion has no such special province of values. It consists in the metaphysical tincture and relation which all these values may assume. Religion would be deprived of its universal significance if the sacred were marked off from the other cultural provinces as a special section of the life of values. Wherever this is attempted in practice, religion becomes rigid and sapless. When it is done in theory, it prevents an insight into the essential relations between religion and secular life. The course of history is in its general features in harmony with this. We now know all four cultural forms as differentiated departments, often overlapping with religion, but clearly distinct from it in their nature. But this was not always the case. The further we go back into the past, the more we find a religious complexion even in the secular aspects of life. All science has developed from myths and dogmas, all artistic creation from practices of worship, all morality from the religious obligation of conscience, all State organisation from the religious bonds of society. From these differentiated and secularised institutions religious reactions and new growths are quite distinct. They take the secularised forms of civilisation back into the religious unity, and

the process of differentiation has to begin over again. European evolution shows this feature of the history of civilisation in all its phases. Greece and Rome develop the outer forms of culture out of the religious matrix in the clearest fashion. With the science of the Ionics knowledge is detached from the mythical imagination: in Greek comedy and plastic art the secularisation of the æsthetic life is completed: the ethic of Epicurus brings about a conception of life entirely free from religion: and the secular political organisation of Rome, even where it retains some external remnant of its religious origin, stands clear of the whole group of religions which wage war on each other within its frontiers. Afterwards, at the time of the great migrations of peoples, the religious reconstruction begins. It opens with the clash of religions, which ends in the triumph of Christianity, and Christianity takes back science, art, morality, and political life into its religious form. Thus it was in the Middle Ages. But from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth we see the other institutions of civilisation gradually awoken to a sense of independence and assume an increasingly secular form, which remains a luminous standard for all future time. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, a new reaction seems to set in, and all the signs of the times seem to promise a fresh period of religious integration. A new wave of strong religiosity sweeps over old Europe. The ecclesiastical forces, especially the Roman, work cleverly to direct it into their bed. They have to struggle against the multitude of sects, the rich growth of which affords the best proof of the religious pressure of the time. Far less dangerous for them is the mystical tendency which has infected the thought of our time in the sense that a philosophy to-day seems to be able to count upon a stretch of reality when it takes these elements into consideration. The mystical intuition, which forswears a conceptual knowledge of its subject, abounds in picturesque language and glowing imagination, but it yields no firm and distinct results. It is a thing of moods; and, as history repeatedly teaches us, it merely loosens the soil for

ecclesiastical dogmatism to sow its seed and reap the fruits in its own domination.

The religions which owe their own origin to an advanced stage of civilisation, such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, adopt the valuations of the other departments of culture as parts of their own life, and give them a new complexion. In the case of other religions, which have developed out of primitive conditions with the peoples who hold them, and suffered State and morality, art and science, to grow out of them as independent structures, all these values are from the start included in the religious unity. Thus these relations to the other departments of culture are common to all religions, and they have been rightly characterised and classified, according to the predominance of one or other element, as æsthetic, theoretical, ethical, and ritualistic religions. This shows, however, that the value is to be sought always in the other fields, and that the specific religious element must be sought only in the relation of these to a transmundane validity. This is, therefore, the essential thing in religion that offers itself to philosophic inquiry. All the special forms which this otherworldliness assumes in the imagination, feeling, and conduct of the religious man must remain the subject of empirical investigation.

The connection with a higher world of values is first felt in the empirical consciousness, and Schleiermacher has justly described the devout feeling of "simple dependence" as the foundational fact of the religious life. This feeling, however, in its naïve and simple primitiveness, knows nothing about the object to which it is related. Psychologically considered, it is one of the indefinite feelings, and even Schleiermacher connects it first only with a world-unity in the Pantheistic sense of Spinoza. To embrace and explain the totality of the psychic life this feeling must be given in presentation. Only then can it develop in the external life as a motive of will and conduct and organise itself as a specific religious community in a Church. But this definition of devout feeling in presentation is not possible as knowledge; and in that we have the fundamental problem of religious existence,

For knowledge, which in the last resort must be capable of scientific proof, comprehends only the world of experience, and in this instance there is question of the relation of this world of experience to what is beyond experience. Of this relation our knowledge can attain only one element ; the other we know only by postulating the relation itself, and out of these two elements we cannot construct that which is beyond experience. Instead of knowledge, therefore, we get a presentation which claims another sort of validity. This is the *mythos*, in the general sense of the word ; much as Hegel described religion as the form of presentation of the Absolute in consciousness. Here we have the same relation as that which Kant, in his "transcendental dialectic," described in regard to the attempts to create a philosophic-dogmatic metaphysics. It is a question of something that is not experienced, but must necessarily be thought, yet cannot be known solely by its relation to experience. Hence the constantly recurring attempt to attain the impossible, and the failure of every such attempt. Just in the same way all the historical religions attempt to give some sort of form in presentation to the object of pious feeling. They do not attain any knowledge that can be proved, but merely the self-shaping of their inner life in the "presentational" mind. This significance must be conceded to the *mythos* in every form ; but this is all it can claim. It is only in this way that it is protected from the criticism of scientific thought, which otherwise would have to bring to bear upon it its logical principles, its principles of contradiction and sufficient reason. This criticism is disarmed in respect of the *mythos* when it purports to be no more than a presentational expression of the religious feeling ; for the latter, being a relation between the knowable and the unknowable, inevitably has in it a character of irrationality. The truth that the mythical presentation can lay claim to is, therefore, Pragmatist. It is, in fact, the most important field for the application of the Pragmatist conception of truth. For it means the mental satisfaction of the religious craving beyond the limits of any possible knowledge.

Hence in the course of philosophic thought we cannot

deal with any of the questions which the mythical presentations, or the dogmatic teachings in which they are elaborated by the actual religions, involve. They are, it is true, the occasion for most men of the birth of doubt in regard to their naïve ideas, and therefore they lead to philosophy. In ordinary life we mean chiefly by "sceptic" the man who has begun to question the traditional religious teaching. There are many questions with which the mind of youth, especially, torments itself under the pressure of traditional dogmas, and which, nevertheless, can never be problems of philosophy, because they presuppose purely mythical views. Doubts of this kind cannot in detail be solved by philosophic thought. It can only consider in a general way what elements of the religious reality are accessible to the scientific mind. The essential thing is to inquire to what extent man belongs to this suprasensuous vital order which forms the essence of every religious affirmation. In that sense alone can the truth of religion be considered from the point of view of philosophy.

Before we go into this, it is advisable to point out the ambiguity of the idea of the suprasensuous world in the ordinary way of thinking and speaking, which leads to a good deal of misunderstanding. We find the word used by Kant himself in two different ways; by which he got out of many difficulties, but created greater difficulties. If by "sensory" we understand, according to the direct meaning of the word, what is accessible to the bodily senses and knowable through them, it is the same thing as corporeal or material. On these lines the non-sensory or suprasensual is the incorporeal or immaterial: that is to say, everything without exception that is not body or bodily movement. The soul with all its states and activities belongs to this incorporeal or suprasensuous world, according to general opinion as well as all philosophic theories except the Materialistic. But that is not what is meant when we speak of the suprasensuous in the sense of religious metaphysics. Here there is question of the relation of the mundane to the transmundane, and therefore the entire psychic life, as far as it can be experienced,

belongs to the mundane. When we thus bring the psychic into relation with the world of sense, we may express it by speaking of the "inner sense" as the form or faculty of knowledge in which we have experience of the psychic functions and come to know them. The difficulty of the ambiguity is, therefore, that in one sense the sensory excludes the psychic life, and in the other includes it; to put it the other way about, the psychic life is part of the suprasensuous on one view, and not part of it on the other. The difficulty was felt by Plato, in whose teaching the soul belongs to the world of appearances, but is related to the world of suprasensuous forms, and is able to perceive them. He solved the difficulty by regarding the soul as the highest and best thing in the corporeal world. The ambiguity of sensuous and suprasensuous is still more marked in Kant's philosophy. As long as we remain in the field of theoretical reason the sensory world, which we can know, is conceived in the sense of the world of experience, to which the objects of the inner sense, the psychic states, belong just as strictly as do the objects of the outer senses, bodies. The suprasensuous here is the realm of what lies beyond experience, of the unknowable, which we have to think, though we cannot attribute to it any content of our experience. But the moment we pass to the field of practical philosophy, the moral life becomes part of the suprasensuous, and is opposed to the life of sensuous impulses. The suprasensuous fills itself with experiences of the moral consciousness, and is opposed to all that is defined and conditioned by a relation to the bodily life, and by man's belonging to the world of sense or matter. Out of this vacillation in the use of the word arises the fundamental religious problem, how in man the psychic life reaches from the sensuous world to the suprasensuous

§ 21

The Truth of Religion.—Faith and knowledge—Natural religion and rational religion—The immortality of the soul—The transmigration of souls—The substance of souls—The postulate of freedom—Posthumous justice—The Faust-like impulse to live on—Personalistic pluralism—Soul and spirit—The philosophical idea of God—Proofs of the existence of God—The ontological proof and Pantheism—The cosmological proof and Deism—The teleological proof and Theism.

The first contact between knowledge and faith, between philosophy and religion, was inimical. The thinkers of the school of Miletus, in whom the scientific thought of the Greeks begins, put their physical and metaphysical hypotheses in the place of the ideas which they found in popular beliefs, in the æsthetic national mythos, and in cosmogonical poetry; and out of their teaching the poet-philosopher Xenophanes forged his weapons in his struggle with the anthropomorphism which was common to all these forms of faith. Thus science created a new conception of God, having little but the name in common with the traditional view, and this new creation encountered the movement toward Monotheism that was taking place in general thought. In the great vitality and subtle differentiation which distinguished the religious life amongst the Greeks it was inevitable that the various deities should blend with each other, and this was in harmony with the Henotheistic feature which was present in Greek mythology from the start, since it expressed the idea of fate or of the preponderance of a single deity such as Zeus. Science co-operated very powerfully in the victorious development of Monotheism, and since that time all its positive relations to religion have been restricted to Monotheism. The relics of polytheistic and polydæmonistic myths, which even the great civilised religions partly retained and partly reabsorbed in the course of time, lie entirely beyond the range of philosophical inquiry. The evolution of Monotheism, on the other hand, coincides with the change which we regard as the transition to moral religion, an essential

feature of which is that the Deity shall be endowed with ethical predicates. Amongst the Greeks this change occurs in the very period in which scientific criticism of religion was born. The gnostic poetry represents Zeus as the supporter of the moral order, whilst the ridicule which Xenophanes poured upon the popular belief had reference not only to the imagining of the gods in physical human shape, but particularly to the fact that human experiences such as birth and death, human sins like murder and adultery and lying, were imputed to them. The new conception of Deity, which philosophy helped to elaborate, combines the metaphysical idea of a single world-principle with the idea of a supreme court of the moral life. Hence there arose an antagonism between the religion of science and the religion of the people. With the conceptual forms of the Sophists the Cynics and the Stoics taught that there was only one God according to nature and truth, but there were many according to human belief and the changes of opinion. In the course of time the conflict of religions in the Middle Ages, in the period of the Arabian philosophers, and then the struggle of sects in the West led to a distinction between positive religions, which are based upon history, and a natural religion based upon reason. The eighteenth century in particular sought this unsectarian religion: a religion that could be understood and proved, and which should represent the essential and significant things in all religion.

Opposed to a natural religion of this character are all the arguments we quoted previously in dealing with natural law. And there is a special difficulty in the case of religion. If there were such a natural religion, its teaching could be established in the same way as a mathematical theorem, and there would then be only one religion. But it would no longer be a religion, because it is part of the fundamental pious feeling that its object is vague and undefined. This forms the mystery of it, and without mystery there is no religion. Hence science is ill advised to attempt to construct a

religion out of its knowledge. Wherever this has been attempted, the result has been an anæmic structure which secured no community, and was unsuited to secure one. Indeed, even positive religion is equally ill advised when it attempts to convert itself into a demonstrable doctrine. It then exposes itself to all the dangers which arise for the irrational content of life from clash with rational thought, and it divests itself of the mystery which is of its very essence. "Christianity without mysteries" was an unhappy idea of the eighteenth century. Hence, however necessary the construction of dogmas may be in the ecclesiastical organisation and for the purposes of its external life—as Plato very clearly shows in his ideal State, which has a deeply religious complexion—yet the intellectualising of the devout feeling is a great menace to its specifically religious energy. It has been said of Church-law that religion ends where it begins; and the same might be said of dogma, for they are parallel forms in the secularisation of religion.

In spite of these objections to the attempt to found a rational religion, it must be recognised that such attempts have brought out the two problems with which we have to deal in any philosophical discussion of the theoretical truth of religion. The poverty and anæmia of natural religion are due to the fact that it retains only two elements out of the whole apparatus of the religious mind: the belief in the existence of a just and good God as creator and ruler of the world and the belief in the immortality of the human soul. It is easy to see that there are remnants of anthropomorphism even in these formulæ of eighteenth-century thought. To the Deity, for instance, they do not, it is true, attribute any physical or morally reprehensible features, but they do ascribe a moralising tendency of a human sort. They are midway between the mythical ideas above which they would rise and the conceptual description of the transmundane with which philosophical inquiry is concerned. And this character shows in what direction we must look for the philoso-

phical elements which are the ultimate justification for the whole mass of religious ideas.

In the idea of immortality we have a combination of a number of elements derived from human needs ; and these are in part of a worldly origin and content, and they therefore chiefly determine the various forms in which the life of the soul after death is pictorially represented. We need not go into these different shapes which the imagination has given to the intellectual demand which is common to them all. It is our place rather to point out that this common element of them all is the metaphysical craving to secure for the human personality some significance that transcends the world of sense. We have found this craving fully justified in every form of the life of values : in the knowledge of science, in the unconditionedness of the moral judgment, and in the task of art. We need therefore give no special proof here. But religious thought has converted this into a temporal conception. If there were question only of the philosophical postulate in virtue of which the highest forms of valuation which we discharge as our own bring into the world of appearance a transcendental order of reason, the problem would assuredly have to be solved in an affirmative sense by a critique of the logical, ethical, and æsthetic activity. But ordinary religious thought demands the prolongation in time of the existence of the human individual beyond its earthly life, and it thus takes the problem into quite a different field. In this sense the belief in the immortality of the human soul first arose in the Dionysian religion of souls. In this the soul was regarded as a *dæmon* which, on account of some sin, was banished from the suprasensuous world to which it originally belonged, and put into an earthly body to expiate its sin and merit a return to its divine home. Hence in the original sense, as we see very clearly in the writings of Plato, immortality meant the transmigration of souls. It teaches pre-existence just as emphatically as post-existence. Indeed, in the case of Plato, it seems from the first argument for immortality in the

Phædo as if he particularly emphasised the pre-existence, and only inferred post-existence by analogy. The whole philosophy of life of the Dionysian religion is concentrated in this idea of transmigration of souls, according to which the *dæmons*, limited in number, wander restlessly through the world of living things, feeling all the misery of sin and repentance and at last finding rest with the gods who, in a state of eternal felicity, are raised above the whole of this turmoil. Later redemptive religions more or less vigorously rejected the idea of pre-existence, and confined their theory of immortality to post-existence. They see no difficulty in representing the soul as beginning to exist at a definite point in time and then continuing to exist for ever. Since then the task of apologetic thought has been to find a secure foundation for this perpetual post-existence of the human soul after its life on earth is over.

The theoretical arguments which may be used for this purpose are centred mainly about the conception of the substance of the soul. They lay stress upon the feature of indestructibility which, since the Eleatic metaphysics, has been inseparably connected with substantiality; and we need hardly point out that this applies also to the claim that the soul never began, as in the original idea of the transmigration of souls. Since it has been the custom in ecclesiastical metaphysics to count the soul amongst the finite substances created by God, and at the same time award it the character of indestructibility, the proof of immortality has been sought particularly along the line of proving the soul's substantiality. The earlier arguments, which were drawn from the idea of the soul as the ultimate cause of all movement and the principle of life, clearly prove too much. As far as they can be regarded as sound, they apply to all sorts of "souls," not merely the human soul; and they are generally connected with the primitive idea of the soul as a vital force which, as we have previously shown, has been more and more discarded in the progress of scientific thought, and replaced

by the idea of a bearer or vehicle of the functions of the mind. Now, if the soul in this sense were a simple substance—as it was in Descartes's metaphysic—it could neither be destroyed nor dissolved into simple constituents. This was the direction taken by Plato in his arguments in the *Phædo*, where he emphasised the inner unity and independence of the soul as contrasted with the composite character of the body. The chief stress in this was laid upon the antithesis of physical and psychic, and the "suprasensuous" nature of the soul was essentially found in its conscious functions. But we saw in the course of our analysis of the ontic problems of substance and causality the weakness of applying the category of substance to the facts of inner experience, and that modern psychology speaks rather of a functional than of a substantial unity of the individual psychic life. In any case, it is impossible to deduce from the categorical form of thought and speech the actual endless duration of that to which the form is applied. It is rather the other way about: verbal usage must be justified by actual proof of this particular feature of "surviving all the changes of time." And from the nature of the case this empirical proof must remain within the bounds of experience. Such survival might be conceived, perhaps, on the dualistic lines of psycho-physical causality, whereby, on the analogy of the nature of memory, one might speak of an indefinite persistence of the psychic contents beyond their temporal and bodily occasions. But, on the other hand, on the lines of psycho-physical parallelism it is difficult to think that the soul has not to share the fate of its body.

Considerations of this nature are merely an application, in harmony with modern empirical thought, of the criticism which Kant made in his *Paralogisms of Pure Reason* of the arguments which were current in the rational psychology of his time for the substantiality and immortality of the soul. He showed that these arguments are based upon a confusion of the logical subject with the real substratum. But he went on to show that the negative position, the denial of im-

mortality, is just as incapable of proof as the affirmative, and that here again we have one of the cases in which science ends in an insoluble antithesis, and so it is permitted to decide between the alternatives on the ground of an interest of practical reason. Hence his theoretical criticism kept open the possibility of an ethical metaphysic, in which the soul returned, not now under the name of substance, but as "intelligible character" and a reality of the suprasensuous world.

This brings us to what are called the moral arguments for the suprasensuousness of human nature. In the course of his ethics Kant finds this argument in the self-determination of the will without any other motive than the moral law—that is to say, in freedom. Since this is impossible in the world of sense, which is subject to the law of causality, the reality of freedom, without which there can be no morality, must be sought in the suprasensuous world; indeed, it is only by freedom that we learn its reality. In so far as a man belongs to this world of freedom he is a person and intelligible character, and is raised above time, which is merely the form of the phenomenal world. This is not the place to examine Kant's argument in detail: to ask whether the practical conception of freedom as self-determination by law is quite identical with the theoretical (transcendental) conception of freedom as the capacity to cause without being caused. We are rather concerned with the fact that we have precisely in this train of thought the decisive reason for lifting man as a moral being into a super-terrestrial world. But Kant was not content with this. He went on from this height to the traditional idea of immortality as an infinite persistence of the earthly life of man, and he afterwards sought to justify this postulate by the feeling of validity and the demand of justice beyond the grave. In this he expressed a common mode of feeling and thinking, which plays an important part in the positive religions and their treatment of moral questions. Kant's formulation starts from the idea of the highest good as the identity of virtue and happiness. He means that it is incon-

ceivable that virtue should alone be worthy of happiness, yet not destined to share it. And since this identity is not secured during earthly life, but very disputable, the realisation of the highest good must be sought in the life beyond. It is a fact that this feeling really exists. We would like the good man to be happy ; and it is painful for us to see the wicked man enjoy the good things of earth, perhaps in precise proportion to the unscrupulousness with which he uses means which the moral law forbids others to use. The general feeling is not satisfied with the assurance that, in spite of all his sacrifices, the good man bears real happiness within him, and the other, in spite of all his enjoyments, has only a fallacious happiness. No : the fact is that in the course of earthly life the distribution of happiness and unhappiness proceeds on lines of ethical indifference. Let us not deceive ourselves as to this fact. But when we regard this as unjust, and trust that the injustice will be remedied beyond the grave, is this really a moral or morally justified sentiment ? Is it, especially, so necessary a claim of the moral consciousness that the postulate of immortality may be securely based upon it, as Kant attempted to do ? We may seriously doubt it. A strict rigorism might discard it, and find that virtue and happiness are two things that have, and ought to have, nothing to do with each other. The man who would say this might justly expect the approval of so strong an opponent of Eudæmonism as the founder of the categorical imperative. On the whole, however consoling the argument may be, and however many it may help through the painful riddle of life on earth, it is certainly not proof. Besides all other objections there is in the end the question : Who is going to guarantee that what we think ethically necessary will be realised ? It is quite clear that the broad application of this argument in its popular forms is not free from objection. The idea of justice beyond the grave certainly does much to promote legality, and this element could not very well be spared in the actual condition of social life. But it also contains a danger to pure and

autonomous morality, since it is apt to make a decisive motive of the idea of reward and punishment in the next life. And there is another danger in the frequent use of this type of argument. The more closely the moral precept is, in theological moralising, brought into relation with the appeal to immortality and justice after death, the greater is the likelihood of scepticism arising as to moral conduct itself when the belief in the survival of the soul after death is enfeebled.

The moral proof of immortality is purer in the form in which Goethe, in his eightieth year, formulated the postulate. "My belief in our continuance after death," he said, "arises from my conception of activity. If I work right to the end, nature is bound to provide me with another form of existence if the present can no longer sustain my spirit." Goethe goes on to say that he will have nothing to do with eternal happiness unless it means new tasks and new difficulties to overcome. From this he deduces that immortality depends upon the value of one's activity, and is not given to all. In the same way some of the Stoics claimed that only the wise were immortal. In both cases the idea is based upon a belief in the justice of the world-order.

Thus does the belief in immortality extend from one extreme to the other. On the one hand we have the desire for rest after the unrest of life: on the other hand a desire of unbounded activity: between the two all the desires which in one way or other postulate a continuance of earthly life and a remedy of its defects. In all of them there is something of the Faust-impulse—to experience more than earthly reality can supply. The finite spirit is not content with the narrow circle of space and time in which it finds itself exiled. The spatial limitation of existence might, perhaps, be tolerated, especially if we could continue the familiar experiences of life. But our limitation in time is a more serious matter. Men are not much troubled about the past, and are not afflicted because there were so many things at which they were not present; but it is hard to reflect that we shall not see the future, not see the further

development of those tasks in which our inmost feelings were involved. Hence the Faust-impulse casts itself upon the unbounded future. In a sense the limits of time might be removed, and the limits of space remain; and so imagination, working upon the idea of immortality, has pictured us in the future life wandering from star to star, and has thus got back to the original idea of the transmigration of souls.

We need not speak here about the very definite pictures of the future life which have thus been imagined, but will add a few considerations as to the metaphysical and metapsychical tendencies of these things. In the first respect we have the idea that personalities are amongst the timeless primary constituents of things, and that they do not represent results in the temporal course of the empirical which arise and pass away. In this sense Kant and Schopenhauer speak of the "intelligible character" of man. Later writers speak of primary positions, henads, and so on. We have noticed this question, when dealing with ontic problems, in connection with the antithesis of the singularistic and the pluralistic view of things. Personalistic Pluralism has very often been held in connection with the problems of freedom and responsibility; but we cannot fail to see that it is opposed to Monotheistic metaphysics in a way which cannot be concealed by any ingenuity of argument. Lotze, perhaps, made the best attempt to get over the difficulty by representing that individual personalities may be conceived as merely partial appearances of the primary divine substance, in which case they must share its eternity and indestructibility. Fechner at the same time contended that he found room for the belief in immortality in his Panpsychic philosophy of life; but in this case it is scarcely consistent with Fechner's own theory of psycho-physical parallelism.

In relation to metaphysics the ideas of immortality are connected with the attempts to find a stratified structure in the psychic life, the mortal parts being separable from the immortal. This was done by Plato

with explicit reference to differences of value; by Aristotle rather on theoretical lines. Plato in his later period regarded the psychic activities which are bound up with the body and its needs as the lower and mortal, overshadowing the higher and immortal part to some extent during its life on earth; in which case it is not easy to see in what can have consisted the sin of this pure immortal soul, for which it was condemned to exile in the body. Hence in Plato's *Timæus* the migration of souls looks more like a law of fate than a moral dispensation. In Aristotle the vegetative and the animal soul are put in a position of inferiority to the higher and specifically human soul or reason, the *voûs*; which, as it is supposed to have come from without into the organic world, may also survive as the immortal part. Thus, at all events, Aristotle has been understood by all his scientific commentators. The combination of these theories gave rise to the Neo-Platonist theory, which has persisted, with various modifications of expression, from the time of Plotinus to modern philosophy, and survives in the speech of our time. Besides the psychic life that is bound up with the world of sense, and perishes with it, there is supposed to be a spiritual life which rises into the suprasensuous world. The "soul" is of this world; the "spirit" belongs beyond this world. The one is empirical, the other metaphysical. That is to some extent the language of our own time. These theories, however, are in their assumptions in some measure at variance with the idea of immortality. For what we may call the reason or the spirit, as distinguished from the soul, is altogether impersonal or superpersonal. The commentators on Aristotle were not agreed whether there is question in his theory of personal immortality; and historically those were right who contended the *voûs* is in the Aristotelic system not personal, but merely the generic reason or even the world-reason. Even in Plato there is the same impersonality of the immortal part of the soul, since he at times gives it the same name, reason. These ideas are, up to a certain point, easily harmonised with

modern theories of the general mind. Just as the individual arises from an empirical general mind, in which he constantly shares by the whole of his own activity, so there is in this general mind, as an ultimate and innermost stratum, a province of rational validity, and the individual mind shares also in this. But this share in its actual content and its eternal validity is independent of the extent to which it enters into the system of an historical general mind, and through this into the province of an individual mind. To that extent we have here also a distinction of the mortal and the immortal in the psychic life, and precisely in the thought that we can make this eternal element our own in our empirical psychic activity we find compensation for the mortality of all that merely enters consciousness from the bodily conditions of the life of the individual soul. Any person, however, who consoles himself with this thought, that whatever has the value of eternity lives and works on in our nature and work, must realise that this is not the individual and personal immortality of religious teaching.

The moral proofs of immortality always find their completion in the idea of a moral order of the supra-sensuous world, an *ordo ordinans*, as Fichte called it as a counterpart to *natura naturans*. If man, as a metaphysical being, is to rise to a higher world, this itself must be conceived as a self-contained whole; and if the category of substance is applied to it, it takes the name "God." In Kant's formula the postulate of immortality is completed by the existence of God. The realisation of the highest good is by no means guaranteed by the natural order even in the endless duration of the life beyond. It is only guaranteed if there is a final unity of the natural and moral order in the Deity. In the main this was the chief point in the moral religion of the eighteenth century, in the case of such men as Shaftesbury and Voltaire.

When philosophy thus approaches the problem of the reality of God, we must bear in mind that this con-

ception has an important feature in common with the idea of God in current religion, but is by no means identical with it. The distinction is of importance in connection with all the theoretical proofs which philosophy urges of the existence of God. They hold first of all for the constructive religion which attempts to put conceptual clearness into the traditional ideas of the *mythos*. We must remember that from the earliest period of science philosophers have been accustomed to give the name "God" to the ultimate principle of reality, no matter how they conceived the content of the term. Anaximander of Miletus calls the infinite the divine: Xenophanes calls the one, which for him is identical with the all, *Θεός*. So it goes on as far as Spinoza's *Deus sive natura* and Fichte's God as the moral order of the world. Positive religion will not recognise this use of the terms. It declares that these doctrines are atheism—they deny *its* God. Nor need philosophers be surprised at this, since they see the different religions bringing against each other the charge of atheism, because one conceives the Deity differently from another. Everybody who does not believe as we do is an "unbeliever." Philosophy has, of course, nothing to do with these controversies. But this very ambiguity of the word is fatal to the popular proof of the existence of God *ex consensu gentium*. For what different peoples and ages meant by "God" were very different things. We may disentangle some vague surmise as the common element in all this rich diversity, but we must remember that a vague general belief of this kind need not be a general truth.

The philosophic problem of Deity, which emerges from axiology, is concerned only with our principle of a totality of the suprasensuous world. The ordinary proofs of the existence of God, of which we noticed the theoretical significance in dealing with ontic problems, especially the problem of substance, were divided by Kant into the ontological, cosmological, and teleological or physico-theological. The ontological argument is that which starts from the conception of being.

By being is meant the content of all reality, and there is then no difficulty in proving that it exists. If we call God the *ens realissimum et perfectissimum*, our idea includes reality and wants no proof. But we may ask whether we are compelled to think the *ens realissimum* at all; and, since the drift of Kant's criticism is that reality does not follow from any conception that may be thought, it is not even enough to show that this conception must necessarily be thought. In this respect Kant made the problem all the deeper when he asked for proof, not of the existence of God, but of the necessity of the existence of God. When we rid this idea of its scholastic formulæ, we find ourselves at the extreme limit of human inquiry. We are face to face with the question why anything must exist at all. Why is there not nothing? There is no answer to that question. For, if we are not to move in a vicious circle, this necessity must always be sought in something else, and from that to another, and so on *ad infinitum*. This holds good even if we seek the reason of all being, as Fichte and Weisse did, in the "ought" or in the possible. For we again ask, whence the "ought" or the possibility, and we must seek the reason in some other being. Hence being reveals its necessity by the fact that it is. In this direction lay the "one possible" proof, which Kant, after his criticism of the ontological argument, first himself devised, and then silently abandoned. And in the same direction lay the rehabilitation of the ontological proof which Hegel attempted. It is quite another question whether absolute being can be, in respect of its contents, something different from all special beings. On the strength of the premises of the ontological proof that must be denied, and hence arises its affinity to the Pantheism of the Eleatics, the medieval Realists, Spinoza, and so on. Hence also the intimate relation of this argument and of Pantheism to the original indefiniteness of the religious feeling. With this Pantheistic feature are connected also the superlative predicates which play a great part in the dialectic of this argument: the greatest, most real, best,

most perfect, etc. Whatever is possible in the world of appearance and beyond it must be contained in the principle itself. Even if it only makes its appearance in the sensory world in the course of time, and had, perhaps, never appeared before, it must be timelessly real in the absolute being like all conceivable perfections. Here the suprasensuous is regarded in a thoroughly Spinozistic sense and *sub specie æterni*, and therefore the question discussed in the earliest metaphysical controversies, whether perfection means the beginning or the end, is irrelevant from this point of view. Emanation and evolution relate only to the appearance. The divine world-essence has neither beginning nor end. It is alike beginning and end, the Alpha and the Omega.

The cosmological proof comes a little nearer to ordinary religious thought since it seeks a cause of the innumerable individual things poured out in space and time: a cause that shall be different from them in its nature and its mode of reality. In the Scholastic formulation this argument is helped out by ideas of chance and necessity, or of relative and absolute, conditioned or unconditioned, necessity, of the contingency of the finite and the necessity of the Infinite. In the very complicated dialectical play of these conceptions, which we find most thoroughly drawn out in Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Gottesbeweise*, we see the need of reducing the force of this argument to the ontological, as Kant showed. The cosmological argument in its simpler historical form, as we find it in Aristotle, depends on the category of causality in the same way as the ontological argument depends upon the category of substantiality. It seeks a final link in the chain of causes, the "prime mover," τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν. From this was developed later, partly by introducing into it the element of time, the theory of the transmundane creator of the world, the idea of the Deists. In this causal form the argument is exposed to the well-known objections derived from the theory of knowledge. Causality, in so far as it is a category, is a relation between given empirical elements, and from it arises the need and the right to seek a second

link in connection with one that is given, but only within the sphere of experience. But this does not justify the *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* which would occur if one were to pass in search of the cause from the physical to the metaphysical, from the finite to the infinite, from the contingent to the necessary. It follows, however, that it would be just as illogical to deny this physico-metaphysical causal relation as to affirm it: that is to say, Atheism is no more capable of scientific truth than Deism. But even if we were to ignore these objections and grant a demonstrative force to the cosmological argument, it would give us no knowledge of the nature and content of the cause which we thus inferred from the effect. For the causal relation does not determine anything about the likeness or unlikeness of cause and effect. Hence at the most the cosmological proof merely leads us once more to a quite vague idea of a First Cause, without saying anything as to its nature. It therefore gives us no ground to think of God as a spiritual being, a personality.

If we are to do this, we need to go on to certain elements which will enable us to determine the contents of the cosmic cause. This is supposed to be done by the teleological proof, which is on that account, as Kant pointed out, the most impressive of all, and is the most esteemed by religious people. It infers a spiritual agency from the purposiveness and harmony, the beauty and perfection of the world. From the perfection of the machine it deduces that it originated in the mind of a supreme engineer. Hence this proof finds favour with men of science who wish to reconcile the mechanical trend of scientific investigation with religious belief. The argument from analogy, which is thus made the basis of the metaphysical position of Theism, has a good deal of rhetorical force, but it is not strictly a proof. Indeed, the analogy does not hold altogether when the argument is supposed to lead us to the conception of an all-wise, all-good, and all-powerful Creator. For the human engineer finds his material at hand, and there is thus a limit to his power; whereas the Deity

has to create the material. This distinction was indicated by Kant when he said that the teleological proof leads only (as was the case with the older thinkers) to the conception of a governor and architect of the world. In order to go on to God we have to use also the cosmological (and in the end the ontological) argument. But even with this restriction the teleological argument is open to still further objections. That the purposive can only be due to design cannot be proved; from the properties of the effect nothing can, strictly, be deduced as to the properties of the cause. Hume himself pointed out that it was possible that, on the principles of probability, in an infinite course of time there might arise a constellation of masses which would admit only a minimum of disturbance and therefore persist for a considerable time; and when modern biology purported to be able to give a mechanical explanation of the vital capacity—which, as we previously saw, means purposiveness in them—of organisms, physico-theological speculation received a serious check and found itself in a problematical situation.

An examination of the soundness of its premises is even more menacing to the psychological impressiveness of this argument. Is the world really as purposive, as harmonious, beautiful, and perfect as it ought to be in order to sustain the burden of the teleological argument? Kant took these premises for granted, but others have made a detailed elaboration of them. Astronomical and, especially, biological teleology has figured conspicuously in the literature of the subject. With the petulance which, unfortunately, is always imported into any discussion in regard to religious questions it is said that only bad will can close a man's eyes to the purposiveness and beauty of the world; that it is ungrateful not to search for the author of it. As a matter of fact, no one actually resists this impression, but it is not the only possible impression. Any man who observes reality impartially sees a good deal that is not purposive and not harmonious, a good deal that is ugly and imperfect, in the world. Both, the pur-

positive and purposeless, are found everywhere. There is a good deal of each, and it would be difficult to say which is the more abundant. Religion itself in its highest form, redemptive religion, emphatically asserts that this world, which in its purposiveness bears the stamp of its divine Creator, is nevertheless full of imperfection, misery, and sin. How are we to reconcile this? What is the relation of the divine being who sustains a suprasensuous world of values to a world of sense in which these values, while realised to some extent, are in large part flagrantly denied? What is the relation of what ought to be to what is? Of the world of timelessly valid values to the world of things and temporal events? That is the final problem.

§ 22

Reality and Value.—Subjective and objective Antinomianism—Optimism and pessimism—The problems of theodicy—Physical evil—Moral evil—Dualism of value and unity of the world—The will as the principle of the temporal.

Our inquiry began with the unsatisfactoriness of knowledge: it ends with the unsatisfactoriness of life. The former stimulated the reflective thought which finds itself urged from the unsettled ideas of daily life, through scientific conceptions, to the problems of philosophy; and these have pressed upon us more and more as we passed from questions of knowledge to questions of valuation. All theoretical problems arose from the fact that the assumptions and postulates latent in the forms of knowledge of reality, especially the assumption of the identity of the world with itself, can never be fully realised in the contents given in experience. The whole life of values reveals an unrealised, or even unrealisable, mass of demands that are made, not only of our ideas of the real, but of the reality itself; and these unfulfilled demands concern not only human states and activities, but also the things and situations to which they relate. Indeed, it is of the very essence

of valuation that the norm which guides it is not fulfilled of itself, and not fulfilled always. "Ought" and "is," value and reality, must be different. If norm and reality were identical, there would be an end of valuation, since its alternative character—affirmation or denial—presupposes this difference. There would be no logical appreciation of true and false if there were a natural necessity guiding the mind only to sound conclusions: no ethical appreciation of good and bad if the natural process of motivation fulfilled the moral law in all volition and conduct: no æsthetic appreciation of beautiful and ugly if in every construction of nature and art we had a perfect expression of the significant content; and even all hedonistic appreciation would cease if the whole of life were pleasant or useful. The laws of "ought" and those of "must" cannot be entirely different, yet cannot be identical. Thus from the subjective antinomianism which reveals itself in all philosophic treatment of problems we came to an objective antinomianism, which puts the dualism even in reality, and makes the subjective dualism intelligible by showing that it is only a special case of this. The fact of valuation necessarily implies a dualism of the valuable and valueless in reality.

This subtle truth, which is easily overlooked, may be traced in the meaning of the two attitudes which we find opposing each other under the names of optimism and pessimism. Even optimism does not deny that there is evil in the world. The superlative expression in the name means only that the world is the best of possible worlds. That is its meaning in the scientific form which Leibnitz gave it. It by no means implies that the world is free from evil, but that it is a world in which evil is restricted to the smallest possible proportions. It is the best in the sense that it contains the least evil. Pessimism, on the other hand, has no idea of denying that there is any good in the world. Its most eloquent champion, Schopenhauer, admits that even in this evil world there is much that is purposive, successful, beautiful, and consoling. Hence neither view

calls into question the dualism of value in the real. All that they pretend to prove is the preponderance of one or the other element, and in this they have a good deal of appeal to the emotional reaction of people upon life. There are optimism and pessimism in the sentiments of the individual, or even of whole groups of individuals—peoples and ages—which are urged by temperament or experience in one or the other direction. These are effects of emotional apperception which we quite understand psychologically. If at some time the accumulation of similar experiences leads to one of these definite attitudes, it is generally confirmed and strengthened by selection and assimilation. But the result is a mood or disposition, and moods can neither be proved nor disproved.

Hence we cannot objectively prove any preponderance either of the valuable or the valueless in the world in the sense of optimism and pessimism. It is impossible to estimate or appreciate the proportion with any confidence even within the narrow limits of humanity, to say nothing of the whole realm of life or the entire universe. Moreover, in judging that anything is good or bad we pass beyond the limits of man's faculty of knowledge in the sense that in doing so we must flatter ourselves that we know something about the end of the world. This is particularly true of the lowest and most widespread form of optimism and pessimism, the Hedonist form, which seeks to determine whether pleasure or pain predominates in the totality of reality. In this respect explicit theories are generally pessimistic. In ancient times, as a consequence of the Hedonism which found the end and meaning of life in pleasure, there arose a feeling of despair of attaining this end and a depreciation of life, to which a Hedonist named Hegesias gave expression by preaching suicide. In modern times Schopenhauer chiefly advocated pessimism; his metaphysic of the will and his ethic based upon compassion culminated in his doctrine of the misery of existence. Here were the germs of the scientific pessimism which was afterwards established by Edward von Hartmann.

The very nature of the will, he said, involved a preponderance of pain ; since in every effort there is the pain of the unsatisfied will. This is replaced by pleasure only when the will is fulfilled, but the pain returns and is intensified when it is again disappointed. Hence even if the chances of satisfaction and disappointment were equal, there would be a preponderance of pain, which must in any case precede in the will. This is merely a scientific description of the pessimistic mood itself, and the argument of it may be countered by pointing out that the effort, whether it be successful or no, is a pleasure, a pleasant feeling of life and self-assertion ; though this again is only a description of the optimistic tendency. Thus optimism and pessimism in the Hedonist form are based upon claims which the impulse to happiness makes upon knowledge, and with which knowledge is unable to comply. Even if we could statistically and scientifically prove a predominance of pleasure or pain in the whole scheme of things, it would give us no right whatever to qualify the universe as good or bad. There would always remain the counter-question, whether the world is there for the purpose of producing pleasure : a question that many answer in the affirmative in practice, but that no one has ever answered theoretically. Hedonist optimism and pessimism are therefore moods at which we need not cavil as long as they do not claim the general force of demonstrable theories.

On a higher ethical level we have an optimism and pessimism which see in the fulfilment of the moral law the end and aim of the world and of human life. Here we get a difference due to the theory that man's natural and original disposition was good, and that it has changed and degenerated in the course of his historical development. Those who, with Rousseau, hold that man is naturally good, must consider, when they contemplate the present state of things, that up to the present, at all events, history has led to his degeneration. On the other hand, those who regard man's primitive disposition as bad, as the Egoistic ethic or the theolo-

gical doctrine of original sin or Kant's theory of radical evil does, will have to show that social or religious influences have greatly improved him. These again are antithetic views that are often due to individual disposition or experience, and which are incapable of convincing proof. As regards man's natural endowment, we have already seen that a sharp division of men into good and bad, such as the Stoics claimed, argues a superficial psychology. As a matter of fact the motives of men are so mixed in real life that it is impossible to divide them in this way. As to historical development, our consideration of the philosophy of history has shown us how difficult it is to form scientific ideas about the moral changes of the human race in the past or the future. It is always open to hold that the moral nature of man generally has remained unchanged, or is even unchangeable; and that would be an ethical pessimism that is not confined to Schopenhauer. Again it is possible to combine a pessimistic view of man's original, and even of his present, condition with an optimistic view of his future. Thus Feuerbach and Dühring, in spite of their severe censure of actual moral and social conditions, were not shaken in their belief in the perfectibility of man and the certainty of progress and improvement. The finest combination of optimism and pessimism is in Hartmann, who believes in a development of civilisation which will lead to redemption from the misery of existence by the growth of the intellectual and the ethical life. Leibnitz, he thinks, was right in holding that this world, considered in its entire evolution, is the best of all possible worlds; but Schopenhauer also was right when he said that the world is bad and miserable enough. Hence it was a mistake of the unconscious essence of the world to produce a world at all, and the best possible world is this, in which the mistake will eventually be made good by knowledge and the denial of will, and the Deity may be redeemed by his own world.

In this fantastic way the optimistic and pessimistic moods are built up into philosophical systems. The

only sound element of knowledge in them is the dualism of value in reality. It is the task of philosophy to get beyond optimism and pessimism, and understand this dualism; to overcome it is a problem on which it has expended much fruitless labour. Ancient philosophy took the wrong way to do this under the pressure of the prevailing religious beliefs. It attempted to make the dualism of value equivalent to the theoretical dualism in which all metaphysical consideration ends: the dualism of the spatial and the mental, of body and soul, of matter and spirit. From various motives and in many different ways it contended that the world of sense is the world of the imperfect and bad, as opposed to the good world of the spirit, the suprasensuous world; and that in man the body was the evil, the soul or spirit the good. We have dealt previously with this identification and have pointed out the defects in its theoretical basis. In its effects, however, it goes far beyond scientific thought; in which, indeed, it did not originate, and to which it is by no means confined. Both in theory and practice (from which it sprang) it involved a depreciation of the life of the senses. Man was taught to be ashamed of his own body, of the sensuous-suprasensuous dualism of his nature. For two thousand years this has lain like a disordered dream upon European humanity, and we return slowly, very slowly, to the clear Greek view of life.

Apart from this error and aberration, the fact of the dualism of value in the whole of life remains in undiminished obscurity, and from it sprang the four problems of theodicy which we have considered. The fundamental question, formulated in religious terms, is, Why did God create a world of which evil is a necessary constituent? These problems again present themselves first to the ordinary mind in a Hedonist form. The idea that the creation of the world was due to the wisdom, goodness, and omnipotence of God seems to be sharply contradicted by the dysteleological facts of life on earth: the cruelty of animal life and the worse evils of human life—pain, want, and misery of every sort. This im-

pression is increased when we consider the distribution of happiness and unhappiness, which seems to our sense of value unjust. Even apart from all this, the bare reality of physical evil is a powerful instance against the belief in a divine creation and government of the world. The question of Epicurus, whether God could not or would not keep evil out of the world, or both, has never been satisfactorily answered. The rhetorical arguments which have been used repeatedly since the time of the Stoics and their opponents depend entirely on more or less pronounced anthropomorphisms. When people speak of the educational value of evil, of the unavoidable incidental effects of things good in themselves, of the use of apparently contradictory means for the eventual fulfilment of the divine plan, one can always retort by asking whether a benevolent omnipotence could not have found less painful means for carrying out its designs; and the appeal, made long ago by the Stoics, to the impenetrability of the ways of Providence is supposed to be valid only for the believer, not for the sceptic.

These reflections may suffice to lessen the force of the problem of physical evil for some people, but they do not touch the heart of the question—the reality of moral evil, the quantity of wickedness in the world. It is no use attempting to argue away this as is done with physical evil, by saying, as the Stoics did, that pain is not really an evil, especially for the wise, but is merely considered such by the immature man; or by saying, as the Neo-Platonists did in their metaphysical optimism, that everything real is good and perfect, and that the evil and imperfect is merely a defect of being. Rhetoric of this kind, as that evil is merely the absence of good, is of no value. The religious mind itself can never get over the fact of sin, which is for it the most certain of all facts, and as such is the origin of all the fervour of the craving for redemption. This is the point at which the desire of a unified understanding of the world breaks down before an insoluble problem. The world of values and the world of realities, the provinces

of "ought" and "must," are not foreign to each other. They are in mutual relation everywhere. But they are certainly not the same thing. There is a rent in the fabric of reality. Besides the values which are realised in it there is a dark power of something indifferent to or opposed to value. If we mean by God a single principle in which all that can be experienced has a common being and common origin, we can never understand how it divides into a duality that contradicts itself. Ancient philosophy on that account stopped short at the antithesis of God and matter, or form and matter. At a later date theosophic and theogonic speculations, such as those of Jacob Boehme, tried to do away with this "division" or "otherness"; but they had to be content with obscure figures of speech and assumptions that were little more than aspirations. We cannot get over the contradiction. The dualism is the most certain of all facts, yet Henism is the most solid of all the assumptions of our philosophy of reality. For the dialectic which would try to evade the difficulty the only logical means seemed to be the contradictory disjunction, and the only metaphysical escape the recognition of negativity; and it has therefore, from Proclus to Hegel, attempted the impossible with its thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. But when it thus attempts to show how, in the words of Heraclitus, the one divides itself into two and then returns to itself, it merely succeeds with the dialectical process in defining and describing, but never in understanding and explaining.

From the very nature of the case this final problem is insoluble. It is the sacred mystery, marking the limits of our nature and our knowledge. We must be content to remain there and to recognise that here, at this inmost point of life, our knowledge and understanding can reach no further than the other side of our being, the will. For the will the duality of value of reality is the indispensable condition of its activity. If value and reality were identical, there would be no will and no event. All would remain motionless in a state of eternal completion. The innermost meaning

of time is the inalienable difference between what is and what ought to be; and because this difference, which reveals itself in our will, constitutes the fundamental condition of human life, our knowledge can never get beyond it to a comprehension of its origin. Hence we human beings find a dispassionate joy, not in the unrest of the will, which drags us into the transitory turmoil of the world of appearances, but in the tranquil province of pure thought and contemplation in which the values of eternity are revealed: ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδίστον καὶ ἄριστον.

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Printed in Great Britain by
UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING

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JAN 10 1946

21/-

BD Windelband, Wilhelm, 1848-1915.
23 An introduction to philosophy / by Wilhelm
W52 Windelband ; translated by Joseph McCabe. --
London : Unwin, 1923.
365p. ; 23cm.

Includes index.

1. Philosophy. I. McCabe, Joseph, 1867-1955, tr.
I. Title.

A25804

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